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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Senior Research Staff on International Communism

**AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SRS
THE FIRST "PIATILETKA" (FIVE YEAR PLAN)
JANUARY 20, 1956 - JANUARY 20, 1961**



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SUMMARY

During the early 1950s there was growing concern in CIA and the intelligence community over the extent of coverage being devoted to International Communism considered as a movement. As the result of an investigation conducted in 1954-55 by Mr. Richard Bissell - then Special Assistant for Policy Coordination to DCI - the Senior Research Staff on International Communism was established, beginning its work on 20 January 1956. The Senior Research Staff (SRS) was intended to fill a gap existing between the basic - country by country - research conducted in Department of State (OIR-INR) and the operational research carried out in CIA (DDP/CI/ICD). Its function was described as the speculative study of International Communism and means of countering it. This mission was further characterized as an attempt to view the activities of the Communists "through their own eyes," i. e. a projection into the thought processes and habits of the Communists themselves. By this stipulation SRS was in effect enjoined to apply critical judgment to generically "Western" interpretations of all aspects of the movement. This it has consistently endeavored to do.

The Staff was deliberately kept small - six senior research officers, three research assistants and two administrative and clerical assistants. In order to ensure organizational flexibility and freedom from the constraints of coordination, the Staff was attached to the office of the Deputy Director/Intelligence, with provision for close working relations with the operational elements of the Agency. It was encouraged to cultivate extensive contact with other parts of the Government and with academic institutions, foundations and non-governmental experts in the US and abroad.

SRS activity and production has been of broad scope and variety including major studies with wide distribution, memoranda on special topics, advice and support of opera-

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tional programs, delivery of outside speeches or lectures, and participation in academic meetings and symposia. Individual staff members have attended and helped to organize domestic and international conferences devoted to the study of Communism. They have published articles and reviews and have lectured or conferred in leading universities.

The substance of SRS thought has been consistently informed by its charter injunction to try to see and understand the Communists in their own terms. This has generally led to the attachment of great weight to Marxist-Leninist ideology, conceived not as a sterile doctrine but as the creative interaction of theory and practice, developed - to use Khrushchev's favorite language - by the forces of "history" and of "life itself." This does not mean that SRS views this ideology as objectively "scientific" or "true." Our papers have, however, imputed to it a profound dynamic quality, even though it may be often a purely subjective one. We have tried to persuade our readers that Communism is a "secular religion," impelled by an inner energizing principle which cannot be separated from the dialectical framework of its doctrine and world outlook. We have not of course neglected the other factors which contribute to the power of Communism, especially its genius for organization, nor have we denied the existence of those differences tending toward Marxist-Leninist contradictions, which have, especially in recent years, generated acute perturbation in the movement. We have, however, emphatically warned against the optimistic and even complacent tendency, endemic in the Free World, to view these differences as leading the movement fatally toward disintegration.

Although our coverage has been global, we have concentrated our primary attention on the relation between the two giants of the movement - USSR and Communist China. We have sought through language and area study to develop in ourselves the basis for a joint discipline centered in the Sino-Soviet

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relation. In addition, we have constantly propagated the claims of this discipline throughout the intelligence community and in wider academic circles. One of our staff members was instrumental in organizing the Third International Sovietological Conference in Tokyo, September 1960, which may properly be described as the most important gathering of scholars and experts devoted to this field which has yet been held. Plans have been approved for a fourth such conference in 1962. The seminal influence of SRS "missionary work" in promoting Sino-Soviet studies has been acknowledged by several leading universities.

The thought tissue woven in five years with strands of fact and speculation is described in summary version in this, our intellectual "autobiography." A synoptic view of this thought is presented in the following paragraphs.

Communism, as the overtowering challenge of our age, is the embodiment of an ideology in an organization, both informed by a unique principle of human dynamics, the unremitting pursuit of world revolution. The main source of power in this combination is its rigorous application of dialectical materialism. Much of the frustration which the Free World has experienced in its confrontation with Communists in action springs from its failure to impute credibility to their invocation of the dialectical principle, especially the doctrine of "antagonistic" and "non-antagonistic" contradictions.

International Communism is in fact a movement, a whole which is greater than the sum of its parts. Its interests transcend those of the individual nations, Parties, leaders, cadre and rank-and-file which compose it. Its cohesiveness enables it to withstand crises such as those which shook the movement in 1956 - de-Stalinization, Poland, Hungary - and to restore general stability.

In an effort to resolve the dialectical contradiction between national and international elements in the movement,

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the CPSU has increasingly emphasized the concept of "commonwealth" (sodruzhestvo), a free association of equal, sovereign nations united by bonds of friendship (druzhiba) and mutual assistance. We have pointed out that, although it still lacks concrete organizational form, this concept can be vested with such, and that it contains the potential of a "socialist" or "Communist" antithesis to the United Nations, already ominously signaled by Khrushchev.

In our treatment of the "vanguard" of the movement, the USSR and the CPSU, we have frequently found ourselves holding what seemed to be also a "vanguard" - at times isolated - judgment as to their actual and potential power and threat to the Free World. During the crisis of the Stalin succession, especially in 1956 and 1957, we opposed the prevailing tendency to over-estimate the role of the "collective leadership" or the factional elements - political, technological, military - arrayed against Khrushchev. We have made significant contributions to the evolving appreciation of Khrushchev as a leader in the great tradition of Lenin, Stalin - and Mao. In general we have emphasized the prospect of stability in the Party leadership which can be expected to surmount future crises, including that of succession.

Our judgment of the potential of Soviet power has been more somber than that which has generally prevailed in the Free World. We have not addressed ourselves to the field of military estimation, but we have suggested that in economics and even in science, the prospect of unguessed "sputniks" is as yet imperfectly apprehended.

Our principal object of consideration on the USSR, especially during the past three years, has been the "transition to Communism." Heralded at the XXI CPSU Congress (January 1959), this theme will dominate the XXII Congress

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scheduled for October 1961. Inevitably it becomes the "roof" over all research and speculation on the future of Soviet and world Communism. We are attempting to outline for ourselves a broad program of study on the "transition", and are encouraging others to do likewise.

The key to the "transition" is the simultaneous creation of a "mighty material base" and a "new Communist man." We have pointed out the mounting emphasis on the slogan of "socialist humanism," and the latent contradiction which this concept, coupled with increased emphasis on material benefits and relative affluence for the individual Soviet citizen, appears to be generating in the still impoverished Chinese. We have forecast the application of appropriate sumptuary measures to meet the criticism of the latter, and to provide a sufficiently austere "consciousness" for the prosecution of the "world revolution." We have stressed the seriousness with which the CPSU views its education and indoctrination program for the "new Communist man."

Our work has been less comprehensive on Communist China than on the USSR, but it is now progressing rapidly with the development of a wider linguistic and research base, among ourselves and our consultants. As in our interpretation of Soviet affairs, we have applied the dialectical analysis of "contradictions," of which Mao is the undisputed master. We have sought to differentiate traditional elements, such as Confucianism, and Han imperialism and xenophobia, from the Marxist-Leninist ideology which the CPC claims to be applying to "concrete Chinese conditions." In maintaining the balance between "proletarian internationalism" and "national interest," we believe the Chinese leadership to be firm on the goals of the world revolutionary movement. For this reason, we have maintained a conservative appreciation of the Sino-Soviet controversy, affirming that considerations

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of unity, developed through "comradely criticism" and stubborn bargaining, will prevail over the undeniably bitter issues of dispute. We do not share the optimistic view of those who believe that the two major partners will break over these or any predictable issues, least of all those which the Free World attempts to create or to exacerbate by propaganda or political action.

Our study of the internal development of China has emphasized the particular "style" which Mao, master tactician and strategist of revolution, has imposed upon it. We have pointed out the consistent, if not always predictable, alternation of "right" and "left" tactics, and the importance of Mao's characteristic principle "imbalance-balance-imbalance" in launching such fundamental moves as the establishment of the communes. As in the case of the USSR, our estimate of China's economic and scientific potential is higher than that which generally prevails, and we anticipate that the CPC will eventually enter into "comradely emulation" with the CPSU in the effort to create the archetype of the "new Communist man."

We have made an important contribution to the study of the East European satellites, stressing the theme that these have been and remain satellites. We have shown that the flare-up of "national Communism" in 1956 has been successfully controlled, with the result that the "orthodox," i. e. the international elements in the Communist Parties are firmly in control. We have noted the need for more intensive research on economic developments, and their interaction with popular attitudes toward the regimes.

We hold that Yugoslavia constitutes the only authentic example of "national Communism," and as such must remain anathema to the "world socialist system." Hence we view

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differences between the CPSU and the CPC over the correct attitude to Yugoslavia as evidence of dialectical interaction rather than radical contradiction.

Although we have not treated the Communist Parties of the Free World in detail, we have maintained the proposition that they are all essential tools of International Communism, no one of which, however insignificant, will be sacrificed for tactical expedience. We have emphasized their collective role of authority, as vital elements on the occasion of an ecumenical council of the movement, strikingly displayed at the Moscow Conference of November-December 1960. We have highlighted the tremendous potential of the mass Parties, especially the Indonesian and Italian. We have called especial attention to the leading role in the West of the PCI, whose leader Togliatti is the author of the concept of "polycentrism" which underlies the sodruzhestvo or commonwealth.

We have given close attention to the CPs of the underdeveloped countries, stressing their high potential for subversive action. At the same time we have pointed out that the decision whether to outlaw a given CP raises many questions and problems, not always correctly appreciated by the regime in power. In connection with Latin American Communism, we have surveyed the Chinese Communists' growing interest in the area and speculated on possible competition of Moscow and Peking for influence in the national Parties.

The SRS charter includes, in addition to research and speculation on the nature of International Communism, the responsibility of providing suggestions on means of countering it. We recognized that, since CIA does not have a policy function, it would be inappropriate for SRS to make specific policy recommendations. Nevertheless it seemed both feasible and appropriate to speculate on certain aspects of US

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posture and foreign activity insofar as these would be reflected in the reactions of Communism itself. In other words, our research and speculation automatically had an obverse side which could perhaps be described as an implicit contribution to the policy making process.

We have contributed to several studies of Soviet and Communist vulnerabilities in general. Our central theme has been a cautious and pessimistic one derived immediately from our analysis of the nature of Communism. We have examined a considerable number of the commonly cited vulnerabilities, especially those of the Soviet Union in its relations with Communist China, and have found that in most cases the objective existence of a potential for Western or American exploitation was questionable. SRS has not, however, taken a defeatist attitude toward all attempts at exploitation of vulnerabilities. We have recognized that in certain cases opportunities would arise from the very fact of taking action. Nevertheless, we have strongly urged that careful research was necessary, considering the long-range repercussions of any divisive or provocative action on our part, measured against the contingencies of either success or failure.

In connection with the conduct of political and propaganda action against Communism, we have called attention to the fact that the Communist system itself does not recognize a qualitative distinction between policy and propaganda such as is basic to our system of government. We prepared for the Sprague Committee a paper on the Amalgamation of Policy and Propaganda in the Soviet system, coining (by analogy with "agitprop") a new phrase to describe it, "politprop." "Politprop" represents an integral approach to foreign action in which the general lines of policy are fully meshed with the means and media and themes of propaganda.

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Among general themes for positive action we have stressed the importance of various forms of international activity to develop the economies and polities of backward nations. We called attention to the importance of concentrating greater effort and attention on the UN in a period when we still had a strong political preponderance in that body. We have also suggested that US support for regional organizations could advance stability and thus build barriers against Communism. Some proposals along these lines were embodied in a paper entitled "The Promotion of Constitutional Stability in Afro-Asian Countries: A Weapon in the Battle Against Communism" (November 1957). On a less comprehensive scale we have proposed the desirability of enlightening the intellectual elites in Asian and African countries on the nature of Communist imperialism, suggesting among other means the convening of regional seminars or symposia.

We have felt that the Democratic Socialist movement has a potential which should be exploited in our context with International Communism. Some views on this subject were set forth in a memorandum, "The New International Communist 'United Front' Offensive and the Position of the Socialist Parties" (23 April 1956). As one aspect of working to diminish the power of a major Communist Party, we have consistently urged a positive approach to the Nenni Socialists (PSI) in Italy, where the sharpening polarization of the extreme right and left remains a grave danger not only to that country but to the Western European integration movement.

During the first half of 1958 we noted the danger that Communist propaganda would exploit to our disadvantage the problem of the disposal of nuclear waste. We came to the conclusion that until this problem was solved the West and the US were running a grave risk in propagandizing the advent of the age of nuclear plenty. There is evidence that the Com-

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munists are building a case against US disposal practices which, although they may not be worse than those of the USSR, are likely to create grave alarm when their full significance becomes apparent to public opinion here and abroad. We have also suggested the need for better international coordination of fuel and power planning among the major Western countries in order to face the growing Soviet and Communist entry into world markets, to help deficient areas like India to break out of their inefficient practices, and to meet the complaints of producing states in the Middle East and Latin America.

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AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SRS
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Introduction

By any standard, the five years of SRS's existence constitute an unusual chapter in the history of the Agency. In attempting to summarize them, our task falls into a number of overlapping aspects: clinical report on an organizational experiment, profile of an evolving doctrine, apologia for strongly held and sometimes "offbeat" views, and appeal for greater recognition of these generally pessimistic views. For this reason we venture to title our Five Year Report an autobiography. In essence it is the story of an intellectual endeavor which can be surveyed and evaluated independently of the circumstances under which it has been conducted. Indeed, it is possible to read Sections II and III of this report which deal with our principal themes, in full abstraction from Section I, which provides a background of organization, history, and modus operandi.

SECTION I

Concept and Mission of the Senior Research Staff on International Communism

The Senior Research Staff on International Communism was the outgrowth of a series of discussions and organizational experiments during the period from 1950 to 1954. (These are summarized in Appendix I).

The basic document which grew out of these earlier efforts was the letter of Mr. Richard Bissell, then Special Assistant for Policy Coordination (SA/PC) addressed to DCI, 9 November 1954, entitled "Production of Intelligence on

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International Communism." This memorandum distinguished three types of intelligence production activity on International Communism:

1. "Production of finished intelligence of a level of generality useful to policy makers, organized for the most part in the form of studies of institutions, situations, and developments in particular countries, including most contributions to NIE's and the NIS, etc."
2. "The provision of operational intelligence in support of FI and CE activities and of specific and detailed information on Communist organizations, communication nets and personalities, including much unclassified specific detail useable for propaganda and other PP purposes at home and abroad."
3. "Continuing basic and operational research on, and speculative study of, Communism and the means of countering Communism."

Observing that (1) was performed by OIR in State, and (2) by DDP/CI/ICD, the Bissell study recommended a substantial increase in the slots or funds available to these two existing elements. With respect to the third function, which remained to be created, the Bissell memorandum made certain specific recommendations as to size, range, caliber of personnel, and location within CIA. In general, and with certain modifications such as the assignment to DDI rather than to DDP, these recommendations have been carried out.

The most important part of the Bissell memorandum was the description of the type of activity which the SRS should perform. This has been so fundamental to the approach of SRS that it seems advisable to quote it in its entirety.

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"The work should be carried on by a small group of individuals of high professional competence, chosen or developed as specialists in the practical study of Communism, who would not be burdened with the task of turning out finished intelligence in its more familiar forms. They should be allowed to spend more of their time than is usual in the Government on fundamental research, that is, on thoughtful investigation and analysis which would be expected to yield neither certain nor prompt results in the form of useful intelligence, but their work should, as the foregoing characterization implies, be oriented toward the possibilities for operations and considerations of policy. It may be asked how the activity thus defined differs from "the production of political, social and economic intelligence" on Communism. The answer is that, as a practical matter, existing intelligence production staffs do not do what is here proposed, would not do so even if their work were expanded along the lines of current proposals (e. g. the prospectus for additional sections on Communism in the NIS), and that their organization and activities could not be readily modified to permit them to do so. Basically what would be expected of the individuals engaged in this work would not be more information or even better analysis of Communist developments so much as more penetrating insights into the nature of Communist phenomena, greater perspective in judging their probable evolution and more originality in the consideration of the means of countering Communism. Thus the activities of these individuals would be deliberately extended beyond the limits of the intelligence function. Their function would include that of a 'red team' in war planning, which tries to reproduce the enemy's mind, and that of policy planners who weigh both enemy capabilities and those of their own side, in judging possible courses of action. What would really differentiate the function from those normally performed in the intelligence community would be

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the concentration of a combination of certain intelligence, evaluation, and planning responsibilities with respect to the broad but by no means all-embracing subject matter characterized above, in the hands of a single small group of people."

The Bissell recommendations were acted upon as follows:

1. A substantial increase in slots for DDP/CI/ICD;
- 25X1A1a 2. A subsidy of [redacted] a year to OIR for recruitment of Communist experts in support of various country desks; and
3. A draft notice to the IAC (IAC/D/99) announcing the intention to create a Senior Research Staff on International Communism (August 1955). The IAC took due notice of this document and the initial membership of the staff was recruited in the fall of 1955. Obtaining space in the office building assigned to ORR/FM, SRS was officially launched on 20 January 1956.

25X1A9a 25X1A9a 25X1A9a [redacted] was designated Chief; [redacted]

25X1A9a [redacted] Deputy Chief; and the other senior members were [redacted]. By the middle of 1956 [redacted]; and

[redacted] had been recruited; [redacted] 25X1A9a had returned to DDP, and [redacted] was transferred 25X1A9a

25X1A9a [redacted] from OCI. Gradually three research assistants were recruited. The functions of the Administrative Assistant, [redacted] who has been with SRS from the beginning, were supported by a GS-5 clerical slot through which three individuals have been rotated. [redacted] left SRS and 25X1A9a the Agency in August 1958, and was replaced as Deputy Chief by [redacted] 25X1A9a

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Personnel

As must be expected on the creation of a new and unorthodox element in the Agency hierarchy, there was little enthusiasm on the part of existing elements to provide personnel. In effect there was barely sufficient choice to fill out the available T/O. In spite, however, of this lack of a broad panel to choose from, the Staff was singularly fortunate in finding that all those who were available were eminently suited to the work.

In 1958 the T/O was stabilized at the eleven slots occupied by present members of the Staff. In general there has been a high degree of continuity with small turnover, a factor which has contributed to the consistency of the SRS viewpoint in the production described below. This in turn has been an important factor in maintaining esprit de corps. A high degree of dedication to the work and loyalty to the Staff as an entity have been characteristic throughout. One of the strongest points of SRS personnel, which has been cultivated continuously during these five years, has been knowledge of languages. With respect to Far Eastern and European languages SRS is possibly unique among substantive elements of comparable size and function in the Agency. As a result it has been able to utilize a large number of books, journals, and newspapers from key areas of International Communism in the original.

Furthermore, SRS has continually emphasized both internally and to outside elements the high priority to be attached to language study. This has been particularly true with respect to Chinese and Russian. In May 1959 the Chief of the Staff delivered a speech to the graduating group of the Russian Research Center at Columbia on the importance of cultivating Chinese in addition to the Russian discipline. In June of the same year, [REDACTED] attending an interna-

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tional conference at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, on the subject of Sino-Soviet training, defended the same line of approach. There is reason to believe that this missionary work of the Staff - subsequently extended to most universities having area centers in these fields - has made an important contribution toward the creation of a sound and growing corps of Sino-Soviet specialists.

General Activities of the Staff

After some exchange of views with other Agency elements, especially CI/ICD, a charter for SRS was established in mid-1956. The text of the charter itself is, however, of less importance than the spirit in which it has been carried out. Because of the obvious possibility of overlap on one hand with DDI elements, especially ONE, and on the other hand with DDP elements, especially CI/ICD, there was an initial period - perhaps as much as two years - in which the scope and indeed the jurisdiction of SRS remained in flux. The firm consolidation of the jurisdictional and substantive scope of the staff may be said to have been achieved in mid-1958, at which time the Inspector General's office conducted a thoroughgoing review. Despite certain lingering reservations as to the appropriateness of the SRS function in CIA, and suggestions that it might better be performed in an academic rather than a government environment, it was decided that the experimental stage had been successful and that SRS should be regarded as a permanent and useful feature of the Agency.

Before discussing the heart of SRS's activities, namely its substantive production, it should be pointed out that the Staff from its inception was called upon to carry out extensive liaison and contact work. This had been clearly specified by the original Bissell instructions. Within the Agency itself SRS speedily assumed a certain bridgelike role

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between DDI, to which it was attached, and DDP, a primary customer. Previous association of several SRS members with DDP facilitated this and helped to bring about other types of fruitful contact bearing on Communist operations.

Outside the Agency an extensive network of formal and informal relations was developed, in the first instance with OIR (later INR) Department of State, and IRI/USIA. Gradually extending these relationships, SRS has become well known to elements of the Department of Defense, and the individual military services; to USIA, the NSC Staff, etc. It has maintained contact with the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department.

The original Bissell concept of a Senior Research and Planning Staff was later modified and the planning function dropped from its title and charter. Direct and frequent contact with the NSC, with the right to submit substantive memoranda to it, which Mr. Bissell had originally recommended, was tacitly dropped, in view of the fact that a natural channel existed through the DDI.

Academic Liaison

Perhaps one of the principal foresights of the Bissell memorandum was that a major function of the new Staff would lie in developing close intellectual relations with the academic world. This, in fact, has been a major activity conducted in one form or another by all of the senior personnel. It takes many forms, not always immediately associated with the primary SRS mission. In general, SRS members make a practice of attending important national and international scholarly conferences bearing on Communism, and in one major instance, have played a key role in organizing such a gathering.

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
As a result of this systematic approach, SRS, its personnel and its views are well known in such academic institutions as the Harvard, Columbia and Indiana Russian Research Institutes, the RAND Corporation, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Center of International Studies (Cambridge, Massachusetts), etc. This type of activity has been coordinated with the External Research Division, State Department, which in turn has provided valuable substantive assistance and administrative support in the form of "light State cover" for foreign travel.

Steps have been taken to achieve bona fide standing in the academic world by the publication of articles and reviews, by consultant work and briefing of foundations and universities. (See Appendix III.) As a result of this planned and methodical activity it can be said that SRS personnel are widely known and accepted as equals by American and foreign scholars and our key ideas have exerted an important seminal influence. On a more limited scale, SRS has attempted to stimulate cross-fertilization between government and scholars through the mechanism of symposia (small dinners held at the Cosmos Club) to which distinguished research authorities have been invited, along with representatives of other components of the Agency and government.

Consultants


Because of its broad scope, it has been impossible for such a small Staff to conduct all necessary research on its own resources. Accordingly, an effort has been made to recruit competent consultants. At present the Staff has the following:

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All of these individuals work together informally and have brought to SRS a widely diversified expertise on many aspects of the Communist bloc.

Approach

During the period of the initial recruitment of the Staff, numerous discussions were held as to the proper approach. In amplification of the generalized description from Mr. Bissell's Memorandum quoted above, we were told that in a certain sense we were to function as a "conscience" of the Director and the intelligence community in matters of International Communism. Without construing this as a directive, we have found it a stimulating and at the same time a sobering consideration. It appeared that almost by definition the SRS was elected to state certain uncomfortable and even unpopular propositions. As the five years have unrolled, we have frequently felt ourselves to be in a position less assured than that of the inspired voice of conscience. We have found ourselves regarded by others as a Cassandra, a Geist der stets verneint, a gadfly, an enfant terrible, and even a bete noir. We have found it possible to live with all of these slightly disagreeable imputations and even on occasion to relish them, rationalizing our situation in a paraphrase of Voltaire, as that of an entity which, since it did not previously exist, "had to be invented." It is true that at times the curse of Cassandra - that prophesies though

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true should go unheeded - has been onerous. But the satisfaction of being vindicated by events has occurred with sufficient frequency to provide confidence in our ability to yield a steady current of clairvoyance.

It has sometimes been suggested, even by friends and well-wishers, that SRS, in its effort to induce a state of empathy with Communism, has fallen into a certain professional and possibly even personal deformation of outlook. Our consistent pessimism, our muted Jeremiads, scoring a complacency which so often appeared to have been the besetting sin of the West in its affluent days, has not in our belief been an artificially self-induced defeatism. Rather it has seemed to us to correspond with the "spirit of the times", a voice which, during the past five years, has become steadily more articulate and dramatically in consonance with the world around us. On the not infrequent occasions when we have been invited to present our views to outside groups, the frank assumption of a pessimistic standpoint has generally been greeted with unmistakable appreciation. It is our profound hope that the necessity for such persistently somber views will abate as our second five years unfold. To put it bluntly, SRS does not enjoy proclaiming trouble, but it "can do no other."

The Policy of the Communist World and the Task of SRS

From the outset, it was determined that SRS should not focus its attention on individual countries outside the orbit, nor concentrate on minute, day-to-day tactical movements of the Communists. The first was to be done by State, the second by ICD. SRS was to observe Communism on a global scale and, within the Orbit, to focus its attention on the fountainheads of Communism, first in Moscow and second in Peking. Close attention was also to be given to the satellites as components of the "world socialist system."

In the judgment of SRS this approach highlighted the distinction between traditional political research and

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analysis and that dedicated to the exploration of world Communism as an all pervasive essence. In order to recognize the policy motivation and strategy and tactics of the movement, not to mention its basic objectives, knowledge of Communism as an organic whole comes first. Without it, a sound appreciation of intentions and capabilities is next to impossible. Since the policies of the movement are based upon Marxist-Leninist concepts of life and matter, since they are, in effect, not so much national as International Communist policies, SRS regards the exploration of the motivation of these policies as its primary task. It has therefore studied the application of Marxism-Leninism in both the USSR and Red China, as well as the relations between these two, with particular attention.

Modus Operandi

Because of certain unique elements in its charter, especially its mission of viewing the actions of Communists through their own eyes, its freedom from responsibility for coordination, its placement at a high level outside the jurisdiction of any specialized office, and above all the character of its personnel, SRS has consistently sought to function on the basis of a harmonious mixture of discipline and informality. Each member is highly individualized, yet, aware of the impelling need for cooperation, each has elaborated his own approach to that part of the field which was assigned to him. Having only a handful of individuals to cope with a protean global phenomenon, it was necessary for us to establish broad areas of geographic and functional competence. In some cases these conformed naturally to the professional or linguistic background of the individual. In others specialization was taken on as an arbitrary assignment to which he must train himself. The degree of mastery achieved, for example in dealing with the satellites or the underdeveloped regions, inevitably falls short of that which could be

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achieved by a lifetime of limited professional specialization. On the other hand, it has proved feasible to develop a degree of competence which has made discourse with such specialists possible on an equal intellectual plane.

The Staff has, generally speaking, worked on what may be called the total intelligence "take." We have received for all areas and aspects of International Communism essentially everything which would go to a specialist's desk, wherever located. The volume of this material inevitably has been large, and has required a rigorous screening. The research assistants have learned to eliminate items containing only minor factual information, such as would be filed, say, by a State Department country desk, but at the same time to build up substantial files of our own from which all the significant elements of International Communist activity within a given area could be thoroughly studied. Both by charter and by sheer necessity, we have winnowed out the mass of detail - personnel of minor sections of national CPs, routine travel of functionaries - while retaining key documents, speeches, organizational tables, and other necessary information on all countries.

The daily reading load of each member has been large, perhaps occupying as much as a third to a half of his time. In addition to this, efforts have been made to keep up with the most important journalistic comment and with active scholarship, learned journals, new books, reports on conferences, etc. No member of the Staff would feel that he has been able to do full justice to this abundant flow of ephemeral, medium range, and fundamental documentation and literature which has confronted him.

The problem has been how to combine what may be called working level familiarity with detail in many fields and broad perspective on the inter-relationships of the move-

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ment as a whole. This has been an exacting discipline which none of us would claim had reached its fulfillment. And yet in the process, a certain degree of mastery has been achieved.

Perhaps the most valuable aspect of the SRS approach and method has been its internal cross-fertilization. Because of its smallness and its freedom from deadlines and pressure of coordination, the Staff has been able to achieve a high degree of versatility. Each member is to some extent a cell functioning separately, to some extent an autonomous center of activity, existing as part of an organic whole. This "holistic" nature, which was developed in part spontaneously and in part as a result of plan, seems admirably suited to the task of dealing with International Communism, itself an organism which is something more than the sum of its myriad parts.

In organizing our thought and writing our papers we have sought to maintain both individuality and collectivity. There is an "SRS point of view." It is not a doctrine or a monolith, however, nor even an ideology. There have been active internal controversies between individuals and points of view. On some of the most fundamental problems of analysis and interpretation, notably the classic controversy over the national and international elements of world Communism, there is no absolute SRS consensus. Over months and years of internal debate and discussion, however, a sort of SRS "dialectic" has been evolved, our own version of these "contradictions" which Communists universally recognize and proclaim as a source of strength to their movement. In our own microcosmic effort to reproduce the Communist macrocosm, we have gradually learned how to "handle" these contradictions.

Production

The production of SRS falls into three main categories:

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a. Major studies, reproduced in a numbered SRS series (Appendix IV) and distributed rather widely in the intelligence community and in other government offices dealing with foreign affairs and national security. Most of the SRS series have been given supplemental distribution through DDP and OO/C to field stations, where they are sometimes used for liaison and contact purposes; on occasion a separate unclassified version has been prepared for unattributed use.

b. Substantial memoranda for more limited distribution; these may be in response to particular requests, e. g. in connection with a speech of the Director or one of his deputies, an operational requirement from a Division of DDP, or a request from other government elements such as the former OCB or the Sprague Committee. Others have been self-generated, often serving as a prelude to a more intensive study in the SRS numbered series. (Appendix V).

c. Ad hoc memoranda on a great variety of subjects. (The more important of these are included in Appendix V).

d. Comments on papers and answering questions of various government offices on problems of Communism.

One might add a substantial category of purely internal documents, ranging from casual comments to detailed discussion among staff members, frequently involving controversy.

In general it has been the policy of this Staff to aim at the lowest possible classification for all its output.

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SECTION II

The International Communist Movement

In attempting to review the varied activity of the Staff during the past five years, one is confronted inevitably with a difficult problem of selection and highlighting. In a closely knit group such as ours, intellectual activity takes many forms, ranging from the published works and memoranda cited in the attachments, to an endless stream of notes and marginal comments on the thousands of documents which flow among us. Even the underlinings may take on significance in an emergent pattern of ideas. It would be literally impossible to recapture the myriad stages through which the structure of our thought has grown. It has seemed better, therefore, to attempt an act of complete detachment, seeking to see the woods rather than the trees.

What then has been the contribution of the Senior Research Staff? Reverting to the two principal injunctions laid down by Mr. Bissell, the contribution seems to lie in the extensive use of speculation and the application of that faculty to the task of penetrating the Communist mind. If we were to seek to crystalize this in a single formula, we might say that SRS has succeeded in achieving a "voluntary suspension of disbelief" in the reality of Communist dialectical processes. We have sought to achieve a certain empathy with the men and the institutions who make up that world movement which is dedicated to our destruction. This effort has called for imagination and objectivity. The conclusions we have drawn may be said to be at once both intuitive and scientific.

The lessons which we feel have been learned from them are neither reassuring nor terrifying. Rather, they add up to a challenge which in our judgment has been imperfectly apprehended and inadequately faced in the Free World. Inevitably, as intelligence officers, students, and citizens, we have often experienced during these past five years a pro-

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found sense of frustration. Not, of course, that we have been alone in our grave concern. With the growing body of Americans who have come to recognize the ineluctability of the Communist challenge, we have watched the slow growth of hope and confidence that it can be met.¹

In the following summary we have selected the broad themes which have governed our research and speculation and have sought within each to isolate the specific element which has been unearthed by the application of the approach "through Communist eyes." Presenting a synthetic rather than an analytical picture, we have attempted to tie each specific element to something we have written. It has not seemed practical or useful, however, to make specific reference to the numerous papers and memoranda listed in Appendices IV-VI. In the great majority of cases, these have been given circulation ranging from one addressee to hundreds on general distribution. In a few cases the theme or idea has remained within the staff, either because its dissemination was deemed inexpedient or inappropriate, or because it had not been fully elaborated. In a number of key instances such themes may be regarded as unfinished business of SRS, high on the priority agenda for the second "Piatiletka." We may hope that the act of broaching such themes here may constitute a step toward future elaboration. By way of highlighting this continuity of past and future we have subdivided our subject matter in broad rubrics, stated in the form of propositions. In the discussion of each, we attempt to do justice to the shadings of interpretation which such propositions require.

¹SRS writings have on occasion been criticized as being too "intellectual." It has been suggested that the discourse is either too abstruse or too scholarly for the "busy policy makers" to grasp. We have been reluctant to accept this view of our leadership, holding to the belief that all persons actively concerned with Communism must, and can devote their full resources of thought to it, and that these, within the Agency and Government, are generally of a high order.

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SECTION II

A. The Nature of Communism

1. Communism is the overtowering challenge of our age.

SRS has done little else but read, analyze, speculate, and theorize on the nature of Communism. We have produced no systematic, comprehensive study of it as a "thing in itself." We have taken it on the one hand as a datum; on the other hand, as an unknown quantity: unknown to us, as to most Western students, because only a person who has actually been a Communist can credibly claim that he fully knows what it is. We have carefully examined the psychological and sociological analyses which others have made. We have abstracted from these and from our own studies the conviction that Communism is a "secular religion" engendering in many individuals a type of personality whose motive springs of action, whose outlook on the world and history, and whose very perceptions of reality are other than ours. We have sought to measure its intensity of fanaticism, its dynamic of confidence, dedication, and indeed its messianic zeal. At the same time we have noted the "human, all too human" weaknesses in the prophets, leaders, and would-be supermen of the Marxist-Leninist cult. From it we draw a certain parallel with the history of the great churches, the inspirational force of the doctrine, the abiding sense of destiny and mission, and the conclusion that the institution transcends the individuals - even the greatest - who compose it.

2. Ideology is the motive force of Communism.

We have undertaken to understand and appraise the ideology of Communism, pointing out that its force within the movement is too little appreciated by those who are outside. It has been gratifying to note the gradual dilution of that strong current of Free World skepticism which sees in

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Communism one and only one spring of action, the naked drive for power. We of course have never minimized this spring, but we have held it to be only one aspect of a complex. Moreover, in company with a small group of scholars, we have pointed out that ideology is not mere dogma, but is a compound of theory and practice. To use the language which Khrushchev never tires of repeating, it is "life itself." Thus seen, ideology stretches from the top to the bottom of Communism, from generality to particular, from strategy to tactics, from goals to methods.

3. The key to the understanding of Communist ideology lies in the application of dialectics.

Within the sprawling, luxuriant growth of Communist ideology - sometimes jungle, sometimes thicket, and rarely a verdant plain - we have devoted our closest scrutiny to the field of dialectics. This tough and repellent doctrine in our judgment has been systematically neglected - not of course by scholars - by men whose task is to evaluate Communist courses of action and intentions. It is here that a deliberate effort is required if one is to penetrate the thinking and action processes of Communism.¹

It is easy to demonstrate that the theory of dialectics as elaborated by Marxists is logically incoherent, derivative in nature, and generally absurd. Nevertheless, having accomplished all this, the student of Communism is left face to face with the reality of a world conquering

¹ In the course of its efforts to propagate the habit of viewing International Communism dialectically, SRS has encountered considerable resistance. In the midst of a serious group effort to interpret the Sino-Soviet controversy and its culmination in November-December 1960, SRS was urged "not to mention 'dialectics' again." This struck us somewhat as though a member of the NSC Planning Board had said "I don't want to hear the name 'Khrushchev' again."

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principle. How is one to isolate the living element in dialectics? It has seemed to us that a partial key is found in the theory of contradictions. Mao, and before him, Lenin and Stalin have developed the doctrine of contradictions, the so-called unity of opposites, which is expressed in the classic triad - thesis-antithesis-synthesis. It has been our contention that this is neither a sterile abstraction nor a childish game. Rather, it emerges as a powerful, vitalistic logic which sees in the never-ending clash of opposing elements of man and society an impelling principle of progress. We have concentrated on this theme particularly since the beginning of 1957, and have produced a running fire of commentary and illustration ever since.

4. Organization is the key to the power of Communist ideology in action.

In addition to being a faith, an ideology, and a method, Communism is of course above all an organization. Here there has been considerable spade work for SRS to do. Although the scholarly works on Communist Party organization are numerous, there has been a persistent need to reaffirm the reality of its pervading power, and above all its capacity for self-purging and renewal. There is a perennial wishful theme in Free World thought - the theme of erosion, the "mellowing of despotism," the "erosion of revolutionary fervor" and other quasi-sloganistic reassurances which we administer to ourselves from time to time. The SRS chronicle displays a running obligato of dissent to this dominant theme. We, of course, no more than other historically minded students deny the theoretical and practical possibility that Communism will change its nature or decline as a result of its own inner contradictions. It too may prove another of those waves of turmoil which reach an alarming height on the beach of history and then recede. But we hold that its high tide is as yet unreached, and the ebbs which we

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note from time to time are, in Communist parlance, "re-treats for further advance." As in the case of spiritual religions which have shown immense energy for conquest, notably Islam, Communism combines the motive forces of individual impulse with a supra-personal dynamic. The genius of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao is merely the acme of those forces of organization which convert the mission of the isolated Messiah into an ecclesia militans. Even the "pragmatic" Khrushchev, in his tough Russo-Ukrainian peasant soul, seems aware that he as an individual is nothing - the movement is everything.

B. The Nature of the International Communist Movement.

1. International Communism as a movement transcends the interests of its individual national components.

Having satisfied ourselves - if not all of our associates - that the ideology and the organization are vital components of Communism, we have found ourselves challenged by the question whether the international movement is also a primary reality. This too is a classic question among sovietologists; it usually has taken the form of the debate between those who stress the purely national interests of the Soviet Union, and those who believe that there exists an entity with transcending interests. Not only is the debate perennial; it is seemingly irreducible. The recent climax of development within the movement which culminated in the Moscow Statement of December 1960 has, if anything, hardened the controversial positions among Western scholars.

We have even found it necessary to "bloom and contend" on this subject in our own midst. There is no SRS unanimity on the proposition that the goals and interests of

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the movement transcend those of its constituent members. This may seem somewhat ironical, in view of the very title and function of the Staff - Research on International Communism.

During its five-year study of the International Communist movement as a whole, SRS has developed three major themes. Analyzing the profound crises which shook the movement in 1956 - de-Stalinization, Poland, Hungary - SRS predicted at the time - contrary to the prevailing view - that these would not destroy nor even set back the movement. Countering the widespread and almost exultant expressions of confidence that Communism had been mortally wounded, SRS predicted in 1957 the eventual success of the already visible effort of stabilization. The second major theme has been the emergence of the movement from the turmoil of the 1956 crises and the ensuing stabilization process into the development of the concept of the "socialist commonwealth." Finally, in an effort to provide a rational description of the recurrent cycle of crisis and stabilization which could be projected against future developments, SRS began in 1957 - as noted above - the elaboration of the theory of dialectical contradictions as the key to an understanding of relations between the components of the "world socialist system," and, particularly, between the USSR and Red China.

2. The relationship between the USSR and the movement as a whole is dialectical.

Leninism prescribes a balance between the doctrine of nationalities and proletarian internationalism. This is expressed in the classic formula: the respective components of the USSR - and by extension, of world Communism - are states which are "nationalist in form, socialist in content." It is well known that in the case of the Soviet Union, the "multinational state" par excellence, there have been per-

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sistent and as yet imperfectly resolved "contradictions" among the dominant Great Russian element, the secondary Slavic nationalities, and the numerous non-Slavic minorities. The contradictions at times have approached "antagonistic" proportions. The end is not yet in sight, although presumably a "melting pot" type of amalgamation will gradually prevail.

On the broader Bloc and world scale, SRS has contended that the historic evolution of Communism was impelling the movement toward the global application of the Leninist formula. We believe that this was expressed sincerely and authoritatively by Khrushchev in his speech at Leipzig, March 1958, in which he said that national frontiers will eventually be absorbed in world Communism. We do not, of course, predict that this will be an uneventful, uniform, least of all an inexorable process. In any case it will be subject to ebbs and flows as yet far from predictable.

In the last analysis the forecast for the national-internationalist dialectic rests on an intuitive judgment. We have never affirmed that our interpretation is logically demonstrable. We have, however, systematically opposed the general view that 19th century types of nationalism, projected in varying forms into the present era, have remained immutable forces. Even in the Free World these forms show signs of fundamental modification, especially in Western Europe.

The essential point for research and speculation seems to lie in the question whether the so-called "messianic imperialism" drive of Czarist Russia is being converted into a movement transcending the cultural life and the material interests of the Moscow centered nucleus. How will this now mighty surge of the "Rus" empire emerge after its interaction with the Phoenix-like revival and trans-

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formation under Marxism of a decadent oriental xenophobic empire which once prided itself on being the Middle Kingdom of the world? Will Han, clashing with "Great Russian chauvinism" prove the validity of the thesis that nationalism is the ultimate and centrifugal driving force of Communism?

3. The concept which is being evolved for the future resolution of this dialectic is that of sodruzhestvo (commonwealth).

In an effort to penetrate deeper into this complex of forces and to understand the rationale of what Communists now call the "world socialist system," SRS has devoted an intensive study to the concept of a "commonwealth of Socialist nations."¹ In this study we demonstrated that the term sodruzhestvo - since 1955 - has played a mounting role in Communist statements on the relationship among socialist countries.²

¹ SRS-10 - "The 'Socialist Commonwealth of Nations': Pattern for Communist World Organization." The SRS study on sodruzhestvo is our only major work which has been published - in a sanitized version - outside the government

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² This analysis has been received with attention and respect among experts throughout the world and has influenced the conceptual approach of several recent scholarly studies on the organization of the Communist Bloc. It has not so far received the attention which it deserves in the intelligence community.

² Originally translated as "commonwealth" in official English language Soviet texts, the term has recently been somewhat blurred by such renderings as "community" or "comity" of socialist nations. This shift may be in part a reaction to Chinese sensibilities; at any rate, the Chinese rendering of sodruzhestvo as the "big family" of socialist nations is also frequently adopted in Soviet pronouncements.

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4. The sodruzhestvo concept is pregnant with organizational form.

The significance of the sodruzhestvo as a matrix for future organizational developments, not only within the socialist "camp" or "bloc" but in the vast underdeveloped areas in which Communism is making such powerful strides, must not be overlooked. It offers a rationale or at least a slogan for free and flexible association among equal sovereign states, within which an impetus toward socialism and ultimately Communism would be established. It also provides a theoretical organizational concept which can be set up as a counter to the existing UN, a dialectical opposite which under certain circumstances the Communists might indeed choose to bring to reality. The recent threats of Khrushchev against the UN have brought home to the West the all too distinct possibility that a "socialist commonwealth" might indeed emerge.

The analysis of this concept has become especially timely in connection with the recent Moscow meeting and Statement. This point will be discussed later under the heading of Sino-Soviet relations. It is sufficient here to suggest that the Moscow conclave was an unprecedented manifestation of the sodruzhestvo in action. The two mightiest parties and nations of the world socialist system locked in serious contradictions have criticized each other and "self-criticized" themselves before an assemblage of some 80 at least theoretically equal parties. The fact that the two are richer in "equality" than all the others did not diminish the impact of this demonstration that in world Communism the "whole is greater than the sum of its parts."

Conclusion

SRS over the past five years has thus satisfied itself that the initial premise on which it was founded is correct. There is an International Communist movement which, within

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a shifting dialectical pattern, is advancing beyond the era of the national state. It has suffered even within the five years of our existence a major crisis which it successfully stabilized. It has passed through a second dialectical phase - the resolution - on the surface at least - of a number of profound contradictions between its two senior members. It professes to face the future, not in the illusion that crises and contradictions are forever overcome but with a high degree of confidence, resulting from the Moscow demonstration, that the dialectic does work. In the eyes of Communists - and we repeat that our effort has been to see through their eyes - the resultant of all the divergent pulls and thrusts of these turbulent years appears to have been a unilinear advance. We shall later examine the resultant of the forces of the Free World which are seeking to contain this progress.

C. USSR

1. Since the death of Stalin, and particularly since 1957, the leadership problem has been resolved on the basis of a dialectical balance between collectivity and one-man rule.

This problem first became acute in 1956 before the final emergence of Khrushchev as the undisputed head of the Soviet State and the CPSU. It will be recalled that at that time there was a strong tendency to view the party's professions of collective leadership as authentic. Even as late as the spring of 1957 one of the most influential Soviet experts of the US government expressed the view that Khrushchev would not be able to exploit his position as First Secretary of the Party to create a political machine which would enable him to achieve top personal power. It was only a matter of months before this view was disproved by the ouster of Malenkov and the Anti-Party group. As early as mid-1956 SRS had questioned the immutability of the collective leadership principle and had recommended caution in attempting to apply historical analogies - the

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Venetian Doges - to the Soviet situation.¹

SRS's subsequent views on the relationship between collectivity and one-man rule have evolved with the course of events and the analysis of Khrushchev's actions. At present we still accord a major role to consensus and community of purpose among the CPSU leaders while laying emphasis on the very real personal leadership which Khrushchev is able to exercise.

2. There is no visible focus for any effort to overthrow the party's control. The science - or pseudo-science - of Kremlinology has continued to flourish, especially among journalistic "experts." SRS, while recognizing the occasional value of this type of speculation, especially when anchored in meticulous "indications analysis," has generally been skeptical of the existence of any factions or power groupings within the Soviet leadership which could effectively challenge the control of the Party. In September 1957 we warned against overestimating the possibility of a take-over by the military; the purge of Zhukov in October 1957 underlined this point. We have also generally opposed the attribution of special significance to the other non-Party hierarchies, especially the so-called technological or managerial elite which has sometimes been portrayed as in sharp contradiction to the dominant Party hierarchy. We have pointed out that the few scholarly analyses made in this field have demonstrated the absolute precedence of the Party, maintained by personnel rotation between it and the economic, military, scientific, and

25X1A9a¹ Probably the only expert who actually called the turn in 1957 was [REDACTED] whose "indications analysis" clearly forecast as early as March 1957 the outcome of the Malenkov-Khrushchev struggle. Unfortunately, [REDACTED] findings were held up until June and did not achieve the credit for correct prediction which they deserved.

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cultural hierarchies. We have persistently refused to be impressed by the perennial speculations on the existence of a rival Suslov power position.

3. Khrushchev as a man and a leader has been generally strong.

SRS has been struck by the need for a thorough psychological and political study of Khrushchev and has urged that such a project be undertaken. The efforts in this field so far have done little more than scratch the surface. We have attempted our own summary characterization of Khrushchev, emphasizing the complexity, vitality, and power of the man. We have also discussed his "style of leadership," bringing out the protean qualities derived from his background and environment as a Russo-Ukrainian peasant and proletarian, and from his discipline in Marxist-Leninist ideology and in the stern crucible of war and Stalinist terror.¹

On the ideological side we have been exploring Khrushchev's position and status in relation to Mao,² the creativity of the latter being at present in question. In general, we have expressed a high appreciation of Khrushchev's native intelligence and even of his intellectual qualities and have been opposed to overweighting the widely current "pragmatist" tag.

¹ We have circulated an unclassified paper by one of our consultants on the role of khamstvo or "boorishness" in Khrushchev as a formidable political weapon and a factor in determining the aggressiveness of Communism.

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² Current investigation by [redacted] of OCI, now working [redacted] casts doubt on Mao's originality and suggests that claims for his initiative in ideology - on contradictions - are based on fraudulent dating of his two chief contributions "On Practice," and "On Contradictions."

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4. Internally the Soviet regime has been stable throughout the period since mid-1957 and will probably remain so.

It is generally agreed that the most important factor in promoting stability has been Khrushchev's modification of Stalin's coercive methods and his substitution of a more relaxed and beneficial policy toward the Soviet people. Although the coercive apparatus is still maintained on a substantial scale, its application of "terror" and the visible activities of the informant system have been reduced considerably. We have been devoting our attention to the application of the new psychological principle of "positive reinforcement" - as opposed to terror - which is designed to create a "climate" contributing to the development of loyalty and even enthusiasm for the "system." We have pointed out that Khrushchev himself has sought by a wide variety of means to achieve popularity, exploiting his natural traits to create the image of a man of the people who at the same time embodies the universality and comprehensive wisdom that had been attributed to Stalin.

The dynamic of Soviet successes coupled with the sentiment of "Soviet patriotism" has engendered growing confidence in the future. We have called attention to such factors as the subtle efforts to transform Czarist Pan-Russianism and "messianism" into a positive loyalty to the "multinational state," the internal sodruzhestvo of the USSR which becomes a pattern for the wider international "commonwealth of socialist nations." We have given a high evaluation to such psychological factors as the lure of the new Soviet "frontiers" - Siberia, the virgin lands - coupled with the unfolding career opportunities for the intelligentsia and the rapidly growing educated element of the populace throughout the numerous hierarchies of the regime.

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5. The growth of Soviet power during this period has steadily outstripped basic Western estimates. SRS has not officially entered into the field of military estimation but has set forth a number of largely intuitive judgments in the economic field. In January 1958 we suggested that existing estimates of long-range Soviet economic potential were too conservative - by a factor comparable to the earlier military under-estimates - being based on an extrapolation of isolated factor curves without sufficient cumulative aggregation. This view was discussed with specialists both inside and outside the Agency, meeting initially with only limited acceptance. We believe, however, that this pessimistic judgment has been vindicated by what appears to have been mounting appreciation of the tremendous potential of the Soviet economy. We have recommended that economic analysis within the Agency set up a purely speculative examination of the hypothesis that economic production, especially in the industrial field, may advance by a factor considerably in excess of that which present analytical tools forecast. We have also suggested that the long-range potential for a drastic rationalization of agriculture is good. The current setbacks which have provoked sharp criticism from Khrushchev, in our judgment, merely heighten the prospect that the problem will be vigorously tackled and eventually solved. In any event we have predicted that during the 1960s there will be a steady rise in the efficiency of Soviet agriculture, resulting in the release of many millions of workers to industry with a corresponding rise in productivity of the latter branch.

6. As in the case of the economy, the Soviet Union's scientific potential is probably still underestimated.

SRS has found itself less at variance with the scientific than with the economic estimates. This may reflect the fact that the former have been generally realistic and have been projected with due regard to the cumulative effect of measures taken in the organization and rationalization of

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scientific research, especially the Academy of Sciences system. It would appear to us, however, that popular opinion, despite the impact of sputniks and other Soviet triumphs, is still unprepared for what may be major breakthroughs in the future or at any rate for a sustained rapid growth on a compounding basis of Soviet science. Noting the mounting role of cybernetics, especially in the so-called human or behavioral sciences, SRS has maintained close contact with the OSI Task Force [REDACTED] and has contributed the full-time services of a senior officer to it. Although we have been unable to conduct independent substantive research on scientific topics, we have been active in propagating the findings [REDACTED] organizing symposia and arranging briefings by members of the task force. In a number of speeches at [REDACTED] [REDACTED] the office of Civilian Defense Mobilization, Chief, SRS, has attempted to combine an overall appreciation of Soviet policy with an evaluation of the prospects in the field of scientific organization. The generally pessimistic tone of these speeches has apparently elicited favorable reaction. We have also stressed the importance of intelligence research in the field of cooperation between the USSR and China, a subject which will require an unusual combination of language and scientific discipline on the part of the analysts who approach it.

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7. The "transition to Communism" provides a powerful lever for the party's exploitation of the dynamics of the Soviet system.

SRS has consistently urged that the "transition to Communism" be regarded as a roof topic covering all research on current and future social and economic developments in the USSR. Although we have not as yet published a general treatment of this topic, we have outlined heads of research on many aspects of it and have attempted to obtain contributions from research consultants and to stimulate interest in academic circles. Our provisional judgment is that this program

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is largely a slogan at this time, but one which is pregnant with significant development. It may have been seized upon by Khrushchev, partly as an answer to the growing challenge of Communist China for co-leadership in the application of Marxist-Leninist theory to the practice of revolution. The program is widely discussed by Soviet internal propaganda, and certain specious steps have been taken toward actualizing, it notably in the field of law enforcement and discipline e. g. the so-called comradesly courts and workers militia. Nevertheless the need to push the economic buildup of the USSR to a much higher plane has compelled the leadership to dwell on the principle of material incentive which is in dialectical contradiction to the impulse toward social production which is supposed to arise spontaneously and as the result of intensive conditioning in the "new Communist man." We anticipate that the 22nd Party Congress, now scheduled for October 1961, will place this theme at the top of the agenda for internal development of the Soviet Union and may arrive at programmatic formulations which will have a dynamic effect on the international movement as well. We are preparing the lines of research for this program when it materializes.

8. The concept of "socialist humanism" is a key point in the "transition to Communism."

Coupled with the creation of the material base for the "transition", the development of the theme of "socialist humanism" has figured prominently in internal Soviet agitation and propaganda. SRS has noted the importance of this theme, arising somewhat in parallel to that of sodruzhestvo or "commonwealth" within Soviet propaganda on the relations among socialist nations. There was some initial Soviet reticence toward adopting the term "humanism", because of its classic role in Free World ideology and its recent romantic and somewhat individualistic interpretation at the hands of Poles. There has also been a little noticed but apparently serious contradiction with the Chinese, who appear to be highly uneasy over the Soviet theme. The Chinese have

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repeatedly attacked "bourgeois humanism" by implication paralleling it with "modern revisionism," which they have also attributed obliquely to Khrushchev and the Soviet leaders. In any event Khrushchev repeatedly emphasizes the highly "moral" and even "spiritual" virtues which will be developed in the "new Communist man" and sets forth a concept of synthesis between individualism and collectivism which may prove to be the central approach of education and indoctrination in the Soviet system during the coming years.

A bright, almost Utopian goal is being set for the not too distant future. This deserves close scrutiny by our research. The Soviet regime is involved in a serious contradiction over the pace and degree of benefits to the individual from its present and projected vast economic expansion. It became apparent in the second half of 1959, approximately at the time of the Mikoyan-Kozlov-Khrushchev visits to the US, that a new drive was in the making to improve the lot of the Soviet consumer. SRS called attention to the remarkable provisions of a number of Central Committee decrees, reaching a high point in a decree of January 1960 which if carried into effect would introduce an "Americanized" system of production and distribution of hitherto virtually unknown foods such as frozen fruit juices and sugar-coated prepared cereals - advertised by television! In our most recent analysis (SRS-15), we suggested that this solicitude for the consumer has become a major theme of contradiction with the Chinese, who must view in this drive a bourgeoisification and a softening of sumptuary austerity, inimical to the physical and moral health of the revolutionary movement.

9. Party indoctrination is struggling with the problem of inspirational guidance to overcome sterility, boredom and stereotyping of ideology.

Parallel to the decrees on benefits to consumers, the Central Committee of the CPSU, has expressed serious concern over the decline in efficacy of party indoctrination.

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This reached its height in a major decree of January 1960 which calls for a creative revitalization of propaganda and indoctrination throughout the USSR. In our discussion of this decree we opposed a tendency observable in the Western press to interpret it as evidence of the inherent futility of the entire indoctrination program. We suggested that ideological and other pressures exerted on the party cadres would probably have a stimulating effect on Agitprop which would be heightened by competitive pressure of the Chinese.

D. Communist China

SRS output on Communist China has been relatively slight in volume although considerable in thoroughness of analysis. We have been greatly impressed with the need for continuing research in Chinese language publications of which the volume available in translation is considerable but still far from adequate. Enlisting the help of outside consultants, we are preparing the base for fuller treatment in the future. The present section deals only with a number of central themes which we have utilized in various connections but have not presented systematically in a single paper.

1. The essential characteristic of the Chinese communist regime is its combination of orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideology with features of traditional nationalism.

The Sino-Soviet controversy culminating in the recent Moscow meeting has cast Mao in a role "plus catholique que le pape." The implication of the Chinese polemic has been that Khrushchev is an incipient heretic, a potential "modern revisionist." Although the Chinese have been careful not to claim explicitly that Mao is the leading ideologist of contemporary Communism, by their emphasis on the study of his "thought" they have clearly attributed to it an exemplary value not only for the Chinese but for the peoples of other countries entering on the path of revolution. We have taken note of the nationalistic factors, the xenophobia

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which goes back deep into Chinese history, the irredentism over Taiwan and the outward thrust toward the ancient Han imperial boundaries. The pertinacity of Mao in defense matters, such as the refusal to accept Soviet naval bases and other military installations on Chinese soil, has suggested comparison with the position of de Gaulle in NATO. All this, however, we have held to be a dynamic phase of national self-assertion which the leaders consciously subordinate to the forces of the future binding China firmly to the international movement. We have noted the reticence with which the Chinese have handled the Soviet theme of sodruzhestvo and their preference for a looser and more figurative expression of the relationship among socialist states - that of the "big family." Their consciousness of the transcending importance of the movement came through clearly at the Moscow Conference.

2. The internal development of China must in Mao's own terminology be viewed as a tissue of dialectical contradictions.

Since the function of SRS is to attempt to view Communist actions through their own eyes, we have attached considerable significance to Mao's frequently picturesque but deliberately chosen slogans. We have endeavored to consider such internal programs as the "great leap forward", "walking on two legs", "the entire nation a chessboard", not to mention the international catch phrases such as "paper tiger" and "east wind prevails over west wind", as living realities. We have repeatedly noted the dialectic alternation of rightist and leftist factors in Chinese economic programs, but we have been generally reluctant to view this as some very sophisticated Western analysts do - as reflecting sharp conflict within the leadership. We were particularly cautious in evaluating the "rectification campaign" of 1957 and the "hundred flowers blooming and contending" slogan which preceded it. At a time when responsible analysis was imputing substantive reality to this professed liberalization, we specifically warned that it was in fact a device to

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entrap critics and deviationists.¹ Noting the excesses and the scarcely concealed criticism by the CPSU of the commune movement, we recalled the basic operating principle of Mao Tse-tung summed up in the triad: imbalance-balance-imbalance. We suggested that this pattern, observable earlier in the launching of the cooperatives and the socialization of urban enterprises, corresponded to the revolutionary nature of Mao himself and represented a realistic calculation of the drastic steps necessary to transform the highly rigid patterns of Chinese society. We suggested that the opposite approach has been characteristic of the Soviet leadership, at least since the late Stalinist period, and has inevitably involved contradiction with the Chinese "style of work."

3. As in the case of the USSR we believe that the long range estimate of the Chinese economy is still too conservative.

Here the pattern indeed is different, since the two economies are at radically different stages of development. Nor can it be said that the tendency of Western analysis is to belittle Chinese achievements, especially in the industrial field. Nevertheless even here we feel that in the popular consciousness of the West and to some extent in the minds of the more sophisticated political leaders there is still a tendency to seek comfort in China's backwardness, in the allegedly grudging or inadequate nature of Soviet support, or even in basic shortages of natural resources. For our part we have defended the view that Soviet aid has been adequate to the situation and has been properly appreciated by the Chinese. The fact that it has been promptly paid for

¹This view was acknowledged to be correct by Secretary of State Dulles at a press conference some six months later.

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by shipment of agricultural and light industrial products has, in our judgment, been evidence of the principle of business-like comradely mutual respect and self-respect which the movement professes to require of its members. This is not to say that there has been no contradiction, no sensitivity nor hard bargaining between the two partners in the course of the past decade. Like any economic association, it is marked by sharpness and by inherent tendencies to forward individual rather than mutual advantage. We have noted the seemingly ambivalent attitude of the Chinese toward CEMA, reflected in their decision to maintain observer rather than participant status, and the corresponding caution and correctness with which the USSR has accorded the Chinese a specific exemption from the principle of international specialization of labor - i. e. satellization - within the "world socialist system." China, in other words, alone in the Bloc has been granted the right to comprehensive total economic development

We have canvassed a number of other specialized themes without always being qualified to conduct the necessary basic research in them. Among these we may mention the role of science in Communist China, especially the cooperation with the USSR in joint programs such as the atomic project at Dubna. We have called attention to the high quality of American trained Chinese scientists who have returned to the mainland and who in such fields as cybernetics are fully on a par with their Soviet colleagues.

E. The Sino-Soviet Relation

Since we have already indicated the general lines of our view on this relation and since our latest publication¹ sums up this view, we may confine ourselves here to a brief

¹ CIA/SRS-15, "A New Program for International Communism: The Statement of the Moscow Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties (December 1960)" 17 February 1961.

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overall statement. The Sino-Soviet relation must be studied under varying lights and with a high degree of intellectual detachment and humility. Until a joint discipline has emerged in which the specialists command both halves, including language, in relatively equal balance, the estimation and analysis of this relation is bound to be fluctuating, with a tendency to one side or the other according to predilection of the individual analyst or the extent of his specialization in one or the other components. Anticipating, as well as we can through speculation, some of the lines which may emerge in a later and balanced analysis, we are struck with the need to consider the relation in dialectical terms. We have suggested that the doctrine of "contradictions," as developed by Mao on the basis of the classic Marxist-Leninist theory, provides an important clue not only to the earlier controversy but to persistent elements of opposition which have already been noted since the Moscow Conference. In a number of papers we have suggested that every resource of the potential "art of the possible" is being applied to the task of preventing these contradictions from becoming antagonistic, utilizing the techniques of "comradely" criticism and self-criticism to resolve them. In this position, as we have noted above, we have been generally questioned by some of our learned colleagues in the Agency who have viewed this insistence on following the dialectic approach with suspicion and even with a certain Western form of "antagonism." Outside this immediate environment, however, the presentation of this thesis has met with considerable interest and agreement, both in the US and abroad.

We have been careful to avoid anchoring this interpretation purely in doctrine or theory. We recognize that the Sino-Soviet relation is based on an association of human groups which is subject to the vagaries of traditional alliances, the quarrels, jealousies, conflicts of interest, irrational impulses and even destructive intrigues inherent in all collective actions. We have therefore attempted, especially in our most

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recent analysis, to bring out the subjective factors, the latent mistrusts, the unspoken outraged feelings, and to balance them with the positive and constructive elements of "socialist emulation." Applying Mao's principle of the "unity and negation of opposites" we have accorded both national and "proletarian international" factors comparable valence and have sought to isolate the synthesis which may be expected to emerge from their interaction. We have given high weight to such negative factors as shared hostility to the "imperialist camp headed by the US," the fear of nuclear destruction and the disastrous effects on their common interests which would result from a break. At the same time we have balanced these against positive factors, also jointly shared, especially devotion to the ideology and goals of Communism in the world movement. We have tried to take account of naked power factors, setting them against impulses of idealism and zeal and even downright utopianism which are not lacking among Communist leaders, especially Khrushchev.

All this presents a very complex pattern which has been emerging slowly and empirically during the past five years and which is as yet necessarily somewhat imperfectly formed. We believe, however, that we have laid the foundations for a sound interdisciplinary analysis within our own Staff and have made an important contribution to promoting this joint discipline in the intelligence and academic communities.

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F. The Soviet Satellites

1. The Satellites have been and remain satellites.

One of SRS's major productions has been a series of six studies on the East European satellites. These studies have covered the period since the death of Stalin and have traced both the government and party aspects of their history up to 1959.

With the exception of a special paper on the effect of the Sino-Soviet dispute on the satellites (SRS -14), we have refrained from further comprehensive studies of the situation in the satellites as it developed from 1959 onward, since we believed that by then it had become clear that the "national Communist" flare-up of 1956 had been successfully controlled and that the "orthodox," i. e. "international," elements in the Communist parties were firmly in control once again, and that there was little to add to that. On the other hand, in our view, the degree of acceptance by the non-party masses of Communism combined with foreign rule can not but be closely related to economic developments in those countries, that is, to their degree of success in providing a measure of compensation by means of an improvement of the standard of living. Unfortunately, serious objective research in this field (except perhaps in the special case of East Germany, which is of course closely watched by the West Germans) is too inadequate to permit any sound conclusions to be drawn.¹ This is all the more regrettable since the Communists

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¹ The first results of a CIA-financed project at [REDACTED] started in 1957, are not expected before the end of this year. Inexplicably, Rumania (the second largest satellite) and Albania, are not included in the program. Neither is Yugoslavia.

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frequently assert that ideological conviction is an indispensable ingredient of successful Communist economics, and it should therefore be possible to draw interesting conclusions from comparisons between production and consumption figures for the different satellites, the USSR, and Yugoslavia, as well as for free economies which have progressed rapidly during the same period, West Germany, Japan, and Italy, for instance.

There certainly is an interaction between the popular attitude toward Communism - itself affected by its origin, native (as in the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) and foreign (as in the other satellites) - and economic developments, an interaction from which valuable conclusions might be drawn, eventually inter alia for propaganda purposes, and which would seem therefore to be well worth a more intensive study. We have made repeated attempts to spur interest in this subject.

G. Yugoslavia

Although we have studied and speculated on the role of Yugoslavia, we have dealt with it only occasionally in our publications. Our general view has been that the Tito regime constitutes the only authentic example of "national Communism" and as such must remain anathema to the "world socialist system." We have suggested (SRS-6) that Soviet policy would fluctuate between efforts to reduce Tito to the status of the "forgotten man" and more positive initiatives designed to exploit his natural tendency as a Communist to keep his foreign policy views in consonance with those of the USSR and the socialist camp. We have been disinclined to view the Chinese and Soviet attitudes toward Yugoslavia as being in radical contradiction but rather in a state of dialectical interaction to advance the general tactical line of the movement.

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H. Free World Parties

SRS has maintained files and studied all the Communist parties of the Free World. We have not, however, produced any major or systematic publication on them. The following general theses have informed our study and thought in this field:

1. The de-Stalinization crisis of 1956 shook the Free World parties severely but was quickly stabilized.

This was the essential theme of SRS-6 and also of a memorandum (dated 7 February 1957) warning specifically against the widespread anticipation in the intelligence community and elsewhere of a serious decline in the French and Italian parties.

One of the principal continuing theses of SRS concerning Italy is that the PCI has a good chance eventually of polarizing and seriously damaging the democratic process in Italian politics unless a stable Democratic Socialist alternative can be established to the power monopoly of the Christian Democratic party and its minor allies. Since 1956, we have consistently urged the exploration of a modus operandi with Pietro Nenni and his Italian Socialist Party (PSI) with a view to breaking the unity of action pact with the PCI. This matter is still current. We have pointed out that it is not merely a concern of internal Italian politics - which in itself would still be of great importance - but bears upon the entire Democratic Socialist movement in Europe, on the health of the Second Socialist International, and ultimately on the viability of Western European unity.

2. All Communist Free World Parties, no matter how insignificant in size and power, must be taken seriously as tools of International Communism.

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There is a perennial tendency in the Free World to dismiss the minor CP's. During the post-war period this tendency was especially apparent in Western Europe where many of the parties declined sharply in membership and political influence. Thus, especially in Scandinavia and the Netherlands, some of the Communist parties have come to be regarded as "ridiculous." It has even been suggested that the international movement itself would be willing to sacrifice them in the interest of a "peaceful coexistence" or other foreign policy tactic of the USSR. We have repeatedly contested this view and have insisted that no Communist party will ever be sacrificed or allowed to go under, no matter what short-range advantage might result for Soviet foreign policy. We have recognized that most Western European CP's, including even the still mass-based French Party during the deGaulle period, have been rather effectively isolated in current parliamentary practice, but we have also insisted that both the underground illegal apparatus and the overt Party itself contained the ever-present potential of rapid escalation in the event of crisis. Perhaps the most striking example of this was the vigorous role played by the previously insignificant Belgian CP during the strike of December 1960 and the Congo crisis.

3. The Communist Parties in the under-developed areas must be considered in every case to contain a highly dangerous action potential.

The Parties of the underdeveloped areas range from the mass to an almost sectarian and cellular level. We have commented on them in a variety of contexts. Perhaps our strongest theme has been the formidable threat of the Indonesian Party (PKI), the largest mass-based Party outside the bloc with the exception of the Italian. The PKI is led by a young, dynamic, Moscow-disciplined and trained group which has learned all the techniques of legal and illegal action that

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the USSR and Communist China could teach it for the take-over of crisis-fraught Indonesia. Building solidly on the grass roots in local issues, exploiting the strengths and weaknesses of Sukarno, guided by a vast international plan, the PKI stands perhaps closer to the threshold of a major victory for world Communism than any other Party. We have consistently stressed the danger of political collapse in Indonesia. While we, of course, have not been alone in our alarm over this prospect, we have perhaps been more consistent than others in concentrating attention on the main thrust of the PKI and denying that the alleged Sino-Soviet rift would inhibit its march forward.

a. The Asian Situation

The Communist menace has been particularly serious in the underdeveloped areas of Asia. Periodically during these five years we have sounded our own notes of foreboding concerning the entire arc stretching from Seoul to Rangoon. Here, too, we have not been alone in this sense of impending disaster, but we have at least focussed primary attention on the active and aggressive action which International Communism, working as a movement through the local parties, has played in the area. We have suggested that every link of the chain in this vast arc of Southeast Asia is weak and that the chain under Communist tension will probably yield at one or many points. Specifically, we have warned, ever since 1956, of the dangerous situation in South Korea, resulting from the arbitrary and often corrupt regime of Syngman Rhee. We pointed out that this was playing directly into the hands of the North Koreans and the Communists in general, and we suggested that in the event free elections were held, it was by no means certain that they would go in favor of South Korea. We periodically urged that appropriate measures be taken to discipline Rhee and to reduce the swollen size of the ROK army to which our military assistance program had so heavily contributed.

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Ever since its inception SRS has been concerned over the situation in Taiwan. We have been alarmed over two major developments: the growing opposition of the Taiwanese against the KMT regime and the reluctance of the latter to accord adequate political representation to the native forces. Observing the conduct and attitude of Chiang Ching-kuo, son of the Generalissimo, we have raised, along with others, the question as to the possibility that Ching-kuo may have anti-American sentiments. He studied in Moscow and has a Russian wife. He is reported to have been at least partially responsible for the anti-American riots of May 1957. His backing of Indonesian insurgents and the Chinese irregulars in Burma, while ostensibly anti-Communist in purpose, has been a major element in promoting anti-American sentiment in Indonesia and Burma. Even though these suspicions may be unfounded, and they are not shared by many who have been in close contact with him, it is not unreasonable to conjecture that Ching-kuo, in the event he acceded to power after his father's death, might yield to pressure to make a "deal" with Peking.

Elsewhere, throughout Southeast Asia, we have been greatly alarmed by the Communist threat, and the inadequacy of US political and economic measures to counter it. We have repeatedly warned of the consequences which might arise from the arbitrary conduct of Diem in South Vietnam and the danger that guerrilla penetration would lead to rapid sapping of the strength and stability of his regime.

Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the prospects are equally grim. With respect to Laos we have generally followed the pessimistic estimate that Communist pressure would mount and that at a minimum the division of that already miniscule kingdom could be achieved. Red China's treaty with Burma will give that country a strong taste of Chinese penetration; the resistance of the military against neutralist policies already has caused U Nu to initiate purges which

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might eliminate leading officers friendly to the United States. The events in Laos have greatly disturbed the Thais, and while that country's sentiments are generally anti-Communist, unchecked advances of Communist forces in Southeast Asia will bring out strong isolationist attitudes in Bangkok. Even the Secretary General of SEATO seems to tend toward neutralism.

We have for some time advocated active US measures to promote regional federation in Southeast Asia, but the recent attempt of the Malayan government to create just such federation has not been successful, and it is doubtful that Burma could be moved to participate so long as U Nu remains in the saddle.

Our views on Japan, the only fully developed country in Asia, have been both optimistic and pessimistic at the same time. We noted the strong pro-Western elements in Kishi's policy and urged, well ahead of time, the need for enlightened revision of the Security Treaty. On the other hand, we have pointed out the JCP's penetration of the labor movement, Sohyo, and its control of the left wing teachers' union which in turn heavily dominates intellectual life in the islands, together with the ambivalence of the Socialist Party and the disruptive nature of Japanese Trotskyism, especially among students (Zengakuren) all serve to reinforce the strong under-current of neutralist sentiment in the population.¹

¹ In our memorandum of 13 May 1958, "Proposal for a World-Wide Survey of Anti-Americanism" (see below, p. 56) calling for an appraisal of anti-American sentiment throughout the world, we had in mind such specific situations as that which led to the cancellation of the Eisenhower visit in 1960.

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b. Latin America

During the period of this report the potentialities of Latin American Communism have been revealed in impressive fashion. The speed and thoroughness with which the Cuban Communists have come to dominate what started as a reformist-nationalist revolution indicate that all parties in the area deserve to be taken seriously as threats to hemispheric security and the hope of orderly progress. The front organizations of labor unions, students, journalists, women, and other social and professional groups are increasingly active in promoting Communist aims.

SRS has published one major study dealing with the Latin American situation. That was SRS-13, "The Chinese Communists and Latin America." It drew attention to the increasing scope of Peking's interest in the Latin American scene and to the propagation of the Chinese "model" for countries of allegedly similar characteristics - agrarian, illiterate, semi-colonial. The study attributed the Chinese Communists' campaign of propaganda, exchange visits, and trade offers to a desire for diplomatic recognition in a region until then unpenetrated, to the aim of fostering anti-US sentiments and weakening the US position in countries of special security importance to Washington, and to ideological zeal. It discussed the question of Soviet-Chinese competition for influence and concluded that the long Moscow orientation of the Party leaderships would be decisive if ever a choice had to be made. The study also concluded that Maoism had a strong appeal for the more revolutionary elements in the Latin American Parties and would probably gain influence among them and in fellow-traveling circles. An unclassified version of this report was prepared for DDP utilization.

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The Latin American parties figured in our analysis of the problem of legality vs. illegality (SRS-4, "Legal vs. Illegal Status: Some Considerations Relevant to Banning a Communist Party"). Several of them - notably the Brazilian and Cuban parties - illustrate the ability of the Communists to play a significant political role although nominally banned. The general conclusion of the report was that a broad attack, involving both positive action and repression, was required to reduce a party's power and influence. Unattributable copies of this study were prepared for DDP liaison purposes.

c. The African Situation

Except for references in such general studies as those on the youth festivals, SRS has not prepared any reports on Africa. One reason has been that most Communist activity to date has been governmental and regularly analyzed in estimates, economic reports, and current intelligence items. We have, however, followed African developments and consider that the area is an important target of International Communism. Our most systematic view of the African situation was given a few months ago in a staff member's presentation to an Agency seminar on Africa. The following paragraphs summarize that talk:

It appears that the Communist world has been surprised as much as the West at the pace of developments in Africa. Once aware that the nationalist ferment was widespread and that it offered opportunities to weaken and divide the "imperialists," the Communist countries moved quickly to exploit the situation.

They have simultaneously pursued several lines of action. In the first place, they have endeavored to collect and organize useful information about the continent and its peoples, the establishment in the Soviet Academy

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of Sciences of an African Institute under Professor Potekhin being a notable example of their new interest. Secondly, they have sought to identify the nationalist cause with their policies and propaganda lines. This has been evident in the United Nations and in such organizations as the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization. A third line of action has been to establish the "presence" of the Communist states as widely and as prominently as possible through diplomatic and trade missions, cultural programs, and visits of high-ranking officials. Finally, there has been the cultivation of Africans through scholarships, exhibitions, broadcasts and all other means of contact and influence.

A new phase of Communist action is probably now starting - one in which state relations will be supplemented by such controlled instruments as leaders trained in the Bloc, trade union factions, and front organizations. Reports of attempts to found Communist parties are few and inconclusive. It is likely that at present the directors of Communist strategy for Africa regard the penetration of mass movements and the followings of charismatic leaders as more promising than the usual party forms of organization. By the successful manipulation of all lines of influence and control, the Communists probably look forward to the graduation of a number of African states into the new category described in the 1960 Moscow Statement, the "national democracy." These countries, having severed their links with "Western imperialism," would be dependent on the Bloc for trade and arms and would be qualifying for the next stage by "socializing" their domestic institutions.

I. International Fronts

We have maintained files and systematically studied the international fronts but have published little on them. In part this was owing to our recognition that other elements of

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the intelligence community were occupied with this topic (Bloc International Activities Division, INR). We have, however, entered into friendly controversy with those few who have tended to deny the importance of international fronts; we have insisted that they occupy a high priority in the calculations and the tactics of the international movement. The indorsement of united front tactics in the 1960 Moscow Statement of 81 Parties and the injunction to Communists to join with all "the fighters for peace, national independence, and democracy" bear out, we believe, this evaluation of these international organizations. We recognize that the intensity of activity of different fronts varies from time to time and that they often are exposed as tools of Communist policy, but nevertheless they are a part of the global apparatus and can and do mobilize much non-Communist strength behind the current line.

Our principal contribution has been to the study of the two Youth Festivals, Moscow and Vienna, on which we have published two major studies (SRS-5, SRS-8). We were directly instrumental in bringing about a modification of the State Department policy of imposing restrictions on American participation in the Festivals and of generally discouraging Free World countries from sending high quality delegations.

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SECTION III

Introduction

In speculating on means of countering Communism it is of course necessary to start from basic estimates not only of the strength of International Communism itself but of the Free World and the United States. From the balance of the "gross capabilities" of the two sides emerges what is called the "net" estimate, i.e. the resultant of the forces confronting us and our assets and resources for defense against them. It has not been the function of SRS to prepare such "net capabilities" estimates for publication and distribution. Nevertheless, in order to perform its function of providing suggestions for combatting Communism, SRS has found it necessary to arrive at such judgments for working purposes. A few of these are discussed in the following pages.

A. SRS Estimative Judgments on The World Situation

Although the focus of the SRS mission on International Communism forces it to leave out of consideration many aspects of world affairs, nevertheless we have found in practice, as indeed was to be foreseen, that virtually no event in the modern world can be viewed in complete abstraction from International Communism. For this reason we have not hesitated to speculate on a broad variety of topics adding up to a sort of world estimate of our own.

One of our most significant theses was formulated in an internal paper prepared in September 1956 under the title "The US is Confronted with a Probable Era of International Lawlessness." Our primary contention here was that the advent of nuclear parity had introduced a mantle of mutual deterrence under which sharp but limited clashes inevitably would take place involving not only the bi-polarized nuclear factions but also, in unpredictable and dangerous patterns, the vast areas of economic backwardness and nationalist

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revolution. We forecast that this age of "international lawlessness" would generate increasing contradictions and perils for U.S. and Free World policy. A year or two later, this view was widely held throughout the public domain.

At the same time, attempting to look even farther ahead, we began to stress the latent factors working for new world alignments. Again our thought in some respects was premature. Thus as far back as early and middle 1956 we forecast the speedy actualization of the potentiality for economic integration in Western Europe which even in the highest official estimative and policy circles was given an extremely low rating.

SRS has speculated widely, although it has not put out any publication, on the prospect of the modification of the bi-polar world alignment - USSR vs. US blocs - which dominated the 1950s. The erosion of bi-polarity has become a popular theme among international affairs experts in recent years. We have attempted directly and by implication in the analysis of the Socialist Commonwealth (SRS-10) and the Moscow Statement (SRS-15) to project the Communist reaction to the globalization of the great revolutionary forces that have been unleashed by the national liberation movement. Our thought here is perhaps neither unique nor pioneering in nature but it has led us to persistence in stressing an important policy theme, the promotion of Free World regional integration, which is discussed below (pp. 56-57).

Throughout our five years we have given constant thought to the difficult question of Free World ideology. Profoundly impressed as we have been by the world-conquering thrust of the Communist secular religion and the powerful organizational implements which Communism has forged for its advance, we have looked in every direction for an adequate Free World answer to its challenge. We have considered schemes for overt and covert organization along the lines of

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the so-called "Democrintern" and have canvassed many ideas of our own and others. We have scrutinized such schemes as "Peoples' Capitalism, " Militant Liberty, Moral Rearmament, and other panaceas, unfortunately finding them wanting. We have looked at the narrower scale of opportunity lying before our own Agency's operational apparatus and again, unhappily, have found them generally inadequate for countering Communism on a global scale. Coming reluctantly to the conclusion that no major counter-offensive was possible under the state of mind and social-political dispensations of the 1950's, we have turned our eyes toward the 1960's and our second five year plan with sober and restrained hopefulness.

B. Means of Countering Communism

1. General Observations

We have noted that the SRS charter includes in addition to speculation and research on the nature of International Communism, the responsibility of providing suggestions on means of countering it. As we have noted above, this was originally considered to be a planning function which would entail close contact with DDP and frequent access to elements in the State Department, OCB, and the National Security Council. With the dropping of the word "planning" from the original title of the staff, there followed a certain contraction of attention and focus on operational considerations. It was recognized, that since CIA does not have a policy function, it would be inappropriate for SRS to make specific policy recommendations. Nevertheless it seemed both feasible and appropriate to speculate on certain aspects of US posture and foreign activity, insofar as these would be reflected in the reactions of Communism itself. In other words, our research and speculation automatically had an obverse side which could perhaps be described as an implicit contribution to the policy making process.

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This contribution may be divided into two factors - one negative, the other positive. The negative aspect centered primarily in the examination of so-called vulnerabilities of Communism, an exercise in "what not to do." At various times during these five years SRS was called upon to contribute to DDP, DDI, and even DCI papers or draft speeches bearing on Soviet and Communist vulnerabilities in general.

Our central theme has been a cautious and pessimistic one derived immediately from our detailed analysis of the nature of Communism itself as summarized in the preceding two sections. Since this analysis strongly emphasized the general dynamic and expansive force of the movement, it followed that the individual points of weakness in International Communism were by no means automatically exploitable.

We have examined a considerable number of the commonly cited vulnerabilities, especially those of the Soviet Union in its relations with Communist China, and have found that in most cases the objective existence of a potential for Western or American exploitation was questionable. We further pointed out that even in cases where a vulnerability appeared to exist, it by no means followed that a direct exploitation of it through propaganda or political action would be fruitful. Rather the danger seemed to be in most cases that such action would run the risk of being self-defeating, either by provoking a counteraction more damaging to us than any likely gain or by stimulating remedial measures on the part of the Communists themselves.

We have not taken a defeatist attitude toward all attempts at exploitation of vulnerabilities. We have recognized that in certain cases opportunities would arise from the very fact of taking action. Nevertheless we have strongly urged that careful research was necessary, considering the long range repercussions of any divisive or provocative

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action on our part, measured against the contingencies of either success or failure.

The present stage of vulnerability studies, especially with regard to the Sino-Soviet relationship, is somewhat fluid. The Sino-Soviet Task Force (constituted in September 1960) has been attempting to draft a contingency plan based on the assumption that Moscow and Peking have failed to achieve a "genuine" reconciliation of views, even after the issuance of the Moscow Statement, and that a real potential for successful divisive activity may be before us. SRS acknowledges the need for such a contingency plan, but has also recommended the simultaneous drafting of a plan based on the opposite assumption, i. e. that the unity and harmony of action between the senior partners and the other members of the movement will be enhanced as a result of the Moscow meeting and the ensuing speeches and documents published throughout the bloc. We hope to contribute some ideas on the basis of this contingency assumption.

Another general theme which we have elaborated deals with the method of conducting political and propaganda action against communism. We have started from the premise that the communist system itself does not recognize a qualitative distinction between policy and propaganda such as is basic to our system of government. In August 1960 we prepared for the Sprague committee a paper on the amalgamation of policy and propaganda in the Soviet system, coining (by analogy with agitprop) a new phrase to describe it, "politprop." "Politprop" represents an integral approach to foreign action in which the general lines of policy are fully integrated with the means and media and themes of propaganda. Thus our American concept of a group of "policy makers" who generate pure policy and then transmit it to operators for execution or implementation in the propaganda field is held to be artificial. We recognize of course that

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the full application of the highly effective Soviet concept and practice would be impossible in the matrix of our democratic society. We would suggest, however, that a closer and more nearly reciprocal interaction of the two could be achieved. In this connection the recent decision to have the head of USIA attend cabinet meetings seems to be a step in the right direction.

We have also suggested informally that a high level inter-Agency and inter-disciplinary group be established to study and analyze current Soviet "politprop." Such a group would not be a coordinating body, a super-committee of representatives of individual agencies, but rather would be a working team somewhat analogous to SRS itself, in which experts would be assigned independently of their parent offices to conduct a continuing analysis of Communist foreign activity, leading to recommendations to the NSC Planning Board or the President's Special Assistant for National Security. Such a team, in order to be effective, would have to be composed of experts in Communist doctrine, ideology and practice, with background experience in both policy and propaganda work.

In connection with our consideration of the means of countering Communism, we have studied the efficacy of outlawing a local CP. The results of this study were published in SRS-4, Legal vs. Illegal Status: Some Considerations Relevant to Banning a Communist Party. Our general conclusion was that, although constitutional or statutory proscription is certainly a measure to be considered in attempts to suppress Communist power and influence in a country, this approach needs to be appraised in the light of a number of domestic factors, such as strength of the party, efficiency of security services, effects of driving Communists underground and governmental ability to thwart circumventing actions.

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2. Themes for Positive Action

Our basic premise being that propaganda and political action are integral with overall policy, we have naturally found ourselves speculating on the soundness of policy itself. Our starting point has been concern with the impact of American policy and the American "image" on those areas of the Free World where the Communist offensive is especially dangerous. From the very beginning we were struck by the widespread and almost universal distortion of that image throughout the underdeveloped areas. In 1957-1958 after anti-American actions and demonstrations had begun to mount alarmingly, we proposed that a serious and objective study of anti-Americanism be initiated jointly by all agencies of the government having overseas representation. We specifically proposed the issuance of a directive to embassies and other foreign posts requiring objective reporting on such attitudes, including answers to such a question as whether it would be safe for the President of the U.S. to visit a given capital.

Proceeding to positive instrumentalities, we concentrated on the potential of various forms of international activity to develop the economies and polities of backward nations. Two themes emerged; the first was the importance of concentrating greater effort and attention on

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Our second theme for positive US action was the support and promotion of regional organizations in the

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Free World, aiming toward limited political federation, economic cooperation such as common markets and general social planning. We were aware that US policy has long been favorable in principle to such activities, but we noted that constructive initiatives have been impeded by an overwhelming sense of the difficulties arising from fragmenting nationalistic forces. Although it has been our judgment that greater zeal could have been shown in promoting regionalism and indeed was essential if Communism was to be contained in such areas as Asia, Africa, and Latin America, we recognized that limited actions were all that was possible during this stage. We canvassed a number of concrete proposals, one of which seemed capable of immediate and effective implementation. Specifically in May 1957 we urged the establishment of a regional technological institute for Southeast Asia. Although this proposal attracted interest among official personnel familiar with the region, it encountered objections which necessitated laying it aside. In view of the immense inroads which Soviet technological aid and instruction have made in certain countries of this area we still feel that some such step is urgently needed.

In an attempt to arrive at a broad concept which could bear operational fruit within the Agency's mission, we submitted a paper entitled "The Promotion of Constitutional Stability in Afro-Asian Countries: A Weapon in the Battle Against Communism" (18 November 1957). In it we proposed a number of possibilities for action. Among these was a long range program for developing a network of unofficial, high level political advisers for backward countries. We had in mind the careful and secure recruitment of distinguished scholars or experts, with a natural interest and cover for a given area, including language proficiency, who could establish themselves on a basis of unimpeachable friendship in higher government and academic circles of a given country, building up over a period of time the kind of relationship with the elite which would enable them to work dis-

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creetly but effectively for the improvement of constitutional and political processes in their host country. A few partial steps appear to have been taken in this direction, but a sophisticated, comprehensive, patient, farseeing program still awaits development.

We have made other less comprehensive recommendations, especially for South and Southeast Asia. Among these was a proposal to hold regional seminars or symposia on the Sino-Soviet relation, drawing on journalists, educators and other opinion molders from the several countries of the region. Such seminars could be conducted under the auspices of local scholarly organizations with the cooperation and support of Western institutes and foundations. We specifically recommended

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Among a number of other tangible suggestions for countering Communism we might cite the following:

a. Proposal to strengthen the forces of democratic socialism as a principal bulwark against Communism. This proposal was made in a memorandum, "The New International Communist 'United Front' Offensive and the Position of the Socialist Parties" (23 April 1956, 2d, Rev. Edition, S), which pointed out that the Socialist International organizations of Europe and Asia have been consistently effective in resisting Communist united front blandishments. We recommended a general US policy line indicating friendliness and approval of Democratic Socialism as a legitimate

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political force. In order to support this broad endeavor we suggested the establishment of a joint DDI-DDP Desk for Socialist Affairs. We still believe that the work of such a unit would bring attention to the anti-Communist potentialities in the Democratic Socialist movement and provide constructive intelligence support for State Department policy and Agency operations.

In this connection we have consistently urged a positive approach to the Nenni Socialists (PSI) in Italy (see above, p. 42). In a series of memoranda going back to mid-1956 we pointed out that Italian democracy will remain precarious and unstable so long as the Communist Party (PCI) is able to maintain its hold over the PSI. We pointed out the strength of the "autonomist" movement within the PSI and of the very real opportunity of uniting it with the Saragat PSDI, creating a broad based Democratic-Socialist Party. This proposal proved highly controversial, especially in 1957 and 1958. The sharpening polarization of the extreme right and left in Italian politics remains a grave danger not only to Italy but to the West European integration movement. We continue to feel that a new policy approach to this situation is highly desirable. Effective action is still possible.

b. Concerted attack on the problem of the disposal of nuclear waste. During the first half of 1958 we noted the danger that Communist propaganda would exploit this matter to our disadvantage. Looking further into it,

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we came to the conclusion that until this problem was solved, the West and the US were running a grave risk in propagandizing the advent of the age of nuclear plenty. This hopeful program seemed not only risky but positively unwise, in view of the mounting evidence that it was likely to be economically unprofitable, if not technically impossible, for a long time to come. We accordingly recommended and still recommend that at the highest level cognizance be taken of this problem and that appropriate policy and propaganda be developed to dampen false expectations and to prevent possibly cruel exploitation of them by the Communists. This concern has been intensified rather than relieved as the result of mounting evidence that the Communists are in fact building up a case against US disposal practices which, although they may not be worse than those of the USSR, are likely to create grave alarm, if not panic, when their full significance becomes apparent to public opinion here and abroad.

Speculation on this subject also led us to consider the general need of international coordination of fuel and power planning throughout the Free World in order to face the growing Soviet and Communist threat in this field. We noted the ominous Soviet entry into the petroleum and natural gas field via tankers, pipelines, and other forms of export. We also noted the alarming fact that Western oil exploitation, especially in Venezuela and the Middle East, has been extremely profligate in the "flaring off" of the natural gas by-product. When it became apparent in 1959 that this waste product could be liquified and delivered in tankers on a competitive basis with other forms of fuel, we recommended that the highest priority be assigned to developing this potential. Specifically, we cited the possibility of combining international, governmental, and private investment to develop a massive system for distributing this liquified gas in underdeveloped countries such as India, reaching out beyond the cities and towns into the villages. Aside from the immediate benefits to the Indian economy this would yield important

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psychological advantages, especially in producing countries like Saudi Arabia, where indignation is mounting over the wasteful practices of the Western oil companies. We have also pointed out that such a program would be financially advantageous to the oil companies in the bargain. At the same time, reverting to our concern with atomic waste disposal, we have suggested that countries like India be encouraged to focus their limited but growing scientific talent on this problem, rather than on research reactors, which at this stage, can be little more than prestige play-things for them.

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APPENDIX I

History of
Non-operational intelligence work on
International Communism

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In 1948, there was set up within the EE/USSR Division of ORE, an International Communism Group (ICG), [REDACTED] Chief. A Propaganda Analysis Group, created a little later, was amalgamated with the ICG in 1949. The ICG became the nucleus for non-operational intelligence work on International Communism both as a producer and coordinator. In spite of its being an administrative part of the EE/USSR Division, it worked directly under the AD/ORE; the Chief of ICG chaired the ORE Committee on International Communism on behalf of the AD/ORE. This Committee also functioned as editorial board for the ICG publication, International Communism Monthly. Furthermore, the Chief of ICG was the Secretary of the Inter-Departmental [REDACTED] Committee on International Communism whose chairman was the AD/ORE and whose membership consisted of the State Department, the three services, Joint Staff, FBI and AEC.

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As a result of the Jackson reorganization, ORE, and with it ICG, was abolished in December 1950. The responsibility for IC intelligence was transferred to State, OIR, which pledged to set up an International Communism office with a T/O of twenty. However, due to budgetary difficulties, this office was never set up. On the other hand, there was no inclination on the part of the State Department to relinquish responsibility for this work and return it to CIA. As a result, the demise of ORE and ICG coincided with the end of non-operational work on International Communism intelligence for several years. The reasons for this extraordinary situation were (1) disagreement on

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whether State or CIA should undertake the work; (2) the question as to whether work on International Communism would not overlap general political intelligence, and (3) the problem of where to put such an intelligence unit administratively.

25X1A2g Following the 1950 reorganization, the newly created OCI set up a group of three or four staff employes to do current intelligence work on IC, but abolished it a few months later. Thus, apart from operational intelligence in CI/DDP, no work on this subject was done in CIA. In the State Department a unit of about three people sought to maintain a semblance of IC intelligence activities. With the help of an inter-regional Committee, using techniques adopted from the ICG, it began to issue a successor publication 25X1A2g the International Communism Monthly. Moreover, the [redacted] Committee slipped into oblivion just at a time when its Sub-committee was about to submit plans for intelligence production of interest to the entire intelligence community.

25X1A9a In early 1954, Colonel Brown of General Schow's office, Army G-2, approached [redacted] as the former Secretary of [redacted] and asked about the status of work on International Communism. As the answer could only be negative, Army requested that a survey be undertaken to determine the status of International Communism intelligence throughout the intelligence community. [redacted] 25X1A9a was assigned to undertake this survey for CIA. There followed a period of search and numerous meetings, chaired by 25X1A9a [redacted]. Some of these meetings were attended by [redacted] and representatives of OCI and ORR. 25X1A9a

25X1A9a At the end of that year, to be exact on 9 November 1954, Mr. Bissell summarized his ideas in a memorandum to DCI, incorporating [redacted] idea for a Senior Research Staff. Intermingled with the substantive considera-

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tions were discussions concerning the locus of IC work. Opinions continued to differ sharply. State was still unwilling to give up its claim to primary responsibility even though it had not provided the machinery to implement this responsibility.

25X1A9a [REDACTED] Gradually, the initial tendency of some CIA officers to have State retain the responsibility for IC gave way to the conviction that CIA was better equipped to do the job. The predominant question under discussion remained the organizational and substantive aspects of IC intelligence. Against [REDACTED] plea for centralization ("total integration of Communist efforts requires total, integral efforts to counter them"), a compromise solution, dividing the work between State, DDI and DDP, was adopted in a "Report to the IAC on Implementation of the Survey of USIA's Intelligence Needs and Assets" of 5 October 1954 (IAC-D-82/6). Accordingly, and following an official letter of General Schow to the IAC of 3 August 1955 emphasizing the need for improvement of IC intelligence, this plan was spelled out in Tab "B", IAC-D-99 of 22 August 1955.

It was determined that "finished intelligence of a level of generality useful to policy makers, specifically developments in individual countries, should remain located in the DDP"; furthermore, there was to be "continuing basic and operational research on, and speculative study of, communism and the means of countering communism." This part of the work was to be carried out by a Senior Staff, attached administratively to the DDI. In order to carry out these recommendations, a yearly contribution of [REDACTED] 25X1A1a was to be authorized as "reimbursement to the Department of State for the production of NIS material along the lines of the outline of a country supplement . . ."; the operational staff on IC was to be considerably augmented and a small

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staff of senior officers was to be set up to implement the proposal for speculation on and countering of Communism.

Thus, in 1956, work on International Communism began on a decentralized basis. The CI staff charged with operational intelligence in IC became the International Communism Division (ICD) and greatly augmented its T/O; the Senior Research Staff on International Communism (SRS/DDI) began to work on 20 January 1956. Not much change was observed in the State Department, however, and in 1960 the CIA budget contribution was dropped. Thus actual research and analysis on International Communism remains quantitatively small and relatively fractionalized.

* * *

There have been repeated attempts on the part of the intelligence community to establish coordinated inter-departmental work on IC intelligence. The first such attempt led to the formation of the [REDACTED] Committee in 1948, chaired by CIA. With the 1950 reorganization, this Committee expired without having been formally abolished. Only at the end of 1955, as a result of Mr. Bissell's initiative in this field, plans for a new committee were discussed, leading finally to the establishment of the Committee on International Communism under State chairmanship in January 1956 (IAC-D-99/2, 24 January 1956). This Committee was set up primarily to establish requirements. It was subsequently renamed Committee on Intelligence Priorities and Requirements Relating to International Communism (CIPRIC). In its work, the Committee reviewed production and capabilities in various US agencies and created a requirements mechanism for the intelligence community on IC.

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From 1958 on, after its work on requirements was completed, State strongly recommended the abolition of the

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Committee. The military service representatives opposed this step; the SRS representatives believed that the Committee should be reconstituted and given substantive functions as a service of common concern. Failing this, SRS and the services argued, the Committee had no reason for existence. The argument was ended only in 1960 when a new proposal for the reconstitution of the Committee under the previous name of Committee on International Communism was submitted on 17 February (USIB-B-48/3/2). The USIB approved. However, little progress has been made since, and the meetings have amounted largely to briefings. It is anticipated that State will once again propose the abolition of the Committee.

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APPENDIX IV
LIST OF CIA/SRS REPORTS

<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
SRS-1	The 20th CPSU Congress in Retrospect: Its Principal Issues and Possible Effects on International Communism (C)	13 June 1956
SRS-2	The Present Communist Controversy: Its Ramifications and Possible Repercussions (C)	15 July 1956
SRS-3	"National" vs. International Communism: A Comparative Analysis (OUO)	19 Dec. 1956
SRS-4	Legal vs. Illegal Status: Some Considerations Relevant to Banning a Communist Party (C)	4 Jan. 1957
SRS-5	International Communism and Youth: The Challenge of the 1957 Moscow Youth Festival (OUO)	6 June 1957
SRS-6	Status and Prospects of International Communism: The Dialectic of Crisis and Stabilization (C)	16 Sept. 1957
SRS-7	Communism in Eastern Europe: Post-Stalin Developments in the Satellites (C) I From Death of Stalin to XX Party Congress II-A - Poland	25 Oct. 1957

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<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
SRS-7	II-B - Hungary (C) (S)	22 April 1958
SRS-7	II-C - East Germany (C)	16 June 1958
SRS-7	II-D - Rumania (C)	28 Aug. 1958
SRS-8	Between Two Communist World Youth Festivals: Moscow-1957-Vienna 1959 (C)	1 Dec. 1958
SRS-7	II-E - Czechoslovakia (C)	31 Dec. 1958
SRS-9	Speculative Observations on the XXI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (27 January 1959) (C)	2 Jan. 1959
SRS-10	The "Socialist Commonwealth of Nations": Pattern for Communist World Organization (C)	18 June 1959
SRS-11	International Communism in 1965 (C)	20 July 1959
SRS-7	II-F - Bulgaria (C)	6 July 1959
SRS-12	The Tenth Anniversary Celebration of the People's Republic of China (Peking, 1 October 1959) (C)	1 Sept. 1959
SRS-13	Chinese Communism and Latin America (S)	26 Feb. 1960

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<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
SRS-14	The European Satellites and the Sino-Soviet Differences (C)	3 Nov. 1960
SRS-15	A New Program for International Communism: The Statement of the Moscow Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties (December 1960) (S)	17 Feb. 1961

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APPENDIX VI

Selected List of Memoranda
Prepared by SRS/DDI

<u>Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>
6 Feb 56	World Federation of Trade Unions
9 Mar 56	Invitation to Sukarno to Visit US
6 Mar 56	Khrushchev's Visit to London: Some Proposals
20 Mar 56	Latest Developments of the "Anti-Stalin" Trend in International Communism; Interpretation and Possible Exploitation
28 Mar 56	Chinese Communist Reactions to XX Congress of CPSU
10 Apr 56	International Communism and Parliamentary Electoral Systems
11 Apr 56	Collective Leadership in USSR - Are There Historic Parallels?
1 June 56	Proposed Attack upon Khrushchev's Pretended "Socialist Legality"
1 June 56	Proposed US Attitude toward the Nenni Socialists
19 June 56	Political Situation in Guatemala
27 June 56	Communist Reactions to Release of Khrushchev's Speech
30 July 56	Countering the Soviet Satellite Redefection Campaign

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>
14 Aug 56	Conditioned Reflexes as Communist Methods (Pavlov Dogs, etc.)
17 Oct 56	A European Approach to the Problem of Tropical Africa
28 Nov 56	Suggestions for Exploitation of Nehru's Visit
17 Jan 57	Significance of "Liberalization" in Communist China
24 Jan 57	Speculative Comments on the Merger Negotiations of the Italian Socialist Parties
7 Feb 57	Effects of Soviet Repression in Hungary on Communist Parties in Italy and France
1 Mar 57	The Moscow Youth Festival: Is American Participation Desirable?
27 Mar 57	Suggested Assumptions for a Propaganda Program Addressed to the Intelligentsia of the East European Satellites
26 Apr 57	Suggested Topics for Discussion with the Intellectual Elite of the Satellites
2 May 57	Proposed Establishment of an Institution of Higher Technical Learning in Southeast Asia
25 May 57	Speculation Concerning Possible Communist Role of Chiang Ching-kuo
27 May 57	Speculation on the Advisability of Revising the US-Japanese Security Treaty

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>
7 June 57	"New Soviet Man"
12 July 57	June 1957 Reorganization of the Soviet Presidium and the Satellites
30 Sept 57	Proposed Establishment of an Institution of Higher Technical Learning in Southeast Asia
9 Oct 57	Reflections on the "Psychological Pearl Harbor" (re First Sputnik)
14 Oct 57	Possibility of Creation of a New Communist Roof Organization at Occasion of the 40th Anniversary of the Soviet Union
15 Oct 57	Suggested Speech by Eisenhower on World Situation
25X1A9a 16 Oct 57	 Interview with Mrs. Roosevelt
29 Oct 57	Speculation on Program of the 40th Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution
29 Nov 57	Suggestions for NATO Conference Declaration
5 Dec 57	Speculation on the Gross Capabilities of USSR in Non-Military Field
10 Dec 57	Proposal for an Attempt to Bring About a Merger of the Nenni and Saragat Socialists
4 Jan 58	Foreign Policy - Basic Principles and Programs
30 Jan 58	Importance of Words in the Cold War

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>
	25X1X7
3 Feb 58	Comments on [REDACTED] Working Paper on Soviet Psychological Vulnerabilities
27 Feb 58	Purpose and Effects of Moscow Youth Festival
1 Apr 58	Two Proposals for Action in the Italian Election Campaign
12 May 58	Straws-in-the-Wind Kremlinology
13 May 58	Role of Ideology in Communist Affairs
13 May 58	Proposal for a World-wide Survey of Anti-Americanism
15 May 58	Proposal for Action Regarding the 1959 World Youth Festival in Vienna
23 May 58	Speculation on the Outcome of the Italian Elections
30 June 58	Speculation on Sino-Soviet Tactics toward Japan
18 July 58	Suggestions to Resolve the Middle East Crisis
25 July 58	Proposals for the UN-Summit Meeting
25 July 58	Speculations on Intention of Chiang Ching-kuo with Respect to Indonesia
5 Aug 58	Speculation on Possibility of Communist Provocation in the Far East
7 Aug 58	Expression of Concern on the Problem of Disposing of Nuclear Waste

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>
7 Aug 58	Re Attitude of Peiping vis-à-vis Tito
23 Sept 58	The New Journal of International Communism
24 Sept 58	Analysis of the Communist Position in the Taiwan Straits Area, and Suggested Course of Action by the US
30 Oct 58	Pasternak and the Nobel Prize - The "Literary Hungary"
12 Nov 58	The Eurasian Communist Bloc and the Free World
4 Nov 58	Role of Military Power in Communist Strategy
21 Nov 58	Proposal for Action to Support of Autonomist Faction of the Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI)
24 Nov 58	Suggested Course of Action in West Berlin Crisis
17 Dec 58	Thoughts on Resignation of Mao-Tse-tung
30 Dec 58	Proposal to Establish a Special Research Unit on International Organizations and Movements in the Free World
20 Jan 59	Speculative Observations on the Chinese Peoples Communes
24 Jan 59	Draft of Proposed Ideas for Director's Speech on the Communist Challenge to Free Government
30 Jan 59	Current Status of Chinese Psychological Studies

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>
20 Feb 59	Some Reflections on the XXI CPSU Congress
13 Mar 59	Soviet Vulnerabilities
3 Apr 59	Dangerous Implications of Article by Harrison Salisbury, "Choice for the West" (<u>New York Times</u> , 3 April 1959).
10 Apr 59	Suggested Theme for Propaganda against Chinese Communists
13 Apr 59	Papers on "Nikita Khrushchev"
14 Apr 59	Proposal for Concentration of Agency Effort in the Sino-Soviet Field
30 Apr 59	Comment on the Selection of Liu Shao-chi as Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic
13 May 59	Proposal for the Exploitation of Liquified Natural Gas for the Underdeveloped Areas
5 June 59	Desirability of More Complete Coverage of Economic Developments in Satellite Countries
11 June 59	Proposal to Invite Khrushchev to Washington
6 Aug 59	Suggestions Concerning the Visit of Khrushchev
7 Aug 59	Draft of Memo to DCI "Proposal for a Task Force on Sino-Soviet Relations"
15 Sept 59	Comments by Staff Members on Khrushchev's Article in <u>Foreign Affairs</u>

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>
24 Sept 59	The "Crisis" in Communist China and the Sino-Soviet Relations
30 Sept 59	"Areas of Sensitivity Displayed by Nikita Khrushchev"
14 Oct 59	Comment on Predictions in the American Press of a Sino-Soviet Split
2 Mar 60	"The Range of 'Ideology' - The Scope of its Practical Application"
15 Mar 60	Thoughts on the Pending Khrushchev Visit to France
30 Mar 60	Communism vs. Religion
20 June 60	Speculative Appraisal of Khrushchev's Power Position
15 Aug 60	"Dialog Between Liu Shao-chi and Mikhail Suslov"
1 Sept 60	Bibliography and Suggestions on Teaching Communism
26 Sept 60	Khrushchev and UN: Probable Khrushchev Intentions
5 Nov 60	"Conversation Between Liu Shao-chi and Mikhail Suslov"

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Occasional Papers

<u>Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>
7 Aug 57	Electoral and Parliamentary Practices in the USSR and Poland
18 Nov 57	The Promotion of Constitutional Stability in Afro-Asian Countries: A Weapon in the Battle Against Communism
2 Jan 58	Suggestions for Improving the Position of the United States in the Face of the Communist Challenge
3 Aug 60	The Amalgamation of Policy and Propaganda in Soviet Action Abroad

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