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Nº 300

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Senior Research Staff on International Communism

### LEGAL VS. ILLEGAL STATUS: SOME CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT TO BANNING A COMMUNIST PARTY

CIA/SRS-4



JOB NO. 80-01445R

BOX NO. 1

FOLDER NO. 4

TOTAL DOCS HEREIN 1

DOCUMENT NO. 1  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 1  
~~DECLASSIFIED~~  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 15 MAR 82 REVIEWER: C18657

4 January 1957

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Legal vs. Illegal Status:  
Some Considerations Relevant to Banning a Communist Party

I. The Nature of the Problem

Since the emergence of the Soviet regime in Russia, nearly every state in the world has been faced with the problem of how to treat a national Communist party. Governing circles, at least in recent years, have almost invariably recognized the Party as the subservient agent of a foreign power and its objective to be the overthrow of the local political and social order and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In most countries, only small minorities have been won to the acceptance of this objective, but in a few places Communist parties, through the exploitation of genuine grievances and aspirations, have gained wide popular support.

In countries that are both non-Communist and non-democratic, the problem of the local CP is usually dealt with in the manner accorded all opposition groups and movements. The Communist Party falls under the ban, provided by law or decree,

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pertaining to subversive political activity. In some of these countries the repression is thoroughgoing and effective; in others it is sporadically successful; in still others it is little more than an inconvenience to the Party's efforts at organization and agitation.

The problem is more complex and difficult in democratic countries with their traditions of political toleration and their guarantees of civil rights. The Communist Party can utilize the constitutional and statutory provisions which protect the political activity of opposition groups, and it can appeal to the courts to defend the alleged rights of the Party and its members. It can employ the electoral machinery and representative institutions of the state to propagate its cause and to sabotage the political process. Under the cover of a legitimate political party, it can serve the Kremlin's interests by propaganda, infiltration, subversion, and espionage.

In democratic states, moves to ban the Communist Party raise serious legal problems. It is difficult to devise laws and administrative orders that strike at the Party and yet

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do not interfere with the activities of non-Communist opposition groups. Legal definitions sufficiently precise to net the Communist Party and discriminatory enough to satisfy the courts are not easy to draft. Moreover, Communist parties have become adept at taking advantage of this condition in democratic countries. By changes of names and officers and by persistent litigation, they have frequently evaded the enforcement of the law or have delayed its application for long periods of time.

Besides the legal problems involved, moves to outlaw a Communist Party sometimes encounter opposition from influential segments of the public in democratic countries. Some of this opposition arises from a philosophical premise that it is wrong to repress by legal means any body of opinion or professed political organization however repugnant its views may be to the majority of the citizens of the country. Another kind of opposition argues that it is tactically unwise to outlaw the Party. Persons holding this view contend that, in a healthy democratic state, the Communist

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Party will never gain many adherents when it has to compete in a free market of ideas and that its rigid adherence to the "line" disgusts all voters but a self-deluded fringe. Furthermore, they believe that it is easier to battle a visible enemy than one underground.

## II. Historical Experience

Since 1917, history provides examples of many different policies for dealing with local Communist parties. The experience of a number of countries is instructive for the present-day consideration of the problem.

### A. Western Europe

During the era of the Weimar Republic in Germany the Communist Party operated as a legal political organization, and, as the strongest section of the Comintern outside Russia, it seemed to prosper. It achieved considerable electoral success, polling approximately two million votes in the presidential election of 1925 and almost four million in 1932. Just before the Nazi coup it had 100 members in the Reichstag. It built up numerous broad front organiza-

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tions. During the same period the KPD continued to pay lip service to revolutionary radicalism and to maintain skeleton staffs of an underground apparatus. However, the bulk of the Party, both leaders and rank-and-file, became smug and complacent; they failed utterly to comprehend the magnitude of the disaster which struck them when Hitler seized power. Their attempts to transform the entire, huge Party organization into an illegal movement were so clumsy, amateurish and half-hearted that Hitler found it comparatively easy to ban the Party and all its fronts in 1933 and to wipe out its underground cadres in the following years. The Nazi repression of the KPD was thorough. Even today, the Communist element in the ruling Party in the Soviet Zone of Germany is largely an artificial structure, brought back to life by Soviet military power rather than by intrinsic political impulses. The Party in Western Germany suffered equally from losses in leaders and organizational continuity inflicted upon it during the twelve years of Nazi dictatorship. Recently banned by a decision of the

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Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic, the Party had seen its popular vote fall from 5.7% in the first post-war election to 2.2% in 1953. It had no representatives in the present Bundestag, since it failed to receive the constitutional minimum of 5% of the national vote, the percentage required in order to participate in the distribution of seats. In view of the Communists' waning fortunes, the Government was widely criticized in Western Germany for pursuing the litigation it instituted in 1951 to ban the party.

The history of the Communist Party of France supplies a picture in reverse. While operating as a legal party in the 1920s and '30s, it gained comparatively few adherents. The Party was outlawed by the French Government in 1939, but it was not effectively repressed. During the Nazi occupation, Communists were active in the Resistance movement and gained sympathy and respectability as stalwart patriots. Thus accepted, the Party withstood the Gestapo's repressive measures which had destroyed the German CP. It emerged from the war period as a well



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organized, disciplined Party with widespread popular support. Although the number of cardholders has fallen since 1946 from about 850,000 to 350,000, the PCF has regularly polled more than a quarter of the total vote in postwar elections. It is currently the largest Party in the National Assembly with 150 members.

The Italian Communist Party has shown a similar resurgence. Outlawed and repressed during the Fascist era, it emerged, especially in Northern Italy, as an active resistance force toward the end of World War II. The PCI has had the voting support of approximately one-fifth of the Italian electorate in the postwar period, and through its working alliance with the Nenni Socialists, it has controlled more than one-third of the seats in the parliament. In addition, the Communists alone or with their PSI allies dominate about 25% of the local governments in Italy.

With respect to the French and Italian Communist parties, caution should be observed, of course, in attributing too much importance to the tempering and solidifying effects of combat-

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ing opposition, since there are a number of causes to account for Communism's postwar strength in both countries. War-time conditions, moreover, produce a special situation. The parties undoubtedly benefited from Allied help to the Resistance movement and from their participation in patriotic fronts. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that both parties withstood the repressive efforts of efficient security services and, when legalized again, promptly demonstrated widespread support in elections and in labor organizations.

The Communist Party of Spain, which was a miniscule organization of about 3,000 members in 1935, gained an unknown number of adherents during the Civil War when the USSR supplied the only major foreign aid to the Loyalist cause. By legislation of the Franco regime in 1939 and 1940, the Party was outlawed along with other opposition groups. The repression has been effective, and the Party is estimated to have currently no more than 3,000 hard core members.

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National Communist parties have always operated as legal organizations in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, and the Scandinavian countries. They were politically unimportant in these countries before World War II. They had no success in competition with the Socialist parties, which claimed the allegiance of large sections of the working population and of leftist-inclined professional groups. During and immediately after the conflict, the Communist parties in these countries all gained considerably in members and voting support as a result of the USSR's war-time prestige and the Communists' resistance activities in the occupied areas. It was a temporary surge, however. As the nature of Soviet foreign policy became clear and as the subservience of the local CPs to the Kremlin "line" was revealed, the parties, except in Finland and Iceland, declined to their former impotence as legal organizations. Probably the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia was the most important single event contributing to the decline of the parties in most of the Northern European countries.

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Tables in the Annex show the voting strength of the Communist parties in the postwar elections.

B. Near and Middle East

In the Near and Middle East, most governments have banned local Communist parties by law or decree. Repression has been sternly carried out in some of these states; in others, illegality has imposed only mild handicaps to Communist activity. In this area the fluctuations in the fortunes of the local parties have depended much more upon the willingness and efficiency of their governments to take repressive action than upon legal or illegal status.

Turkey, Iraq, and Iran are currently maintaining reasonably effective control over the outlawed parties. Egyptian repression of local Communists has continued despite closer relations between Cairo and the Soviet Bloc. It is open to question, however, whether this policy can be maintained in view of the likely influx of Communist advisors and technicians and the public favor which the Kremlin has won during the Suez crisis.

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In Greece, the Communists, who were thwarted in their attempt in 1944 to seize the government by the Greek and British liberating forces, resorted to armed insurrection. With Soviet connivance, they were supplied and succored by the adjacent satellite states. Their military defeat was accomplished through U. S. aid and advice and by Tito's timely defection. Today the illegal Party, although harried and repressed by the authorities, exercises considerable influence in Greek politics, with the acquiescence of the governing coalition, through a front organization, the United Democratic Left (EDA). Wary of attacks on its front activities, the Party has not neglected its clandestine organization.

The importance of governmental policy and effective police action on the condition of an illegal Party is well illustrated in the case of Iran. During the Mossadeqh regime the Tudeh Party operated in an undisguised manner and grew to an estimated membership of 35,000. While the Prime Minister and his ministerial colleagues were not Communists, their toleration of the Tudeh Party led them to

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become increasingly dependent upon the rabble-rousing support it could organize. The successor government, under Zahedi, greatly reduced the Party's influence in Iranian affairs. Its membership is now estimated at about 7, 000.

The Iranian experience has a parallel in the current situations in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Sudan. In these countries, as during Mossadeqh's tenure in Iran, the local Communist parties, although illegal, have become increasingly bold in their overt activities. They proclaim an extreme nationalist and anti-Western line, and they gain the backing of other opposition groups by playing on their fears that official repression will not be limited to the Communists alone. The weak and unsure governments of these countries, where the military and police authorities are themselves deeply involved in political intrigue, have neither the will nor the power to enforce the laws against the Communist parties. By contrast, the control which Nuri as-Said has exercised over Iraqi

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politics since his country's independence has resulted in effective repression of the Party.

The Communist Party (MAKI) is a legal organization in Israel, but conditions peculiar to that country have kept it small and relatively unimportant. The Socialist movement has held the allegiance of the working class and many professional people. Moreover, Soviet opposition to Zionism and to the emigration of Jews from the Bloc, as well as the Kremlin's support of Arab nationalism, have been heavy weights for the Communists to carry. As a result, the Party's appeal is largely to embittered Arabs living within Israel.

C. South Asia and the Far East

In South Asia and the Far East the fortunes of the local parties, whether under conditions of legality or illegality, have been mixed. The Communist Party of India, operating legally since independence in 1947, has developed into a considerable menace to constitutional government. Although harassed by the authorities for subversive activities, it has exploited with some measure

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of success the divisive tendencies in a country of many races, castes, and linguistic groups. Conditions in Indonesia have been even more favorable for the Party, since unlike India there has been no governing majority comparable to the Congress Party with its nationalistic record, strong organization, and popular leaders. Indonesia's numerous parties, sectional quarrels, and xenophobic nationalism have offered a benevolent soil for the growth of a legal Communist movement.

The CP of Japan, emerging from underground during the Occupation, has shown itself to be a danger to democratic government, although still a relatively small party and subject to police curbs on subversive activities. Effective police control in the Republic of Korea and in Taiwan, where the local parties are outlawed along with all subversive movements, has kept the Communists repressed in recent years. In the Philippines, the reduction of a dangerous Communist movement has been accomplished by a combination of police and military action and construc-

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tive social measures, notably the agricultural resettlement of defecting Huks.

D. Latin America

With the exception of Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador, and Mexico, the Communist parties are illegal in all Latin American countries. A Party's status in law, however, is no guide to its influence in the political and cultural life of each of the twenty-one nations of the region.

In the countries where the Party is outlawed, enforcement ranges from effective repression to occasional harassment. Enforcement is probably best in the dictatorships, such as Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela, where the police are experienced in the suppression of opposition movements. In Brazil, a vigorous and publicly supported campaign of repression in the period 1947-48 has since subsided to the point where the Party operates with little effort at concealment. The Brazilian Communist Party was able to play an influential role in the presidential election of 1955, and its infiltration of the military and public services has reached, in the view of

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some observers, alarming proportions. The Party's strident propaganda against U.S. -Brazilian cooperation has led to its acceptance as an ally by the ultra-nationalists who share its aims in this respect. Together they have whipped up agitations that have on occasion overborne the more moderate political forces of the country.

Whether illegal or not, the Communist parties in Latin America have had a good deal of success in infiltrating labor, student, and professional groups. Economic backwardness and the need for political reform in many Latin American countries often cause the leaders of these groups to cooperate with the Communists or to embrace them as reforming allies. Front movements are thus easily organized and exploited by the Communists.

Latin American liberality with respect to political asylum and the general lack of control over the movement of individuals have enabled Communist leaders to evade many of the legal measures against subversive parties. Mexico is a popular country of active exile. Furthermore, there is a good deal of travel to and from the Iron Curtain

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countries. The Latin-American Communists have recently found it less easy to arrange international meetings, travel, and liaison, but in most countries they still face only hindrances and not barriers to their activities.

### III. Results of Experience

Several generalized conclusions may be drawn from the experience of many countries in dealing with the problems posed by national Communist parties.

#### A. A Number of Factors Affect Growth and Influence of Parties

In the first place, legal status is only one of a number of factors affecting the growth of a national Party and the influence it wields. The importance of these factors varies from place to place and changes under the impact of internal and external developments.

Geographical proximity to the Communist Bloc has both favorable and unfavorable effects upon local parties, whether legal or illegal. Parties like the Viet Minh in Indochina and the Tudeh in Iran have undoubtedly been aided by their nearness to the Bloc. The Communist Party of Finland, which

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has not declined in numbers like the other Scandinavian parties, has probably also benefited from proximity to the USSR. Travel for purposes of consultation and training is easy, and the flow of supplies and propaganda materials is facilitated.

On the other hand, the Communists in West Germany, Austria, and Turkey may suffer from their geographical location. In the first two countries, where many people have experienced occupation by the Soviet Army and live close to the police states it maintains, the Party has little appeal. The West Germans are aware every day of the contrived and artificial nature of the SED in the East Zone and of its leaders' subservience to Moscow. The Turks, with their centuries of resistance to Russian imperialism, are little attracted to a Party which is so patently an agent of their perennial enemy.

Other factors influencing the growth and power of a local Communist party are the political situation and the social conditions in the country in question. Where timor-

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ous and vacillating governments succeed one another in a pattern of continuing futility, the Communists have a favorable situation to exploit. In a number of countries ineffective government betrays a social order and an economic system in need of reform. The forces of change are drawn to the Communists. They at least have a program of action. They are prepared to crack the strongholds of vested interests. To industrial workers dissatisfied with the distribution of the national income, to peasants hoping for land reform, and to frustrated intellectuals, the Communist Party often seems the only vehicle for the attainment of their aims. In countries where constitutional methods hold out real hope of change and opportunity to these dissatisfied elements, the Party's appeal is weak.

Much has been written explaining the support of the Communist Party by millions of French and Italian voters in the above terms. Ineffective government and the slow pace of social and economic change can be accepted as forming the principal basis of Communist appeal. Weak government

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coupled with the rigidity of the social order explains, in large measure, the growth of Communism in spite of legal bans in several Near Eastern countries. Conversely, the Communist parties in the Northern European countries have never attracted much support because their political systems have been responsive to change and have produced governments capable of giving effect to reform programs.

A further factor bearing upon a local Party's position in a given country appears to be the intentions of the USSR with respect to that party. These are not publicized, of course, but it seems clear that the Kremlin regards a good many of the national parties as helpful but not very important allies. They are useful as sources of delegates to "world-wide" congresses, as propaganda bodies, and as agencies for the recruitment of persons for underground and espionage work. They are not taken very seriously as the vanguard of revolution. The cavalier attitude of the Kremlin toward the leaders of the British and American Communist parties was illustrated after the 20th Congress

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of the CPSU when they learned, to their obvious embarrassment, of Khrushchev's speech through its publication by the Western press. Moscow will fulminate mightily when one of these weaker parties is legally banned, as it did recently over the West German CP, but whether or not the Kremlin considers that Communist capabilities have been seriously impaired is open to question.

B. Outlawry Is Usually Detrimental but not Fatal

A second major conclusion to be drawn from the historical record is that the outlawing of the Communist Party is usually detrimental but seldom fatal to the Party's capabilities. The banning of the Party probably will deprive it of real advantages. In democratic countries, it will lose its rights to participate in political campaigns, to nominate candidates, and to win elective offices. If it has no success in an election, the Party has at least spread about a good deal of Communist propaganda. In case it elects some candidates, it has acquired useful tools to disrupt and discredit democratic procedures. The turmoil often created by the

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Communist deputies in the French and Italian parliaments has contributed to the contemptuous attitude with which many citizens view these assemblies. Moreover, Communist officials in a predominantly non-communist government can render cooperation with traditionally friendly states difficult or impossible and bring the country into closer relations with the Soviet Bloc even against the desires of a majority of the people. Iceland is presently a case in point. Furthermore, as a legal Party, the Communists can always delude some people into serving their cause through easily organized friendship societies, cultural groups, and committees for this or that purpose. Such organizations are often the sources of revenue, some of which is applied to causes far from the interest and intentions of the non-communist donors.

While outlawry will cost a Party real advantages, Communists can sometimes turn their misfortune to good account. The Party membership is reduced to a hard-core of militants who are prepared to serve obediently. New recruits are

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usually dedicated revolutionists or individuals attracted to clandestine activity and willing to undertake hazardous assignments.. When directing an illegal organization, Party leaders can concentrate on building the underground apparatus and on subversion, espionage, and sabotage. Moreover, the money available to the Party can be expended on a limited number of objects; the support of frequently bankrupt publishing activities will not be necessary. Thus, illegality may toughen and sharpen the Party and enhance its clandestine potential. Greece and Brazil are examples of countries where the local parties, although outlawed, remain a serious threat to the security of the state.

C. Comprehensive Repression is Necessary

A third conclusion is that banning a Communist Party is relatively unimportant in reducing its capabilities as an agency of Soviet imperialism unless it and all associated activities are effectively repressed at the same time. It must be recognized that the legal Party is only one arm of a Communist organization. Such an organization consists of

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at least five elements:

1. The overt Party, organized and conducted to participate in the political system of the country.
2. The clandestine Party, with an underground apparatus usually subdivided into political, paramilitary, and intelligence components.
3. Front organizations of various kinds - political and social organizations as well as business enterprises, which serve as auxiliaries, allies, or covers for the Party. They may be founded by the Party, penetrated by it after establishment by non-Communists, or indirectly influenced by remote control.
4. Individual Communists in sensitive positions, such as government officials, officers of the armed forces, molders of public opinion (editors, broadcasters, publishers, teachers, and artists), and key persons in strategically important industries.
5. Diplomatic, military, trade, and other missions of Communist governments whose activities often

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include propaganda, espionage, and subversion.

All these elements of a Communist organization are supported and aided by external Communist activities. These include propaganda, printed and broadcast, directed toward the country in question, invitations to international meetings, student exchanges, and training courses in the USSR or elsewhere for nationals of the country.

Repression, therefore, requires lopping off all arms of the octopus-like organization. Banning the overt Party will probably be injurious to the Communists, but it is unlikely to inflict a fatal wound. Indeed, as previously indicated, it may lead to the concentration of Communist resources on less obvious but more dangerous activities.

To deal effectively with the ramified Communist organization a government needs loyal and efficient security services. The law or decree banning the overt Party must be enforced. But this action is only a start toward genuine repression. A thorough-going program would include the following measures:

1. The underground elements of the Party must be penetrated on a high level and in many places.

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2. Key Communist personnel must be identified and their movements and activities brought under surveillance or at least intermittently checked.

3. All organizations, groups, and business enterprises suspected as Communist fronts must be investigated.

4. Persons in sensitive positions in government, the armed forces, and strategic industries must be screened and periodically re-checked.

5. Overt propaganda issuances of Communist missions must be monitored as leads to clandestine activities.

6. Listening to foreign Communist broadcasts must be prevented by jamming, confiscation of short-wave radio sets, and police action.

7. Foreign mail must be censored to prevent an influx of Communist propaganda.

8. Travel abroad must be controlled to prevent persons from participating in Communist-

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managed congresses and training schools.

A comprehensive program along the above lines is difficult to carry out except in a dictatorship. Nazi Germany offers probably the best example of the successful extirpation of Communism's multi-armed organization, although Hitler's foreign policies, it may be noted, contributed greatly to the spread of International Communism. The pre-war Italian and Japanese governments applied similar methods, but Communist organizations survived to emerge in dangerous strength in 1945.

Granted that no democratic government and few authoritarian regimes will apply the full catalogue of repressive measures necessary to suppress Communist activity for all practical purposes, it remains important that the banning of the overt Party be accompanied by several additional types of action designed to handicap and weaken the Communist potential in the country. These should include the penetration of the Communists' underground apparatus; the identification and surveillance

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of Communist Party members and sympathizers; the screening of personnel in sensitive positions; the prosecution of Communists for perjury, bribery, espionage, subversion, and similar crimes; the exposure of fronts and infiltration efforts, and informational programs to create a public awareness of the dangers of Communism. (It may be noted that the U. S. Government, without banning the Communist Party or infringing civil liberties, has greatly reduced and contained Communist capabilities by pursuing these methods).

The cooperation of all law enforcement agencies is essential to a satisfactory degree of repression. The police must act promptly and skillfully to arrest Communists violating the law, the executive authorities must support the police, and the courts must mete out the penalties provided. The roundup of some rank-and-file members and minor functionaries, the raiding of a suspected headquarters, and the imposition of light fines and sentences are not major deterrents to Communist activity. Communists expect and

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are prepared for such harassment. Short prison terms are accepted as opportunities for recuperation and the planning of future work. Under lax or corrupt administration, a jail cell may become a convenient headquarters for covert Communist activity.

D. Support of Public Opinion Required

The final conclusion is that governmental action to counter Communism in a country must have the support of public opinion if it is to be effective. A majority of the population must believe that the banning of the Party as a legal organization is necessary to the security of the state. If the Communist Party is small and seemingly powerless, an educational program may be required to explain the usefulness of a legal ban. Outlawry of the Party as an election stunt or as a diversion from serious public problems or criticism of the governing authorities will probably redound to its advantage, for Communists can then pose as martyrs and victims of political spite.

Enforcement of the legal ban on the Party and the insti-

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tution of other repressive measures require continuous popular support, not just a surge of outrage and indignation. In other words, the political environment must remain favorable to the government's efforts. Hitler's security forces, for instance, which were remarkably successful in liquidating the Communist underground in Germany, were far less successful when called upon to suppress war-time Communist resistance in Nazi-occupied areas, although they were assisted by native fascists and collaborators. This difference in performance by the same organization, operating with the same personnel and using the same techniques, can be explained mainly by the difference in public support. In Germany, millions of people were convinced Nazis, and even those who were not, had the traditional German respect for authority and power. The great mass of the population, therefore, cooperated willingly with the security forces. In France, and elsewhere in occupied areas, people were not only hostile to the occupying power but often distrust-



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ful of the police of their own country. Hence, they impeded reprisals against the Communists even though many of them were anti-Communist. In several Middle Eastern countries, the lack of public support has rendered the outlawry of the Party an almost meaningless gesture. Outlawry has gained for the local Party the sympathy and cooperation of other opposition groups who fear the same fate. Therefore, enforcement is lax, and the security services get little cooperation from the public.

#### IV. Considerations to be Weighed

A government contemplating the legal banning of the local Communist Party should weigh the following considerations:

A. Is the overt Communist Party of such strength and influence that it represents a significant menace to the stability of the state?

B. If the Communist Party is growing in strength and influence, are there measures of reform which can be taken to reduce its appeal?

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C. Can a statute or decree be drafted, given the nation's constitution, its judicial doctrine, and its political traditions, that will be an effective weapon against Communists, their organizations, and activities?

D. Are the state's police and internal security services efficient enough to enforce the legal ban on the overt party and to repress the other activities into which the Communists' efforts will be channeled?

E. Is public opinion prepared for a measure outlawing the Communist Party?

F. Will there be continuous popular support for enforcement of the ban and the additional measures necessary to repress the local Communist movement?

These questions should be pondered and weighed in the light of conditions in each country. No standard answers are possible. In some countries, outlawing the Party is a step, and an important one, in reducing the Communist potential. In others, it may be of little significance insofar as Communist capabilities are con-

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cerned. In still others, it may convert a minor irritant in the body politic into a menacing disease. Some Communist parties have withered and died under conditions of illegality; others have spread their underground roots. Legal proscription, one can conclude, is not necessarily the answer to the Communist menace.

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ANNEX

Communist Vote in Several Northern European  
Countries in Recent Elections

	<u>Date of Election</u>	<u>Percentage of Popular Vote</u>	<u>Seats in Lower House</u>
<u>Belgium</u>	1946	12.7	23
	1949	7.5	12
	1950	4.7	7
	1954	3.6	4
<u>Denmark</u>	1945	12.0	18
	1947	6.8	9
	1950	4.6	7
	1953	4.8	8 <sup>#</sup>
<u>Nether- lands</u>	1946	10.6	10
	1948	7.7	8
	1952	6.2	6
	1956	4.8	4*
<u>Norway</u>	1945	11.89	11
	1949	5.8	0
	1953	5.1	3
<u>Sweden</u>	1944	10.3	15
	1948	6.3	8
	1952	4.4	5
	1956	5.2	6
<u>United Kingdom</u>	1945	0.4	2
	1950	0.3	0
	1951	0.1	0
	1955	0.1	0

<sup>#</sup> Seats in unicameral legislature.

\* Will be increased to 7 when lower house is enlarged  
from 100 to 150 seats.

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