

~~TOP SECRET~~TAB BPSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington, D. C.CHECK LIST OF SUGGESTED PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIONS
WHICH MAY BE TAKEN AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME IN SUPPORT
OF GOOD TREATMENT AND RELEASE OF US/UN POW'S

1. Immediate release of selected prisoners of war who do not desire to return to Communist territory, especially prisoners of war held in United Nations hospitals.
2. Removal of the above category of prisoners of war from the immediate combat area under scrutiny of an International Board or Commission, under either UN or Red Cross auspices with an accompanying request to the Hostile Power to allow a similar Board or Commission to supervise removal of sick and wounded POW's. (Article 111 of the Geneva Convention on Treatment of Sick and Wounded Prisoners of War).
3. Renewed publicity through efforts of the International Red Cross to inspect prisoner of war camps in Communist area. Refusal of such inspection will be the signal for sustained psychological operations designed to focus world opinion on Communist intransigence.
4. Demonstrations, protests in the UN General Assembly, protests in UN member nations' parliamentary bodies, newspaper campaigns citing the number of days which have passed since request for permission has been unanswered, publicity attendant upon flying inspection teams to takeoff points, etc., invitations to neutral correspondents, various international organizations to observe and report conditions in UN prison camps.
5. Offering bounties for return of, or aiding escape of, US/UN prisoners of war.
6. Organizations of guerrilla task forces to harass POW camps and effect rescue of key personnel.

B

SECURITY INFORMATION

67230-8
#1

TAB B

7. Intensification of escape and evasion measures.
8. Leaflet drops to Prison Camps' Areas containing messages for prison authorities and/or prisoners. These messages should include offer of bounty for release, aid and escape.
9. Leaflet campaign to combat areas on the subject, with appropriate themes.
10. Balloon campaign with leaflets, provided technological limitations can be solved.

- 2 -

T O P S E C R E T

TOP SECRET

territory, and termination of hostilities. (Oppenheim, 3d edition, Vol. II, p. 195)

- c. Article 118 of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention requires the repatriation of all prisoners of war upon the cessation of hostilities.
- d. There is, however, no restriction upon release without repatriation prior to the cessation of hostilities. This can be accomplished with or without parole. Under the Convention the permissibility of parole is governed jointly by the policy of the Detaining Power and the policy of the Power on which the prisoner depends. Assuming the Detaining Power offers parole, the conditions under which the prisoner may accept parole are governed by the rules stated by his government at the beginning of hostilities. The two hostile regimes have failed to impose any such rules with respect to the Korean conflict, and enemy prisoners may therefore accept parole if they wish. If parole is permissible, then, by inference release without parole is also permissible if the Detaining Power so elects.

3. Policy Prior to Cessation of Hostilities

- a. It appears then that a policy of releasing prisoners of war is feasible which does not require modification of the Geneva Convention. This policy would entail the voluntary release of prisoners of war prior to the cessation of hostilities either with or without parole. To be effective from the propaganda standpoint, such release must include arrangements for the future welfare of these persons.

TOP SECRET

- b. The wholesale release of enemy POW's does not appear desirable for the following reasons:
 - (1) It would considerably increase the risk of reprisals.
 - (2) It would pose difficult administrative problems of screening and resettlement.
 - c. Selective release with or without parole would serve the purpose of permitting publicity on the granting of asylum, without the disadvantages cited above.
4. Psychological ^{implications} duplications of this policy.
- a. General
 - (1) In order to maintain its position of caring for prisoners of war according to the letter and spirit of the Convention, the United States should notify the Hostile Power of the unconditional release of such prisoners of war.
 - b. Specific advantages
 - (1) It would re-enforce the principle of United Nations asylum from tyranny.
 - (2) The effectiveness of future United States psychological warfare programs would be enhanced by the adoption of this policy.
 - (3) It would obviate the disadvantage cited in the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum of 8 August of establishing a precedent contrary to Article 118 of the Prisoner of War Convention of 1949.

- 3 -

TOP SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

c. Specific Disadvantages of Recommended Policy

- (1) The Hostile Power might impose deprivations on US/UN prisoners of war as a retaliatory measure, although this is much less likely in the case of selective release than of wholesale release. This might exert psychological pressure upon Allied publics and US/UN troops, although it is not predictable whether these psychological effects would result in strengthening or weakening of Allied morale. This disadvantage can be in part offset to the extent that specific psychological actions by the U.S. (See TAB B) effectively place the Hostile Power on the defensive with respect to treatment of prisoners of war.
- (2) The disadvantage cited in sub-paragraph 3d of the Joint Chiefs of Staff paper (that UN action might be used by the Communists as a reason for breaking off peace negotiations) is not considered fundamental, inasmuch as political issues more important to the interests of the Hostile Power than the prisoner of war issue exist as agenda items.

6. Policy Upon Cessation of Hostilities.

- (a) Exchange of prisoners on a one-for-one basis is subject to the disadvantage that the Communists can impress Koreans and pass them off as genuine POW's. This would enable them to retain a residue of US/UN prisoners after all exchanges have been made.

-4-

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

TOP SECRET

- (b) Exchange of POW's on an all-for-all basis offers the best assurance of the protection and return of US/UN prisoners of war. This should be our announced policy.

Administratively, the return of US/UN prisoners of war can be accelerated by exchanges of groups mixed in nationality, on an approximate basis of one-to-one. Lack of good faith on the part of the Communists can thus be detected early, and propaganda designed to influence their actions can be instituted.

TOP SECRET

87230-A

##1