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1. Principal and Ancillary Objectives:

A. Principal Objectives:

1. By exploitation of the theme of Stalin's death, to cause maximum disruption to the Soviet and Soviet-controlled machinery, within and without the Orbit, both prior to, and after the event.
2. To encourage defections and/or resistance within the armed forces and at other levels of the Soviet machine, world-wide, through exploitation of this theme.
3. To stiffen disaffection and encourage effective resistance at all levels of the Soviet, Soviet-dominated and Soviet-inclined peoples and groups throughout the world, by the use of this theme.

B. Ancillary Objectives:

1. Pending Stalin's death, to sow insecurity at all levels of the Soviet hierarchy through accounts of past purges and predictions of future adverse developments.
2. To instill within the military the desire to seize the opportunity to liberate the people of the USSR and to encourage the people to incite and support the armed forces to struggle for liberation.
3. To weaken the effectiveness of the State Security personnel by bringing to their attention that the day of reckoning is approaching and anything they do against the people will be held against them.

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them in the event of:

(a) upheaval on the part of the people.

(b) the possibility of military dictatorship.

4. To suggest to the people the opportunity, presented by the change in the regime and consequent dissension at the top levels, of negating the efficiency of the Police State oppression, through

(a) passive resistance;

(b) slow-downs in production;

(c) collective efforts at neutralising the informant

net system.

5. To suggest to non-Orbit Communist parties and leaders that subservience to Moscow can no longer be construed as ideological allegiance to the Prophet of Marxism-Leninism nor to the prophecy of better times ahead, but as simple anti-national fifth column activity for an aggressive foreign power. The intent will be to diminish local influence of the party while advancing the concept of National Communism and causing attrition of Kremlin capabilities world-wide.

6. To intensify feelings of insecurity among Satellite leaders.

7. To elicit spontaneous statements of concern and support for the oppressed peoples of the Orbit at a time when the upheavals of the Police State machine give them their first opportunity of self-liberation.

2. Capabilities

a. A review of principal capabilities shows:

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- (1) That our only current means of directly affecting elements within the Soviet Union is through radio broadcasting facilities.
- (2) That our best capabilities of spreading rumor and/or fact within the Soviet Union lie in the exploitation of our facilities for being heard by Soviet occupation forces in Germany, Austria and the satellites, to which should be added the Soviet technical troops in Korea through indigenous and emigre elements.
- (3) That our present capabilities in the Far East should be utilized and intensified in support of the attainment of the objectives outlined in this paper.
- b. An evaluation of our capabilities shows that:
- (1) Our coverage of the European Satellites and the Far East for the purposes of [REDACTED] by overt and covert operations is our most developed present capability. 25X1A
- (2) Our considerable capabilities in the free world are convertible to [REDACTED] targets but are not currently geared to such coordinated effort.
- (3) No effort to coordinate policy or action with foreign governments and controlled media has been initiated, posing an emergency problem that demands prompt and vigorous action.
- (4) Expanded capabilities will be needed to meet effectively the opportunity presented by Stalin's death and these capabilities must be developed without further loss of time.

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c. The media and techniques to be brought to [REDACTED] include the following, which must be divided into overt and covert courses of action:

(1) Overt means.

- (a) State Department action: Controlled diplomatic action
IIA
VOA
- (b) U.S. government inspired press: Domestic and Foreign
- (c) U.S. controlled media: RIAS Berlin
ROT-WEIS-ROT
IIA Film program
- (d) Military attaché system
- (e) MSA representation
- (f) TCA representation (Point Four)
- (g) Foreign controlled media (BBC, RADIO MADRID, RADIO ISTANBUL, etc.)

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
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d. Overt and covert exploitation of the theme of Stalin's death falls into two time phases:

- (1) From the present to death;
- (2) Subsequent to death.

Both phases demand carefully synchronized overt and covert action. Moreover, the first or interim phase must be used for the development of the expanded capabilities needed for the second phase.

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