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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**  
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THE INTERACTION OF POLICY AND PROPAGANDA  
IN SOVIET ACTION ABROAD

Introduction

This paper attempts to describe and evaluate certain aspects of the Soviet counterpart to what is being investigated for the United States Government by the Sprague Committee. We believe that this field is not adequately defined, in the Soviet case, by the term "Information." Nor is it purely propaganda. Rather, as we shall argue, it is a confluence of policy and propaganda in an integral or total effort, which - by analogy with AGITPROP - we suggest calling PROPOL. We believe that this integration - although not unique - has been carried further by the Soviet regime than by any other government or system in history.

We recognize, of course, that this amalgamation of PROPOL has been possible only because the Soviet regime is totalitarian. We do not, therefore, suggest that it be copied in the United States. We would, however, raise the

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question whether our present system does not suffer from a less than clear recognition that policy and propaganda constitute a single entity. We believe that, without abandoning our own system, it is still possible to adapt this lesson from the Soviet Union.

This paper, which is to be regarded as a first essay, rather than a detailed elaboration, concentrates largely on the intangible components of PROPOL. It leaves aside, for separate treatment, such important tangible components as the organizations and media - Party, State, International Fronts and diplomatic installations - through which the system operates. We make no effort here to construct a total "profile," but confine ourselves to sketching a few of its more striking traits.

A. The Basic Concept of PROPOL

The Communist - and specifically the Soviet - conduct of all foreign activity is based on a conscious interplay of both internal and external propaganda and policy.

This paper, however, deals only with the latter, reserving

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the discussion of its interaction with the former for separate treatment.

Our working hypothesis attributes to the Communists the following premises:

1. The process of "world revolution" is total; it combines "revolutionary theory" with "revolutionary practice." Its advance, though subject to setbacks, is inexorable, being ordained by "history," by "life itself."

2. That which maximizes the power of the Communist party is moral and just, because it advances the International Movement toward the ultimate goal of the perfect "communist society."

3. Marxism-Leninism provides a scientific rationale, which makes it possible for the Party to delineate the goal, chart the course toward it, and cope with the obstacles interposed by the "enemy."

4. Integral to this rationale is the principle of dialectics, specifically the doctrine of "contradictions." Defensively, "contradictions" must be recognized and re-

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solved - to prevent them from becoming "antagonistic" within the "world socialist system." Offensively, they must be detected and exacerbated within the body of the "enemy" - their latent "antagonism" must be made actual.

5. All events must be analyzed and all courses plotted dialectically with a clear discrimination between tactics and strategy.

On the basis of these, and other secondary premises, the Kremlin has developed the concept and technique which we suggest designating as PROPOL. This is nothing less than the total amalgamation of the process by which policy is determined together with the specific lines through which it is implemented in action and described, defended and advanced in words and other forms of communication.

We believe that, in effect, the communists have developed a new discipline, transcending and potentially destroying traditional diplomacy. By their unwavering application of the dialectical principle they have achieved a cross-fertilization of ends and means which yields a revolu-

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tionary force of unprecedented power.

B. General Objectives of PROPOL

The integrated propaganda-policy activity of the USSR is conducted to serve two principal objectives. The first is to advance the interests of the USSR as those are conceived by the Presidium. It is obvious that the Kremlin leaders believe in a restless, aggressive, purposeful assault on the non-communist world, however much they may preach "relaxation of tensions." By constant probing, instigation of disorder, and manufacture of crises, they seek to further the "decisive shift in the balance of world power," which they claim has already taken place. In these efforts they regard the fortunes of International Communism as being indissolubly linked with those of the Soviet Union. Thus, whatever advances the national interests of the USSR, benefits the cause of "proletarian internationalism."

The second PROPOL objective is the instruction, direction, and stimulation of the worldwide communist apparatus. Although Marxist-Leninist ideology provides a common

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frame of reference for reactions to particular situations, the Communist parties and the front organizations need tactical guidance on propaganda themes, on political action, and on timing of moves. These Moscow undertakes to supply, in coordination with its own actions and propaganda. The constant activity directed by the Kremlin - protest meetings; national, regional, and world congresses; strikes and demonstrations; the publication of tracts, overt and clandestine - maintains the militancy of the party members. The total range of this objective and the methods used by the communists to fulfill it are beyond the scope of this paper.

C. The Marxist-Leninist "matrix of reality."

In attempting to fathom the enigmas which PROPOL regularly presents us, it is essential to remind ourselves that the Communists - quite literally - do not see the world as we do. Not only their ethic, but their intellectual formulation and their logic are radically different. This explains the widely noted phenomenon of semantic incongruence - they use the same words as we, but the meaning simply is not the same.

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The Marxist-Leninist "matrix of reality" has been derived from the "founding fathers" (Marx and Engels), endowed with a revolutionary methodology by Lenin, consolidated by Stalin, and "creatively" adapted to modern conditions by Khrushchev. This matrix informs agitation, propaganda and policy. It is the subject of exegesis in thousands of books and tens of thousands of articles in the official organs of the party and their offshoots.

It is sometimes claimed that the Communist gospel is entering eclipse, that it no longer inspires revolutionary fervor but only boredom. To be sure, this tendency exists, and it is recognized by the Communists themselves as a danger to be vigorously combatted at all times. But it would be unwise for us to derive from their own, often sharp, internal criticism, the reassuring conclusion that the leaders, or even the cadres, have ceased to think and act within the matrix of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Not only are they committed to it by deep vested interests; they see in it the root and cause of the innumerable successes which they are

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achieving. The psychological impact of an unremitting indoctrination tinctures their lives with a fervor akin to religious fanaticism. Seeing world events through a doctrinal filter, which is never removed from their mind's eye, they have come to identify their insights with dialectical and scientific certitude, enabling them to predict and to hasten the doom of capitalism and the victory of Communism. The rigidity of this matrix does not however preclude flexibility in PROPOL manipulation.

D. The Soviet Estimate of the Situation

Let it be said at the outset that we are greatly handicapped in determining the basic estimate of the world situation which is held by Khrushchev and the Presidium leaders, if we approach it in purely Western terms. About all that we could infer is that it is a compound of objective information and subjective interpretation. We have evidence that there exists a regular channel for undistorted, factual reporting on world events, the so-called Red Tass. This differs from what is generally believed to have been the

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highly slanted intelligence and information flowing into Stalin. We know that Khrushchev reads Western papers, and on this score there appears to be little restriction on top officials, even well down into the apparat. Thus there is probably an undistorted core of fact at the center of the PROPOL armature.

We believe that if we make an effort to project ourselves into the reasoning of the Kremlin leaders at least three basic propositions may be imputed to their general estimate.

1. There exists a deterrent balance, resulting from the perfection of nuclear instruments of destruction by both the USSR and the US. Officially this is denied, and the superiority of the Soviet striking and retaliatory power is affirmed. In view of his insistence on the necessity of "peaceful co-existence," however, one must assume that Khrushchev actually accepts the permanence of a balance, sufficiently stable so that general war is irrevocably ruled out. One may also speculate that the Chinese leaders largely share this estimate, though overtly disputing it. If this is the case,

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the outward controversy between the two Bloc partners may in fact conceal elements of a profound deception.

2. Although PROPOL proclaims that there is an inexorable rotting of the "capitalist system headed by the United States," we believe that the sober estimate of the Presidium is that the disintegration of the free world economies, especially that of the US, is not imminent. Rather, a long "peaceful competition" will ensue, the ultimate outcome of which is not in doubt but which will have its ups and downs. This competition will be played out in the world arena, with the underdeveloped countries in the dual role of spectators and lesser protagonists. In this the Communists see many opportunities. For the present, however, the determination of the capitalists should not be "tested by force."

3. On the other hand, the Presidium may seriously estimate that the capitalist polities are weaker and more vulnerable than they seem. This would presuppose that the "ruling circles" - the bourgeoisie of bankers and industrial-

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ists, as opposed to the petty bourgeoisie - have lost their grip, their confidence and above all their "operational code," which is in important respects identical with that of the Communists. In other words, they would have ceased to be "serious."

If the Presidium had in fact made such a fundamental judgment, the consequences for PROPOL would be profound. It would then be possible to predict a speedy collapse of the enemy, and the approved maxim "despise the enemy strategically, respect him tactically" might become parallel in both its members. Nevertheless, the fact that the theme of "contempt" has recently been played by both Peking and Moscow does not mean that it has already become strategic. The PROPOL motives behind it are almost certainly limited and tactical, and may even be concerned primarily with smoothing the relations between the two centers of communist power. There is probably still a strategic basis for the professions of "respect" which Khrushchev, seemingly without irony, delivers to such "serious" capitalists as Rockefeller and Harriman.

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All that we would suggest here is that the Soviet estimate may be in a state of tactical flexibility, perhaps waiting to see what may develop in the United States after the elections, in Europe as it moves toward economic, and even political unity, and in the "former colonial areas" as their independence progresses and they react to the appeals of a Free World "Commonwealth." The Kremlin will adjust its estimate and its PROPOL as these unfold.

E. General Themes Derived from the Estimate of the Situation, and Policy Objectives

1. Triumph of Communism is inevitable. In the latest version of the new Communist bible, FOUNDATIONS OF MARXISM-LENINISM (1959), it is stated (Chapter 26) that "the building of socialism means the universal historic victory of the workers." This is merely one of the innumerable assertions which embody the prediction that the laws of historical materialism will make the triumph of "socialism" inevitable. Khrushchevism is distinguished from its predecessors by the intensity of its effort to translate the doctrine

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into practice. In the current view, Soviet society is approaching the transition from socialism (which has been achieved in the USSR) to Communism. This is possible not only because of the tremendous progress in creating the "material-technical base" for such a transition, but also as a result of the formation, since 1945, of the "world socialist system" or "socialist commonwealth." In other words, the doctrinal forecast of a Communist world-wide victory is now, in the opinion of the Soviet leaders, being implemented on the basis of the actual and potential power of the bloc, a vast camp of nearly one billion people.

On the other hand, the certain decline and fall of capitalist-imperialism, also forecast by the prophets of dialectical materialism, will occur with a speed proportionate to the increase of Communist power and influence. Although the Kremlin does not deceive itself - as Peking seems to do - about the might of the Western world, nevertheless the growing strength of the socialist camp indicates to Communist ideologists that the "decisive shift" of power in their

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favor is well established. Thus both in theory and practice, the Communist leaders are confident of the eventual triumph of Communism; they are not worried about the factor of time, because they are convinced that it is on their side.

2. Western "ruling circles" are the obstacle to a peaceful, prosperous world. In the Soviet view, and outwardly to a greater extent in that of the Chinese Communists, the intentions of the imperialist "class states" are not of a peaceful nature. Since a capitalist economy without an arms race would deteriorate, and since the "ruling circles," i. e. the "Pentagon" and "Wall Street;" are the principal usufructuaries of profits from arms manufacturing and the exploitation of workers, no genuine peace can be expected while these "circles" continue in power. Fearing that disarmament would eliminate their profits and topple their economic systems, they oppose the Communist demand for converting the arms industry to peaceful ends. This is at the bottom of their hatred toward Communism, whose growing prosperity they "frantically" try to undermine. The "people" of the capitalist states, however, are "peace-loving" and they are

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prevented from seeing their true interests only by the deceptive practices of their class masters.

3. Strength and Unity of the "Socialist Camp."

The strength and unity of the "world socialist system" is, in the Communist mode of expression, "calculated by its character to facilitate the fastest possible development of all countries entering into it." They may build socialism "independently" but they are also assured of fraternal assistance from the other members of the "camp." The nations of the "socialist commonwealth" are not in competition with one another but all strive to achieve the common goal. The fiction of individual sovereignty is maintained in international relations. Internally, the economies rest on another fiction, that not individuals but the entire society controls the means of production. The identity of ideological belief postulated for the "system" is thus supplemented with the identity of political and economic interests. Such monolithic purposefulness, the Communists feel, makes the socialist "camp" stronger than the capitalist "camp;" it is

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fully capable now of stopping the imperialist warmongers from aggressive action.

4. "Socialist" countries are disinterested friends of the under-developed world. While the Western colonialists remain attached to their principle of exploitation, the "world socialist system" is only interested in helping the former "colonial and semi-colonial" countries to achieve their national aspirations and to raise their social and economic standards. Against the Western profit motive, the Eastern position is solely one of altruistic and benevolent interest. Association with the Bloc means identification with the forces of "peace," whereas alliances with the "warmongering West" can only serve to continue the cold war. Imperialism will always try to re-enslave the newly liberated countries politically or economically, and to draw them into aggressive "military blocs" such as SEATO or CENTO.

5. "The greatest good for the greatest number." Communism, free from profit motivation, has no reason for tolerating the exploitation of man by man. It seeks to



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achieve a state of happiness for all people on earth. It has none but selfless motives and is confident that it is endowed, through Marxism-Leninism, with the tools to reach its objective. This goal, however, cannot be attained immediately but requires certain previous stages of development. The initial stage of "building socialism" is imperative; without it the "transition to Communism" is impossible, since the material-technical base would be inadequate. Peace, of course, is a conditio sine qua non, and thus it is incumbent on all peoples who aspire to happiness to break with imperialism and to frustrate its inherent greed and warlike intentions. Furthermore, it is necessary to follow Soviet guidance in "socialist construction" since only the USSR has had the "rich experience" to qualify for leadership toward Communism. (A limited but important guidance role is also prescribed for China).

F. The "Operational Code."

Among the intangible factors which govern the conduct of PROPOL, we may cite the complex of attitudes, habits

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and working principles which Nathan Leites has called the "Operational Code."<sup>1</sup> In large measure, as Leites has shown, this code is a heritage of Lenin and Stalin, but it has undergone important modifications, to the present day. These will be alluded to - necessarily in somewhat speculative terms - in our discussion.

We believe that such a code exists and that it establishes a general consensus among top communist leaders as to how to approach the difficulties growing out of "objective situations." Its development and application may be modified by the "working style" of the top leader, but its general

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<sup>1</sup> The Operational Code of the Politburo (New York, 1951) and A Study of Bolshevism (RAND Corporation, 1953). Leites may be described as the Machiavelli of Bolshevik political theory - unlike Machiavelli, observing from the outside. The first, short work is the counterpart of The Prince; the second, monumental work, rich with illustrative quotations, is the counterpart of the Discourses. It would seem desirable that Leites' work, which covers only the period to the death of Stalin, be extended to the era of Khrushchev. We believe that the former at least, and ideally the latter, should be the livre de chevet of all persons professionally concerned with the interpretation of Communist PROPOL. Our discussion in this section leans heavily on Leites' concepts, but goes beyond them in several lines of speculation.

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content displays a high degree of continuity with the classical era of Bolshevism. Probably the chief general feature of its latter-day development has been the increasing differentiation between its "exoteric" and its "esoteric" aspects.<sup>1</sup> There is a marked tendency toward secrecy as opposed to Lenin's - but not Stalin's - "frankness." This in turn opens up the possibility of deception, which can be practiced on the masses of the socialist countries, on the lesser Party cadres, and on the "enemy."<sup>2</sup> Despite the "frankness," which Khrushchev also professes in his "working style," the operational code certainly enjoins the use of "misinformation" and "intoxication."

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<sup>1</sup>In a different - primarily internal - frame of analysis, this distinction is explored by Hadley Cantril: Russian Leaders and the Human Image, Institute for International Research, (Princeton, N. J., 1960). He categorizes the principles of the leaders as "explicit" and "implicit."

<sup>2</sup>We believe that the role of deception in Communist PROPOL constitutes the area of our deepest ignorance. Intensive study is necessary on this subject; even the current "ideological controversy" between Communist China and the Soviet Union should be considered under the hypothesis that it may contain important elements of deception.

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Among the many important principles of the "code," we shall single out a few which bear especially on the effectiveness of Soviet PROPOL.

1. The "Fear of Annihilation." History "teaches" that the "capitalist-imperialist" and the "communist" systems are locked in mortal conflict. Lenin taught that one will destroy the other. There is no other possibility. Until the ultimate victory of "communism," there will always persist the danger that the movement may be completely destroyed. Consequently eternal "vigilance" is prescribed as the price of "advancing revolution."

It may be questioned, in the light of the Communist "estimate of the situation," whether the present Soviet leaders entertain the same lively apprehension on the score of annihilation as their predecessors. Nevertheless, there is no reason to suppose that they have lost their general respect for the death-dealing capacity of the enemy, at least in the military if not in the political and economic fields. Hence we must assume that their PROPOL continues to prescribe

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prudence and the avoidance of "adventurism." There may be a difference in judgment between the Chinese Communists and the Kremlin leaders as to the acceptability of risks in given tactical situations (Taiwan, Berlin), but it is difficult to foresee a contingency in which either would pursue uncontrolled "brinkmanship." Slogans such as "reactionaries and all imperialists are paper tigers" are in the nature of provocative taunts rather than confident cries of present victory.

2. Pressing to the Limit of Strength and Ability.

The Soviet "estimate of the situation" is predicated on confidence of victory, and dynamism in its pursuit. At the same time it probably imputes some loss of these qualities to the enemy. PROPOL is at all times forward pushing. Vacuums must be penetrated; opportunities, no matter how small, must be seized and exploited. There is a restlessness which works down from the Presidium through all the instrumentalities of propaganda and action. At times, even purposeless activity seems to be enjoined. This may be a

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preventive against the rust of inaction, against the atrophy of the cadres, which is always a danger in situations - such as Western Europe - where the possibility of revolutionary work is apparently foreclosed for a long time. It would seem that we must sometimes abandon the search for a real motive in a particular communist initiative, and rest on the assumption that it may be intended to "keep the franchise" or to "flex the muscle." Conversely, we should not be misled by prolonged talk of "relaxation." As recent events in Italy show, "distensione" can be converted to violence during the course of an evening of Togliatti with the Presidium leaders in a Moscow dacha.<sup>1</sup>

3. Advance and Retreat. The principle of "two steps forward, one step backward" is too well known to need elaboration. What we would suggest in the Western analysis of PROPOL is careful attention to the circumstances under which an aggressive line of thrust is halted. All too often, when the "heat is off," there is a tendency to assume that

<sup>1</sup> There could scarcely be found a more classic example of PROPOL than the selection of the Neo-Fascist issue to disrupt the rapprochement of the Center and the non-Communist left.

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it will stay off. "Thank God that is over!" But it would be imprudent to assume that either Khrushchev or - let us say - the "Laos Desk" in the Foreign Section of the CC apparatus, ever puts a mere "localized" operation into "deep freeze." It may go on the "back burner," but it still "cooks," while the "Cuba Desk" or the "Congo Desk" boils up.

It is possible that the present Communist leaders have a different attitude toward setbacks from their predecessors. Holding that there has been a "decisive shift in the world balance of power" in their favor, they may believe that they can continue to advance boldly on all fronts, subject of course to judicious variations in the line of thrust.

Nevertheless, it seems more likely that Khrushchev still believes in the classic Leninist-Stalinist doctrine of historical ebb and flow. Some setbacks may still be conceivable to him which could seriously postpone the day of victory, though probably few, if any, are conceivable which could bring annihilation.

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4. Pacta (non) Sunt Servanda. While there can be no question that morality remains that which is expedient to the power of the Party, current Communist doctrine may have evolved from Lenin's view of treaties as "pie crust, made to be broken." There may be a diminishing return in the process of violating international agreements, which even Khrushchev could not accept indefinitely. This would suggest that he is not likely to allow a negotiation to issue in a treaty which the logic of communist interest would later compel him to violate. A disturbing corollary of this would be that in most cases negotiation would not lead to agreement at all. The experience of the past few months (summit, Berlin, disarmament) seems to bear this out.

Accordingly, we may infer that a new tactical, if not strategic attitude toward international negotiations and treaties is emerging. On the one hand, the institutions and practices of international comity continue to have authority and currency. On the other hand, a certain diplomatic iconoclasm is being cultivated. The Monroe Doctrine is

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challenged and a "Bolshevik doctrine" counterposed to it, a challenge so outrageous that it can only be regarded as provocation. Even the United Nations is being "needled," not so deeply as to produce a revulsion within it, deeply enough to continue the tactic of partial discrediting which Khrushchev and the PROPOL apparat intermittently pursue.

There is some evidence from communist sources that the "world socialist system" under Moscow's leadership may be preparing a "commonwealth" matrix within which a rival - and in their calculation a successor - to the United Nations could be created.<sup>1</sup> This is a long range gambit, and Khrushchev may seek no more from it now than forcing the admission of Communist China or perpetuating the divisive effects of its exclusion. But his UN maneuvers display a versatility which suggests that he views himself as having a winning hand. Even when he is most preposterous -

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<sup>1</sup> SRS-10, The Socialist Commonwealth of Nations, (July 1959).

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charges of U-2 "aggression," the Congo - he is careful to balance his PROPOL with gestures of respect.

G. "The Style of Work"

This characteristic and frequently used communist term is applied to the activity of the entire party apparatus. At the basic cadre level it is used to prescribe the desired type of internal relation with the masses: close contact, sincerity, avoidance of rudeness, freedom from the abuses of bureaucracy and arbitrary action. At the top level, besides exemplifying the same internal virtues, the "style" reflects an image of the leadership in action, as it seeks to present itself to the external world. This image is integral to the conduct of PROPOL. We know what this implied in the case of Stalin. In the case of Khrushchev, the "style" needs further analysis, a searching psychological and political study of the man, such as has not yet been done. We may cite a few aspects of his "style" which have an important impact on the conduct of PROPOL.

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The most striking quality of the Khrushchev style is its dynamism. This is a composite of physical vitality - rendered "human" by visible brief punctuations of fatigue - zest for "life itself" and restless energy. This is communicated through his personal impact to PROPOL which is represented as the activity of a surging, buoyant, intense nation and society, "pressing to the limit."

From this inner dynamic radiates the aura of confidence. A key to Soviet PROPOL is the "habit of success," the inexorable drive to world mastery, which impels doubters and laggards and frightens the proponents of the status quo.

The "style" is also represented as being popular. In this, there is of course a sharp divergence from that of Stalin. The sheer personal magnetism of the leader is imprinted on the "consciousness" of the Soviet people, and this in turn is propagated abroad in innumerable forms, immensely energetic and engaging ballet and folk dance troupes, "slick" magazines with smiling, active faces from

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all racial and social groups. These are intended to establish an identity of the regime with the multi-national peoples of the Soviet Union, which will lend force, credibility and impact to its manifold activities in all parts of the world.

The style purports to be humane. This aspect of the image is presented in lofty theoretical projections of the "transition to communism" in which the material, moral, spiritual and cultural worth of the new Soviet man will afford a model to all mankind. It is translated into action down to the lowest level of demonstrative "baby-kissing" on Khrushchev's foreign tours. At a more serious level it is represented by such cultural diplomats as Ehrenburg, whose eulogies of France and Italy rank among the most penetrating and "sincere" appreciations of foreign critics. Even Khrushchev is careful - on his travels and after his return home - to include a note of praise for the climate, the natural beauty and the art forms of exotic lands - coupled, usually, with an occasional disparaging note (a "modern" statue at an Austrian dam, the crafts of Bali).

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The style is efficient. As far back as the '20s, Stalin held forth the ideal of "American practicality" as a trait to be appropriated, the more so since the Bolsheviks regarded its opposite as a congenital vice of Tsarist Russia. In this sense, a TU-104 making its first appearance at a New York airport - met by a landing ramp several feet too short - becomes a symbol of American inefficiency, serving the broad interest of PROPOL. The generally businesslike performance on technical projects - in spite of a few short-term failures - supports the claim of a potential to surpass the "working style" of capitalism in building up the underdeveloped countries.

On the other hand, the style is hard. Khrushchev does not attempt to present himself like his predecessor as a man of steel. But he constantly emphasizes that he is firm, blunt, a man of "no-nonsense." On occasion, and by deliberate calculation, this trait becomes intensified - the khamtstvo or boorish brutality of the Russian peasant. There is an important secondary doctrine of the Bolshevik code - "rudeness pays." It protects the perpetrator from being "sucked in" and

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"used." It disarms the antagonist, and lowers him in the eyes of bystanders, especially if he "can't take it." At the same time, a dialectical balance is maintained. If the offended person "stands his ground," especially if he "hits back," Khrushchev invariably switches to a bluff, jovial, tone of admiration (the Nixon encounter in Sokolniki Park). In the case of weaker individuals, especially if they are in no position to retort (Chancellor Raab), an ironic deprecation of rudeness completes the cycle of provocation.

Finally, an aspect which penetrates all others is versatility: "Anything you can do, I can do better" - or at least "well enough"! Khrushchev delights in demonstrating this in himself, the image of a Bolshevik uomo universale, different from Stalin in "style" but not in virtu. This manifests itself in many ways, his physical resilience, his mental elasticity, his calculated change of mood. Even when talking about an internal subject such as the change of priority from hydro- to thermal-electric power stations, or the advantages of square cluster planting and of hybrid

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corn (with a nod to Garst), he is consciously making a contribution to the immense fund of PROPOL images, a man heading a party, a government, a nation and an international movement, which can do anything.

H. Manipulative Principles and Methods

The "estimate of the situation," the "Marxist-Leninist matrix," the "working style" and the "operational code" provide the intellectual and psychological climate for the conduct of PROPOL. It remains to touch on a few of the techniques, devices and methods which are used to the end of manipulation. These obviously require much more thorough treatment at the hands of psychologists, social scientists and practicing operators in propaganda on our side. This aspect of our discussion of necessity deals more with the PRO and less with the POL, but even here they are inseparable.

1. The Big Lie is not a Lie! The engineers and artisans of PROPOL are well acquainted with Hitler's technique of the Big Lie. They utter it every day. And yet,

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there is a profound difference, because for them, it is instrumentally a lie only in the eyes and ears of the capitalists. To the communists, it is constructive truth, pravda. Within their concept of the "secular religion," that which advances the power of the party, and thereby the goal of world communism, is by definition both true and just. The classic example - and it is pure PROPOL - is the case of Hungary. The "revolution" had to be destroyed because it was "counter-revolution." Absurd as this proposition may seem to Western eyes - and in the eyes of the United Nations - it is not a falsehood to the Communists. It is an "objective" verdict.

2. The enemy can be disintegrated by scientific psychological manipulation. A simplified statement of this technique has recently been developed by British and American psychologists on the basis of Pavlov's experiment on dogs. On a more sophisticated level, it has recently been shown (by CIA/OSI) that advanced cybernetics techniques are being applied to the study of psychology with the aim of

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influencing and conditioning education and behavior in ways which will bring about the emergence of the "new Soviet man." There is evidence that this line of research - directed by the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat and its offshoot, the Academy of Social Sciences - is also being brought to focus on the conduct of international relations.

Although it would be premature to speculate on the extent to which this scientific manipulation technique will prove effective, it is possible to say now that planned, deliberate manipulation is basic to PROPOL. Perhaps the most clearly perceived objective is the creation of a neurotic situation, floating between extremes of anxiety and security. A striking example, of course, is the alternation between professions of "peaceful coexistence" - itself a manipulative device - and nuclear sabre-rattling. Over the past three or four years, it is as though the Kremlin had established a fund of apprehension, especially in Western Europe and Eastern Asia, in which a stream of increments have been deposited. These draw compound interest, and the fund

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has reached such proportions that its very existence could, during a severe crisis, cause runs on the banks of confidence in the Western alliance.

3. The use of economic "reinforcement." Here, too, principles of scientific psychology work hand in hand with simple economics. The primary technique is one of "positive reinforcement," the conditioning to planned favorable responses by the judicious distribution of material rewards. In this form of manipulation there are also techniques of withholding, building up economic attachments which can then be turned on and off with tantalizing effect, either to crush resistance or to create new commitment. There are negative approaches, such as disparaging Western economic aid, both as to quality and as to the motives of its dispensation. These are coupled by positive presentation of Soviet assistance - not "hand out" aid, gifts which corrupt and destroy self-respect, but businesslike loans and investments, "with no strings attached." It needs little argument to prove that this is one of the most powerful techniques of PROPOL.

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4. The judicious use of provocation. Leites argues convincingly that the fear of being provoked is an important feature of the Bolshevik code. Being successfully provoked, signifies that the victim has lost control of his own actions and is being "used." In the classic period of the "code," a similar attitude is imputed to the "serious bourgeoisie." Whether Khrushchev believes that present day "ruling circles of capitalism" are as wary - and successful as Lenin, and presumably Stalin, thought them to be - is moot. But it does seem clear that the current practice of PROPOL utilizes the provocative tactic. One aspect of this is the "mouse trap" (U-2); another is the use of demonstrably absurd charges of aggressive intent (Cuba, Congo), designed to elicit an angry denial which inevitably results in some of the mud sticking where it was thrown. The nimble use of provocation inevitably puts a more sedate or encumbered enemy at a disadvantage.

5. The Deceptively Simple. A technique of great effectiveness in Communist PROPOL is the advocacy of

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deceptively simple solutions to complex international problems. Since World War II, Moscow has originated a succession of these proposals - "Ban the bomb, " "Dissolve aggressive military blocs, " "Abolish foreign bases, " "Sign a peace treaty with Germany, " "Total disarmament. " These have relatively little impact among the politically influential groups in Western countries, but they appeal strongly to the less sophisticated leadership in other parts of the world and are applauded by the untutored masses. They sound practical: all that is required, as the communists point out, is the superseding of the "ruling circles, " "warmongers, " and "revanchists" in the centers of "capitalist imperialism. "

6. Complicating the Problem. Traditional diplomacy seeks to limit international controversies, both as to number of parties and as to matters in conflict. It hopes thereby to focus the issues and reduce them to diplomatic adjustment. The communist practice, however, is to involve as many states and interests as possible and to complicate the questions in dispute. This practice in its simplest

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form may be seen in the repeated attempts of the Soviet government to expand the membership of international conferences or to play the numbers game in the United Nations. Even if unsuccessful, the communists can claim to be the champions of the unrepresented countries. If successful, they have greatly complicated the task of the Western negotiators. The Soviet representatives, maintaining a fixed position and unaffected by the addition of other "socialist" governments, can play on the rivalries, vanities, and conflicting interests of their opponents. A corollary practice is connecting the unrelated, the bringing in of issues and problems for the purpose of arousing fear, prejudices, and antipathies among as many parties as possible. The technique was well illustrated in the Soviet declaration of 13 July on the Congo. Besides condemning the actions of Belgium, the United States, Great Britain, and France, disparaging the efforts of "the American Bunche" and the UN, and praising its own anti-imperialist record, Moscow got in licks at NATO, Chancellor Adenauer, foreign military bases, US-

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British intervention in Lebanon and Jordan, and the "plundering methods" of the imperialist powers in Latin America and Asia as well as Africa.

Conclusion

It is clear from our discussion that we place a high evaluation on the effectiveness of Communist policy and propaganda. We do not, of course, argue that it is infallible, or even that it is destined usually to get the best of us. The principal aim of this essay is to suggest that a continuing, intensive analysis of PROPOL is necessary, and that it should balance the purely Western approach with a perspective derived from Marxism-Leninism itself.

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