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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Special Assistant to the Secretary

MEMORANDUM

SEP 17 1951

To: PSB - 25X1A5a2 [REDACTED]

Subject: Preliminary Report for Group II (Intelligence)

Reference: Work Assignments, Panel B, 30 August 1951

1. Organization for Intelligence Support, Panel B.

Each of the intelligence agencies and the intelligence agencies combined will be in a position to give intelligence support to Panel B. The combined support will be in the form of intelligence estimates which transcend the competence of any one agency, i.e., National Intelligence Estimates coordinated by CIA. The bulk, however, of the intelligence support will probably stem from the resources of the Department of State intelligence organization, because of the nature of the intelligence required. However, the Department will be under obligation to call upon the other agencies for contributive support where appropriate, even on estimates which will be forthcoming from the Department. The Department will also call upon resources outside of the Government for such private research as will be helpful.

The representation on Panel B from the Department's intelligence organization, together with the representation from CIA intelligence will insure the fulfillment of this support herein outlined and these representatives will be in a position to identify and call upon such other intelligence representatives as can assist Panel B.

2. Preliminary Substantive Intelligence Support for Panel B.

OIR has undertaken two basic intelligence studies to support the work of Panel B.

Project 1. The common and variable aspirations of the peoples of the Soviet orbit, and the tensions that may be associated with any conflict between these feelings and present Soviet policies. (Preliminary outline attached, Annex A)

Project 2. The common and variable aspirations of the peoples of the free world, excluding the US, and the tensions that may result from any conflict between these feelings and present Western policies or from Soviet PW exacerbation of these feelings. (Preliminary outline attached, Annex B)

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Since the psychological planner must be aware of the competition he faces from the enemy, each of the above two papers will include an estimate of the capabilities and limitations of the Soviet propaganda apparatus (domestic and foreign) for exploiting the aspirations and fears of the peoples in both the Free World and the orbit.

Project 1 will be coordinated among the intelligence agencies as a National Intelligence Estimate. The State Department draft contribution which will be available to Panel B, should be ready by September 24.

Project 2 is essentially a State Department paper and should be available September 28.

3. Other and Future Intelligence Support for Panel B.

There are other intelligence studies finished or under way which should be of use to Panel B. For example,

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-- Leadership: A study in depth, being carried out by a private group at [redacted] of the psychology and character of the key figures in Soviet society, with particular emphasis on

- a) vulnerability to psychological pressures, and
- b) any predictability of action in response to certain circumstances;

-- Reaction studies: Periodic analysis by OIR of foreign reactions to particular policies or actions.

It is not anticipated that any particularly new or unconventional intelligence means will be necessary for application to the problems of Panel B. The fundamental character of the problem, however, requires a more intensive employment of the means available. For the immediate work of Panel B, however, a compromise must be struck between the schedule of Panel B's work and the time required for intensive and basic research.

It is anticipated that as the work of Groups I and III progresses, certain questions will arise which intelligence can attempt to answer. Furthermore, there will probably be a need to elaborate particular points raised in the intelligence studies now in production. In order to be of greatest service to Groups I and III in this regard, a representative of Group II should, as appropriate, sit in with the other groups to assist in recognizing and defining those questions which will require further intelligence.

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This memorandum has the concurrence of CIA, 25X1A9a

Fisher Howe
Fisher Howe (per WJK)
Deputy

Attachments:

Outlines, Annexes A and B.

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ANNEX "A"

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(Preliminary
version)

PSB Panel B, Project No. 1

THE COMMON AND VARIABLE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLES
OF THE SOVIET ORBIT, AND THE TENSIONS THAT MAY BE
ASSOCIATED WITH ANY CONFLICT BETWEEN THESE FEELINGS
AND PRESENT SOVIET POLICIES.

I. Cohesive Forces in Soviet Society

1. Physical control over individual and masses
 - a. Police mechanism
 - b. Physical and spiritual isolation of population from outside world
 - c. Controls over individual
 - (1) Passport system
 - (2) Economic restrictions - place of employment, period of employment, inability of peasant to sell what and when he wishes, corvee
 - (3) Virtual dependence of individual upon state for necessities (food, consumer goods, and housing)
2. Centralized control over political and economic institutions
 - a. Party
 - b. Government
 - c. Economy
 - (1) Industry-plant and labor
 - (2) Agriculture - sovkhos and kolkhos
 - (3) Commerce - domestic and foreign
3. Uniform ideology disseminated under centralized control
 - a. Doctrine formulated by topmost leaders
 - b. State monopoly over communications media
 - (1) Physical control over media
 - (2) Pervasiveness of media
 - (3) Only official doctrine disseminated
 - (4) Endless repetition partly overcomes popular skepticism of official pronouncements
 - c. Cultural activities limited to furthering official doctrine
 - (1) Arts
 - (2) Sciences
 - d. Educational system monopolized by state
 - e. Theme of monolithic character of regime
 - (1) "Supported by all" (nationalities, social strata, and religious groups)
 - (2) Resulting isolation of individual
 - f. Universally inspired fear of war and attachment to soil
4. Predominant position of Great Russians
 - a. Absolute majority of population
 - b. Union-wide distribution
 - c. Privileged position - "first among equals"
 - (1) State exploitation of traditional Great Russian inferiority complex

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- (2) Stimulation of Great Russian nationalism
- 5. Trappings of popular participation in regime
 - a. Central government
 - b. Local government
 - c. Public organizations
- 6. Announced objectives of regime
 - a. Standard of living
 - b. Equality of opportunity for all strata and nationalities
 - c. Freedom and security of individual
 - d. Nationalism
 - (1) Local national governmental bodies
 - (2) Encouragement and use of local languages
 - (3) Approval of some local historical figures
- 7. Stake of the elite in perpetuating regime
 - a. Great material rewards
 - b. Identification with regime and fear of punishment with collapse of government.

II. Causes of Tension in Soviet Society

- 1. Nationalism among Soviet minorities
 - a. Ukraine
 - b. Baltic States
 - c. Caucasus
 - d. Central Asia
- 2. Peasant discontent over agricultural policy
 - a. Collective cultivation of land
 - b. Collective farm crop delivery system
 - c. Inability to leave collective
 - d. Increasing incroade on remaining private operations
 - e. Harsh labor discipline
 - f. Party members get best jobs and largest rewards on farms
 - g. Real and artificial shortage of manpower (women are primary source of farm labor)
- 3. Worker dissatisfaction with industrial system
 - a. Bad working conditions
 - b. Restrictions on movement of labor
 - c. Harsh labor discipline and penalties for violation
 - d. Compulsory deductions from pay
 - e. Trade-unions represent state rather than worker interests
 - f. Low pay
 - g. The Stakhanovite speed-up system
 - h. Cutting down number of non-work days, (1) Fewer now than before war, (2) Abolishing national holidays

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- i. Constant agitation and meetings at place of employment to spur production
 - j. Plant administrative staffs are inflated, jobs are cushy
4. Persistence of religious feelings
- a. Only permissible form of ideology contrary to official dogma
 - b. All church organizations state controlled
 - c. Religious groups with special grievances
 - (1) Ukrainian Uniats
 - (2) Lithuanian Catholics
 - (3) Minority groups in Russian Orthodox Church
 - (4) Moslems
5. Extensive and arbitrary police power
- a. Inadequate legal safeguards against police
 - b. Omnipresence of police and informers; universal mutual distrust among Soviet population
 - c. Disparity between crime and punishment
 - d. Extent and inhumanity of labor camps
 - e. Control over residence and travel
6. Inter-class frictions
- a. Popular resentment at elite privileges and their perpetuation
 - (1) High officialdom vs. masses
 - (2) Party vs. non-Party
 - (3) Officer vs. enlisted man
 - (4) Workers vs. managers and engineers
7. Dissatisfaction with standard of living
- a. High cost, scarcity, and low quality of necessities
 - b. Squalid housing conditions
 - c. Difficulty of putting children through school
 - d. Contrast with Western standard of living
8. Popular distrust of official propaganda, hence government's integrity
- a. Disparity between reality and official doctrine
 - (1) Soviet "freedoms"
 - (2) Internal economic conditions
 - (3) The "oppressed West"
 - (4) Distorted news of specific events, World War II experience
 - (5) Disillusionment accompanies maturing
9. Lack of popular participation in government
- a. Party monopoly of political power
 - b. The rigged election, fear of voting against the Party, feeling of isolation
 - c. Lack of popular elections in the Party
 - d. The farce: "dictatorship of the proletariat."

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10. Suppression of free intellectual inquiry
 - a. Impossibility for the artist, writer, newspaperman, scholar and scientist to express his real thoughts because of the Party manufactured straitjacket:
 - (1) The Party line
 - (2) Dictation of subject matter
 - (3) Danger of venturing into fields uncharted by the Party
 - (4) Unpredictable changes in the Party line
 - (5) All-pervasive censorship
 - (6) Penalty of non-conformity; purge
 - (7) Isolation from foreign cultures

11. Great popular fear of war
 - a. Increased Soviet emphasis on "just war"
 - b. Increased attention to war propaganda against the USSR

12. Intra-class frictions
 - a. Politburo
 - (1) Struggle for succession
 - (2) Malenkov-Zhdanov feud
 - (3) Direct and implied criticism of Andreyev and Khrushchev
 - b. Struggle among lesser elite groups for power positions
 - (1) Military vs. Party and Police
 - (2) Inter-service rivalry
 - (3) Managerial-administrative elite vs. Party and police
 - (4) Recent Party members vs. old Party members
 - (5) Party leadership vs. rank and file Party
 - (6) Party vs. police
 - (7) Bureaucrat (Civil Servant) vs. Party and Police
 - (8) Party idealist vs. Party opportunist

13. Racial and religious animosities
 - a. Anti-Semitism
 - b. Anti-Great Russianism
 - c. Azerbaidzhani-Armenian
 - d. Georgian-Armenian
 - e. Catholic-Orthodox
 - f. Moslem-Orthodox

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(Preliminary
Version)

PSB Panel B, Project No. 2

THE COMMON AND VARIABLE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLES OF THE FREE WORLD, EXCLUDING THE US, AND THE TENSIONS THAT MAY RESULT FROM ANY CONFLICT BETWEEN THESE FEELINGS AND PRESENT WESTERN POLICIES, OR FROM SOVIET OR EXACERBATION OF THESE FEELINGS.

- I. Common aspirations and fears of the peoples of the free world.
 1. Peace.
 2. Security from external aggression.
 3. Political independence and status.
 4. Economic welfare and independence.
 5. Governments responsive to the citizenry and useful for achievement of their aims.
 6. Development and preservation of autonomous cultures.
- II. Aspirations and fears of particular areas and groups within the free world. (In this connection, particular attention should be paid to those aspirations and fears which will diverge from those specified under I, above.)
 1. Western Europe.
 - a. Different economic groups, e.g., industrial wage earners, farmers, white collar salaried groups, middle and upper classes.
 - b. Different occupational groups whose significance is out of proportion to their size and economic position, e.g., bureaucrats, politicians, and government leaders.
 - c. Different national groups: Scandinavia, the UK, West Germany, continental Western Europe.
 - d. Different religious groups: Catholics, Protestants.

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2. The Far East and South Asia.

- a. Different economic groups: peasants, low income city dwellers, middle and upper classes -- commercial, professional, and industrial groups; landlords.
- b. Key occupational groups: intellectuals, bureaucrats, politicians, and government leaders.
- c. Different national groups, particularly bringing out the distinctions between four groups of countries: (i) industrial Japan; (ii) Philippines, pre-Western Korean, Thailand, and Nationalist China; (iii) newly independent Indonesia, Burma, India, and Pakistan; (iv) embattled Malaya and Indo-China.

3. The Near East.

- a. Economic groups: peasants, low income city dwellers, middle and upper classes -- commercial, professional, and industrial groups; landlords.
- b. Key occupational groups: intellectuals, politicians, bureaucrats, and government leaders.
- c. Different national and religious groups, bringing out especially the distinctions between attitudes in Turkey, the Arab states, and Israel.

4. Africa.

- a. Economic groups.
- b. Occupational groups: intellectuals, political leaders.
- c. Different racial groups, bringing out particularly the different attitudes of the native and European populations.

5. Latin America.

- a. Economic groups: peasants, low income city dwellers, middle and upper classes -- commercial, professional, and industrial groups; landlords.
- b. Occupational groups: intellectuals, politicians, bureaucrats, and government leaders.

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III. Conflicts and drives.

1. To what extent are these aspirations and fears described under 1 and 2, above, channeled by existing US and other Western policies into drives that support US aims?
2. To what extent are these aspirations and fears so adversely affected by existing US and other Western policies, and/or so exacerbated by Soviet psychological warfare, as to create conflicts between US and free world attitudes which can be exploited by the USSR?

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