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INFORMAL MINUTES OF MEETING OF DIRECTOR, INTERDEPARTMENTAL FOREIGN
INFORMATION ORGANIZATION, AND CONSULTANTS ON MONDAY, AUGUST 21, 1950,
IN OFFICE OF DIRECTOR

PRESENT: Department of State - Mr. Barrett, Director
Mr. Oechsner, Acting Executive Secretary
Mr. Phillips
Department of Defense - General Magruder
Joint Chiefs of Staff - Admiral Stevens
Central Intelligence Agency - [REDACTED]

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Mr. Barrett opened the meeting with the announcement that Mr. Sheppard, representative of National Security Resources Board, was on leave and that NSRB would not be represented at this meeting. [REDACTED] introduced [REDACTED] as his alternate to attend meetings during [REDACTED]

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Mr. Barrett explained that Mr. Stone had proceeded to London for a period of about two weeks upon Mr. Spofford's request for a P-area representative to work on the NATO information organization.

The minutes of the last meeting were approved with minor corrections.

With respect to action pending from the last meeting on the question of identification of Chinese communist participation in the Korean war, Mr. Barrett reported the recommendations of the State Department. These were approved.

General Magruder presented copy of a cable from CINCFE, replying to the cable suggesting that two or three representatives from Washington might visit Tokyo to review psychological warfare needs on the spot. CINCFE's reply stated that such representatives would be welcome but that a more immediate need was for operating personnel. Mr. Barrett suggested that the representatives might consist of one from State and one from Defense. Admiral Stevens stated that it had been decided that Lt. Col. Young was to be the Army representative and that Col. Young desired to take Mr. Phil Davison of the RAND Corporation along. Mr. Barrett suggested that Mr. Brad Connors might be the most appropriate State representative and agreed to notify Admiral Stevens of the State nominee.

With respect to the suggestion advanced at the meeting of August 15, that we might give circulation to reports or rumors that the Soviets do not actually want to seat Chinese communists in the UN, it was reported that carrying out of this suggestion was under way.

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State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file

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Mr. Phillips reported briefly on the status of his revision of the Wallace Carroll paper on Foreign Information Policy Objectives in a Transition Period, and Mr. Barrett directed that copies of the paper be distributed to members of IFIO and that it be placed on the agenda for discussion at the next meeting.

Item II on the agenda, Discussion of Staff functions to support IFIO, was taken up briefly. The Executive Secretary explained that he had not been in a position before the departure of Mr. Stone for London to work out the simplified statement of functions pending from the meeting of August 15. As a result of discussion, it was agreed in principle that Staff projects in support of the Board henceforth should be entrusted to individuals who would head up their own working groups to develop projects where necessary. It was agreed that State would prepare the simplified statement of functions for discussion by the Board.

The Executive Secretary noted that IFIS project No. 5 on the broad functions of an interdepartmental board still required comment by the Director as a basis for further detailed organizational planning by IFIS. Mr. Barrett directed that this paper be placed on the agenda for the next meeting.

Admiral Stevens stated that he had not yet seen the paper and requested that two copies be supplied him.

Mr. Barrett mentioned the desirability of securing more publicity on the psychological warfare being conducted in Korea to reassure the American public on that score.

The Executive Secretary said that he had been requested to supply certain information on psychological warfare activities of the U. S. Government, particularly with respect to the functioning of the National Psychological Strategy Board, for inclusion in a report which the Brookings Institution was preparing under contract with the Bureau of the Budget. Mr. Barrett requested a list of questions which the Brookings Institution desired to have answered. Since material to Brookings could not go above the confidential classification, and since it was agreed that it was desirable to go as far as possible to meet the request and to get material on psychological warfare before the U.S. public, the question of down-grading NSC 59/1 was discussed. It was felt that, except for the mention of covert activities, the paper could probably be classified confidential without security risk. The Executive Secretary was instructed to examine the question of down-grading and to report.

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Mr. Barrett referred to [redacted] as the CIA representative a memorandum from the CIA Representative on IFIS, inquiring whether the Department of State had made provision for inclusion of a CIA liaison representative for intelligence to the National Psychological Strategy Board. [redacted] duly raised the question, and following discussion it was agreed to ask CIA to designate a liaison officer for intelligence to be available to attend Board meetings as a liaison representative

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when required. The letter to Admiral Hillenkoetter on the composition of the Board is to be revised to conform to the above, and request designation of a liaison officer for intelligence.

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With respect to Item III [redacted] stated that (1) he and [redacted] in their forthcoming discussion [redacted] planned taking up the matter of frequencies as "a political and not a technical one;" (2) he felt that motion pictures were a most useful medium.

With respect to the use of balloons, IFIS project No. 8 on the subject was considered briefly. Mr. Barrett directed that comment be secured from the Bureau of European Affairs on the use of balloons to satellite areas, as well as the use of balloons strictly as a covert medium. The Executive Secretary was instructed to place this item on the agenda of the next meeting.

The question of the bombing of Seoul radio station was discussed in the light of apparent reluctance by U.S. military authorities in Korea to carry out this bombing mission. The Executive Secretary was instructed to draft a cable with Mr. Brad Connors, detailing the reasons why it was desirable to bomb the radio station and suggesting that special consideration might be given the mission.