

GEN. SMITH

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PSB M-13

M I N U T E S

Thirteenth Meeting of the  
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD  
June 12, 1952 2:00 P. M.  
Department of State  
Room 5104, New State Bldg.  
21st St. and Virginia Ave., N. W.  
Washington 25, D. C.

MEMBERS:

- Mr. David K. E. Bruce, Under Secretary of State,  
Chairman
- Mr. William C. Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense
- General Walter B. Smith, Director of Central Intelligence
-  Director, Psychological Strategy Board

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OTHER PARTICIPANTS:

Department of State

Mr. Joseph B. Phillips

Department of Defense

Brig. General John Magruder, USA (Ret.)

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Brig. General Jesmond D. Balmer


Central Intelligence Agency

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Psychological Strategy Board

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Secretary to the Board

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Agenda Item No. 1. - Analysis and Planning to Counteract Soviet Biological Warfare Propaganda and the "Hate America" Campaign; Staff Study on Soviet Germ Warfare Campaign (PSB D-25)

Action:

Approved with following changes:

- (a) Delete mission "a" in par. 22.
- (b) In par. 22 add a new mission: "Develop new measures designed to seize and maintain the initiative in the fields of propaganda and operations".
- (c) That par. 23 be changed to read: "That CIA provide the necessary intelligence support to POC, appraising the significance and impact of the Soviet BW campaign, gas warfare allegations and 'perversion of science' propaganda, in their relationship to the total complex of Soviet cold war strategy".

Discussion:

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██████████ commented that the principal recommendations were in par. 22-24. He noted that, in view of PSB's continuing interest in the problem, par. 24 would require POC to submit progress reports on it to PSB. (Apropos of this, ██████████ remarked that he had heard POC was having difficulty staffing their Planning Staff. He expressed the belief that the member agencies want to give POC all possible support in staffing its planning responsibilities so that PSB staff will not be forced to engage in such planning.

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General Smith offered additional language in par. 22 which was accepted (see par. (b) under Action above).

Mr. Foster said the study was acceptable to him and urged that its recommendations be aggressively pursued. He proposed that the PSB be kept advised of action taken to counteract this BW campaign.

Mr. Bruce expressed the belief that the State Department is already carrying out, in large part, the recommendations in par. 19, but the Department will explore further (a) the possibility of getting more assistance from other governments and (b) the proposals in par. 20.

Mr. Bruce proposed that the POC mission defined in par. 22a be made a part of the NIE proposed in par. 23. ██████████ said this would be acceptable. General Smith said the NIE docket is so crowded that it would take a year to get the NIE proposed in par. 23. He said CIA would give intelligence support but not necessarily as an NIE.

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Agenda Item No. 2. - Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations During General Hostilities (PSB D-8/b; NSC 127)

Action:

- a. The Board agreed to advise the NSC that it would not accept

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the changes proposed by the Bureau of the Budget in par. 20 of NSC 127.

- b. The Board approved the Bureau of the Budget's changes in par. 19 of NSC 127.

Discussion:

Mr. Bruce read from his letter to [redacted] of June 6 in which he reported that the Bureau of the Budget's change in par. 19 (substituting POC for PSB) was acceptable to the State Department. Mr. Foster and General Smith said they preferred the language of par. 19 as originally written. Mr. Foster agreed to the change, however, subject to reserving Defense's right of appeal if the use of POC in this plan becomes unsatisfactory.

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Agenda Item No. 3. - PSB Procedure for Evaluation of National Psychological Effort (PSB E-4)

Action:

The Board recorded as its opinion that:

- (a) The evaluation by the PSB staff of the over-all psychological effort should not be undertaken at this time.
- (b) That the PSB staff be authorized to select a specific project or an area for evaluation, recommend the methods to be used, and present it to the Board for consideration and authorization.

Board Recommendation

Discussion:

25X1A [redacted] commented that the responsibility for evaluating the national psychological effort is the third major function of the Board and one of the most difficult. He indicated that the PSB staff had given a great deal of thought to the approaches and methods to be used in this evaluation task and had consulted extensively with evaluation experts in and out of the Government. The proposed evaluation procedure, [redacted] said, is a minimum program and an experimental one.

Mr. Bruce expressed his opposition to the use of the traveling task force technique proposed in the paper under discussion. He said it would mean contacting U. S. mission and foreign officials abroad, taking up their time, and perhaps unintentionally harming U. S. efforts.

25X1A [redacted] said it was his impression that the Board's responsibility for evaluation was something more than simply the sum of each department evaluating its own position; the Board had a joint responsibility for making a coordinated evaluation effort.

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Mr. Foster suggested that PSB staff should direct specific questions to each of the member agencies for answer through use of their existing evaluation facilities. In the event the necessary data for evaluation could not be obtained in this manner, then the PSB staff could send someone to the field after getting the Board's approval, Mr. Foster proposed.

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██████████ reviewed some of the points in the paper under discussion. He emphasized that the five-point procedure outlined in the paper would make possible the production of an over-all, coordinated evaluation picture which would take in all the many factors of our psychological effort and point out contradictions and overlaps between agency programs.

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General Smith said PSB's evaluation responsibility was one of the most important things it can do and is badly needed. He commented that exclusive dependency on the U. S. field missions to evaluate themselves would result in reports which vary in accuracy, strength and value and would be colored by their nearness to the problem and professional pride in the work on which they are reporting. General Smith expressed doubt, however, whether any useful product would be developed through the use of the proposed task force technique. General Smith suggested alternatively that outside consultants might be employed by PSB. ██████████ said he liked this idea of using consultants.

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██████████ observed that under the Presidential Directive and under the reporting outline received from the NSC (see Agenda Item No. 4) the Board was required to come up with an evaluation of the national psychological effort in terms of objectives, policies, capabilities and limitations. He suggested that we should go back to the NSC and report that the broad-scale evaluation effort proposed by the NSC was too extensive an undertaking at this time, and that the Board instead proposes to proceed on a more specific basis. Mr. ██████████ also recommended that the use of the task force technique be retained in certain instances where it seemed appropriate rather than be eliminated altogether.

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Agenda Item No. 4. - Memorandum to the Board: Reporting to the National Security Council (PSB E-3)

Action:

Final action was deferred until clarification can be obtained from Mr. Lay, NSC Executive Secretary, concerning the precise intent of his letter of May 29 requesting PSB to submit a report on the status of national psychological programs for the NSC 114 review.

Discussion:

Mr. Bruce observed that the Departments are under obligation to make progress reports independently on their own activities. He urged that clarification be sought from the NSC staff as to whether these

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reports were to be made through PSB. [REDACTED] said it was his impression that PSB is asked to assemble and coordinate the agency reports concerning the national psychological effort. Mr. Foster said his interpretation of NSC's request was that PSB would only extract the information bearing on the national psychological effort from the regular reports, without itself getting in between the member agencies and the NSC.

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General Smith commented that the NSC may be confusing the Board and the Board's staff. He said the Board cannot very well pull together parts of its separate report and then submit it to NSC as an over-all report.

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[REDACTED] reported that the NSC staff had in mind, in connection with the NSC 114 review, that the various agency reports would be reviewed and coordinated by PSB rather than having them come directly to the NSC secretariat from the departments.

General Smith proposed that the three agencies should make up their reports independently and submit them to PSB who would then form a tripartite working panel. This panel would write up a summary report for NSC, attaching the three independent reports as annexes. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] commented that this procedure is what he had in mind, too.

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Agenda Item No. 5. - Princeton Statement (PSB D-26)

Action:

Final decision as to how and when Statement is to be used deferred to next meeting. Department of State to improve text in interim.

Discussion:

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[REDACTED] stated that this item had already been discussed preliminarily at the preceding luncheon.

General Smith expressed his concern that this statement or some form of it be issued as a public statement so that it may be used as guidance to our foreign information agencies. He recommended that the second sentence in the final paragraph be changed to read: "The United States has no thought of urging its cultural, social or economic patterns on any country", in place of the former language: "The United States had no intention of attempting to impose ...". General Smith said the original language gave the impression that the United States had the power to impose its patterns on other peoples.

General Magruder commented that Mr. Allen Dulles (who participated in the original drafting task) also had certain modifications in mind. Mr. Bruce said that the language of the Statement could be improved and made more forceful. He noted that the Princeton group reached no agreement as to precisely what would be done with the Statement and when it would be issued; they wanted a paper that could be used as a statement of U. S. foreign policy in case it was decided that it would be appropriate for the President or another high government official to issue a statement which could be used as a guidance.

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Agenda Item No. 6. - Progress Reports on Current Work

Not presented.

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