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IFIS DRAFT #2
25 October 1950

Plan for Exploitation of Psychological Opportunities

Created by the Korean Incident

I. PROBLEM

A. To formulate a psychological warfare and propaganda plan in support of U.S. national objectives with respect to Korea; and to specify the means of implementation, following cessation of major military operations.

B. To specify the organizational arrangements and delineate the policy formulation and guidance responsibilities for a UN re-orientation and re-education program, and a UN troop information and education program.

II. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

A. U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives with Respect to Korea.

1. The objective of post-war U.S. policy with respect to Korea has consistently and unswervingly been a free and independent Korea. The cornerstone of this policy was laid at Cairo in December 1943 when the United States, the United Kingdom and China declared as one of their war aims in the Pacific, "that in due course Korea shall become free and independent". This objective was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945 to which the USSR adhered at the time of its declaration of war against Japan.

2. The United States endeavored to attain its objectives in Korea through direct collaboration with its wartime allies so long as such collaboration appeared to hold any possibility of success. For two

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years after American and Soviet troops occupied Korea in September 1945, the U.S. endeavored to obtain agreement of the USSR to the abolition of the line dividing their respective zones of occupation along the 38th parallel and to the restoration of the political, economic and administrative unity of the country.

3. As a result of persistent Soviet refusal to cooperate in good faith, which intransigence frustrated the achievement of a unified, free and independent Korea, the United States, in September 1947, placed the problem of the independence of Korea before the United Nations General Assembly.

4. With the establishment in September 1948 of the "Democratic People's Republic" under the aegis of Soviet occupation forces and in direct contravention of the expressed will of the United Nations General Assembly, the immediate policy objective of the U.S. became preservation of the independent Republic of Korea under a freely elected government as a nucleus for eventual unification of the entire country on a democratic basis. This objective the U.S. endeavored to attain by pursuing the following policies:

- a. Encouragement of international political support of the government of the Republic of Korea, particularly through the instrumentality of the United Nations.
- b. Provision of economic assistance to develop in Korea a stable and self-sufficient economy.

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- c. Extension of military assistance to the Republic of Korea to enable it to maintain internal security and to resist external aggression.

5. Current United States foreign policy objectives with respect to Korea derive in straight lines from the above. Our basic objective may be defined as establishment of a unified, free and independent Korea that is politically and economically stable and is capable both of maintaining internal security and of resisting threats of communist aggression and that has a government responsible to, and expressing the free will of the people.

6. In facilitating the above objectives, it is the policy of the U.S.:

- a. To support the UN decisions relative to Korea.
- b. To the extent that it is practicable, to channel U.S. actions and efforts through the mechanism of the UN.
- c. To obtain no special position for the U.S. in Korea and to retain no bases or other military installations in that country.
- d. To withdraw U.S. forces from Korea at the earliest moment consistent with fulfillment of obligations as a member of the UN.
- e. To encourage establishment of internal Korean arrangements which will serve as a beacon of hope to North Asians overrun by communist forces and an affirmation

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of the worth of freedom to those faced with the threat of aggressive communism.

- f. To strive toward ultimate disengagement from special military and economic responsibility in Korea by encouraging development of conditions permitting independent Korea to survive without material U.S. assistance.

B. U.N. Objectives with Regard to Korea.

1. The fundamental objectives of the United Nations, as expressed in resolutions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly are:

- a. To restore peace and security in Korea, and
- b. To unify and rehabilitate Korea.

2. In facilitating the accomplishment of these objectives, it is the policy of the UN:

- a. That UN troops occupy North Korea.
- b. That conditions of stability be established and ensured in Korea.
- c. That elections, leading to the formation of a unified, independent and democratic government, be prepared and held in Korea with the assistance of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), and the UN command and in consultation with the government of ROK.
- d. That UN forces should not remain in any part of Korea,

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except as necessary for the achievement of b and c above.

- e. That the occupation should effect as few changes as possible, consistent with responsibilities attending the maintenance of law and order; leaving to the Korean people themselves, after unification has been accomplished, the task of making whatever changes they desire.
- f. That the rehabilitation of Korea be carried out on the basis of plans drawn up by ECOSOC, (a) "for relief and rehabilitation on the termination of hostilities," and (b) "for long-term measures to promote the economic development and social progress of Korea."
- g. That UN responsibilities with respect to Korea be discharged in a manner demonstrating that the UN is a constructive force for peace.

C. Military Operations.

Major operations against North Korean forces will have been concluded and all formal NK military action will have ceased. Guerilla operations will continue sporadically. There will be no overt intervention by Chinese Communist or Soviet forces, nor sufficient covert intervention to alter significantly the above assumptions.

D. Administrative Arrangements.

- 1. The occupation of North Korea will be administered by the

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Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command (CINCUNC), who will utilize to a maximum UN forces other than those of the United States.

2. The Commander-in-Chief UN Command will be responsible for executing the information, re-orientation and re-education program of UN in North Korea, and an information and education program for UN troops. He is at present responsible for executing the U.S. foreign information program in the ROK, in his capacity as CINCFE.

III. INTELLIGENCE

A. See Enclosure A, CIA Intelligence Memorandum No. 334, 2 October 1950, for:

1. Korean Issues Susceptible of Propaganda Exploitation in Korea.
2. Korean Issues Susceptible of Propaganda Exploitation Elsewhere.
3. Korean Psychological Predispositions and Vulnerabilities.
4. Soviet Propaganda Aims with Respect to the Korean Situation.
5. Public Opinion on the Korean Situation.

IV. CONCEPT OF PROPAGANDA OPERATIONS

A. General.

1. There are three U.S. information responsibilities in Korea requiring U.S. participation:

- a. The first is an information, re-orientation and re-education program for North Korea, carried out under UN auspices by the Commander-in-Chief, UN Command.
- b. The second is an information and education program for UN troops, carried out by CINCUNC.
- c. The third is the already existing U.S. foreign information operation in the Republic of Korea.

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2. In addition, there is a U.S. responsibility for foreign information with respect to the Korean incident, as it is interpreted to the rest of the world.

3. This plan is concerned with propaganda content as it applies to the third (U.S.) program, (including propaganda about Korea to the major countries of the world), and U.S. organizational adjustments necessary for the execution of all three programs.

a. The content portions, although designed to support the third program, have been prepared with a view to exploiting the US-UN relationship; they treat Korea as a unit; and it is intended that the content be utilized by the CIMCUNC in the execution of the UN programs in North Korea whenever practicable.

b. An enclosure to this plan should be prepared by the organization described in sub-paragraphs A, 3a, b and c of Section V below, stating the broad policy objectives for the first and second programs. It should utilize the pertinent content portion (objectives and tasks) of this plan to the extent practicable.

4. Execution of the third program is to be accomplished by:

a. Selecting a limited number of propaganda objectives and tasks, and focussing all available U.S. propaganda facilities upon implementing them.

b. Supporting these objectives and tasks, by creating themes

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on the principle of controlled decentralization.

c. Implementing these objectives and tasks by an integrated propaganda campaign. This campaign envisages:

(1) The maximum possible correlation of governmental decisions and actions in the political, economic and military fields with a view to capitalizing upon them to support the objectives and tasks outlined in this plan.

(2) The injection of material in support of the objectives and tasks assigned by this plan, into

public statements and speeches wherever practicable.

5. Adherence to the following additional factors is deemed essential to execution:

- a. Timing of the use of themes.
- b. Simplicity of content.
- c. Repetition
- d. Choice of appropriate media.

B. Propaganda Objectives, Tasks and Themes.

A statement of Propaganda Objectives, Tasks and Themes is contained in Enclosure B, including definitions and instructions for their use.

C. Phases of Accomplishment.

1. The accomplishment of the first and second (UI) programs is governed by the three phases of civil affairs action specified in the draft Civil Affairs Directive to General MacArthur.

2. For the third (U S.) program, no division into phases of ac-

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accomplishment is envisaged at the present time. Changes in objectives and tasks should be made as a result of continuing review of this plan by IFIO, and enunciated as information policy guidances.

V. IMPLEMENTATION

A. Organizational Arrangements.

1. General

- a. The U.S. Government is responsible for planning and executing three information programs, as described in sub-paragraph A-1 of Section IV above.
- b. The first is a UN program, which the CINCUNC will execute as the UN military governor for North Korea until such time as a Government of Korea is established as a result of UN-sponsored elections. To perform this function, CINCUNC will use such facilities and personnel of the UN, the Department of State and the Department of Defense ^{are} as/available, during his period of responsibility.
- c. The responsibility for the execution of the second program rests with CINCUNC, who utilizes appropriate military agencies for its implementation. The importance of this program derives from the impact of the behavior and attitude of UN troops on local populations.

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- d. The third program is solely a U.S. responsibility. Responsibility for execution of this program should be transferred from Department of Defense to Department of State at a mutually agreed time.
- e. All three programs will be operative concurrently. This indicates the need for precise coordination in planning and operations, as well as careful delineation of intra-staff, inter-service, and interdepartmental responsibilities.
- f. Policy formulation and guidance for all three programs is a U.S. Government responsibility at the State-Defense level. Any UN policy directives should, accordingly, be channelled through the U.S. Government.
- g. Inter-departmental coordination of policy formulation and guidance for the U.S. program is accomplished through the mechanism of IFIO and IFIS. In the interest of simplicity, inter-departmental coordination to fulfill the U.S. responsibilities in connection with the UN program should be accomplished by the same means.
- h. The chief governmental agencies presently interested in the execution of foreign information responsibilities are:
 - Department of Defense
 - Department of State
 - Central Intelligence Agency
 - Economic Cooperation Administration

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2. Organizational Arrangements in the Far East:

a. CINCFE is now responsible for the execution of the U.S. program in the ROK.

(1) He avails himself of the assistance of all staff agencies of FECOM, among which the following are particularly important:

(a) PW Branch, G-2

(b) CIE Section

(c) Public Information Section

(d) Economic and Scientific Section

(e) Troop I & E Section

(2) He provides for coordination with the field agencies of the Department of State, CIA and ECA.

b. The Commander-in-Chief, UN Command, is responsible for re-orientation execution of the UN information, and re-education program for North Korea and for coordination between the UN program (for North Korea) and the U.S. program (for the ROK).

(1) For the purpose of coordination of all UN information efforts, it is believed that the CINUNC will create a staff organization within his UN staff. Coordination between that staff and Psychological Warfare Branch, G-2, GHQ, FECOM, the agency now responsible for executing the U.S. program in the ROK is believed essential to the efficient execution of the programs.

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3. Organizational Arrangements at the State-Defense level.

- a. The Department of State should be responsible for specifying, in coordination with UNCURK and the Department of Defense, the broad objectives and tasks of the UN information, re-orientation and re-education program for North Korea.
- b. The Department of State should make provision for appropriate liaison with UNCURK, to assist in the performance of this function.
- c. Normal arrangements for interdepartmental coordination of the U.S. program in the ROK should continue.
- d. Each department should make provision for inter-staff coordination, in the implementation of this plan, of all staff sections having an information responsibility or function.
- e. Central Intelligence Agency should give intelligence support to the programs on the interdepartmental level, and should prepare and execute appropriate plans to support the U.S. program. Coordination should be accomplished through the mechanisms of IFIO and IFIS.
- f. Economic Cooperation Administration should assist in the execution of the programs. Coordination should be accomplished through the mechanisms of IFIO and IFIS.

B. The Need for Complete Implementation.

Efficiency of implementation can be maximized by:

1. A clear assignment of responsibilities for execution.

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2. Vigilance on the part of executors, so as to take timely action in coordinating all possible governmental actions and public statements. Executors can improve implementing efficiency by acquainting all key persons with the general concept and eliciting their participation and assistance.

C. Delineation of Responsibilities for Execution.

1. The Department of State should:

- a. Prepare an interdepartmental plan, stating the broad policy objectives to govern the execution of the first and second (UN) programs. This plan should include the delineation of responsibilities for supplementary planning tasks.
- b. Prepare such supplementary plans as are required to render operational support for the programs.
- c. Implement the information objectives and tasks of this plan as appropriate, with respect to the domestic public.
- d. Complete the organizational adjustments delineated in sub-paragraph 3h of Section V-A.
- e. Implement the objectives and tasks of the third program, as appropriate, with respect to American private enterprise organizations.
- f. Provide for review and revision of this and related interdepartmental plans, using for that purpose the interdepartmental foreign information organization.
- g. Furnish to the NAT information organization, the MDAP information organization, and the appropriate international

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- h. Implement the third program within that part of Korea and during that period for which it has execution responsibility.
- 2. The Department of Defense should:
 - a. Provide for supervisory responsibility for the execution of the three programs during the period of military responsibility.
 - b. Implement the third program within the ROK during that period for which it has execution responsibility.
 - c. Provide planning support for the programs for which CHICUNG has execution responsibility.
 - 3. The Central Intelligence Agency should:
 - a. Give intelligence support as requested of assistance in review and revision of this and related inter-departmental plans.
 - b. Prepare and execute appropriate plans to support the U.S. program.
 - c. Provide for coordination of its field agencies with other U.S. field agencies charged with executing responsibilities for the third (U.S.) program.
 - 4. The Economic Cooperation Administration should:
 - a. Implement the third (U.S.) program, utilizing its information facilities.
 - b. Provide for coordination of its field agencies with

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other U.S. field agencies charged with executing responsibilities for the third (U.S.) program.

Enclosures:

Enclosure A - CIA Intelligence Memorandum No. 334, 2 October 1950.

Enclosure B - Propaganda Objectives, Tasks and Themes
Annex 1 - Terms and Use

Annex 2 - Propaganda Objectives and Tasks
for Korea

Annex 3 - Propaganda Objectives and Tasks for
European Countries, Related to Korean
Events /In preparation/

Annex 4 - Propaganda Objectives and Tasks for India
and China, Related to Korean Events.

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IFIS - Korean Plan Working Group

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