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**THE "SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS":  
Pattern for Communist World Organization**

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Pattern for Communist World Organization

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This is a speculative study which has been discussed with US Government intelligence officers but has not been formally coordinated. It is based on information available to SRS as of 11 June 1959.

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THE "SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS":  
Pattern for Communist World Organization.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The crisis which shook International Communism in 1956 - from the "secret" speech of Khrushchev denouncing Stalin to the bloody suppression of the Hungarian revolt - was met by the Communist leaders with a concerted drive for stabilization within the movement.<sup>1</sup> Two great Moscow conclaves have marked the successive advances and triumphs of this campaign: the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties assembled in celebration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the October Revolution (November 1957), and the XXI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (January-February 1959). Although the Congress was signalized primarily by the emergence of a new "personality cult" - that of Nikita Khrushchev - by the glorification of the new Seven Year Plan, and by the formulation of the "transition from socialism to communism," it was also the occasion for reaffirming the monolithic unity of International Communism and projecting the future pattern of governance of the "world socialist system."

2. The emergence of this "system," according to Communist statements, is a direct result of World War II; it is held to have brought about a "decisive shift" in the world balance of power. Prior to the War, there had been only one Communist state, the USSR, and International Communism consisted not of a system of states, but of a world-wide array of subservient parties, some operating legally, others clandestinely, under the general control of the Soviet-dominated

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<sup>1</sup>For a discussion of the earlier phases of this process, see SRS-6, The Prospects of World Communism: The Dialectic of Crisis and Stabilization (16 September 1957).

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Comintern. The dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 was primarily a gesture to mollify the Soviet Union's wartime allies; it was also the recognition that post-war Communism would require a new form of direction, not yet clear in outline.

3. Indeed, the prospects confronting Stalin in the first post-war years may well have surpassed his earlier dreams. Whereas during the previous fifteen years he had been engrossed in "building socialism in one country," he was now about to extend his writ over the expanded empire of the European satellites in which, under the guise of "people's democracies," Communist governments were coming to power in rapid succession. China, sweeping toward conquest of the mainland, and already casting its shadow over the future Asiatic satellites - North Korea and North Vietnam - would soon be pressing for a share in the control of the Bloc.

4. To cope with the expansion of the "socialist system," a successor to the Comintern was devised, the Cominform (1947) which disseminated the directives of the Kremlin through the more restricted medium of an authoritative Journal, "For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy." But, in a shorter space of time than its predecessor, the Cominform outlived its usefulness and was dissolved (1956) both as a concession to its critics and as a measure of preparation for a new dispensation.

5. The past two years may be regarded as a sort of interregnum. The classic links and channels of the movement - embassies, Communist parties, front organizations and cultural or economic missions - have been reinforced by the extensive use of bilateral and multilateral party meetings, highlighted by dramatic Communist "summit" conferences. But a formal governing entity has not emerged.

6. In the light of the most recent development it has become increasingly apparent that the leaders of the movement

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are seeking a new and more effective mechanism for maintaining unity and control. After the 1956 upheavals, the Kremlin appeared for a time to favor the establishment of a Comintern-type of organization, or at least a modified Cominform, but this met with considerable opposition, especially among Communist leaders outside the Bloc. It would seem that Moscow, acknowledging the validity of these objections, has cast about for some new form of association which would emphasize the "sovereign" and "independent" nature of the participant states.

7. In pursuit of this objective, the Kremlin has given currency to a relatively new term, the Commonwealth of Socialist Nations - sodruzhestvo sotsialisticheskikh stran - or states - gosudarstv. The term sodruzhestvo is derived from a Stalinist usage limited in application to the USSR; its extension to the international sphere dates from the end of 1955, and its official propagation from the height of the 1956 crisis. The concept has been elaborated with a degree of subtlety and circumspection which has resulted in its being generally ignored or overlooked in the Free World. And yet, it appears to contain the germ of an institutional form within which the Marxist-Leninist imperium may move toward the goal of the "world socialist system, " a nascent Communist "United Nations" as the organizational framework for the "transition from socialism to Communism."

8. This essay is a contribution to the historical, semantic, organizational and ideological study of the Socialist Commonwealth. In our judgment, this analysis justifies the speculative conclusion that the Soviet Union, and possibly Communist China, may in the not too distant future utilize this concept to establish some form of federative union with their satellites which would pose questions of vital significance to the security of the United States and the Free World.



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## II. BACKGROUND

### The First International

9. The idea of an international revolutionary association is not an exclusive property of the Communists. Even before the unrest of 1848, French, Italian and German groups, led by Blanqui, Mazzini and Marx-Engels respectively, attempted to create a revolutionary International. It was not, however, until 1864 that the International Working Men's Association was founded under the organizational direction and theoretical guidance of Marx and Engels and with the support of British trade unions. This, the First International, was destined to last only eight years and to achieve nothing beyond creating a historic precedent. A split between Marxists and the Bakuninists (Anarchists) proved disastrous, although the Bakuninist faction showed remarkable stamina, collapsing only at the end of the Spanish Civil War (1939).

### The Second International

10. Established in Paris in 1889, the Second "Socialist" International adopted what amounted to the "national roads to socialism" principle. It was both a representative organization of the ever stronger trade unions and a debating association for orthodox Marxists (Bebel), revisionists (Bernstein), and extreme leftists (Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg). As the events of the Paris Commune (1871) had led to the undoing of the First International, so World War I contributed to the decline of the Second International. For most Socialists the call of national patriotism triumphed over international solidarity, though many condemned and opposed the war. In the 1920 Vienna Congress a split occurred between the patriots and the pacifists. The former reconstituted the International, the latter established a competing organization. In spite of the Comintern's divisive tactics, the two factions merged in 1923, but


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the Second International was already in a decline. Breaking down entirely during World War II it was gradually restored after 1946. In 1947 a Committee of the International Socialist Conference (Comisco) was set up in England, consisting of one representative of each member party. In 1951, the Socialist International itself was reconstituted in Frankfurt, Germany. Its program was "democratic socialism." In 1953 the Asian Socialist Conference was established in Rangoon, following the model of Comisco.

The Third International, (Comintern)

11. The Third Communist International (Comintern), which had been advocated by Lenin as early as 1914, was founded in Moscow in 1919. Since, at the time of its establishment, the Socialist parties eligible to participate were all but bankrupt throughout Europe, the Russian section of the Comintern became dominant at the outset. The "twenty-one conditions" of membership, outlining radical Leninist tactics, were laid down and a frontal assault against the Vienna International was begun. Since the Comintern's original impact had greatly diminished by 1922, United Front tactics, aimed at absorbing the Socialists, were initiated by the Communists. From Lenin's incapacitation to Stalin's consolidation of power - roughly 1922 to 1928 - internecine struggles within the Russian factions and among Russian and non-Russian Communists all but crippled the Comintern. The struggle between Stalin and the Trotsky-Zinoviev "left wing," which had dominated the Moscow World Congress in 1924, led to the victory of the former and the ouster of the "left wings" in all Communist parties as "Trotskyite." From then on, the Comintern's development followed Stalinist lines until its dissolution in 1943.

12. As noted above, the dissolution of the Comintern cost the Kremlin little and paid handsomely in terms of world propaganda at a critical stage of World War II. The explanation of the Comintern Presidium that "the organizational form"



of the Comintern had "more and more become outgrown by the movement's development and by the increasing complexity of its problem in various countries" was euphemistic but basically true. Inter-party communications were dislocated. Resistance to Comintern policies outside the USSR and Soviet occupied territory could not be dealt with effectively. Moreover, the Bolsheviks probably had not expected the non-Soviet Communist parties to emerge from the war with unimpaired strength, and may have felt that in the immediate post-war period World Communism could be ruled from Moscow without formal organization. From the Western point of view, the dissolution of the Comintern promised an end to the two pronged Soviet offensive - governmental and party - and appeared to the unwary to indicate that the Kremlin was no longer planning world revolution. This of course was far from being the case.

13. Indeed, the prospects for the expansion of the Communist imperium which the Kremlin faced in 1945 presented both a challenge and a new set of organizational problems. Whereas in the past the Soviet Communist Party had been the only party governing a national state, Communist parties in Eastern Europe were put in charge by the USSR and were given, at least to some degree, the responsibilities of government. In Western Europe, the French and Italian Communist parties had emerged from the war with a mass following and an acceptance by the voters so wide that their taking over authority was not inconceivable; they remained formidable even after their chance of staging a successful revolution had passed. On the China mainland, the Communists were rapidly coming to power through military victory. In short, the prospect of a Communist empire stretching from the Atlantic across Eurasia to the Pacific was bright, yet no adequate organizational provisions for central control of a monolithic Communist bloc had been made.

The Cominform

14. The problem of directing Communist activity from Moscow was not serious in the countries under Soviet military occupation. Behind the lowered Iron Curtain, the Kremlin proceeded to apply the rules of the book, and before long the local Communists became effective instruments of Soviet rule.

15. As this process advanced, Stalin decided to establish a new international organization to further the consolidation of World Communism. As charter members along with the East European satellites, he included the French and Italian parties, unquestionably in deference to their potentialities for advancing the Communist cause in Europe. Established in 1947 under Zhdanov's leadership, the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) initiated a new phase of aggressive revolutionary actions, notably the Czech coup (February 1948) and the wave of political strikes in France. The initial activities of the Cominform quickly disabused those who might have regarded the Comintern's dissolution as signalling the end of the world revolutionary drive of International Communism.

16. Yet the Cominform as an instrument for strengthening and guiding the Soviet empire had a short life. After the expulsion of Yugoslavia following the break between Stalin and Tito in 1948, the Cominform subsided into a device for transmitting Communist propaganda directives. The strategy and tactics of International Communism remained under the direct control of the Kremlin, which utilized the customary channels of instruction and supervision. In April 1956, the Cominform was officially dissolved. Its demise may be attributed in part to the desire of the post-Stalin Soviet leaders both to heal the rift in the Communist camp caused by Tito's deviation and to

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please certain neutralists such as Nehru and U Nu. Moscow probably also recognized that the Cominform had become a rump organization, lacking the potentiality of exploiting the opportunities for Communist proselyting among the uncommitted countries. An ostensible reason for the dissolution was provided by the policy, set forth at the XX CPSU Congress (February 1956), of permitting "national roads to socialism."

17. The Comintern and the Cominform - each in its time and within the context of existing conditions - had been fully exploited by the Kremlin. When their usefulness had dwindled, they were liquidated. However, this did not imply a belief that International Communism could dispense with a mechanism for international control. The question was only what type of organization would be most suitable.

III. PROSPECTS FOR NEW COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS

18. We may assume that the Soviet leaders have seriously considered the establishment of a new organization along Comintern lines. It would conform to their classic pattern of control and might perpetuate the dominance of the CPSU in the movement. Yet, there is evidence that realistic considerations have led to the adoption of a more cautious and tentative course. Since the primary effort of 1957 and 1958 was toward stabilization of the international movement, any attempt to reimpose an institution which had been associated with Stalinist dictation would be certain to create new difficulties and perhaps even upheavals.

19. A number of major parties were clearly opposed to a revived Comintern or Cominform. China, which had been accorded a sort of co-equality with the USSR as early as February 1955 would probably not have joined any new organization which implied Soviet hegemony, and this would have eliminated the Far Eastern satellites as well. Yugoslavia obviously could not be persuaded to participate. Poland was intent on pursuing its own "road to socialism." Outside the Bloc, Togliatti, who had been shaken by Khrushchev's revelation of Stalin's crimes and who had played with the idea of "polycentrism," was clearly unenthusiastic over the prospect that "foreign" - specifically, Moscow - direction would complicate his task of maintaining the PCI as the leading mass party in the Free World.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, there were Communist leaders

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<sup>1</sup> In an interesting description of the session of the Comintern Presidium at which Stalin dictated the dissolution of the body, Veljko Vlahovitch, a Yugoslav Communist, states that Togliatti had already raised the idea of "polycentrism," i. e. regional cooperation of parties in similar situations, such as the French, Spanish and Italian, the Scandinavian, or the Central European Communist Parties. Kommunist (Belgrade, 20 April 1959) quoted in BEIPI (16-30 May 1959), p. 8.

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who reportedly advocated the creation of a new world organization, notably Ulbricht (East Germany), Novotny (Czechoslovakia) and Hoxha (Albania). The French Communists, under their Stalinist leader Thorez, and the Spanish Communists in exile, were also in favor of tighter central direction. Some of the minor parties, such as the Dutch and the Danish, suffered factional splits over the issue of Moscow control.

20. Possible international repercussions outside the Communist Parties may also have weighed in the decision not to create a new organization at this time. Any reinstatement of a Comintern, or even of a Cominform, dominated by the USSR, would imply a reaffirmation of the immutable objective of world revolution, arousing thereby the suspicions and fears of the highly nationalistic "uncommitted" nations and defeating the theme of "relaxation of tensions" and progress toward the "summit." Soviet foreign policy objectives would be better served by prospective successes in the political, economic and technological fields. These could be counted on to provide a telling admonition to wavering Communists to hew to the line if they wished to participate in the fruits of victory. The appeal of "different roads to socialism" to fellow travelers and to leftist-oriented governments outside the Bloc was not to be sacrificed out of hand.

21. It must have appeared to the Soviet leaders, moreover, that a potential lay before them, broader and more alluring than any accession of power which a reversion to Stalinist methods could attain. With the Sino-Soviet Bloc now comprising nearly a third of the earth's population, and dominating most of the Eurasian land mass, the geopolitical factors were auspicious. A new confidence infused both the Soviet and the Chinese leadership. The problem was to establish a conceptual framework sufficiently vast and flexible to contain the organizational structure within which World Communism could be achieved. It is apparently with this vision in mind that the Soviet leaders and theorists have gradually unfolded the idea of a Commonwealth of Socialist Nations.

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#### IV. THE CONCEPT OF SODRUZHESTVO

22. The concept of sodruzhestvo requires careful historical and semantic analysis. Soviet theorists do not use words casually, especially when they indicate trends or intentions. An attempt will be made to demonstrate in detail that this term is pregnant with ideological and political content, even though its organizational form is as yet imperfectly delineated.

23. The word itself is of relatively recent origin and has been derived as a perfective form druzhestvo from druzhiba - friendship. The prefix so denotes association. The compound, therefore, indicates association in friendship. As such, the word sodruzhestvo is quite different from the English term commonwealth, which implies a commonality of welfare. Nevertheless, the latter is the official communist translation of the former, and, for the purpose of our analysis, will be treated as its equivalent.<sup>1</sup>

24. It is of some interest to note that Soviet political glossaries, dictionaries and encyclopedias until quite recently have not introduced the term in its broad connotation. Thus in Ushakov's dictionary of 1940 sodruzhestvo is defined as "friendship" of the "socialist nations."<sup>2</sup> There is no reference to the British Commonwealth of Nations. On the other hand, Smirnitsky's dictionary, while following Ushakov's interpretation of "collaboration, cooperation, friendship of socialist nations" also defines the British Commonwealth<sup>3</sup> as a sodruzhestvo. The second edition of the Great Soviet

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<sup>1</sup>In non-Communist translations, sodruzhestvo is sometimes incorrectly rendered as community, family, etc.

<sup>2</sup>D. N. Ushakov, ed. Tolkovyi Slovar Russkogo Iazyka, Vol. IV (Moscow, 1940).

<sup>3</sup>A. I. Smirnitskii, Russko-Angliiskii Slovar (Moscow, 1952).



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Encyclopedia uses the word druzhba to describe the "fraternal collaboration, political, economic, cultural and military mutual assistance of peoples of the USSR, enjoying equal rights and voluntarily associated into a single socialist state."<sup>1</sup> In general, Soviet writers avoid referring to the British Commonwealth as a sodruzhestvo and prefer to call it the "British Empire."

25. The word sodruzhestvo as an extension of druzhba appears to have been given some currency by Stalin during World War II. Subsequently its use was further generalized and extended, initially, however, only with reference to the USSR as a "sodruzhestvo (friendship) of Socialist peoples."

26. The broader application of the term to include all socialist countries appears to date from the post-Stalin period. In this connection it is important to note that its primary application, at least initially, was to the association of nations (natsii), countries (strany), or people (narody), rather than of governments or states (gosudarstva). In no case is it applicable to "capitalist" nations or states, whose collaboration is usually described in negative terms as military blocs or as agreement for the exploitation of backward countries.

27. One may recall that Communists - including Trotskyites and Titoists, as well as orthodox Leninists - have generally accepted Stalin's definition of a nation as

. . . a historically constituted, stable community of a people, formed on the basis of the common possession of four principal characteristics, namely: a common language, a common territory, a common

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<sup>1</sup>Vol. XV, p. 238.

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economic life and a common psychological make-up manifested in common specific features of national culture.<sup>1</sup>

28. Pursuing the terminological analysis somewhat deeper, we may recall that Stalin, developing and supplementing Lenin's doctrine, introduced the subdivisions of "capitalist" and "socialist" nations. The latter are "nations of a new type," of which the Soviet Union is the "fatherland." They arose "on the basis of the old capitalist nations by a process of basic transformation." This process has created the "peoples' democracies" of Europe and Asia, each of which follows a course of development peculiar to its concrete historical, social and political conditions. It has been elaborated by Communist literature with a wealth of reference material.

29. The ideological root of the sodruzhestvo concept is Marxist-Leninist "proletarian internationalism," which combats "bourgeois nationalism" and aims at its overthrow throughout the world. The unfolding of the concept may be traced through three major historical stages:

a. The revolutionary stage (1917-22), characterized by the destruction of the former capitalist-imperialist state of Czarist Russia and launching the slogan of the "right of nations to self-determination." This was the period of constructing a transitory internal federation based on the unity of the proletariat under the leadership of its vanguard, the Communist party, and the preparation for the emergence of a united socialist state. The First Congress of the Soviets of the Union, on 30 December 1922, declared:

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<sup>1</sup> "The National Question and Leninism," Works, II, 348. Of course, Stalin's definition is not in conflict with that which has been generally accepted by Western political scientists.

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"The peoples of the Soviet Republics met recently in the congresses of their respective Soviets and unan-  
imously adopted resolutions to form a Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics. Their decision, as peoples exer-  
cising equal rights, is conclusive proof of the volun-  
tary nature of their unification. The resolutions give  
every republic the right to secede from the Union, and  
allow all other Soviet Socialist Republics, both present  
and future, to join it if they choose. The new Union  
state will be a worthy expression of the basic principles  
of peaceful coexistence and fraternal cooperation laid  
down in October 1917. It will be a true bulwark against  
world capitalism, and a new and decisive step toward  
the unification of the toilers of all countries into a  
World Soviet Socialist Republic. <sup>1</sup>"

The Comintern began the propagation of "proletarian  
Internationalism" outside Russia as the ideological  
means for actualizing world revolution in the Soviet  
image.

b. The formation of the "sodruzhestvo" of the  
peoples of the USSR (1923-1945). Out of the multi-  
national federation of the revolutionary period, a uni-  
fied state was created, possessing common political,  
military, social and economic objectives. On the world  
front, the Comintern continued to work in the interests  
of the CPSU, preparing the way for extension of the  
revolution within the capitalist system.

c. Beginning at the end of World War II and con-  
tinuing to the present, the third stage may be described

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<sup>1</sup> Klyuchnikov and Sabanin, Mezhdunarodnaya Politika Nov-  
eishego Vremeni V Dogovorakh, Notakh i Deklaratsiakh,  
(Moscow, 1925-29) III, 226.

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as the construction of the "world socialist system" within which the "sodruzhestvo of socialist nations" emerges on an international scale. The projection of the latter will be developed in the remainder of this paper. It is first necessary, however, to illustrate the step by step elaboration of the term itself in Communist writings and statements.

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V. THE POST-STALIN DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF SODRUZHESTVO.

30. Stalin's contribution to the idea of a Socialist Commonwealth - as we have noted above - appears to have been confined largely to the development of the Soviet Union as an association of co-friendship among its numerous nationalities.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, he laid the groundwork for the international extension of the concept, especially in his statements at the XIX CPSU Congress (1952) on the consequences of the existence of the two rival "world systems" - socialism and capitalism.

31. At the end of 1955 this broader concept was explicitly stated by the CPSU in connection with the castigation of Molotov's ideological "error":

The foreign policy of the CPSU is based on Leninist principles - the struggle for peace and the peaceful coexistence of socialist and capitalist systems. The policy is formulated with full consideration for the profound changes which have occurred as the result of the second World War and post-war developments and which are reflected in the deepening general crisis of capitalism, in the formation of the great commonwealth of socialist states, in the disintegration of the colonial system and the powerful movement of the peoples for strengthening peace . . .

The formation of a mighty commonwealth of socialist states represented a great, universally historical achievement of the peoples of these countries . . .

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. especially "On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union," 1946 and following editions.

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The commonwealth of socialist states is the mighty bulwark of all laboring humanity.<sup>1</sup>

32. The XX CPSU Congress, though it did not stress the term sodruzhestvo, contributed basic themes to the expansion of the "world socialist system." Strengthening "fraternal relations with the people's democracies" would lead to the "development and fortification of fraternal ties with the toilers of all countries." Acknowledgment of "different roads to socialism," which contributed so powerfully to the Polish and Hungarian crises, laid the basis for the theme of "unity in diversity," which, with variations of emphasis - chiefly on unity - , has informed communist utterances ever since.

33. As the crisis over Stalin sharpened, and Communists throughout the world demanded a "Marxist explanation" of his crimes, the CPSU was forced to respond with an ideological stop-gap, the 30 June 1956 Resolution of the Central Committee. This Resolution reaffirmed the principal theses of the XX CPSU Congress, and specifically mentioned in the first sentence the sodruzhestvo.

34. The 30 October 1956 "Declaration of the Government of the USSR on the Basic Factors in the Development and Further Consolidation of Friendship and Cooperation among the Soviet Union and other Socialist States" - written in apparent haste to quiet the upheavals in Hungary and Poland - presented the first official definition of sodruzhestvo:

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<sup>1</sup> Kommunist, No. 14 (October 1955), pp.4-7 (emphasis on commonwealth supplied here and in subsequent quotations). This is the same issue which contains Molotov's own recantation of his "error" in not recognizing that the "building of socialism" had been completed in the USSR, the first step in his decline.

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United by the common ideal of building a socialist society and by the principles of proletarianism, the countries of the great commonwealth of socialist nations can build their relations only on the basis of complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, national independence and sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. This does not preclude, but on the contrary, presupposes close fraternal cooperation and mutual understanding among the countries of the socialist commonwealth in the economic, political and cultural fields.

35. The next stage in the unfolding of the Commonwealth called for a statement, not merely of the CPSU, but of all Communist parties of the Bloc. The occasion was provided by the celebration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution (Moscow, November 1957). The "Declaration of the Conference of the Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries" proclaimed:

The Socialist states are united into one sodruzhestvo, by having entered upon the common path to socialism, by a common class substance of their social and economic system and state authority, and by the need for mutual support and aid, by a community of interests and objectives in the struggle against imperialism and for the victory of socialism and communism, and by a Marxist-Leninist ideology common to them all.

36. It is apparent that this Commonwealth now includes the Peoples' Democracies and is no longer restricted to the one state which had completed the "building of socialism," the USSR. All of these twelve states are governed by certain "common laws," which the Declaration spelled out

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in classic Communist terms. With this formal definition in solemn conclave, the Commonwealth may be said to have been officially launched, not as an institution with precise organizational contours, but as a broad, vague concept susceptible of varying interpretation and emphasis.

37. During the first few months of 1958, there appears to have been relative silence on the sodruzhestvo in the press and official statements, but, since June of that year there has been a steady flow of utterances by authoritative Soviet leaders and theorists. A number of citations are presented in Annex I to establish the currency of the term and to illustrate its Protean aspects.

38. Inevitably, in the wake of such an authoritative statement as that of the November 1957 Declaration, the line of theory, agitation and propaganda has systematically eulogized the Commonwealth theme. Numerous books and articles have appeared, amplifying and bringing the changes on the basic theme laid down by the 1957 Moscow Declaration. A number of these are summarized or listed in Annex II.

39. It may be significant that several recent articles in Pravda have featured the word sodruzhestvo in the title, while using it scarcely or not at all in the text. This is particularly striking in the case of an article by A. Kosygin, Chief of Gosplan. Although the title reads "The Great Commonwealth of the Socialist Countries," all references are to the "world socialist system" or the "camp" except for the last sentence which speaks of the "great sodruzhestvo of the socialist states (gosudarstv).<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, Y. Andropov in a discussion of the "Theoretical Problems of the Construction of Communism" under the title "Development and

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<sup>1</sup> Pravda, 28 April 1959, p. 3.

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Strengthening of the World Socialist System" describes the system as a commonwealth, using almost verbatim the language of the 1957 Moscow Declaration.<sup>1</sup>

40. One of the most reliable indications of the weight attached to a term or concept is to be found in the slogans which appear in connection with the anniversary of the October Revolution and the May Day celebration. Subtle, tactically significant variations of emphasis characterize these semi-annual exercises, and the use of sodruzhestvo is no exception to the rule. In Annex III there are listed the slogans since 1957 in which it is hailed. The wording of the latest May Day slogan (No. 12) is as follows:

Hail to the world socialist system, the indestructible bulwark of peace and the security of the peoples!  
May the great commonwealth of the countries of the socialist camp grow stronger and flourish!

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<sup>1</sup>Pravda, 24 April 1959, p. 2;

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VI. THE RELATIONSHIP OF "SYSTEM, " "CAMP, " AND "COMMONWEALTH"

41. It is apparent that the "world socialist system, " the "camp, " and the sodruzhestvo are to a certain extent overlapping or interchangeable terms. They constitute a triad, a sort of unity in trinity, in which the specific differentiae are not always immediately clear. Indeed, one is tempted to assume that in many cases the usage of an individual writer or speaker may be dictated by habit rather than by precise intention.

42. The close interrelation of the three terms can be illustrated from numerous recent theoretical writings. A single example will suffice:

The transformation of socialism into a world system, the formation and consolidation of the great socialist camp, is the defining factor of the present-day stage of social relations . . . In this lies the source of strength and the inviolability of the socialist Commonwealth.<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, the three terms have distinct connotations, which are carefully pondered in theoretical statements and in propaganda.

43. The "world socialist system" is variously described as "a fact, " as an historic event of crucial importance, as the product of a transformation in which the first two or three post-war years were decisive. In the broadest sense,

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<sup>1</sup> "The World System of Socialism, an Indestructible Bastion of Peace and the Security of Peoples, " Pravda, 21 April 1959.

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it is perhaps best to view it as an ideological framework, the incorporation and consolidation of nations under the aegis of a "secular religion" which aspires to world totality. As such, the term is charged with a sort of "mystique," but it is not vested with a specific organizational form.

44. Similarly, the "socialist camp" is not conceived as a concrete organization. Rather, as its origin in the German word Lager implies, it is an expression of militancy. One body of fighters faces another in hostile array. The "socialist camp" is portrayed both defensively and aggressively. It is a monolithic unity of "peace-loving" peoples confronted by an implacable and aggressive adversary. Against the provocations and aggressions of the "imperialists," the "socialist camp" will deliver a "decisive rebuff." It is within this concept that the communists have developed their now classic tactic of alternating military threats with blandishments and professions of "peaceful coexistence."

45. Unlike the other two, the sodruzhestvo contains an implicit principle of organizational unity, a nascent structural concept. Its usefulness is still being explored, its specific forms are being derived empirically, and its propagation is still tentative.

46. One may be tempted to evaluate the significance of these three concepts in terms of the relative frequency with which they are used. On the basis of a statistical sample of Soviet editorials, articles and speeches it is apparent that both the "system" and the "camp" predominate heavily over "commonwealth." Nevertheless, the relative infrequency of the term sodruzhestvo does not indicate that it is less significant. The fact, which we have noted above, that it is increasingly featured in headlines or book titles, even though its use in the text may be sparing, suggests that it is being "groomed," as it were, for more intensive development.

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## VII. THE IMAGE OF THE COMMONWEALTH

47. From the analysis and quotations already presented, it is possible to sketch the broad outlines of the Socialist Commonwealth, as Soviet propagandists would have it apprehended.

48. The guiding ideological principle is, of course, "proletarian internationalism," first worked out by Marx and Engels, and "creatively" developed by Lenin. Under this principle, there is no room for "bourgeois nationalism," the false patriotism instilled by capitalist exploiters into the working class of their countries. Soviet propaganda extols the special form of "nationalism," which has been cultivated within the USSR, and which is held to be the prototype of the broader relationship that will one day flourish among all countries. Thus Khrushchev, in his keynote speech at the XXI CPSU Congress, declared:

The Soviet Union is a multinational socialist state based on the friendship of equal peoples united by a single will . . . The commonwealth of socialist nations is the source of the growth of strength and might of the multinational socialist state.

The Uzbek Mukhiditnov - the Presidium's expert on national minorities - in his 30 January speech at the Congress echoed the theme:

In a multinational country like ours, one of the most important conditions for successful struggle for the victory of communism is the consistent pursuit of an internationalist national policy . . . In our country national relations have been harmoniously developing on the basis of the principles of the great commonwealth of all nations, the inviolable foundation of the Soviet state.

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49. Soviet doctrinal writings on the Commonwealth rely heavily on the so-called Pancha-Shila or Five Points of the Bandung Conference (1955). The relations of the states in the sodruzhestvo are based on "equality, respect for territorial integrity, political independence and sovereignty and non-intervention in each other's affairs."<sup>1</sup> In the atmosphere of "peaceful coexistence," all countries, big and small, are equal, regardless of their advance or backwardness on the road to socialism. No country enjoys any special privileges. The concern of all is with fraternal cooperation and mutual assistance.

50. Soviet propagandists of course cannot refrain from stressing the leading role of the USSR, its wealth of revolutionary experience, and its "great ideological strength" as the "guard and citadel of the liberation movement throughout the world." This theme is interwoven with praise of Soviet economic power, second only to that of the United States, which enables the USSR to set aside "substantial resources for the allocation of the aid which the Socialist countries need, without pursuing commercial self-interest."<sup>2</sup>

51. But the theme of Soviet pre-eminence, which is strong in discussions of the "camp" is relatively muted in the Commonwealth. Rather, the emphasis is on the bonds of Marxist-Leninist ideology which tie together the aspiring peoples of socialism in their striving to create a "glorious future for mankind." In this sense, sodruzhestvo is presented as the embodiment of humanity's fondest dreams.

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<sup>1</sup> S. Sanakoyev, "The Basis of the Relations between the Socialist Countries," International Affairs, No. 7 (July 1958) p. 25.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 29.

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VIII. CURRENT FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST ORGANIZATION

52. Having presented evidence that the concept of sodruzhestvo is being consciously developed by the Communist leaders as a matrix for the international organization of the "world socialist system," we shall now discuss the principal concrete forms which have been utilized so far, and then endeavor to project them into the future. It is understood that both party and government institutional forms are under discussion; these may merge, overlap and diverge according to the situation. The important role which China plays in manipulating these organizational developments must also be considered.

53. Three principal topics will be analyzed: (a) The use of the system of bilateral and multilateral conferences; (b) The creation of an international journal; (c) Adaptation of existing Bloc institutions - the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) and the Warsaw Pact.

A. The Conference System

54. The 30 October 1956 Declaration, as observed above, marked the first official proclamation by the CPSU of the sodruzhestvo concept, and at the same time it may be said to have constituted the first step in the campaign to stabilize the International Communist Movement after the disturbance created by de-Stalinization and the upheavals in Poland and Hungary. The Declaration was also a concession to the pressure for more nearly equal treatment of the individual states and Communist parties of the Bloc.

55. During the year which followed the Declaration, more than one hundred and fifty bilateral and multilateral conferences were held, for the most part in capitals of the Bloc. Many of these were attended by representatives

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of Free World Communist parties, who in turn passed on the line to other parties outside the Bloc.

56. The effectiveness of this series of conferences soon became apparent. In monotonous succession they produced declarations of "identity of views" on the Hungarian "counter-revolution," on the need for loyal cooperation with the CPSU and other parties, and on the insidious dangers of Titoism and "revisionism" in general. The ideological and organizational campaign was intensified, spurred on by promises of economic assistance to the sometimes hard-pressed satellite regimes.

57. With the growing manifestation of cohesion and solidarity in the parties and front organizations, the question of a central Comintern type of organization was thoroughly canvassed, and, as noted above, at least temporarily set aside. The Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of November 1957, reportedly decided that the system of bilateral, multilateral and "plenary" conferences was sufficient to insure coordination.<sup>1</sup> This decision was duly reflected in subsequent theoretical utterances:

It is natural that the Communist and Workers' Parties in the socialist camp deem it their duty to formulate a single point of view on the most important problems of socialist construction and on the struggle for peace. They are unanimous in believing that, in line with bilateral meetings of leaders and the exchange of in-

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. V. M. Churayev, On Party Unity (Moscow, 1958): The participants in the Moscow Conference "exchanging opinions, decided that there is no current need for creating any kind of international body of communism like the past Comintern or Cominform" (emphasis supplied).

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formation, it is expedient as far as possible, to conduct even more extensive conferences of Communist and Workers' Parties to deliberate on actual problems, to exchange experiences and to coordinate action in the joint struggle for peace, democracy and socialism.<sup>1</sup>

B. The Creation of an International Journal

58. Although the establishment of a new Cominform or Cominform was deemed inadvisable, a decision was made, probably at the Moscow Conference, to establish an authoritative international journal in order to provide guidance for the movement. It is not known whether there was any serious opposition to this step. According to Pravda (7-8 March 1958) the organization meeting at Prague was attended by representatives of "some" Communist countries. Those parties which did not partake in the founding meeting are to be given "an opportunity to join on an equal footing or take part in the publication and work of the journal in any form that suits them."

59. The new journal is now being published in fifteen languages and bears the title Problems of Peace and Socialism.<sup>2</sup> Its editor is Alexei Rumyantsev, a Khrushchev protege, who is a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU and a former editor of the authoritative Soviet theoretical journal, Kommunist.

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<sup>1</sup> Ye. Yuskov, "The Socialist Camp - A Mighty Union of Fraternal Nations," Kommunist, No. 11 (1958). Although this article stresses the "camp," it also identifies it with the "fraternal sodruzhestvo of nations in a new socialist order, in a new economic structure."

<sup>2</sup> Several of the foreign languages are not printed in Prague and some have different titles, the English as well as the American edition being World Marxist Review.

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60. It is still too early to evaluate this successor to For a Lasting Peace! For a People's Democracy! So far its impact appears to have been slight, and its approach is more cautious than that of the defunct Cominform journal. Nevertheless, it provides a medium to display the leading personalities and theorists of International Communism on an implied footing of equality. It does set forth a central line, though hardly one which differs from that appearing in Pravda, Kommunist, International Affairs, New Times, and other readily available Soviet periodicals. In time, it may become more than a merely "theoretical and informative" organ of the movement and provide an authoritative interpretation of Soviet policies, a guidance for the "socialist camp" and a cement of ideological unity. So far, its articles have not emphasized the Commonwealth.

C. The Utilization of Existing Bloc Organizations

61. Although the establishment of a formal international control mechanism remains in abeyance, the economic, political and military aspects of cooperation and mutual assistance are being vigorously developed under the guidance of two existing Bloc organizations, the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) and the Warsaw Pact. Created in 1949 and 1955, respectively, their current burst of activity beginning in May 1958 and continuing to the present was unquestionably stimulated by the Moscow "summit" conference of November 1957, which, as we have seen, launched the concept of the Commonwealth on an international basis. These two primary and permanent organizations are supplemented by continuing development of bilateral and multilateral meetings, and by some degree of tactical coordination at regional levels.

CEMA

62. CEMA - or as it is sometimes called, COMECON - has only within the last year begun to place

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heavy emphasis on the coordination of the separate economies of the member countries. Whereas under Stalin, each of the European satellites had patterned its economy after the Soviet model, seeking to create a heavy industry base even in such predominantly agricultural countries as Bulgaria and Albania, Stalin's successors have increasingly recognized the need for diversification and specialization. The turning point seems to have been reached in the meeting of CEMA which was held in Moscow in May 1958. There is evidence that the Kremlin, at that time, undertook the gradual transformation of the Council into a major organization for long range economic coordination, leading perhaps eventually to the full economic integration of the Bloc.

63. A climax in this development was marked by the celebration of the Tenth Anniversary of CEMA (May 13-16, 1959). It is not without significance that the meeting took place in Tirana, Albania, and was immediately followed by the twelve-day visit of Khrushchev and by the appearance of the Chinese Defense Minister, Marshal Peng Teh-huai. The intertwining of military, political and economic motifs, the presence of the supreme leader of the Bloc in its tiniest capital, the representation of China - to be sure, by a military rather than an economic or political leader - all seem to present the emergent Commonwealth in epitome.

64. There have been many adumbrations of the future role which CEMA may be expected to play. A single example will serve to illustrate it:

The socialist camp presents itself, not only as a political Commonwealth of socialist countries, but as a definite economic unity. It would be premature to consider the world system of socialist economies at the present stage as a single economy directed by a common plan. Such a stage in the development of world socialism has not yet been reached. The ten-

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dency to the formation of a single world socialist economy has still not reached its culmination. The world socialist economic system now appears as an association of mutually connected (sokupnost' vzaimosvyazannikh) national economic systems of the socialist states, the political, economic and cultural development of which proceeds on the base of self-subsistence and independence.<sup>1</sup>

65. This citation - others could be adduced - reveals clearly the caution with which the subject is being handled. It is only natural that the European satellites should be apprehensive over the restrictions which, in the name of "specialization" may be placed over their economic expansion. They have grown used to having their economic activity controlled by Moscow on a direct bilateral basis, and their relations with other satellites have been conducted through an often untidy complex of multilateral arrangements. There is some evidence that the satellite leaders have not adjusted their thinking and practice to the idea that a new order lies before them. Even up to the tenth anniversary session, Polish, Czech, and East German officials are reported to have dismissed the idea that CEMA could become a significant factor in their economic dealings with the other satellites and especially with Moscow. There is still a tendency to view the current outburst of propaganda as unrelated to the reality of short range, largely exploitative control of Bloc economies by the Kremlin overlords.

66. It is the general contention of this paper that the long range prospects of the Commonwealth must be taken seriously, particularly with regard to economic planning.

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<sup>1</sup>I. Vinogradov, "The Economic Cooperation of the Socialist Countries," Kommunist, No. 6 (April 1959) p. 84.

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For that reason we impute high significance to both the ceremonial and the theoretical activity surrounding the Tirana celebration.<sup>1</sup>

#### The Warsaw Pact

67. The role of the Warsaw Pact in the future organization of International Communism must also be considered in the framework of sodruzhestvo. Although this sham alliance was a mere creation of the Soviet Union, obviously designed as a formal military counter to NATO, it has been increasingly presented as a political unity of sovereign and equal states. The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization has been enlisted in major Communist propaganda campaigns, especially in support of "peace" and the banning of nuclear tests. Its communique of 26 May 1958 - three days after that of CEMA - strictly followed the overall Soviet line.

68. Although the Warsaw Pact, being a military alliance, tends to invite presentation as a "monolithic camp," its Political Consultative Committee is suffused, in recent writings, with the aura of the Commonwealth. Its

program for consolidating peace . . . expresses the interest of all humanity, and consequently obtained the approval of the widest circles in the international community.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The significance of the CEMA developments is beginning to be noted in the Western press; cf. Paul Wohl "Soviet Talks in Tirana Conclude," Christian Science Monitor (27 May 1959) who observes that "the new plan highlighted Moscow's decision in favor of joint economic development of the European end of the 'socialist commonwealth'."

<sup>2</sup>Yuskov, op. cit., p. 35.

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The use of the Warsaw Pact framework for political purposes was demonstrated by a meeting of Bloc Foreign Ministers in April 1959, ostensibly for the coordination of policy prior to the Geneva Conference. For the first time in the history of the Pact, Communist China participated.

#### Multilateral Meetings Outside the Bloc

69. Concentration on strengthening the unity and cohesion of the Bloc has not led the Kremlin to neglect the parties of the Free World. Here, too, the device of the multilateral meeting has been employed, and again the theoretical conception is that of sodruzhestvo. At the end of June 1958, a conference "For Peace in Europe" was convoked in East Berlin, ostensibly by the West German Communist Party (KPD). Of the fifteen participating parties, only three were from the Bloc - East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia and all of the remainder were from Western Europe. The Communique of the conference, following the line of the Warsaw Pact meeting, called for the cooperation of the working class against the "adventurous course of American and German imperialism" on behalf of the "world-wide peace movement." Soviet praise of this meeting, as demonstrating the "fraternal support of the working class throughout the world" for the countries of the Socialist Commonwealth shows clearly the directing hand of the Kremlin center.<sup>1</sup>

70. Other multilateral meetings of Free World Communist parties have been held. On the occasion of the XXICPSU Congress in Moscow, both Western European and Latin American party leaders are reported to have met in secret sessions under the chairmanship of Suslov, and to have received binding tactical directives. Subsequently a group of the Latin American delegates visited Peiping where they are believed to have listened to advice from Mao Tse-tung on the conduct of revolution in the Western hemisphere.

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

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Regional Coordination

71. A number of indications point to an increasing use of regional control points for International Communism. These are not intended to function autonomously, in the spirit of Togliatti's "polycentrism." They are primarily centers to facilitate communications, travel, and coordination of matters common to the area. The strongest and most significant Communist Party is assigned certain limited functions which it must carry out in strict subordination to Moscow. If a substantial change of strategy is called for, this is still likely to be laid down in Moscow, behind the scenes at an International Communist conclave, such as the XXI CPSU Congress. So far, the emphasis of this regional activity appears to be more of a Cominform than a sodruzhestvo type.

72. The clearest evidence that this practice is well established comes from Latin America. Several factors appear to have dictated the use of regional control centers: distance from Moscow, difficulty and expense of secure travel and communications, relative weakness and in many cases illegality of Communist Parties, and sparsity of Soviet and satellite diplomatic establishments.

73. In the Middle East, the situation is in flux. The creation of an Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee (December 1957) with its seat in Cairo appears to have had the dual purpose of exploiting the "spirit of Bandung" for regional propaganda and marshalling Communist and fellow travelling elements for the penetration of the area. Subsequent developments, especially the revolution in Iraq and the repression of Egyptian Communists by Nasser appear to have reduced the value of this instrumentality to International Communism. Moscow may be developing a limited form of regional party coordination, utilizing the Syrian Communist Khalid Bakdash and his apparatus to facilitate communications and tactical operations among the Arab countries. Addis Ababa plays a coordinating role for East Africa.

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74. In Europe, the Italian Communist Party appears to have taken on new responsibilities vis-à-vis the hard-pressed French party, and possibly in the Mediterranean area generally. At the beginning of April 1959 a meeting of six Western European Communist Party leaders was held in Brussels for the purpose of discussing the problems presented by the Common Market and European integration. There is no clear indication, however, that a West European Cominform is in being.

75. Relatively little is known about the coordination of Communist Party activities in South and Southeast Asia. There must be some division of function between the Soviet and the Chinese parties. The fact that the USSR and the European satellites are more widely represented diplomatically than Communist China undoubtedly favors a preeminence of Soviet influence, although the Chinese economic "model" is generally held to be more pertinent for the countries of that region than that of the USSR.

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IX. COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION

76. The growing power of Communist China assures it a major voice in the future organization of the International Movement. Since the crisis of 1956 the long shadow of Mao has hovered over every aspect of World Communism, and, at the Moscow meeting of November 1957, he stepped directly into the limelight. No attempt will be made to review the entire course of interplay between the two leaderships - the more so since it is inevitably obscure at many key turns - but there will be offered a speculative appraisal of the attitude which China appears to hold toward the developments described above. This attitude may be examined in its two components of party and state organization.

77. We may be certain that Mao yields to no one in his advocacy of unity and harmony among the Communist parties of the world. But he is equally determined to preserve the principle of specific national differences within this prevailing unity, and to resist any tendencies toward absolute hegemony on the part of the Soviet Union. The classic statement of these principles is contained in a fundamental document of the stabilization campaign, "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" (28 December 1956):

Marxism-Leninism holds that there are common basic laws in the development of human society, but each state and nation has features different from those of others. Thus nations pass through the class struggle, and will eventually arrive at Communism by roads that are the same in essence but different in their specific forms . . . All the experience of the Soviet Union, including its fundamental experience, is bound up with definite national characteristics and no other country should copy it mechanically.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> FBIS, 31 December 1956, pp. 14-15.



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These are carefully measured words, and Mao has elaborated them elsewhere in reproof both of deviationist tendencies among the satellites, especially Poland and Hungary, and of "great nation chauvinism" of the Russians. The Chinese have, of course, been particularly bitter in denouncing the "revisionist" position of the Yugoslavs.

78. The corollaries of this theory of International Communist solidarity are two:

- (a) should the Communist parties maintain relations of equality among themselves and reach common understanding . . . through genuine, and not nominal exchange of views, their unity will be strengthened;
- (b) conversely, if in their mutual relations, one party imposes its views on others, or if the parties use the method of interference in each other's internal affairs . . . their unity will be impaired.<sup>1</sup>

79. Applied to party organization, the Chinese position is incompatible with the reinstitution of a new Comintern. Although Peking recognizes the ideological pre-eminence of Moscow, it is unwilling to permit outside determination of its own party policies. Moscow's leadership, which Mao personally reaffirmed in November 1957, results in part from its historic role in the world revolution, in part from the recognition of its guiding role in strategy, and in part from its economic aid and military support. It is not absolute.

80. In general, it would appear that during the past two years harmony has prevailed in the relations of the Soviet and the Chinese parties. It cannot be denied, however, that there have been manifestations of sensitivity, which, at least to non-Communist eyes, seem to reveal considerable areas of actual or potential friction. Besides rebuking "great nation chauvinism," Mao has set forth a doctrine of "non-antagonistic contradictions" between the ruling party and the masses which

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

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Khrushchev has criticized with visible pique. The overzealous ideological claims which attended the launching of the communes on mainland China were received with initial frostiness and then were quickly rebutted by Soviet leaders. Yet both sides have decided not to "wash their dirty linen in public" and have made adjustments in their positions which restored equanimity. It is impossible to say how much underlying resentment persists, but harmony seems to have been restored.

81. Against this background of party amity, it is probable that Communist China will adapt itself to the concept of relations among socialist states which the Soviet leaders have been elaborating. Whether this will lead to an acceptance of the sodruzhestvo in any concrete organizational terms remains to be seen. There has been a rather noticeable reticence on the subject in Chinese statements. So far, the Chinese Communists have made no effort to provide a theoretical discussion of the Commonwealth comparable to that which Soviet publicists have put forth. Indeed, there appears to be no precise equivalent to the term sodruzhestvo. The usual translation is ta chia t'ing (great-house-court) which may be rendered as the "great family" of socialist nations. Political commonwealths, such as the British, are designated by the term lien pang which means a "federated form of government."

82. In the field of intra-Bloc economic organization, Peking has maintained an ambivalent position. Together with its satellites, it has participated in meetings of CEMA in an observer capacity, but there is no evidence that it has become more deeply involved. The communique of the tenth anniversary session in Tirana has been duly reported in the Chinese press, but without the enthusiasm which characterized the attendant propaganda in the Soviet Bloc countries. It has indeed been apparent for some time that China, like the European satellites, is mistrustful of CEMA's program of "coordination" and "specialization," but unlike the latter it is

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powerful enough to assert its reservations. It is inevitable that China, with its aspiration to achieve a fully developed, balanced modern socialist economy, "outstripping Britain" and other advanced capitalist economies, cannot accept restrictions on any of its fields of expansion. In 1956 Chou En-lai spoke out against the application of "specialization" to China. Continuing difficulties in the progress of trade negotiations with the USSR indicate that Peking has no intention of remaining indefinitely a mere supplier of agricultural products and raw materials to the Bloc. Although it will remain dependent on the USSR and the European satellites for the sinews of heavy industry for years to come, it will not cease to strive for a more equitable balance in the composition of its trade, and for a growing role in the economic penetration of the underdeveloped countries. Recent Soviet statements have been careful not to indicate any desire to restrict this striving.

83. On the political side, the tradition of Chinese Communist theory has much in common with the line which the Soviet Union has been developing. Liu Shao-chi, now second in command to Mao, wrote as early as 1948:

The proletariat firmly opposes all national oppression. It firmly opposes both the oppression of its own nation by any other nation and the oppression of any other nation by its own nation; it advocates complete freedom of federation or of separation from all nations.<sup>1</sup>

This concept of "free federation" lies close to the flexible approach to Bloc relations which the Socialist Commonwealth is designed to provide. We have noted above the close parallel between the guiding principles of the latter and the Pancha

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<sup>1</sup>"On Internationalism and Nationalism," China Digest, (14 December 1958), emphasis supplied.

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Shila or Five Points of Bandung, developed by Nehru and U Nu, which Chou En-lai enthusiastically espoused.

84. In practical terms, Communist China on more than one occasion has intervened in Bloc affairs in the spirit of sodruzhestvo. At the height of the 1956 crisis, Chou En-lai toured Eastern Europe, seeking to calm the rebellious mood of Poland and to moderate the resentment against Soviet dictation in the satellites. At the same time, he - and Mao in "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" - made it plain that the Chinese Communists were firmly opposed to "national communism" in the sense which Tito had given it. Any hope that China would espouse "polycentrism" or would condone excessive emphasis on "national roads to socialism" has been effectively dashed.

85. Within China itself, the possibility of creating a sodruzhestvo patterned after the USSR scarcely arises. China, with its thousands of years of culture, has always regarded itself more as a civilization than as a nation. The national minorities are small, constituting only about six percent of the entire population, and their assimilation presents much simpler problems than is the case with the minorities of the USSR. During the past ten years Chinese policy toward the minority groups has generally been cautious, although<sup>1</sup> within the past year there has been a noticeable hardening. The brutal treatment of Tibet has evoked protests from China's Asiatic neighbors. Peking, however, probably feels that it has no choice but to proceed with the extirpation of "reaction," counting on time to blur the sense of outrage.

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<sup>1</sup>An excellent summary of the changes in this policy is presented by Roderick MacFarquhar, "Communist China's First Decade: The Minorities," New Leader, (8 June 1959), p. 21.

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86. In sum, the Chinese Communist attitude toward the organization of International Communism follows orthodox Marxist-Leninist tradition. Unity comes first, but it must not be imposed arbitrarily. On the party side, the pre-eminence of Moscow must be respected, but it cannot be allowed to dictate through a Comintern. On the governmental side, the co-equality of states must be recognized, and their relations must be developed on the basis of mutuality of interest. Thus, it appears that Peking might be willing to participate in a Socialist Commonwealth in which it would share with Moscow a benevolent condominium of superior power over the satellites but would not permit the exercise of hegemony.

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X. POSSIBLE TACTICS IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY

87. We have seen that in the aftermath of the 1956 crisis, the leaders of International Communism, in their drive for stabilization and ideological conformity, have attached the highest priority to restoring the unity of the Bloc on both the party and the government levels. In this process, no major sacrifice of Marxist-Leninist doctrine to political expedience has been permitted. "Reactionary" and "revisionist" elements - Tito, Nagy, the Dalai Lama - have been crushed by force, where this was possible, or have been expelled from the fold. The maintenance of ideological purity is integral with the preservation of order and cohesion in the Communist movement. The key to its dynamism is organization, dedicated to a social vision of enormous and ominous aspect.

88. If, as this paper contends, the Commonwealth of Socialist States is being readied for a future role of great importance, the question naturally arises what shape it may be expected to take. In all strategic steps the "creative" elaboration of Marxism-Leninism proceeds on a basis of multiple objectives. Tactical requirements may obscure for a time the primary direction, and resistance may lead to temporary retreats. Hence, in assessing the sodruzhestvo, we must project our scrutiny beyond current vicissitudes and seek to penetrate the deeper confines of its potential.

A. A Temporary Continuation of the Conference System

89. As noted above, Communist leaders and theorists have proclaimed the virtues of bilateral and multi-lateral meetings of both parties and governments. They have been resourceful in finding occasions for staging international "get-togethers" - an anniversary or a plenary session of a leading Party. These may be switched from one

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end of the Bloc to the other, dramatizing the vastness of the land mass over which Communism holds direct sway, or even the strategic significance of its tiny exclave, Albania. The profusion of ceremonial speeches and propaganda outpourings builds up an image of power and activity, while providing a convenient screen for closed discussions of tactics and policy.

90. And yet, the conference system can hardly be regarded by the Communist leaders as an adequate mechanism for directing the movement. It does not provide those proper organizational weapons which Lenin consistently argued are essential to the triumph of the world revolution. The conference system lacks the continuity which a powerful core of permanent executives gave to the Comintern. Instead, the central leadership must rely on an assortment of channels and "transmission belts," diplomatic establishments, political, economic and cultural missions, international journals and front organizations. We may question whether this complex system would appear adequate, in the eyes of the Kremlin, to cope with a repetition of the crisis of 1956, or even to provide the necessary dynamics of advance in a prolonged relaxing period of "peaceful co-existence."

B. Exploitation of the Commonwealth to Promote a United Front

91. Although the sodruzhestvo concept is applied at present primarily to the twelve existing nations of the Bloc, it also is being projected, tentatively at least, on a global scale. An appeal is constantly being made, over the governments of the Free World, to the rank and file of workers and "peace-loving peoples" and to some of the left-wing political parties. In time, the Commonwealth concept may be exploited as a lure to entrap sympathetic governments and people in a vast United Front. The appeal is couched in vague, idealistic terms:

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As yet the international relations of a new type are completely dominant in only one part of the world - the Socialist World. However, the existence of these most humane and lofty relations between peoples and countries in mankind's many-centuries long history exercises a great positive influence upon the whole system of relations between countries and upon all the processes taking place in the world today. <sup>1</sup>

This "wave of the future" is presented to all the workers of the world in a spirit "combining internationalism and patriotism."

92. This is, of course, only a part of the untiring campaign of blandishment which International Communism directs to the Socialist parties. Although these appeals usually fall on deaf ears or meet sharp rebuff, Moscow may feel that, couched in the terminology of the sudruzhestvo, they will gradually gain greater acceptance. By subtle analogy with the British Commonwealth, the Communists convey an image of unfettered association, free from apprehension of imperial dominion. <sup>2</sup> The peoples which may be tempted to participate are given the promise of "true" national independence.

93. The Social Democratic parties of Western countries are, of course, much too experienced in Communist deviousness to be taken in by professions of "non-interference" and "fraternal mutual assistance." But in other areas of the

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<sup>1</sup>Sanakoyev, op. cit., p. 33.

<sup>2</sup>The Communists, of course, repudiate any basic similarity of the two institutions: "The imperialists . . . term as 'commonwealths' the aggressive blocs created for war preparation, NATO, SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact, which are entirely subject to US policy. But they are not a commonwealth of nations. They are rather unions of predatory imperialists." Kuskov, p. 263. See Annex IV on differences between the two commonwealths.

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world, especially the Afro-Asian, more susceptible material is at hand. By nurturing the virulent nationalism of the newly independent countries, by offering them arms and economic aid, and above all by professing to be satisfied with their "neutralism" and not demanding positive support, the Communists are preparing the ground to embrace them in an eventual Socialist Commonwealth.

C. The Development of Inter-CP Coordination - A New Comintern?

94. The past few years have been marked by a cautious attitude toward the coordination of the activities of international Communist parties. There is every reason to assume that this will continue to be the case for some time to come. The objections of many Communists to the revival of a visible Comintern, together with the adverse impact which such a step would have on the neutralist and uncommitted nations, probably remain decisive.

95. On the other hand some measure of demonstrative action, some display of solidarity and universality will always seem desirable to a movement with the essential characteristics of a "secular religion." The outward evidence of comradely cooperation and harmony - however fraught with tensions it may be beneath the surface - is an organic requirement for the vitality and dynamism of the movement.

96. The opinion is sometimes expressed that a Comintern is - and indeed always has been - in being, despite the absence of tangible institutional form. The Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties is regarded as the "present form" of the "International Communist organization, formerly represented by the Comintern and the Com-

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inform."<sup>1</sup> Its November 1957 Declaration - quoted above - is viewed as the manifesto of a permanent body, continuity with the past being represented in the person of O. V. Kuusinen who was Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern from 1921 to 1939 and who is now a member of the Soviet Presidium.

97. There is much to be said in support of this view. Nevertheless, we incline to believe that this Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties is as yet an "organization without an organization." Although such an arrangement cannot be entirely satisfactory to the top leaders of the movement, it probably commends itself at this time as a compromise between the hard, rigid, undeviating dictation which was possible under Stalin and the more flexible assertion of power working through consensus which is the professed "style" of Khrushchev.

98. The Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties and the Commonwealth of Socialist Nations may be viewed as a loose but vast apparatus serving the function of welding the "monolith" of parties and states. They are the twin engines of world revolution, guided and dominated by one principle, "proletarian internationalism." Neither has achieved clear institutional delineation, yet both appear to meet the actual needs of the movement. Their roles to some extent overlap. Either or both can be expanded as opportunity arises, or reduced if tactical expedience so dictates. But as strategic instruments - whatever form they eventually

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<sup>1</sup>This is the contention of the US Senate Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act: cf. "The Revival of the Communist International and Its Significance for the United States" (May 1959) passim. Significant evidence is adduced in support of this view, with special emphasis on the subordination of the CPUSA to Moscow.

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assume - they appear to be firmly established. They are wielded by a determined leadership, and so long as a directing will can maintain unity within the movement, they are not likely to be abandoned.

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## XI. CONCLUSION AND FORECAST

99. Having analyzed - so far as possible, within the Communist frame of reference - the emergence and development of the concept of a Socialist Commonwealth and its relation to other conceptual and organizational aspects of the "world socialist system," we address ourselves to the vital questions of concern to the Free World and the United States: what are the long range prospects for the Commonwealth? Do the Communist leaders really believe in the concept and intend to give it tangible shape and form?

100. Although it is obviously impossible to project with confidence over the time span which these questions embrace, it is at least possible to venture a prediction of what may happen to the "world socialist system" over the next ten to fifteen years, unless there is a more vigorous reaction by the Free World to the challenge of the "Commonwealth" than is now being displayed. Put in simple terms, unless it is vigorously countered by bold, positive and imaginative measures, in our opinion the sodruzhestvo has good prospects of making major advances outside the present Communist Bloc.

101. What we are witnessing may prove to be another brazen, brilliant and successful attempt of International Communism to appropriate a noble concept of freedom, precisely as it has grasped and debased other treasures of our heritage - Peace, Democracy, Humanity, and even Freedom itself. The British Commonwealth has set the pattern for the peaceful transformation of an Empire into a harmonious association of widely disparate but equal and sovereign nations. Communism, declaring this institution corrupt and moribund, issues the challenge of its own "co-friendship."

102. One may derive some reassurance from pointing out the obstacles which the Communists are bound to

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encounter, but, if we are to avoid dangerous complacency, we must try to project ourselves into their consciousness and measure the dynamics of will power which they can focus and the historic processes which they expect to work in their behalf. Such a projection is very sobering.

103. We have seen that Communist spokesmen present the Socialist Commonwealth as a step toward realizing the unity of mankind, a kind of "kingdom of heaven on earth." In political terms, this implies that the nation state is already regarded as obsolete. As the embodiment of "bourgeois nationalism" it has become the major source of socio-economic evil. Against it, under the banner of "proletarian internationalism" a world community consisting of nationalities is to be created.

In the long run, national interests in one country not only coincide with internationalism, but international interests supersede national ones, and the state which acts to the detriment of the harmonious correlations and common interests of the Commonwealth (sodruzhestvo) is neither internationalist nor patriotic.<sup>1</sup>

104. The Communists are not unaware of the danger of Utopianism, and inveigh against it, as, for example, in the case of the exaggerated claims which accompanied the launching of the Chinese communes. They have prescribed a long, painful struggle to achieve the "transition from socialism to communism." They recognize that it will not be won unless they can enjoy "peaceful coexistence" over an extended period, not between the two ideologies which are mortally at war, but between the two "systems" of states which have and will retain

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<sup>1</sup>M. A. Sverdlin and P. M. Rogachev, Voprosy Filosofii, No. 1 (1959), p. 44. "Patriotism and Internationalism."

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the physical power to destroy each other. Their ideology gives them the assurance that the outcome is inevitable triumph: this, of course, is a matter of faith, but, in their conviction, of faith that moves mountains.

105. One might be willing to believe that the roseate vision of the Commonwealth could, over a long period of time, come to be accepted by a group of states possessing some ethnic or historical factors in common, such as the Soviet Union and the East European satellites. But could it be extended to comprehend the masses of China and to project outward among other remote and dissimilar peoples? Will not the population explosion of China engulf the Soviet Union? Are not rivalry and conflict between the forces led by Mao and Khrushchev and their successors inevitable?

106. These questions cannot be dismissed with categorical answers. That there are frictions between the two chief countries of the Bloc is certain. But the ties drawing and holding them together, their economic, military and foreign policy interests, are strongly cemented by common ideology and common interests.

107. Duumvirates are notoriously unstable. Nevertheless, whatever disruptive issues may arise, Mao and Khrushchev appear determined to resolve them before they become dangerous. Both men are imbued with the sense of historic mission, and are conscious of the limited time lying before them. They have been compared to twin Moses, glimpsing from afar the Promised Land of Communism which their successors will enter. As time-bound humans, they may prefer that the vanguard of the "chosen people" be Chinese or Russian, but their vision, however clouded, is turned toward future generations of all mankind.

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108. The sodruzhestvo concept, of course, is far from being inspired uniquely by such "lofty and humane considerations" as the Communist theorists and propagandists invoke. As a logical development of Marxism-Leninism applied to organization, it must be regarded by the Kremlin as an eminently practical instrumentality. It can be made to serve the broad purposes of foreign policy, such as the promotion of "peaceful coexistence." It can be used to invest a demonstrative gesture, such as the recent Tirana gathering, with symbolism - "unto the least of these" - and portent - missile bases in Greece and Italy.<sup>1</sup> It can be propagated as a global United Front tactic.

109. The tempo of the Commonwealth is adjustable. There is no deadline for its inauguration, and there are advantages to delay and deliberation. But the development of inter-state Communist association is self-propelling. Whatever the tactical divagations, the strategic goal is steady.

110. The specific interim form which the Commonwealth would be most likely to take would be a federation of Socialist states. At a solemn conclave, for example, at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution (1967) - or much earlier - the Conference of Communist and Workers' Party might "unanimously" approve a constitution which could, for form's sake, be presented by one of the satellite party leaders. The Constitution might establish a Congress,

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<sup>1</sup> It is interesting to note that the Tirana meeting extended at least an olive twig in the direction of Tito. Premier Hoxha of Albania used a sodruzhestvo type of language in offering to develop relations with Yugoslavia on the basis of "mutual respect, equal rights, and non-interference in internal affairs." (FBIS, 1 June 1959, AA 3).

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meeting at specified intervals, rotating through the capitals of the Commonwealth. At each Congress a hierarchy might be elected, a Chairman, a Presidium or Directorate and a Central Committee. All member nations would be equally represented, and would be eligible to share the highest offices. Existing central organizations, such as the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, would be assimilated into the central institution on the same principle of equality. Existing local organizations would be maintained in each member country.

111. We do not believe it unrealistic to think that the Soviet Union could accept such a governance with its formal principle of equality of the greatest and the least. For a long time to come, it could afford to rely on its total power - ideological, political, economic, military - to insure its effective predominance and control. Eventually it might hope that this Commonwealth would realize what the Soviet Union has gone far toward achieving in prototype, the fusion of disparate nationalities into a single political entity.

112. Whether the Chinese Communist leaders would find such a development compatible with their own interest is perhaps more problematical. The sense of military and economic dependence on the Soviet Union will continue to engender ambivalent reactions probably for many years. But the growing consciousness of power, unless it is checked by some unforeseen crisis, should gradually lead to a more relaxed attitude toward the Soviet Union, and produce greater willingness to dilute the de facto condominium with the Soviet Union over the lesser nations of the "socialist system."

113. If the Soviet Union pressed for an actual federation with its own satellites - a partial rather than a comprehensive sodruzhestvo - China might develop a similar relationship with North Korea, North Vietnam and Outer Mongolia - not to mention other countries which might be lured or

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forced to join. Thus, it is possible that the present Bloc might be organized into two Commonwealths remaining juridically separate for some time, while maintaining harmony and cooperation under their common Marxist-Leninist banner. On the practical level such an arrangement might provide a useful "legal" basis for direct interventions by force - as in the case of Hungary - to repress rebellious members of the federation, whether Asiatic or European. This would provide a pretext for circumventing the United Nations.

114. The idea of a federation of Bloc countries, eliminating existing national boundaries, is close to, if not at the surface of public awareness. In his speech to the German workers at Leipzig (7 March 1959) Khrushchev expressed the hope that border problems "will disappear in the future with the worldwide victory of Communism . . . frontiers as they are understood today will gradually cease to exist." As might be expected, this cryptic but authoritative utterance did not go unnoticed in the satellites. A Budapest article has significantly echoed the theme:

The quick economic development of certain countries has resulted in a natural lessening by degrees of the importance of existing economic and outmoded ties among us. This, for example, can have repercussions on the development of certain countries which, because of the victory of communism, can lead to the end of the importance of borders. Under these conditions the old conceptions of borders will gradually disappear. Comrade Khrushchev stressed recently in a speech at the Ninth All-German Workers' Conference that these borders will simply determine the historical settle-

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ment of one or another country. Their significance will not be economic or political, but rather ethnographic and cultural.<sup>1</sup>

115. We have suggested that the ultimate goal of federation within the Bloc would be to create the matrix for a sort of "Communist United Nations." If such an organization were to emerge, it would undoubtedly have to be acknowledged initially by the Communists to be standing in "antithesis" to the existing United Nations. They would justify this "counter" organization by alleging the corruption of the UN resulting from imperialist - specifically American - domination. From the confrontation of the two, they might claim that a new "synthesis" would arise, a "true" world federation. Through the process of "transition from socialism" such an entity would seek to supplant the homo socialisticus sovieticus, sinicus and even albanicus by the homo communisticus universalis, a proletarian world citizen in whom national loyalties would be absorbed in a higher loyalty to all mankind.

116. We do not imply that this goal will ever be achieved. The Communist "brotherhood of man" still awaits the millenium. This "wave of the future" is no more inexorable than others have been. But in order to meet it before

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<sup>1</sup>Robert Jozsef and Imre Pene, "Equalizing the Development of the Socialist Countries," Nepszabadag (24 May 1959). Alert American journalists quickly noted the implications of this idea. On 27 May 1959, Joseph Alsop and David Lawrence, in columns datelined Budapest and Geneva respectively, reported that Khrushchev is developing an ambitious plan to reorganize the Soviet Empire; Lawrence suggests that this calls for "virtual annexation of the satellites." Alsop associates this "federation" with the concept of "commonwealth."

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it can mount to a crest and overwhelm us, we must know the forces which are propelling it. It is the Free World which developed an institutional embodiment for the concept of Commonwealth. By positive actions, it must widen the limited base on which that concept now rests.

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ANNEX I

SOVIET AND SATELLITE STATEMENTS  
ON THE SODRUZHESTVO

Presidium member A.I. Kirichenko, who is held to be next in rank after Khrushchev and Mikoyan, in an address to the XI Congress of the Czech Communist Party described the socialist camp as:

. . . this great Commonwealth of truly independent, truly equal nations, united by the high and noble aims of building a new rich life free of the evils of the capitalist 'paradise'. In this Commonwealth each nation strives to help the others, and each regards the successes of the others as his own. (Pravda, June 20, 1958).

At a meeting of the Czech-Soviet Friendship Society (12 July 1958) Khrushchev dealt with the mutual relations of the Socialist countries primarily in the context of the "socialist camp"; he also, however, dwelt on the Commonwealth theme:

The rallying of the socialist countries into a brotherly Commonwealth of states with equal rights is dictated by vital necessity . . . It is fully understandable that such a Commonwealth, established on the basis of the identity of the social-economic and political regime of the socialist countries, identity of their Marxist-Leninist ideology, and unity of aims in the struggle for the victory of socialism and peace, has nothing in common with the aggressive imperialist blocs aimed against the freedom and independence of the peoples, and against peace and socialism . . .

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On the anniversary of the 1957 Declaration of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties, Presidium member O. V. Kuusinen stressed the need for socialist solidarity:

The Declaration emphasized that in the current situation, it is especially important to strengthen the unity and brotherly cooperation of the socialist states. This recommendation of the Declaration could not have been more timely. The fact of the matter is that in recent years world reaction has led concentrated attacks on the Commonwealth of socialist countries. And the unity of the countries and communist parties of the socialist camp has been one of the main targets at which contemporary revisionists aim their poisoned arrows . . .<sup>1</sup>

Again at an international party conclave, the XXI Congress, Khrushchev repeated the theme of the Moscow Declaration. In enumerating the tasks confronting socialist foreign policy, he stated:

It is essential to strive for the cessation of the cold war and for relaxation of tension, and to do everything possible to strengthen the world socialist system and the commonwealth of fraternal peoples.

It is perhaps significant that against this Soviet crescendo, the satellite leaders, generally Stalinist by tradition, appear to have clung to the more familiar image of the "camp." Nevertheless, even Antonin Novotny, President of the People's Republic of Czechoslovakia and First Secretary of the Czech Party, paid homage to the new concept. In an address to the Central Committee he declared:

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<sup>1</sup>  
Pravda, 22 November 1958.

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The Socialist camp led by the Soviet Union today represents a mighty Commonwealth of Socialist States, united by the strong ties of proletarian internationalism, based on closest brotherly support, and solidified in their position by new socialist international relations. (Mlada Front, 12 December 1958).

As might be expected, Gomulka appears to have welcomed the new concept. In a speech to the Polish shipbuilders at Gdansk (28 June 1958) he hailed the "unshakeable Commonwealth of socialist countries" as the outgrowth of Soviet economic aid and the mutual assistance of the Bloc members. Criticizing Yugoslavia for its ambiguous position toward the two rival camps, he remarked:

One could say, 'There are thirteen socialist countries, but only twelve belong to the socialist camp. One of the countries - Yugoslavia - does not, and does not wish to, belong to the socialist camp.' The imperialist peoples say that they are not attacking Yugoslavia; that they allow her to build socialism although she is isolated. The reply to this is simple. Yugoslavia as a socialist state can exist only because there exists a Commonwealth of twelve socialist countries . . .

More recently in his report to the Third Polish Workers' Party Congress (10 March 1959) Gomulka declared:

When we speak today, as we did in the past, about the world socialist revolution and the inevitability of the world victory of socialism, we must - without detracting one iota from the importance of Marxist-Leninist theory for the development and success of this revolution, but on the contrary developing and enriching this theory - we must realize that at the

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present historical period, in view of the emergence of the world socialist system, the decisive importance of the further development of world socialist revolution lies in the practice of communist and socialist construction in the united Commonwealth of socialist countries . . .

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ANNEX II

I.

In 1958, an immense number of books, pamphlets, and articles were devoted by Soviet and Communist literature to the question of "world socialist system," the "camp," and the "sodruzhestvo." From this mass of material the following three books may be selected as probably performing the role of authoritative directives:

1. "SODRUZHESTVO STRAN SOTSIALIZMA" ("The Co-friendship of the Countries of Socialism") issued by the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in the summer of 1958 (338 pages);
2. "MIROVAYA SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA SISTEMA KHOZYAISTVA" ("World Socialist System of Economy") published at the end of 1958 by the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (559 pages);
3. "VOPROSY VNESHNEI POLITIKI STRAN SOTSIALISTICHESKOGO LAGERYA" ("Questions of Foreign Policy of the Countries of the Socialist Camp") published at the end of 1958 by the Institute of International Relations (254 pages).

The most striking theses of the three books are summarized below.

I.

Published by the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the book under the title of "SODRUZHESTVO STRAN SOTSIALIZMA" consists of articles by six important Soviet Marxist philosophers (M. B. Mitin, Ts. A. Stepanian, F. T. Konstantinov, I. S. Shcherbakov, A. I. Arnoldov, and A. K. Azizyan) followed by an editorial from Pravda (May 9, 1958) entitled: "In the unity and solidarity

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of the Marxist-Leninist parties lies the guaranty of the further victories of the world socialist system." The book presented the following theses:

1. The October Revolution came as a natural consequence of the conflicts of imperialism and the growth and development of the Russian and international labor movements. It was of world wide historical significance.
2. As a result of the October Revolution social and economic changes based on socialist principles were made in the USSR, exemplary socialism was constructed in one country, and the road toward liberation from capitalism was defined.
3. "The victory of revolution within one country is at one and the same time the beginning and premise for world revolution which is continuing to develop as a result of the revolutionary withdrawal of countries from the system of imperialist states." (P. 123).
4. The experience gained by the CPSU and the Soviet state is of international significance and is utilized in the first place by the People's democracies; this experience has confirmed the influence of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the dictatorship of the proletariat and the role of the Communist party.
5. The October revolution gave an impulse to the revolutionary movement in the entire world and to the movement for national liberation of the countries of Asia and Africa, by initiating the organization of Communist parties and of the Communist International.
6. The formation of a "world system" of socialism fundamentally reconstructed the relationship which existed between capitalism and socialism. This system had its beginning in the October revolution and in the successes of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet state has

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played a major role in creating and developing the People's democracies.

7. Transition to socialism produces multiple forms but retains one substance which is the dictatorship of the proletariat. Regularly appearing phenomena which unite the countries of socialism into one camp exist in the historical development of all countries. The laws of revolutionary transformation common to all, and the principles of socialist construction arising therefrom do not permit the appearance of varieties of socialism ("national socialisms") and communism ("national communisms").

8. The communist and labor parties directing socialist countries play a dominant role in the unification of these countries. Therefore, the conference of Representatives of Communist and Labor Parties of Socialist Countries held in Moscow on November 14-16, 1957, was a development of historical significance.

9. "The Soviet Union has been historically formed into the center of the Communist movement of the world. The indestructible camp of socialist states is led by the Soviet Union." (p. 29).

10. The manner in which revolution occurs in individual countries of the socialist camp differs in each case. This leads to variations in the political forms assumed by the leadership of society, as well as in the economic methods used for the transformation of society.

11. Individual countries belonging to the socialist camp are not isolated in their development but mature in close communion and coordination with other socialist countries. The development of the Communist regime proceeds under many forms but is unique in its social and economic contents.

12. The countries of socialism are interlinked by the form of authority which they enjoy ("Dictatorship of the proletariat").

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13. There is complete "unity of views and actions" between the Communist party of China and the CPSU.

14. The common enemy of the countries of the socialist camp is "revisionism."

15. "Proletarian internationalism" is the basis of interrelations between socialist countries.

16. The fortification of the socialist camp is the fortification of socialism as a whole. "In the unity and solidarity of Marxist-Leninist parties lies the guaranty for the further victories of the world socialist system." (p. 317).

## II.

"MIROVAYA SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA SISTEMA KHOZYAISTVA," a publication of the Institute of Economy of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR issued about the end of 1958, is a compilation of instructions covering Communist propaganda and information. The contents are, apparently, the outcome of conferences of the institutes of economy of the USSR and the People's Democracies, held in Warsaw in 1956, and subsequently reviewed at a conference of economists of Socialist countries which met in Moscow on November 26-30, 1957. The book includes five studies by Soviet authors (K. OSTROVITYANOV, L. GATOVSKI, A. KOZIK, A. ALEKSEEV, V. KUVARIN, and A. LOSHCHAKOV), and twelve by economists of other countries in the Socialist camp. These countries are: YUI GUAN-YUAN (China), B. MINTS (Poland), G. KOLMEN (East Germany), two studies by V. KAIGL and K. SVOBODA-L. SHPIRK (Czechoslovakia), I. FRISH (Hungary), N. N. CONSTANTINESCU (Rumania), T. CHERNOKOLEV (Bulgaria), Kh. MARA (Albania), LI MEN SO (Korea), N. ZHAGVARAL (Mongolia), and BUI KONG CHING (Vietnam). In substance all these studies reflect the economic program set forth by the "Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Labor Parties of the Socialist Countries" (November 14-16, 1957).

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The following theses serve as foundation to the entire compilation:

1. The October Revolution ended the existence of a single and all-embracing capitalist system. A new socialist system of economy arose and was developed in the USSR.
2. The successes of socialism in the USSR demonstrated the advantages of the socialist over the capitalist system and created in the Soviet Union conditions favorable to the construction of a material foundation for communism, as well as a base of production.
3. The formation of a Soviet Socialist state led to socialist changes in other European and Asiatic countries and launched the formation of a "world socialist system" now developing on the basis of economic socialist laws identical to those operating in the USSR.
4. The interrelationship existing between the countries of the socialist system presents a new type of international relationship built on principles of economic cooperation, brotherly mutual assistance, and socialist (proletarian) internationalism. The coordination of plans of people's economy lies at the base of economic cooperation and has resulted in the establishment of a new international market of socialist countries. A decisive premise to the successful construction of socialism in all countries belonging to the socialist system is the inviolable unity of these countries.
5. The interests of the peoples adhering to the socialist system are tied in with the fundamental interests of the toilers of the whole world. The expansion of economic ties between the socialist system and countries poorly developed from the economic point of view is of the utmost importance.
6. The construction of socialism in the countries within the socialist system is founded on important laws common, obligatory, and inherent to each country which is in process of

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building socialism; they include state centralism and single-minded planification of people's economy, as well as constant strengthening of the unity existing between the countries of the socialist camp. ("It is impossible to march singly to Communism" - Khrushchev). An important role in achieving this unity is played by the distribution of labor between states, and by specialization and cooperation of industry among the interconnected branches of the economy of countries adhering to the socialist system.

7. The successes of the "world socialist system" exercise increasing influence over the international environment and multiply to an ever greater extent the number of followers of socialism in capitalist countries. "The forces of the socialist world are not limited to the territories and the population of countries within the socialist camp." (P. 89).

8. Economic collaboration between the countries adhering to the socialist camp is developing according to principles identical with those which inspired the co-friendship - sodruzhestvo - of the peoples of the USSR.

9. The principal economic task of the Soviet Union which is "to overtake and surpass in output per head of the population the more highly developed capitalist countries" is the main condition for the further expansion and fortification of socialism in all the countries of the socialist camp.

10. The experience of the Soviet Union in the construction of a socialist society and the aid which socialist countries find therein are a decisive factor in promoting the construction and successes of socialism throughout the socialist camp.

11. Of exceptional significance for a more rapid development of industrial forces in all socialist countries is the continuous perfecting of the forms of economic collaboration, as well as a more profound specialization and cooperation of industry within the interconnected branches of the people's

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economy, as stipulated by the decisions of the conference of representatives of the Communist and labor parties of countries who participated in the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) on May 20-25, 1958.

III.

"VOPROSY VNESHNEI POLITIKI STRAN SOTSIALISTICHESKOGO LAGERYA" published by the Institute for International Relations of the USSR at the end of 1958 presents the first attempt in Soviet literature to show the foreign policy of the Socialist "camp" as forming an integral whole. The book contains thirteen separate articles, two of which (N. PAVLOV and A. GRIGORIEV-A. POPOV) are devoted to the foreign policy of the USSR and socialist camp as one unit, and the remaining eleven (M. KHOSHEV, M. GOSTEV, V. LARIN, M. SATURIN, N. SIDOROV, L. KUTAKOV, V. LEZIN, V. TITKOV, G. ROZANOV, N. LEBEDEV, and P. YANIN) examine the principles followed in foreign policy by the individual countries forming the socialist camp.

"Unity of the socialist stratum" which is dependent upon the regularity in the construction process of socialism and upon the application of the principles of "proletarian internationalism" lies at the foundation of the foreign policy line maintained by the socialist "camp." "The Declaration of the Conference of the Representatives of Communist and Labor Parties of the Socialist Countries" may be regarded as a concrete expression of such unity.

In the foreign policy which it follows, the socialist "camp" finds support in certain principles including:

- (1) Peaceful coexistence and economic competition of the "two systems."
- (2) Assistance to countries which are fighting to fortify their national independence and sovereignty.
- (3) Aid to underdeveloped countries.
- (4) Work for peace.

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The book further discusses the significance of CEMA and the Warsaw Pact as binding the socialist "camp" into an economic, political and military whole. Another question examined concerns individual bilateral treaties concluded between countries of the socialist world.

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ANNEX III

MAY DAY AND OCTOBER ANNIVERSARY SLOGANS

The May Day slogans of 1957 exalt proletarian internationalism and bloc unity in two separate slogans:

9. Long live the great commonwealth of peoples of the countries in the socialist camp!
10. Peoples of socialist countries, our strength lies in fraternal friendship and mutual assistance!

Pertinent to socialist growth on the occasion of the 40th Anniversary of the October Revolution (November, 1957) is a slogan which urges "a transformation of socialism":

10. The transformation of socialism into a world system is the main feature of the present epoch. May the great commonwealth of peoples of the countries of the Socialist camp become stronger and flourish!

The October Anniversary slogan for 1958 differs only in the hortatory language of its opening phrase:

12. Hail to the mighty socialist camp, inviolable bulwark of peace and the security of the peoples! May the great commonwealth of peoples of the countries of the socialist camp become stronger and flourish.

The May Day 1959 slogan, then, rewords this slogan of the preceding October, reintroducing the "system":

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12. Long live the world socialist system, inviolable bulwark of peace and the security of the peoples! May the great commonwealth of peoples of the countries of the socialist camp become stronger and flourish!

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ANNEX IV

A COMPARATIVE TABLE

British Commonwealth  
of Nations

"Socialist Commonwealth"

Scope

Eleven fully independent members, plus the remaining colonial empire of the UK, comprising territories in all stages of political development.

Twelve members of which the USSR is fully independent and Communist China partially dependent on Soviet ideological leadership and economic support. All other satellites are fully dependent, with some minor exceptions for Poland.

Constitutional

No constitutional provisions in any way impair the sovereignty and independence of any member state. The Crown is now regarded as divisible or dispensable. Secession would require nothing more than a proclamation by the withdrawing member.

No ostensible organizational provisions but firm ideological conformity is required and deviation from more than minor principles is suppressed - with force if necessary. The USSR must be recognized as the leading nation and the CPSU as the leading Party. Secession would not be tolerated, as Hungary's example demonstrates.

Political-Diplomatic

No central organs for policy formulation. Prime Ministers meet every year or two for non-binding discussions. Frequent consultations for the achievement of understanding on differing positions.

No ostensible central organ but policies to be adopted throughout the Bloc are determined by Moscow and in some cases by Peiping. Frequent meetings of Party and government officials for purposes of coordinating the Soviet viewpoint.

British Commonwealth

"Socialist Commonwealth"

Military

No Commonwealth strategic planning. Alliances of members exist for purposes of Commonwealth security. Existing military cooperation grows out of generally similar organization, training and equipment.

The East European Bloc is militarily organized under the terms of the Warsaw Pact. Military assistance by the USSR is given to Peiping. Strategic planning and standardization of equipment is Soviet-dominated throughout the Bloc.

Economic

All Commonwealth members, except Canada, belong to the sterling area. Trade connections are long-established and are reinforced by preferential tariffs. The Commonwealth, however, is not an economic bloc.

All Bloc nations are in what may be called the ruble area. Their economies are more or less regulated by Soviet requirements and organizationally supervised by CEMA. The political Bloc is also an economic Bloc; there is no free trade. Stress is on planned, "voluntary" coordination and specialization in production by member countries.

Cultural

There are a great number of committees, institutes, and leagues, operating among all or several member countries. Their interests range from scientific research to sports. Some are government sponsored, others are mixed public and private organizations, and again others are private.

There is much cultural exchange ideologically conceived and supervised. There is no free cultural give-and-take. There is censorship even within the Bloc.

British Commonwealth

"Socialist Commonwealth"

Ideological

Since all member nations are parliamentary democracies, there exists among them a natural and voluntary ideological affinity. The fundamental principles of the rule of law, free elections and individual liberty are a British inheritance which all wish to share and to preserve.

All members are under the monolithic rule of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Their political affinities are forced upon them by the Communist parties which, in turn, are guided by the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism. There are no liberties; there are no free elections. They must follow the Soviet Party line implicitly.

Survival Factors

The future of the Commonwealth is uncertain. No member will sacrifice what it considers its national interests; the Union of South Africa's policy, for example, may make it eventually incompatible with the multi-racial commonwealth. So long as there are no major crises, the Commonwealth will continue to benefit its members, but in a world crisis a split may occur between the Western-oriented and the neutralist-minded members.

Although there is at present no organizational control apparatus, the "Socialist Commonwealth" is held together by common ideology and economic dependency on the USSR to an extent which makes secession impossible. It is possible that this modus operandi will suffice for the time being, but the establishment of a tight-knit organizational superstructure in the future also is a distinct possibility. So long as the two great Communist states, predominantly the USSR, are still powerful executors of the Communist heritage, the "Commonwealth" ties probably will tend to become stronger.

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