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COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE

Post-Stalin Developments in the Satellites

CIA/SRS-7
PART II/D

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COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE:
Post-Stalin Developments in the Satellites

CIA/SRS-7

PART II/D

RUMANIA

This is a speculative study which has been discussed with US Government intelligence officers but has not been formally coordinated. It is based on information available to SRS as of 1 August 1958.

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FOREWORD

This report on Rumania is the fifth installment of a series of studies being produced by the Senior Research Staff under the general title Communism in Eastern Europe: Post-Stalin Developments in the Satellites (CIA/SRS-7, CONFIDENTIAL). The four previous installments, labelled Part I, Part II/A, Part II/B, and Part II/C, have dealt respectively with general trends in the satellites and with Poland, Hungary and East Germany. Developments in the other satellites will be considered in future reports, and the series will be concluded with an appraisal of conditions and prospective trends in Eastern Europe as a whole.

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PART II/D

RUMANIA

Conditions at the Beginning of 1956

1. Economic conditions in Rumania at the beginning of 1956 were, although far from good, better than they had been at any time since the "liberation" of the country by the Red Army in 1944. Thanks to exceptionally favorable weather in 1955, agricultural production had for the first time equalled prewar figures. The relaxation, under the post-Stalin New Course, of the frenzied pace of industrialization had also contributed to the moderate improvement in the exceedingly hard living conditions of prior years, and had permitted a general price reduction in December 1955. Possibly too, the transfer to Rumania in 1954 and 1955 of the Soviet shares in Rumanian enterprises, (Sovroms) "on favorable terms," was the outward sign that the period of exploitation of her economy had come to an end, and that the country had been relieved of a heavy tribute.

2. However, the Rumanian people were not allowed to labor long under the illusion that this was all sheer profit. The Second Party Congress in December 1955 - originally called for 1953 but postponed by the Party boss, Gheorghiu-Dej in the hope of an improvement in the situation, which finally came in the fall of 1955 - was privileged to hear, besides a long list of Communist successes, an outline of the next Five Year Plan. The new plan called for higher rates of increase in industrial production than in the preceding years, although they did remain lower than during the Stalin era. The goal in agriculture was virtually to double the amount of land in the socialist sector by 1956, which was to grow from 26.5 to 50%.

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3. Brilliant as had been, according to Gheorghiu-Dej, the successes of the Communist regime, especially since the restoration of Party unity in 1952 when the Ana Pauker faction had been evicted, and great as was the love of the Rumanian people for Communism, he was not entirely satisfied with the situation. Dangerous internal "enemy" forces, he warned, still existed: the kulaks, the "most numerous capitalist" class, also private tradesmen in certain sectors of the distribution of goods, and the owners of small unnationalized enterprises.¹ As long as these still existed, "class struggle remains the law" proclaimed Gheorghiu-Dej. Naturally, the brunt of the struggle against those subversive elements had to be borne by the Communist Party, the Rumanian Workers' Party (Partidul Muncitoresc Romin, PMR). Here too, Gheorghiu-Dej admitted, there was room for improvement, although two major purges had brought down membership from 920,000 in 1948² to 720,000 in 1950, and 595,000 in 1955, and had improved the Party's social composition and internal discipline. The percentage of workers, he claimed, had increased from 37% in 1951 to 42.6% in December 1955, but was still far from the 60% target set in 1950, which was to be achieved by recruiting 80% of new members among the workers. Actually only 48% of the new recruits had been workers.

4. The obvious difficulties encountered in finding some 100,000 Communist workers needed to bring the Party's social composition up to the desired level, an aim which was vigorously reaffirmed, did not however deter the Congress

¹ The "most numerous class," the kulaks, were estimated to make up about 2% of the peasantry, that is less than 1% of the population.

² Ana Pauker is authority for the statement that the Party had about 1,000 members in 1944.

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from adopting a revised Party statute, which made the rules for admission more stringent than heretofore. This incongruity can only be explained by the even greater importance attached by Gheorghiu-Dej to Party reliability; an explanation supported by the adoption of a number of provisions intended to stiffen Party discipline, among them being the creation of regional, raion, and two revision commissions for closer supervision of Party work.

5. The ostensible cause of the slackening of Party discipline was to be found, according to Joseph Chisinevski, the chief Party ideologist, in the general misinterpretation of the "Geneva spirit," to the effect that from now on, the class struggle would slacken and the conversion of capitalism into socialism would proceed peacefully. Naturally, Gheorghiu-Dej called for increased efforts to improve the ideological level of Party training in order to correct such mistakes.

6. The Congress brought out some interesting figures on the strength of the Party apparatus: there were 29,393 basic units, staffed by 76,000 Party employees, and 370 town, raion, and regional committees, led by 11,000 Party cadres. In the absence of an announcement that the goal set in 1953 to constitute a Party activ (elite) of 80,000 to 100,000 members had been achieved, it follows that the number of hard core Communists in Rumania at the beginning of 1956 was below 167,000, that is slightly below 1% of the population. However, in the absence of any outstanding rival for the Party leadership, they seemed, by comparison with other satellite Communist parties, to constitute a fairly cohesive "monolith" bonded by self-interest and therefore an adequate support for Gheorghiu-Dej's rule. And as long as there were no prominent "revisionists" among the Party members, as in Poland and Hungary, to break the ice, the Security troops, who could always count on Soviet backing, were adequate to discourage any manifestation of popular discontent.

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7. Under the circumstances, the stir created by the 20th Congress and Khrushchev's indictment of Stalin could only be most unwelcome to the Rumanian Communist leaders who certainly much preferred to let sleeping dogs lie. Unlike Khrushchev, Gheorghiu-Dej had no dangerous Stalinist rivals to combat. Moreover, the 2nd Rumanian Party Congress, anticipating the 20th Soviet Congress, had only two months earlier voiced most of the standard slogans on Party unity, collective leadership, Party democracy, and so forth.

8. Gheorghiu-Dej therefore took his time to make his official report to the Central Committee on the 20th Congress, at which he had represented the PMR, and his report, delivered on March 23, 1956, was not published until the 29th and then only in abridged form. The Rumanian public, at any rate, was told no more about Khrushchev's indictment of Stalin than that his "departure from the Marxist-Leninist concept of the role of personality" had had a "negative influence." This had made possible "the hostile provocative activity of Beria and his accomplices," who had exterminated "innocent people, honest cadres of the Party."

9. Five times more space was devoted in the published version of the report to Stalin's virtues, importance, popularity, and works, than to his shortcomings. Moreover, Gheorghiu-Dej implied the matter was chiefly of academic interest to Rumanians, since he could point with pride to the fact that the Rumanian Central Committee had condemned the "cult of the individual" as early as 1952 - that is while Stalin was still alive. This circumstance may explain why the Committee's attitude was only made public in 1953.

10. The evil had persisted, however. The best remedy - for others - was according to Gheorghiu-Dej, self-criticism, a salutary practice which, together with the proper combination of Party democracy and democratic cen-

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tralism, he urged his fellow members to follow in the lower level Party meetings which were to be held to "popularize" these as well as the other epochal teachings of the 20th Congress on peaceful coexistence, different roads to socialism, possibility of seizure of power by parliamentary means, and so forth.

11. In practice, however, these meetings, as reported in the local press, appear to have been devoted mainly to exchanges of recriminations between local Party bosses and envious rivals, the latter usually complaining that the former decided everything without consulting anybody, and the former retorting that decisions had to be made and they could not help it if nobody attended the meetings called to discuss them. Other favorite subjects of complaint were suppression of criticism and violations of socialist legality. Judging by the newspaper accounts, the general effect of the 20th Congress seems to have been a squaring of accounts and a temporary revival of Party "democracy" at the local level.

12. There were, however, significant exceptions, symptomatic of popular hostility to the regime and its methods. In a meeting of the Party Council of Constanta, the country's largest seaport, one of its members - allegedly a former protégé of Ana Pauker - had, according to the local paper Dobrogea Noua of 29 June 1956, "attacked the Party line, slandered and defamed the Party, with the evil intent of weakening the Party's authority and its collective leadership." What lent significance to this attack was the fact that, according to the paper, neither the City nor the Regional Party Committees had manifested any signs of disapproval of the "anti-Party and provocative attitude" of the rebel until the next meeting, which, it was implied, had only been called under prodding from above to exclude him from the Party.

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13. The report of the Writers' Union¹ on the case of Alexandru Jar et al. revealed the existence in intellectual circles of a strong demand for liberalization, a "revisionist" trend as it was to be called later. The report summarized Jar's address at a Bucharest Party meeting as follows:

" . . . Saying he had led a double life, Jar shamelessly attributed these traits to all Party members, all Communists. He falsely alleged that the Party educates Communists in a spirit of cowardice . . . Jar shamelessly made the slanderous remark that Party members are thinking less and less . . . He opposed the Party injunction that liberalism toward manifestations of bourgeois ideology must be combatted. Jar demanded that there be an end to the struggle against liberalism. Slandering our intelligentsia which is sincerely attached to the Party . . . Jar warned that combatting liberalism would endanger the alliance of the working class and the intelligentsia . . . Jar presented the literary situation in a bad light and alleged that in the period when the building of Socialism started . . . literary creation reached a disastrous point . . . "

14. The report stated that Jar had made the same slanderous attacks in a recent interview published in Gazeta Literara and had uttered the "brazen lie" that certain writers were repressed by the police. Other writers, the report complained with specific reference to Mihail Davidoglu and to Jon Vitner, "not only failed to combat Jar's attacks, but Vitner even stated that he shared a number of Jar's slanderous opinions. "

¹Text in Scinteia, June 1, 1956.

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15. The report then proceeded to criticize the Writers' Union's own organ, the Gazeta Literara, for publishing Jar's interview as well as other articles which "spread confusion" and for failing to combat manifestations of "bourgeois ideology." Two editors of the periodical, Paul Georgescu and Veronica Porumbacu, both Communist literary lights, were charged with failure to fulfill their duties. On the strength of the report, the meeting of the Writers' Union expelled Jar from the Party and passed a vote of censure on Vitner and Davidoglu.

16. The situation in academic circles in Jasi, the former capital of Moldavia and an old intellectual center, seems to have also been sufficiently unsatisfactory to call for the dispatch to that city of Josif Chisinevski, generally considered the Party's leading Stalinist. Under his expert guidance, a conference was organized at which a number of Party members and intellectuals castigated the failure of many of their colleagues, scientists, artists, and writers, to combat "certain manifestations which were alien to Communist ideology" notably the "incorrect statements" of Academician Victor Eftimiu, and of Professors Caraman and Davidsohn.¹ The failure of the editors of the local literary magazine, Iasul Literar, to discriminate between justifiable criticism and slander of deserving Party activists and between bourgeois objectivism and socialist realism was also declared to have been exceedingly reprehensible. Finally, the report stressed the great need of improved political work among students, an aspect of education which had been sadly neglected by the teaching staff, the Party organization, and poorly attended to by the inefficient Union of Working Youth (UTM).

17. Any lingering illusions as to Gheorghiu-Dej's intentions with regard to de-Stalinization in Rumania were dispelled by the report, published in Scinteia of May 23, 1956, on a meeting of Party leaders, at which the Party line, fore-

¹ Text of the report on the conference proceedings in Flacara Iasului of July 10, 1956.

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shadowed by him in his report of March 23, was spelt out. The "Pauker clique" was identified as the scapegoat for the "infringements of Socialist legality, " and "violations of Leninist norms of Party life" which could not be denied. These "deviationists, " it was asserted, had played a "great role" in spreading the "cult of personality, " but as they had already been purged in 1952, no government "upheaval" was necessary now. The only mistake the Party leadership was willing to admit was its neglect to make public the criticism of the cult of personality, formulated as far back as 1952 in the higher Party Councils. That failure, it claimed, explained the survival of some manifestations of the obnoxious cult, all traces of which must be uprooted "in the light of the documents of the 20th Congress. " Obviously, the naming of Rumanian towns and streets after Stalin or the adornment of public places with his effigy were not considered traceable to the cult of personality, for there was no change in the situation.

18. In short, the Rumanian Party leaders took the line that far from being themselves guilty of excesses, they had fought them even during Stalin's lifetime and cracked down on the few black sheep in their midst. It was the guilt, not the innocence, of their "victims" which now stood affirmed, and there was no one to rehabilitate - at least no living victim. It was true, they conceded, that they had kept their light under a bushel, but the need for discretion during Stalin's lifetime, they implied, had handicapped them in their endeavors to stamp out Stalinism at the lower levels before it could spread. Who could blame them under the circumstances?

19. It may be doubted that this story was believed by many people in Rumania, but there was no rival leader with sufficient popularity to challenge it with any chance of success, least of all Ana Pauker, otherwise probably the best fitted to do so. The story, unchallenged, served its purpose perfectly. It enabled Gheorghiu-Dej to pose as a faithful

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observer of the Party line while avoiding at the same time any debilitating self-criticism and continuing to employ substantially the same methods of government as before.

20. The outward symptoms of the "thaw" in Rumania were consequently very mild. The president of the Bucharest Military Tribunal, responsible for a number of political sentences, was reported removed in April. The Ministry of the Interior announced on June 7 that its personnel was being reduced in order to simplify and reduce the State apparatus, which meant that secret police activities would be curtailed somewhat. It was said that the Securitate and the Police force were reduced by 12,000 men, but that this hardly weakened the force, as it was naturally the inefficient and unreliable members who were dismissed. In June also, some of the imprisoned Social Democratic leaders whose release had been requested by the British Labor Party, were set free, and the offer to return the confiscated property of members of the German and Hungarian minorities who accepted repatriation may also have been in some way connected with "liberalization."

21. An improvement in the situation of workers was effected by a decree of July 24, which eliminated the provisions of the labor code under which a worker could be transferred to another locality against his will, without separation pay or guaranteed housing, and which also granted the workers some minor financial benefits. The lot of the peasants was also somewhat improved, inasmuch as by resolution of the Central Committee of July 17, 1956, collective farm members were promised some advantages, while individual farmers received assurances of continued support. On the same occasion the Party boasted of its success in increasing the "Socialist sector" of agriculture, the number of households belonging to collective farms or farm associations having increased by one-third, from 390,000 to 577,000, in the first half of 1956.

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22. The regime's persistence in carrying on the campaign to "persuade" peasants to join collectives - in the face of the official admission that the Socialist sector, although it contained 29.3% of the arable area of the country, contributed only 24% of the marketable produce - was perhaps the most striking evidence of the regime's doctrinaire orthodoxy. Apparently not yet satisfied with the rate of growth of the Socialist sector, the government set the seal of its approval on a new and unorthodox type of collective farm which was stated to have developed spontaneously and could be expected to prove more attractive. The novel features were that the peasants who joined retained title to their land, were entitled to an annual rental in addition to pay for labor performed, and were compensated for the cattle and machinery they contributed. The main thing was apparently to get the peasants to join any kind of association. From there on, all roads lead to full socialization.

23. The proceedings of the Congress of Rumanian Writers (June 18-23) and of the Congress of the Union of Working Youth during the following week plainly confirmed the intention of the government to repress velleities of greater intellectual or political freedom wherever they manifested themselves. The writers were unequivocally reminded that "socialist realism" was the only permitted form of art, and the students, among whom the Party Central Committee had found serious shortcomings such as "lack of patriotism, mystic prejudice, . . . and manifestations of moral decay" due to inadequate political indoctrination, were endowed with a new and inclusive Students' Association, remaining however within the framework of the Union of Working Youth.

The Impact of the Polish and Hungarian October on Rumania

24. It goes without saying that the news of the October events in neighboring Poland and Hungary, although

¹Rominia Libera, September 25, 1956.

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heavily censored, caused considerable excitement in Rumania, particularly among workers and students. In countries where, as in Rumania, "the thaw" had been exceedingly mild, little reliable information is obtainable, but some instances of unrest are undeniable and these justify the conclusion that there were others of which no news leaked out. For example, the workers of the Grivita Rosie Railroad shops in Bucharest, a Communist stronghold under the old regime, held a protest meeting on October 26 in which they declared their willingness to help the Hungarian workers if their resistance were "truly socialist," and demanded for themselves higher wages and trade unions with sufficient freedom to struggle for the improvement of the workers' situation.

25. Students at the Bucharest University held meetings in which speakers protested against the courses in Marxism-Leninism and obligatory Russian classes. In the Transylvanian city of Cluj over a hundred students, mostly of the Hungarian language university, were arrested, either as the result of, or to forestall, overt demonstrations. The reports of a strong current of sympathy for the anti-Soviet movements abroad and of considerable unrest in Rumania, sent by Welles Hagen, New York Times correspondent in Bucharest, and other reports appearing in French and British newspapers, were indignantly denied by the Rumanian press,¹ but against these denials can be set the following facts:

A group of important Rumanian officials returned from a visit to Belgrade on October 28, two days earlier than expected, and President Groza, who was convalescing at his country home, was likewise called back to the capital;

¹For example in Scinteia of November 17, and Rominia Libera of November 21, 1956.

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On October 30, substantial increases in minimum wage rates, family allowances, and pensions were granted by decree;

First Deputy Premier Miron Constantinescu, shortly to be appointed Minister of Education, in an otherwise comminatory speech at Cluj on November 5, promised that the government would give attention to the problems of overloading of the university curricula, compulsory attendance in the case of "certain subjects," norms of the teaching staff, and the improvement of students' living conditions;

Khrushchev himself told a Moscow youth meeting on November 8 that the Rumanian Communists had at some unspecified time, noted "an unhealthy state of mind among some of the youth in the educational institutes" and had decided "to speak frankly with the students and with some of their parents." On another occasion workers had said to the students of an institute: "If you do not like our order, which was acquired without blood, then please go and work, and in your place others will come to study."¹

The Minister of Education and his two deputies were replaced, the ministerial post being taken by Miron Constantinescu,² considered at the time one of the top ranking Communist leaders.

In Cluj, the streets were patrolled by military forces during the critical days of the Hungarian uprising.

¹The same threat was used by Minister of State Marosan to intimidate the Hungarian students in the event of the first anniversary of the October Revolution.

²Rominia Libera, November 18, 1956.

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26. There appears to be therefore sufficient circumstantial evidence to justify the conclusion that in Rumania too feelings ran high in October and November 1956, but that the regime managed by timely concessions and a show of force at critical points to head off violent outbursts, long enough to allow the irresistible onslaught of the Russian tanks on the Budapest rebels on November 4 to produce its sobering effect.

Unrest Combated by Economic Concessions

27. Nevertheless, the regime must have had good reasons to consider the popular mood sufficiently dangerous to call for still further conciliatory measures. It may not have been a simple coincidence that these were preceded by a conference in Budapest between Gheorghiu-Dej, Premier Chivu Stoica and Janos Kadar. The communique issued on November 24 announced the two governments' complete agreement on foreign and domestic policy cemented by a Rumanian loan to Hungary of 60 million rubles. As it turned out, this noble gesture was not to cost Rumania very much, for Premier Stoica left Budapest ahead of the rest of the delegation, picked up a group of leading economists in Bucharest, and hurried to Moscow to follow the Hungarian example and apply for substantial financial and economic assistance.

28. A joint declaration, issued in Moscow on December 3, 1956, stressed the "full accord in the evaluation of the present international situation" - presumably considered disquieting for the Communist bloc - and announced that "because of this year's poor grain crop in Rumania" the USSR had agreed to lend her 450,000 tons of wheat and 60,000 tons of fodder. The USSR also agreed to postpone payment of the 1957-1959 instalments on Rumania's earlier debts and to supply Rumania with iron ore, coke, and other goods in exchange for unspecified items, and to provide technical aid and plans for new chemical and oil installations in exchange

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for a claim on their output. The declaration also confirmed that the Soviet troops would remain in Rumania.

29. Fortified by these assurances of economic aid from the USSR, Gheorghiu-Dej was now in a position to follow the general Orbit pattern of attempting further to reduce the causes of discontent by another round of economic benefits, the 1953 and October 1956 rounds having obviously proved inadequate and political concessions being ruled out after the events of October. The new program, embodying drastic revisions of the economic plan, was contained in a lengthy report submitted by Gheorghiu-Dej to a Central Committee Plenum which met from December 27-29.

30. The proposed revisions chiefly affected the investments in heavy industry, the unsatisfactory wage structure, the "excessive centralization" in the management of the economy, and the compulsory delivery system. Gheorghiu-Dej admitted frankly that the regime had failed to raise living standards to the extent promised, heavy industry having prospered at the expense of agriculture and consumer goods, as a result partly of poor planning and partly of the bad harvest of 1956. He proposed that the Second Five Year Plan be revised and funds channeled from heavy industry into consumption, as the implementation of all the planned investments "would demand efforts in the economy which would hinder implementation of the provisions for raising the workers' living standards."

"Therefore we propose that some provisions in the directives be reexamined so as to reduce state investments in the period of 1956-1960 . . . The volume of investment must assure the continued development of Socialist industry, but at a slower pace corresponding to the real resources and possibilities of the economy . . . We must guide our efforts toward the massive development of agricul-

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tural production, light and food industries and housing construction, to which the raising of the workers' living standards is now directly linked. "

31. Although minimum wages, pensions, and family allowances had only recently been raised, Gheorghiu-Dej admitted that "for a large part of the workers, earnings are at an unsatisfactory level." The level of the wage scale was too low, he said, and "had ceased to be the decisive element in the income of the workers," thus reducing the workers' interest in increased productivity, but he also found fault with wage differentials and the bonus system and other forms of incentive. The result of the proposed wage reform, and revision of norms, Gheorghiu-Dej asserted, would be that "the average wage scale for the entire economy will rise by an average of 36%. The net increase in average actual income will be about 15% . . . "

32. Gheorghiu-Dej also outlined the plans for industrial decentralization, a modest forerunner of the reform Khrushchev was to put through in the USSR some months later. The managements of Socialist enterprises were to have "wider possibilities and rights in compiling economic plans and in distributing some of the income." The number of "plan indicators" was to be considerably reduced, the distribution of 2,500 products was to be transferred from the jurisdiction of Ministries to that of enterprises, and "the planning and management of the wage fund" was to an increased extent to be made "the direct responsibility of ministries and enterprises," the State Plan setting only the total wage fund available to each ministry. Enterprises of local importance - consumer goods, construction, and service enterprises - were to be placed under the jurisdiction of the local people's councils.

33. The increase in peasant income was to be achieved by the abandonment of the compulsory quota system, which, Gheorghiu-Dej recognized, had in recent years begun

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"to make the development of agriculture difficult." Compulsory delivery quotas were to be retained only for meat and wool produced by individual farmers. "The replacement of the compulsory quota system with contracting and procurement," Gheorghiu-Dej emphasized, "must be accompanied by an increase in the quantities of industrial goods for the villages." Needless to say, Gheorghiu-Dej's proposals were adopted unanimously.

34. The 1957 budget, submitted to the National Assembly in March, revealed that the improvement of the standard of living was to be achieved by a reduction in defense outlays, (to 8.2% of total expenditures) an 8% reduction in total outlays for development of the national economy - among them, capital investments were 29.2% lower - but an 11% increase in agricultural outlays and substantial increases in allocations for social and cultural purposes.

35. Somewhat puzzling at first sight was the fact that the allocations for the consumers' goods industry were cut more sharply than those for producers' goods industry, but it was explained that it had been thought preferable to import consumers' goods from abroad where they were better and cheaper with the receipts from the export of a larger amount of agricultural products. What was not admitted was the fact that this meant the return by the Communists to the practice they had so violently denounced when followed by their capitalist predecessors.

36. Any illusions as to political liberalization that might have persisted after the Hungarian repression, were dispelled by the conference called by the Moscow leaders in Budapest from January 3-6, 1957, which was attended by most of the satellite chieftains.¹ The Conference served

¹ The failure to invite Gomulka was easy to explain, but not the failure to invite Ulbricht or Hoxha. Whatever the reasons, the GDR and Albania subsequently approved the Budapest communiqué.

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notice on the malcontents that the USSR would not be deterred by adverse criticism from crushing any revolt. It defiantly reaffirmed the correctness of Soviet policy in Hungary, and called for increased cohesion of the socialist camp as well as for vigilance against the West. These and similar themes formed the Leitmotiv of the Rumanian leaders' campaign speeches preceding the National Assembly elections on February 3, 1957.

37. Prime Minister Chivu Stoica, in his outline of the government program to the National Assembly on March 19, confirmed the regime's good intentions with respect to the material interests of the population, announced by Gheorghiu-Dej, and gave some details on the impending decentralization of the economy. This was to be attained by a reduction in the number of Ministries through mergers and a broadening of the jurisdiction of the people's councils. The latter were indeed given, by a law of March 22, the management of some 4,000 industrial plants of local importance, and responsibility for public utilities, and smaller building enterprises, as well as greater authority in the fields of public health, education and culture; but with regard to the major industries, decentralization implied no weakening of central control. All it did was to "centralize" the decision-making power of the overburdened Council of Ministers. "Fewer in number, but with increased authority, the Ministries will be able to solve independently the problems arising in their fields and . . . to improve the standard of work of the state apparatus," explained the Minister introducing the bill.

38. There was good news too in the field of foreign relations: Rumania and the USSR signed on April 15 a status of forces agreement which contained the written assurance that the temporary stationing of Soviet troops in Rumania in no way affected Rumanian sovereignty.

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39. The visit of Gheorghiu-Dej to Sofia at the beginning of April 1957 provided an opportunity to reaffirm the strict orthodoxy of the Rumanian and Bulgarian Communist Parties. In their final declaration, they asserted that Communism was indissolubly linked with proletarian internationalism and was an implacable foe of nationalism and the "national Communism" propagated by the "imperialists." The two leaders promised "the utmost strengthening of the ideological vigilance of the Communist and Workers' parties, an intransigent fight against opportunism and reformism, against any attempt at revising revolutionary Marxism, against nationalism and other influences of bourgeois ideology in their ranks."

The July 1957 Purge

40. Gheorghiu-Dej's condemnation of opportunism, among other sins, did not, of course, prevent him from taking advantage of the favorable opportunity presented by the Moscow purge of the "sectarians and dogmatists," the "anti-Party" group of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, and Shepilov, announced on July 3, 1957, to get rid of his most prominent and troublesome colleagues and possible rivals. On the following day, the Rumanian press carried a communiqué of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party, stating that a plenary meeting had "liberated Josif Chisinevschi from membership in the Political Bureau and from his position as Secretary of the Central Committee, and Miron Constantinescu from membership in the Political Bureau."

41. The Central Committee resolution, the full text of which was published on July 9, contained three sections: a review of the "accountability report" delivered by Gheorghiu-Dej on the subject of Party developments "in the light of the teachings of the 20th CPSU Congress"; a list of the principal tasks facing the Party; and the indictment of Chisinevschi and Constantinescu.

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42. The two men were accused in the first place of "fractionist activities," of "suppressing all criticism," of "mocking and humiliating Party members who dared to have their own ideas," of "disseminating the cult of personality . . . and especially the glorification of Ana Pauker," of "a dogmatic attitude in basic problems of Party work," and "of having exerted pressure" to make the Party "stage trials" of "many basic cadres."

43. In the second place, Chisinevski and Constantinescu were accused of

" . . . having aimed at giving the discussions within our Party of the documents of the 20th Congress an orientation which was opposite to that established by the Central Committee's Plenum of March 1956, which would . . . have weakened the Party's unity . . . and would have given free reign to petit bourgeois nationalism, would have undermined the policy of the Party and of the state. In this respect the events in Hungary are full of lessons At the same time they aimed their attacks against the state security organs. If the Party's leadership had not rejected their attacks, they would have resulted in the paralyzing of these organs whose task is to fight against the enemies of the people's democratic regime The Plenum deems that the position of Comrades Josif Chisinevski and Miron Constantinescu led to liberalism as regards the basic requirements of the activity of a Marxist-Leninist Party."

44. It was true, the resolution concluded, that "in front of the Plenum they admitted their grave violations, but they did not make a profound analysis of these mistakes and violations, did not point out their causes and roots."

45. At first sight, it would appear that Gheorghiu-Dej had performed the remarkable feat of satisfying both the

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Stalinists and the liberals, for Chisinevski and Constantinescu were being punished for right-wing as well as left-wing deviations. However, if the charges are examined more closely, it becomes evident that the charges of "Stalinism" all refer to the pre-March 1956 period, and that even these seem of dubious validity. The main accusation was support for the Ana Pauker group, but the fact that Gheorghiu-Dej represented her in March 1956 as the Rumanian incarnation of Stalin is no proof of its justification. In fact, the Pauker group had been indicted in 1952 mainly for having opened the Party gates too freely to bourgeois elements, for having opposed forced collectivization and favored a policy of economic assistance to private farmers, and of diverting capital investment to agriculture and small industry, a policy which Gheorghiu-Dej was to adopt himself barely a year later - under the "New Course" following upon the death of Stalin, it is true.

46. This leaves as the only "Stalinist" count the charge of having pressed for trials of Party members. However, no concrete evidence is adduced, and indeed demands for trials of Party members are not necessarily proof of Stalinian paranoia. They may prove the exact opposite.

47. On the other hand, the resolution claimed that Chisinevski had been severely criticized by the Party for "petit bourgeois reformist conceptions" as far back as in 1954, and all the charges brought against Chisinevski and Constantinescu for post-March 1956 activities are of having supported "liberal" measures.

48. The impression, widely held after the brief 3 July announcement of the demotion of the two men, that the episode signified a blow at "Stalinism" seems, therefore, in the light of the full text of the Plenum resolution, to have been mistaken. The error was undoubtedly due to the fact that the Moscow purge was over-hastily thus interpreted - presumably on account of Molotov's inclusion - and that Chisinevski, at any rate, was generally considered a "Stalinist."

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49. The conclusion one may draw is that Chisinevschi's reputation was either unfounded, or else that he had, like Schirdewan in the GDR, had a change of heart in 1956. Actually, it makes no difference in this case whether Chisinevschi was or was not a "Stalinist." The chief mistake for which he - and Constantinescu - were ostensibly ousted from the Political Bureau was "liberalism"; consequently their removal could only signify, if anything, a hardening of the Party line. The real reason for their removal was undoubtedly resentment of their frequent criticisms of the policies and decisions of Gheorghiu-Dej.

50. It seems reasonable to assume that, no more than Khrushchev or Ulbricht, would Gheorghiu-Dej have brought the split in the Party leadership into the open unless there had been a serious danger that his opponents, if unchecked, would have been able gradually to win over sufficient Politburo and Central Committee members to their program to threaten his leadership. That Chisinevschi and Constantinescu were not merely congenital carpers but had a definite program was admitted by the July 3 Plenum resolution which said, inter alia, that

" . . . utilizing anti-Party fractionalist group methods they carried out discussions outside the Party organ to which they belonged with the aim of establishing a common platform. They tried also outside the Party organ, to make other members of the Political Bureau join their anti-Party stand and incited certain comrades against others . . . "

But the "danger of fractionism" had fortunately been averted by the Plenum's timely action.

51. The Resolution also admitted that

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". . . during these discussions of the 20th Congress decisions and especially during the events in Hungary there were certain isolated manifestations of confusion and hesitation, influences of the demagogy of wavering and anti-Party elements which reared their heads in Hungary and in other places, as well as influences of imperialist propaganda."

52. The patent falsehood of the further assertion that "the Party organs and organizations, all Party members, combatted and firmly rejected these unhealthy manifestations" is sufficiently proved by the subsequent condemnation of Chisinevski and Constantinescu's attitude precisely during the post-March 1956 period.

53. The conflict between the two men and Gheorghiu-Dej's group on ideological grounds was undoubtedly strongly exacerbated by personal animosities. Chisinevski and Constantinescu, a Ph.D., were the only two intellectuals in the Politburo and they had undoubtedly flaunted their superiority somewhat too freely, especially Constantinescu, as betrayed by the complaint in the Resolution that "he showed petit bourgeois haughtiness, conceit, and arrogance," and that both had "mocked and humiliated Party members who dared to have their own ideas." Needless to say, Constantinescu was relieved shortly after the Plenum of his duties as First Deputy Premier and Minister of Education. Why he, the alleged liberal, had been entrusted with the task of curbing student unrest only seven months earlier remains an enigma.

54. Another section of July 3 Plenum Resolution was devoted to the usual self-laudatory review of recent Party achievements. It noted with satisfaction that the industrial production plan had been overfulfilled by 5% in 1956 and 7% in the first quarter of 1957; that the "experimental application of the improved wages and norm-fixing methods resulted in a

¹ Author's italics.

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broad activation of the workers, engineers, technicians, and employees of enterprises"; that the abolition of compulsory deliveries of agricultural products had had very good effects on peasant morale and had greatly consolidated the worker-peasant alliance; that the socialist sector in agriculture now comprised about 41% of the country's agricultural land; and that the intellectuals were "carrying out fruitful activity in the field of science, art, and culture and . . . supporting with confidence the policy of the Party and government."

55. The Party's correct line was proved, according to the Resolution, by the fact that it had "taken up positions against the cult of personality" and "demonstrated [its] capacity to master and creatively apply Marxism-Leninism in accordance with concrete conditions in our country." It had also "taken a determined stand . . . against the attempts aimed at revising and distorting [the Marxist-Leninist teachings]" - presumably by Chisinevski and Constantinescu in the first place.

56. The last section of the Resolution was devoted to the enumeration of the principal tasks facing the Party. They remained very much the same as before: the strengthening of the Party's unity and iron discipline and of the Party's ties with the masses; the development of socialist democracy by widening the jurisdiction of the people's councils and of the economic units, but also by "consolidating the organs of the state apparatus which have the task of defending the revolutionary achievements of the people, the security of the state, the property of society and of the citizens" - in other words, by strengthening the police; improvement of the "activity of the organs of justice, because many of them are showing impermissible lenience toward thieves, embezzlers, speculators, and hooligans"; development of the economy and raising of the working people's living standards, chiefly by increasing productivity and reducing production costs which were unfortunately not decreasing, as well as by "convincing the working peasants to take the road to socialism"; raising the level of ideological

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work, by helping, among other things, "tactfully and patiently the old school intellectuals to be guided in their creative work by the ideas of Marxism-Leninism"; and last but not least, "strengthening the unity of the Socialist camp led by the Soviet Union."

Attitude of the Intellectuals

57. The admonition to help the "old school intellectuals" to see the light was translated into practice by Scinteia, the official Party organ, in an article published on August 2, 1957. It listed a number of publications which had conspicuously failed in their duty to "take a stand against manifestations of bourgeois ideology in their fields." These included Cercetari Filozofice, Probleme Economice, Teatrul, Film, and also Contemporanul, the latter being the social and cultural mouthpiece of the regime, which Scinteia accused of having published "various bourgeois theories without combatting them with sufficient arguments . . . It is necessary to show the intelligentsia, the broad public and especially the youth, how false and anti-scientific all these theories are . . . But attention to this important task has weakened lately . . ."

58. Rumanian artists and intellectuals were thus notified that the light thaw which has been allowed to prevail in the intellectual field in most of the Orbit after the 20th Congress was over in Rumania too. The reason became clear a few weeks later when Khrushchev's three speeches on the limits of intellectual freedom were published. The regime, however, must have had good reasons for not considering the battle for the mind of the intellectuals already won, especially where the demand for intellectual freedom combined with nationalism to form a particularly explosive mixture. At any rate, the Party deemed it expedient to stage a spectacular Regional Committee meeting in Cluj, the seat of the Hungarian University, which, except for the survival of the victim, was

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strongly reminiscent of the show trials of the Stalin era. As related in full detail in Scinteia (October 16 and 17, 1957), the highlight of the meeting was a confession to, and abjuration of, the errors of nationalism and chauvinism, by a member of the Hungarian minority, Professor Lajos Jordaky. He confessed that although his thoughts had for more than ten years been poisoned by nationalism and he had decided to rid himself of the poison, the same error reappeared during the Hungarian Counterrevolution when he had sympathized with Nagy and the Petöfi Club members. It was not until January 1957, that he realized that the apparent revolt was actually a counterrevolution. Having then discovered within himself the roots of nationalism, he was "determined to extirpate them."

59. Why he had waited ten months to make this important announcement, or why he was making it at all, Jordaky failed to explain. But one may surmise that it was the result of a bargain with the Security Police, which hoped thus to warn other nationalists. Actually the incident served more to focus attention on the fact that in the Hungarian minority in Rumania, nationalism, that is anti-Rumanian as well as anti-Russian sentiment, continued to flourish, seemingly unaffected by proletarian internationalism.

Anti-Subversion Penalties Stiffened

60. Those whose errors had passed from the stage of thought to that of action were not to be let off with mere self-criticism. A decree published in the official gazette of September 30, 1957, raised the penalty for "propagandizing, agitation, or any other activity to change the social order" from a minimum of six months and a maximum of three years in jail, to from three to ten years, and the maximum penalty for "taking part in international or foreign organizations aimed at overthrowing the democratic government," from five to twenty-five years.

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61. The same decree also reintroduced the death penalty for offenses "committed to the detriment of public property or the national economy," such as embezzlement or theft of public property, when they were "of a particularly grave nature." Punishment for "speculation" - any unauthorized private trading - had already been made more severe by a decree of July 16, 1957. The practice must have spread considerably, since, in the spring, taxes levied on small private traders, chiefly in food, and rents for stalls in the free markets in which peasants sold produce, had been raised to prohibitive heights. The immediate result of the stiffer penalties and intensified police activity was naturally a scarcity of a number of products, such as meat and edible oil.

62. The July decree also considerably increased the penalties for begging and vagrancy, for prostitution and hooliganism - the latter offense so broadly defined that it gave the police almost unlimited powers to make arrests, while scrupulously observing socialist legality.

63. Finally, the decree provided for the establishment of an allegedly new system of Corrective Labor Colonies, run by the Security Police, in which convicted offenders were to serve their sentences, running from six months to five years. Since the difficulty experienced by the government in recruiting sufficient labor for its ambitious reed-processing project in the Danube Delta marshes was well known, it was generally believed that the new decree's real purpose was to revive and legalize the methods which had once served to provide slave labor for the notorious Danube-Black Sea Canal project, abandoned after Stalin's death.

64. In the educational field, new rules governing entrance requirements to institutions of higher learning were announced on July 31, 1957. The most interesting provisions were the exemption of workers' children from the requirement to pass entrance examinations and the possibly related fact that

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the list of subjects of which applicants were expected to have some knowledge no longer included the Russian language.

Land Socialization

65. On October 20, 1957, the press was able to announce triumphantly that Constanta region had become the first entirely collectivized region in Rumania. While there is no evidence that direct political or administrative pressure was used in this or other regions, indirect administrative and economic pressure must have been particularly strong to explain the conversion of so many peasants in so short a time. At the beginning of 1956, only 41,000 of the 115,000 peasant families of the Constanta region had been members of collective farms or of the much less "progressive" agricultural associations. On July 4, 1957, Scinteia announced that complete "cooperativization" had been achieved, 55% of the peasant families being members of cooperatives, and 45% of agricultural associations. Three and a half months later, the latter, 52,000 strong, had allegedly changed their minds voluntarily and switched to collectivization. The paper conceded that the volume of propaganda had been tremendously stepped up, but it failed to list any new arguments which might have explained the sudden conversion of so many peasants.

Survival of Limited Artistic Freedom

66. In one field only was there no serious attempt by the regime to backtrack, namely the plastic arts. Exhibitions of paintings by hitherto banned pre-Communist artists and of contemporary painters whose works did not strictly conform to the standards of "socialist realism," continued to be permitted, with only an occasional warning growl from the Party press. The regime presumably calculated that it needed some factual proof of its professed "anti-sectarianism" and that the portrait of a pretty girl or a spring landscape was the evidence of liberalism least likely to endanger its political power.

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Hard Political Line Reaffirmed

67. In a speech to Party members in Bucharest, strongly endorsing the Moscow Declaration and Manifesto of November 22, 1957, Gheorghiu-Dej made it clear once more that in all important matters, such as "revising the Party's political line, undermining the unity of Party ranks and diminishing the Party leadership . . . undermining Socialist democracy" he would brook no "liberalism" and "capitulation to alien ideology."¹ It was therefore not surprising that the amnesty proclaimed on December 29 exclusively benefited common criminals.

68. The absence of any rumors of further dissidence within the Party seemed to prove that Gheorghiu-Dej's threat had been effective and that dissenters, if there were any left, had been successfully cowed. When therefore the Party Central Committee Plenum met June 9-13, 1958, it seemed to be a routine affair, an opinion hardly shaken by the mention in the final communique^e of June 14, of a decision to strengthen Party discipline, unity and composition, and stressing the necessity to combat revisionism and bourgeois ideology. All the greater was the surprise caused by the June 27 Scinteia editorial, which revealed the Plenum's demand "that Party organizations unfold a merciless struggle against any anti-Party manifestations, which certain dissolving, anarchic, and career-seeking elements which have infiltrated into the Party would try to attempt," and that consequently, the Plenum had "unanimously condemned the anti-Party deeds of certain Party members and adopted statutory sanctions against them."

69. Four alternate members of the Central Committee, the most prominent among whom were Constantin Doncea and Iacob Cotoveanu, were expelled from that body as well as from the Party, and it was implied that four more

¹Radio Bucharest, 17 December 1957.

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Party members, who were severely criticized, lost their memberships. Although all of them were accused of personal shortcomings, such as "anti-Party, dissolving activities," "unscrupulous career-seeking," "opportunism," and "personal ambitions," the preceding condemnation of revisionism and bourgeois ideology as well as other indications makes it obvious that the latter were the real reasons for their fall from grace. At first sight it might seem that, considering the official condemnation of revisionism, this heresy would hardly commend itself to an ambitious careerist. But history shows that even in the Communist Party, a man may advance his fortunes by winning the sympathies of the rank and file.

70. To console those who might have deplored the loss of Party members, Scinteia announced that the number of PMR members and candidates had increased since December 1955 from 595,000 to 720,000 and the percentage of members who were workers in industry and agriculture from 62 to 69%. The paper also confirmed the solidity of Gheorghiu-Dej's position by being careful to mention, when extolling the merits of the Politburo, that it was "headed by Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej."

Economic Situation at the Turn of the Year 1958

71. Fortunately, for the regime as well as for the people, the weather had been extremely favorable for agriculture in 1957. The grain harvest reaching a record 11.5 million tons, exceeding the previous best harvest (1955) by over 15%. Nevertheless expenditures budgetted for agriculture in 1958 rose from 4 billion lei in 1957 to 5.3 billion. Social and cultural expenditures were nearly 50% higher than in 1956, while industrial expenditures were 15% lower. On the other hand, publication of the 1957 State Plan report revealed that socialist orthodoxy was being respected, inasmuch as the increase over 1956 in the production of means of production had been 11%, as against 5.1% for consumer goods. The report also

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stated that the revision of the wage and norm system had been completed, and that "the average nominal wages of the salary earners rose by approximately 10%," thereby tacitly admitting that their real wages had not improved. As the report also claimed that the 1957 production plan had been overfulfilled by 6.7%, exceeding the 1956 figure by 8.5%, and that labor productivity had increased by 8.3%,¹ the workers could have justifiably expected a corresponding increase in real wages, on the strength of the constant assurances by the regime that wage raises were tied to increases in productivity. But although there has been no subsequent mention of wage raises or of price reductions, there have been no reports of unusual unrest among workers.

72. On the other hand, the intensified collectivization drive appears to have provoked peasant resistance, at least in some parts of the country. There certainly was trouble calling for the presence of troops in villages around Focsani in the beginning of 1958, and the closing to diplomats of the entire area between Focsani and Galati seems to support the rumors of more widespread unrest in other areas less frequented by foreigners, chiefly in Northern Moldavia and in Constanta region around Tulcea. Although Gheorghiu-Dej, in his exhaustive report to the Agricultural Conference which met in Constanta on April 4-5, 1958, reiterated the Party's and the government's decision to punish severely anybody in authority who disregarded standing orders to refrain from any attempt at coercion, he himself admitted that violations had occurred "recently in some parts of the country." Some overzealous officials had, he said, used "pressure methods" instead of "political persuasion work." Resistance to these on the part of the victims would have been only natural, and even legitimate from Gheorghiu-Dej's own point of view. He could, however, hardly be expected to say so, for official approval of revolts against abuses of the regime might set a dangerous precedent.

¹ Radio Bucharest, February 25, 1958.

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73. It would, of course, be impossible to tell to what extent "pressure methods" were responsible for the - at first sight impressive - gains in the socialization of agriculture reported by Gheorghiu-Dej to the conference. Since the Second Party Congress in December 1955, which had decided that by 1960 the socialist sector of agriculture had to become "preponderant," and up to March 1, 1958, the number of peasant families members of collective farms or of agricultural associations had jumped from 386, 853 to 1, 528, 578, and the socialized area from 1, 334, 764 to 3, 830, 376 hectares. In other words, three times as many peasants had joined in the last two years as in the seven preceding years, bringing the number up to 45% of the total peasant population, and the "socialist cooperatist sector" to 37% of the country's agricultural area. State farms accounted for an additional 15.4% making the grand total of socialized land 52.4%.

74. Upon closer examination, the regime's success appears much less impressive. Gheorghiu-Dej, for the first time, revealed the breakdown of the "socialist-cooperatist sector," showing that of its 1, 528, 578 members, only 398, 246, that is roughly one quarter, belonged to the collective sector; the others belonged to "agricultural associations" or "production cooperatives," in which the peasants retain the ownership of their land and cattle, but pool the land to be worked as a unit, in theory at any rate. In practice, although the benefits of working large fields by machines supplied by the State Machine Stations seem obvious, many association members, at least those who owned the necessary equipment, appear to have carried on just as before. This was frankly conceded by the newspaper Dobrogea Noua of August 11, 1956, under the revealing caption: "On Paper, yes, in Practice, no." The paper asserted that in many agricultural associations, the strips of land were formally pooled to satisfy the statutory requirements, after which everybody farmed his portion of the land as he thought fit, but benefitted "unreservedly

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from the advantages granted by the state to agricultural associations." Although much less frankly, Gheorghiu-Dej himself admitted that in too many associations farming was still carried out on the old individual basis.

75. Actually, considering the numerous financial and other advantages enjoyed by "socialist-cooperatist" peasants and the difficulty of feeding draught animals on small farms in hot and dry climates, one should have expected many more peasants to have joined the associations than actually did. Their reluctance is probably to be explained by the inability of the government tractor pool - 20,700 reckoned in conventional 15 HP units¹ - to cope even with its present tasks, and only a very definite material advantage could offset peasant suspicion of agricultural associations. However far these organizations may be from real socialist agriculture and however easy it may be to evade their modest requirements, the peasants know from Gheorghiu-Dej himself that in the eyes of the regime the agricultural associations are merely the first step toward the "higher" forms of socialist agriculture. The step may be only a short one, but for the peasant, it is a step in the wrong direction. This explains why in spite of "pressure methods" and the material inducements offered by the government, 55% of the peasant population is still holding out.

76. A further proof that pressure, both direct and indirect, is used, in spite of official disapproval - alleged at any rate - may be found in the fact mentioned by Gheorghiu-Dej, that agricultural socialization figures showed tremendous differences, all the way from 10% to 100%, even in neighboring raions under practically identical conditions. Gheorghiu-Dej attributed these discrepancies to the different levels of explan-

¹Less than half the tractor power per acre of the USSR.

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atory and persuasive work by the Party officials. Nevertheless, as the arguments in favor should be pretty generally known by now, it seems much more likely that the unevenness of progress is chiefly due to the varying amount of pressure applied by the local potentates, ranging from the use of naked force admitted by Gheorghiu-Dej - but with no mention of having cracked down on the offenders - to the use of "special, but not very obvious, economic measures," as a Hungarian writer on farm collectivization put it.¹

77. The lack, in practice, of the vital inducement of higher yields, which large scale socialized farming should in theory certainly provide, was indirectly confirmed by Gheorghiu-Dej himself. All he could say to bolster his claims in favor of socialized agriculture was that 40% of the collective farms had obtained yields some 20% higher than the national average, which was not saying very much for this privileged group, but he gave no figures for the much larger group of agricultural associations, although the figures were certainly available to him.

Review of Rumanian Developments Since the Twentieth Congress

78. The history of Rumania in the two years which followed upon Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin contrasts sharply with that of her satellite neighbors, Poland and Hungary. It was as uneventful as theirs was dramatic. How is that to be explained, since Rumanians are certainly every bit as opposed to Communism as Poles or Hungarians, and after a long history of invasions, pillage and dismemberment at the hands of the Russians, have as good reasons as the Poles, and better reasons than the Hungarians, to fear and to dislike their powerful and brutal neighbors? The historical and

¹Nepszabadsag, May 8, 1958.

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national factors which might have a bearing on the subject will be dealt with more fully in a later chapter, but some of them may be briefly mentioned here.

79. Although the history of Rumania is there to prove that Rumanians are quite as nationalistic and independence loving as any of their neighbors - or, for that matter, as Africans or Asians - their success in maintaining their Latin character while most of their neighbors were slaviced, their final liberation from Ottoman power and later from Russian hegemony, have produced a curious mixture of fatalism and canniness in the Rumanian character. However black things may seem to look at one time, Rumanians console themselves with the saying: Rumanians will never be destroyed. This serves as good justification to avoid fighting unless and until the odds look favorable. Educated Rumanians also like to think that as members of a Latin, or, at least, a Latinized race, they are, in the words of Orville Prescott, "endowed with "a Latin realism about the harsh necessities of life" and, therefore, are politically more rational than Slavs or Hungarians, while among the lower classes, Haiduk-style warfare, by no means extinct in the Balkans, has long been a lost art.

80. As a result of earlier disappointments, public opinion in Rumania was also more skeptical than in Hungary as to the chances of assistance from the West in case of conflict with the USSR. Hungary, unlike Rumania, had not had in 1939 an allied guarantee which was not lived up to, nor had she suffered another bitter disillusionment in 1944. Furthermore, as a result of geography, the feeling of being hopelessly isolated from the West is much stronger in Rumania than in Poland or Hungary, not to mention Yugoslavia. On the other hand, an ingrained distrust of their Russian neighbors, whether

¹New York Times, June 23, 1958.

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Tsarist or Communist, precludes any illusions in Rumania as to the Russians' willingness to loosen their grip on any territory they had grabbed, unless obliged to bow to superior force, which the West seemed most unlikely to supply.

81. Among the differences between Rumania and the two other satellites may also be mentioned the fact that the conflict between Church and Party did not exist there. Unlike the Catholic Church, the Orthodox Church is completely subservient to the regime.

82. Finally, Rumanians are respectful of constituted authority and, compared to many other nations, easy to govern. Lacking the conspiratorial and revolutionary traditions which the Poles had developed under the Russians and Germans, and the Hungarians under the Austrians, the great majority of Rumanians - the exception being the Transylvanians - are much more prone to circumvent than to challenge the powers that be.

83. There were also important differences in the political factors influencing events in Eastern Europe in 1956. By the time of the Twentieth Congress, the "thaw" had been allowed to proceed very far in Poland under the dying Bierut. In Hungary, the Nagy interlude had given the liberal opposition, both within the Party and among the intellectuals, the opportunity to gather strength and popularity. In Rumania, there was no equivalent to Gomulka or Nagy and Gheorghiu-Dej never allowed the reins to slacken. There were in March 1956 no cracks in the dam through which, after Khrushchev had exposed Stalin's lies and crimes, the rising tides of Titoism and anti-Stalinism could have poured and carried it away.

84. Gheorghiu-Dej undoubtedly belonged to the school of dictators who always have believed that "total dictatorship cannot become partial dictatorship" and that

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"freedom is not a commodity capable of being rationed" as C. L. Sulzberger put it.¹ Nevertheless dictatorship did not necessarily imply for him the monstrous excesses of which Stalin had been guilty and which, like all excesses, did more harm than good to the Party and the cause. As a matter of fact, Gheorghiu-Dej seems to have been somewhat less ruthless and cruel than most of his colleagues in the other satellites, as exemplified by the leniency shown to the "deviators" Ana Pauker, Luca, and Georgescu, ousted in 1952 - while Slansky and ten associates were being executed in Czechoslovakia. This leniency did not, however, extend to Patrascanu, executed in 1954. It must be admitted, however, that from his point of view Gheorghiu-Dej was right not to spare Patrascanu. Unlike Slansky, Patrascanu was indeed a national Communist. If alive in 1956, it is very likely that he would have played the same part in Rumania as Gomulka and Nagy in their countries. After his death, national Communist or liberal members of the Rumanian Workers' Party had no courageous, able, and popular leader around whom to rally and to form a cohesive group which might have been able to gain a majority in the Central Committee. Gheorghiu-Dej certainly proved himself to be endowed with considerable prudence and acumen in his handling of the Pauker-Luca-Georgescu deviation. The accusations against them were left so vague and contradictory that he could, after Stalin's death, make out that Ana Pauker and Luca had been the prime exponents of the detestable "cult of the individual." This offered a number of advantages. By blaming others, he thus inferentially not only exonerated himself, but emerged as a forerunner of Khrushchev in the fight against Stalinism. Moreover, by dubbing them accomplices, not victims of Stalinism, he was relieved of the painful necessity to sap his own authority by rehabilitations, as Rakosi for example was forced to do.

¹New York Times, May 14, 1958.

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85. Other factors which may help to explain the comparative quiet which prevailed in Rumania in 1956 are the economic situation and Gheorghiu-Dej's personal standing.

86. The 1955 harvest had been very good and although the 1956 harvest was much less so, the food supply was still adequate in November, at which time Gheorghiu-Dej forestalled a shortage by obtaining a large amount of grain on credit from the USSR. Economic conditions in Rumania, although still very bad, seem to have been slightly on the upgrade in 1956, which was not the case in Poland for instance.

87. Personally, Gheorghiu-Dej does not appear to have aroused the violent animosity inspired by such colleagues as Chervenkov, Rakosi, and Ulbricht. In Rumania, the targets of popular hostility were Ana Pauker and Chisinevski when they were in power, and today, it appears to be directed more against Chivu Stoica than against Gheorghiu-Dej. With regard to the two former, Gheorghiu-Dej may have profited from the popular belief that had it not been for him, a man of pure Rumanian stock and who had never left the country, Ana Pauker and Chisinevski, the Moscow-trained Stalinists of Jewish blood,¹ would have made life even harder for the people. How it has happened that Chivu Stoica, an obvious second fiddle, is now made the scapegoat for the unpopular measures of the regime is hard to explain, unless it be simply a matter of personality.

88. That Chisinevski and Constantinescu should have failed in their attempts, if the July 3, 1957, Plenum

¹ Rumanians, like most other Eastern Europeans, generally assume, if only tacitly, that a Jew cannot help resenting discriminations or persecutions from which Jews have suffered in their country and will instinctively seize the opportunity, when in power, to avenge his brethren.

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Resolution is to be believed, to give the Party discussion of the Twentieth Congress decisions "an orientation which was opposite to that established by the March 1956 Plenum, " - presumably to engage in no significant liberalization - is not surprising. Chisinevski as a Jew could hardly lead a nationalist movement, and Constantinescu was apparently too arrogant and caustic to be a popular leader. If they did indeed try to achieve a liberalization of the Party line, they failed to secure a sufficiently large following and it was therefore easy for Gheorghiu-Dej, in full control of the Political Bureau and of the Central Committee composed of spineless mediocrities, to deal with the non-Party opponents, chiefly intellectuals and students, who demanded greater freedom. He had prudently refrained from any far-reaching weakening of the security apparatus. There was apparently only a slight reduction in forces after the Twentieth Congress, and even that did not survive the October events in Poland and Hungary. On the other hand, the spirit of the times appears to have manifested itself in Rumania to the extent of a slight increase in the freedom of artistic and literary expression and of a moderate abatement of police terrorism. Khrushchev had made it plain that indiscriminate arrests, tortures, and executions were no longer approved in Moscow. Repression could still be severe, but it should be just, at any rate, according to the Communist idea of justice, and to that extent Gheorghiu-Dej was willing to conform.

89. How wise Gheorghiu-Dej had been never to give the opposition a chance to "jell, " to have taken the Twentieth Congress resolutions, notably the resolution dealing with different roads to socialism, with a large grain of salt, and not to have allowed his authority to be weakened by criticism - still less by self-criticism - was amply demonstrated by the difference between developments in Rumania and in Poland and Hungary in the fall of 1956. The July 3, 1957, Central Committee Resolution frankly admitted that if it had not been for the fact that the leadership had not allowed the Party's

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unity to be compromised, had not "given free rein to petit bourgeois demands," and had not allowed the security organs to be "paralyzed," events in Rumania might well have duplicated those in Hungary. Even allowing for a desire to blacken its opponents, this was certainly a remarkable admission of its unpopularity on the part of a Communist Party.

90. A factor which, for obvious reasons, the Resolution did not mention, but which paradoxically played a part in preventing an uprising in Rumania in the fall of 1956, was precisely the Hungarian uprising. It was true the Hungarians set a tempting example and undoubtedly did encourage the manifestations of unrest in Rumania. But even in Cluj, where owing to the large Magyar minority, the impact of the Hungarian Revolution was greatest, the antagonism between Rumanians and Hungarians effectively paralyzed the student body. To be successful, any anti-regime movement had to be undertaken jointly, but however illogically, the belief gained ground among Rumanians that the victory of the Hungarian revolutionaries might very well entail the loss of Transylvania to Hungary. In part, the belief was founded on the recent experience of a group of Rumanian students from Cluj who had been invited by the Budapest University Student Council to be their guests during July and August 1956. Their stay was short, for dissatisfaction with the treatment they received from their hosts led to complaints which provoked a violent quarrel, in the course of which Hungarian students boasted they would soon liberate Transylvania from Rumanian rule, with the help of the Hungarian students in Cluj. Naturally enough, the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution two months later seemed to confirm the existence of a well laid plan, especially as Hungarian "revisionist" statements made at the time by Hungarian rebels could be construed as applying to revision of the Trianon frontiers, and not of Communism only. Under these conditions collaboration between the students was impossible. Not only was the incipient movement of revolt among the Hungarian

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students in Cluj easily suppressed by the authorities, but suspiciousness of ultimate Hungarian aims which had rapidly spread in the rest of the country played its part in dampening Rumanian inclinations to rebel.

91. Nevertheless, and in spite of the firm policy he had bragged about, Gheorghiu-Dej must still have had good cause for alarm. His prompt steps to obtain Soviet economic assistance, to raise minimum wages and pensions, to increase the share of the consumer goods industry, and to abolish compulsory farm deliveries, can hardly have been a simple coincidence. But there was of course no question of political concessions to the people, and as far as the Party was concerned, the Plenum Resolution of July 1957 - besides removing Gheorghiu-Dej's chief opponents and critics - strongly condemned revisionism, but never mentioned dogmatism or sectarianism. No better illustration of the gradual rehabilitation of neo-Stalinism - defined as harsh one-man rule, but without indiscriminate physical liquidation or torture - could have been given than the reappearance in the Rumanian May 1957 celebrations of small portraits of Stalin. On that occasion, they were carried in the parade at a respectful distance behind those of Marx, Engels and Lenin, but on August 23, 1957, Stalin's picture once again ranked as high as theirs. The only difference between the pictures some diplomats claimed to have noticed was a layer of ingrained dust which it apparently had not been possible to remove.

The Situation in Rumania in the Spring of 1958

92. On the surface everything seems quiet in Rumania, but this calm does not indicate that the Rumanian people are reconciled to Communism. In spite of recent very modest improvements, the workers share with the other city

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dwellers the hardships of low incomes, high prices,¹ and appalling housing conditions, and view with probably justified alarm the impending revision of work norms. The peasants, although pleased by the abolition of forced deliveries, strongly resent the heavy pressure, which, whether by incessant propaganda or by more concrete means, has been brought to bear upon them to make them join the socialized sector of agriculture. It is true most of them get away with membership in an agricultural association, and often only nominal membership at that, but it would take an unusually naive peasant not to realize that this is only a preparatory step toward something much worse. They know that only by ridding the country of Communism can they ever feel safe.

93. The great majority of Rumanian intellectuals have remained faithful to their "idealistic" training and convictions. Forced to earn their bread, many writers "escape into the past . . . toward the historic void," as the Rumanian Writers' Union Committee complained in its report on the February 1958 session.²

"We find the Committee continued that in recent years fewer novels were written about the collectivization of agriculture, the great national building projects, and the life of workers in factories, although the number of such novels should have increased . . . There exists an extremely dangerous tendency in poetry to slide toward minor themes,

¹ The New York Times correspondent, reporting from Bucharest, stated that a Bucharest saleswoman would have to work two weeks to earn the price of a cheap pair of shoes, and a month for a sweater. (New York Times, February 27, 1958).

² Scinteia, March 5, 1958.

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toward apolitical and timeless poetry . . . The main danger is the influence of bourgeois ideology which on the practical side leads toward the under-estimation of our achievements, toward evasionism, petty bourgeois criticism, and negativism, and on the theoretical side toward the revision of the Leninist principle of Party-mindedness."

94. The hopes of the regime that a new generation of Communist-trained intellectuals would soon be available to fill the places of their incorrigible elders seem doomed to be disappointed. The Rumanian youth has shown itself fully as refractory to Communist indoctrination as Polish or Hungarian youth. Scinteia Tineretului, the Party youth organ, admits the continued existence, among students, in spite of the Politburo decision of June 1956, of "serious shortcomings . . . in the field of political education," of "political and ideological confusion . . . The bad influence of cosmopolitanism, chauvinist nationalism, and mysticism can still be felt. Certain students manifest political passiveness."¹

95. Conditions among high school pupils are no better. Here the Bucharest branch of the Union of Working Youth (UTM) found "serious weakness in their political education." Even "many UTM members do not know . . . the elementary problems concerning the policy of our Party and state . . . Influences of bourgeois ideology, mysticism, and obscurantism become manifest among some pupils."² As for the claim to "unshakable unity of the Party" and its immunity to "revisionist diversion" of the kind which had "smoothed the way for the counterrevolution . . . in Hungary," which, the 27 June 1958 Scinteia editorial boasted, had been

¹ Scinteia Tineretului, April 3, 1958

² Ibid.

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achieved by the "elimination of the anti-Party group [Chisinevschi and Constantinescu]," it was given the lie by the editorial itself. A few paragraphs further down, it announced the ouster of eight party members for precisely these activities. Although not belonging to the top leadership, most of them had held important posts and all were old time Party members. The significance of the episode lies in the fact that they were not accused of open opposition to the Party line; rather they appear to have been, among other things, the sort of members, berated in the editorial, "who are satisfied with declaring their agreement with the Party's decisions but forget about them next day . . ." It is permissible to conclude from specific charges, such as that of "having become the mouth-piece and instruments of the enemies of the policy of the Party," or of having been guilty of "opportunist manifestations incompatible with the Party line," that not only did they "forget" the Party decisions, but they flouted and criticized them in their own fiefs, although not daring to oppose them in full dress meetings. It is safe to assume that the victims of the June 1958 purge, far from being the only guilty members, were actually typical of the majority of the Party membership and were only either more imprudent than their fellows, or simply unlucky in being chosen as scapegoats. The lesson may make the lucky ones more careful in future, but can hardly be expected to make them change their minds or feelings.

96. With surprising candor, the editorial further revealed that the sanctions were not the consequence of recently discovered misdeeds or of changes of attitude on the part of the eight miscreants, but were being applied largely for their failure to help the Party to "unmask certain alien and hostile elements" or for "failure to take a stand in the face of damaging manifestations of certain anti-Party elements;" in the context, this can only refer to Chisinevschi and Constantinescu, demoted in June 1957. That raises the question why no steps were taken immediately to curb their nefarious

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activities, which instead were allowed to continue for a full year? It is difficult to explain the regime's inactivity otherwise than by the assumption that the attitude for which the Doncea group was expelled was so general, that it has become "accepted" as unavoidable by the top leadership itself - provided most of the leaders did not even secretly sympathize with it. But unfortunately for Gheorghiu-Dej, the evolution in Moscow was in the opposite direction and by June 1958 he was forced to line up with Kadar and Gomulka and to give fresh proofs of his loyalty. The corollary of the mystic belief of Rumanians in their indestructibility is, besides a feeling of superiority as Latins over the Slavs whom they had been able to absorb, a tendency to make rather light of foreign occupation, on the theory that this is just another transient phase which, however unpleasant, will do no lasting damage to the nation. Consequently to fight against hopeless odds would be not only foolish, but injurious to the national interest. Better bend, Rumanians believe, and live to see another day than stiffen and be broken by overwhelming force. A favorable opportunity is bound to present itself sooner or later, and the more one beguiles one's enemy in the meantime, the better one's position when the time comes to rise against him.

97. Moscow correctly realized that the chances of a Rumanian uprising under present world conditions were exceedingly small and that the presence of Russian occupation troops was therefore unnecessary. Remote control was quite as effective. On the other hand, troop withdrawal was good propaganda - in the neutral and fellow travelling world, not in Rumania, where it could make little difference, for, if necessary, Russian tanks can be back in Bucharest in a few hours, and bombers in a few minutes. Indeed, it is surprising that the Kremlin waited till May 26, 1958, to make the move. The probable explanation is that until recently, the Russian policy was to negotiate with the West on the basis of quid pro quos. As the unilateral abandonment of atomic

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tests shows, this policy has now been changed. But, that the Russians do not feel absolutely sure of the Rumanians seems to be proved by the fact that the Rumanian army is, besides the Hungarian, the only satellite force which has not been equipped with the newer Soviet T-54 tanks.

98. Their peculiar attitude toward foreign occupations and its ideological corollaries undoubtedly explain why, with few exceptions, Rumanians, including leading Party members, give the impression of not taking Soviet Communism seriously. In the words of a British correspondent, speaking about a group of young engineers; "Like most Rumanians, they wore the trappings of Communism lightly."¹ This may explain the absence in Rumania of anything comparable to the shock produced among Communists in most other satellites by Khrushchev's revelations of Stalin's mistakes and crimes. Those who have no illusions cannot be disillusioned.

99. As they had already shown after the First World War, when they adopted for the sake of political advantage the forms but not the spirit of parliamentary democracy for which they were not yet ready, Rumanians are adept at mimicry. It is largely to this talent that they ascribe the fact that alone of all the Eastern European states, the Rumanian Principalities managed to escape annexation by one of the great neighboring Powers ever since their foundation seven centuries ago.

100. A public spectacle like the state funeral in January 1958 of the Chief of State, with all the pomp of the Orthodox Church, in a deeply religious atmosphere, and with an attendance of a million people, is hardly conceivable in a country whose rulers were all convinced Marxists. It would

¹London Times, May 28, 1958.

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seem as if the funeral provided all Bucharest, rulers and ruled alike, with a welcome pretext to resume their natural color for a day.

101. There are indeed people in Rumania who believe Gheorghiu-Dej has national Communist inclinations. The theory seems to be bolstered by the somewhat independent line taken at times by Rumania in her relations with Yugoslavia and the US.

102. Rumania's attitude toward Yugoslavia, ever since this country's reconciliation with the USSR in 1955, was friendlier than that of the other Bloc countries, except Poland, during the period of renewed tension between Moscow and Belgrade which followed. In the words of the Yugoslav journal Politika (December 29, 1957), "Rumanian-Yugoslav friendship has been considerably strengthened during the past two years and the relations between the two countries have been exceptionally fruitful." Lately, on the occasion of the furor provoked by the publication in April 1958 of the Yugoslav Party program draft, Rumania was the last to criticize Yugoslavia, and when she did so, the Scinteia article of May 18 was comparatively mild and free from abuse. It ended with the assurance that the Rumanian Workers' Party would "continue to spare no efforts to strengthen the unity of the Communists . . ." and declared that it was "necessary that Yugoslavia should also make such efforts." It was only after Khrushchev's violent diatribe against the League of Yugoslav Communists at the Seventh Bulgarian Congress in June 1958 that Rumanian statements on the subject became sharper.

103. In its relations with the West, and more especially with the US, the Rumanian government has also distinguished itself among the satellites by its efforts, interrupted only for about a year after the Hungarian Revolution, to establish more cordial relations, chiefly in the fields of commercial and cultural exchanges and of tourism.

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104. While it is certainly true that this friendlier attitude toward Yugoslavia - the only neighbor with whom Rumania has never been at war - and a deep longing for cordial relations with the Western Powers do indeed correspond to the authentic traditions and feelings of the Rumanian people not excepting the Communist leaders themselves, it is very doubtful that they constitute manifestations of independence from Moscow. If Moscow had considered the relative mildness of Rumanian criticism of Yugoslavia as a dangerous symptom of independence, some thinly veiled warnings would at the very least certainly have been carried by Pravda or the Moscow Radio. There have been none, whereas Moscow's broadcasts to Poland have repeatedly included comments on Yugoslav "errors," written especially for Polish consumption. On the other hand, the Rumanian government immediately changed its tone when the Soviet break with Tito became serious.

105. The reason Khrushchev tolerated Bucharest's friendly relations with Belgrade may simply have been that so long as the Soviet-Yugoslav breach was not complete, it suited him to have a reliable agent on good terms with the potential troublemaker. At the same time, this tolerance served to bolster the myth of satellite independence, at no great risk to the USSR. As for the advances of the Rumanian regime to the US, they are certainly honest but they seem to aim chiefly at establishing an atmosphere in which the US might be willing to make unreciprocated concessions advantageous to Rumania. Even if Moscow is aware of these Rumanian pourparlers, there is no particular reason why it should object, especially if these unpublicized conversations are carried on to the accompaniment of violent diatribes against the US in the Party press.

106. Whatever the correct explanation of Bucharest's foreign political divergences from the strict Moscow pattern, it can be taken for granted, in the absence of corroborative

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evidence of greater moment, that they are, if not encouraged, at least not disapproved by the Kremlin, which must consider them within the bounds of permissible "national peculiarities." Particularly in the matter of relations with Yugoslavia, the more obvious instance of divergence, there can be no doubt as to which of the two countries' - the USSR or Yugoslavia - friendship would be more valuable to Gheorghiu-Dej. That would leave only one possible motive - national pride. But why should pride manifest itself so late, and why in connection with an issue of so little importance to Rumanians?

107. The fact that the Rumanian regime's different attitude toward some foreign countries can hardly be considered a sign of national Communist tendencies, is, however, in itself no proof that Gheorghiu-Dej is not a national Communist at heart. For, if he were so inclined, he would hardly give himself away prematurely by manifestations of insubordination under the present inauspicious circumstances. Eastern European leaders, men of much higher character than Gheorghiu-Dej and his associates, have often in the past played a double game to escape annihilation in times of turmoil, while biding their time. Salus patriae suprema lex.

108. It is, indeed, only reasonable to assume that Gheorghiu-Dej, like anybody else in his place, would rather occupy a position of independence like that of Tito than be at the Kremlin's beck and call, but he certainly would rather be a Soviet pro-consul in Bucharest than a refugee in a Yugoslav Embassy. In order therefore to risk displeasing Moscow in any way, Gheorghiu-Dej would have to be convinced that he could, if not defy the Russians, like Tito, at least, like Gomulka, maintain himself in power without Soviet backing.

109. But the Communist Party machine in Rumania is not strong enough and the regime is too unpopular to be able to maintain itself unaided. The only way it could gain some measure of popularity would be by defying the Russians.

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But that would mean, as the Hungarian experience has proved, Russian armed intervention, which, as Khrushchev has made clear during his April 1958 visit to Hungary, Moscow would repeat, in spite of all propaganda drawbacks. Moscow knows perfectly well that far from being, as in the case of Poland, forced by the overriding raison d'état to side with Russia out of fear of Germany, Rumania, through raison d'état - fear of Russia and the loss of Bessarabia - would inevitably be drawn into the arms of the West. Even less than a neutral Hungary, is Moscow likely to tolerate a neutral Rumania, whose neutrality could never be sincere.

110. There would therefore be no way out of the dilemma for Gheorghiu-Dej, any more than there was for Nagy. His only chance of being accepted by the people, would be to assert his independence from Moscow. But if he did, he would be crushed. Nagy could at least entertain the illusion that Moscow might not dare break its pledges of non-intervention and non-aggression, and, as Khrushchev has admitted, Moscow did have serious misgivings on that score. Gheorghiu-Dej can have no illusions. Forewarned is forearmed.

111. Neither does there appear to be anyone in the Rumanian-Communist Party who might wrest the leadership from Gheorghiu-Dej, and as precedents show, the initiative for revisionism, for a "liberal" revolt against the leadership must come from the Party ranks themselves. The masses are powerless. Moreover, a would-be national Communist in Rumania could not but be discouraged by the fact that few of the reforms achieved by successful national Communist movements in neighboring countries are either of interest to Rumanians or have endured. In Rumania, there is no conflict between the Church of the great majority of the people and the regime, nor has there been any interest shown in challenging the Soviet brand of Marxism-Leninism on ideological grounds as Tito has done. Other achievements, such as workers' councils, or freedom of the press, have not survived

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very long in Poland. Finally, the sharpest thorn in the flesh of captive nations, the Soviet garrisons, has already been removed in Rumania. It may be true that their removal beyond the Pruth makes little practical difference as far as Soviet control is concerned, but their presence on the other side of the border can hardly be protested as an insult to national pride.

112. That leaves for Rumania but few points of practical significance among those included in her neighbors' national roads to socialism. The most important is forced socialization of agriculture. However, so long as the government is content with membership in simple agricultural associations, even this problem is probably not too explosive, especially since the abolition of forced deliveries in Rumania, a most unpopular requirement still in force in Poland. In any case the peasants are too dispersed to be much of a threat to any regime, and it may be taken for granted that the defenders of individual farming find little support even among the more humane and decent of the Party members. Owing chiefly to Rumanian climatic and demographic conditions, some solution to the problem of dwarf holdings was even more urgent than in the other satellites, and nothing much can be said against the agricultural association solution, even if the majority of the peasants do prefer to be left alone and would rather be free than prosperous.

113. The remaining possible advantages of national Communism are greater personal freedom and greater scope for craftsmen and small business activity. But national Communism does not per se guarantee greater personal freedom, and it is less risky to expand small business by black market operations and bribery of officials than by provoking the Russians.

114. It seems therefore that after witnessing the Hungarian tragedy, the gradual erosion of the Polish road to

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socialism and of Polish "sovereignty", the rather dubious practical benefits of Titoism, and the decreasing chances of Western assistance - paralleled by a stiffening of the Soviet attitude - the more liberal members of the Rumanian Communist Party would have to be unusually mercurial or foolish to start any trouble. As for the non-Party members, the people, their attitude is sufficiently characterized by their use of the words "we" and "they" when referring to themselves or the Communists. But they are most unlikely to fight against overwhelming odds for the sake of replacing Khrushchevism with Gomulkaism, Nagyism, or Titoism, for they hate Communism and Russian domination in any form or degree. Only when their chances to get rid of them in every shape are reasonably favorable will they make the attempt. It may take a long time, but history has taught them patience and confidence in their powers of survival.

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