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Excerpts from a paper by [REDACTED] "Suggestions concerning political Measures which might help to the Solution of the Present Crisis without any World War."

Only by incompetence or malicious intention can I explain the fact that the "Russian experts" in the West ignored these 3 main goals of the Communist experimenting with Russian guinea pigs:

- a. Transformation of the Russian economics into Soviet war economics;
- b. Turning Russian society into a vast camp of hard labor and Communist army of world revolution;
- c. Transformation of the Russians into docile robots and cannon fodder for enslavement of the other nations.

The last of these objectives was most difficult to achieve. It is more easy to destroy an old society than old mentality.

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This gives to us a second major feature of the Communist "society:" instability of the social-economic groups and flexibility of positions of strength in the Soviet Union.

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The word, "nachalnik" (chief), has a real sense there. The precipice between rulers and ruled is by far more pronounced in the USSR than it was in the Czarist Russia. Yet, we know that one of the main reasons for popular discontent that led to revolutions of 1905 and 1917 was exactly the omnipotency and authoritarianism of "nachaliki."

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Thus we will have the following picture of anti-communist forces in the USSR today:

- A. Kholkhoz farmers;
- B. Majority of industrial workers, especially women;
- C. Majority of the army rank and file;
- D. Majority of the Soviet white collar workers and intelligenzia;
- E. Large fraction of the average membership in the CP and OY;
- F. Fraction of the regular officer corps;
- G. Some of the high Soviet officials;
- H. Inmates of the Soviet jails and camps, their relatives, and all those who ever had troubles with the Soviet police.

And here is how we can foresee the anti-communist forces during the first period of war with America, this war being carried out by Americans as an Operation Killing:

- A. Fraction of the kholkhoze farmers;
- B. Fraction of white collar workers and intelligenzia;
- C. Fraction of the membership of the CP and CY;
- D. Some of the Soviet high officials;
- E. Inmates of the jails and camps, their relatives, etc.

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(Conclusions) From this, necessarily short review of the forces, dividing the Soviet "society" we can, as it looks to me, draw following conclusions:

1. Soviet Union is still a curious phenomenon, combining very real and menacing force with an extreme weakness and vulnerability, which makes valid, more than ever, the observation of Kennan that it might change literally "overnight." In other words, there are in the USSR far more explosive stuff than it was in czarist Russia on the eve of revolution.
2. Yet, with the introduction of the new Stalinist tactics of merging Communism with Russian nationalism for the benefit of Communism and its world victory, the chances for an anti-Communist action became more obscure than they were before the war with Germany.
3. In the past it was mainly with the Western support than Communism was able to keep itself afloat in Russia. It might be that the possibilities of an anti-communist change in the USSR depends more from the course of the American foreign policy than from an internal development inside the land of Communist obscurantism and terror.

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1. There are, speaking theoretically, 4 main types of a possible revolutionary action in the peace time Soviet Union, i.e., in a situation not directly influenced by outside events or pressure:

- a. Revolution-evolution;
- b. Revolution as a spontaneous outburst of popular malcontent;
- c. Revolution as an organized action of some resolute minority group;
- d. Revolution, provoked and supported from abroad.

2. The author immediately rejects the two first types as fully improbable.

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I believe that basic elements of an revolution from outside must consist of:

- a. Political instability of the regime;
- b. Economic privations and social insecurity of the population;
- c. Acute popular discontent;
- d. Revolutionary spirit and traditions of the people;
- e. Belief of the population in the benevolence of the intervening foreign nation;
- f. Possibilities of an influencing of the population;
- g. Possibility of practical assistance from abroad to the revolutionary action.

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In my opinion the Russians will trust the West only if the West begins to carry out the following program of action, will show by the deeds that it is decided:

- a. To make a resolute and final break with the policies of seeking modus vivendi and other accomodations with the Communist regime, at the expense of the Russian people;
- b. To adopt instead the policies of liberation of the Russian and other peoples under Communist yoke;
- c. To make clear the American desire to fight against Communists only, and do not intervene in the internal affairs of the liberated Russia, especially in its territorial and minorities problems (under "Russia" we understand the territory of the SU as on September 1st 1939, with some rectifications in one or another side.)

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Here are some of the channels through which some fresh air usually has been pouring into a Communist prison, called Soviet Union:

- a. Members of the Soviet Foreign service and officials who went abroad and then returned back;
- b. Members of the Soviet occupational forces in Germany, etc;
- c. German and other POW's.

e. People over

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- d. People over 40, who remember the life in czarist Russia;
- e. Foreigners visiting USSR (by their external look)
- f. Foreign goods (consumption as well as machinery, etc.) which testify that life is better abroad;
- g. Rumors, based on listening to foreign stations or reading of the foreign books and papers (still available through good friends in a VIP positions), or upon one's own wishful thinking-- a very popular source of information in the USSR;
- h. Soviet official propaganda, forced to release some real news, if in the form of polemics, denials, etc.

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Among the technical possibilities for influencing the Russian people (and also non-Russian nations of the USSR), I can name, as the first, preliminary but conditio qua non steps:

- a. Break of diplomatic, trade, and whatever else form of relations with the Communist government in the USSR;
- b. Proclamation of Stalin and other leading Communists in Russia and elsewhere as outlawed criminals and enemies of mankind;
- c. Explanation to the peoples behind "Iron Curtain" of the reasons which dictated the Western ostracism of Stalin & Co. and assurance, in word and deeds, that it is not directed against the Russian and other peoples and states, and would be repelled immediately after the change in the government system would occur.

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