

Enclosure 1

BASIC QUESTIONS

1. To what extent have the policies which govern the national psychological programs been applied? In which areas is policy clarification necessary? Do there exist any actual or possible policy conflicts?
2. To what extent has the U. S. achieved the psychological objectives set forth in NSC 10/5? In which areas and to what extent has Soviet power and influence been reduced and U. S. capabilities increased?
3. To what extent have U. S. capabilities been employed in carrying out a national psychological program? Which U. S. actions have proven most effective in realizing the programs? On the basis of experience during the preceding year, which of our capabilities should be reinforced, increased, or developed?
4. What are the major factors which now impede the successful prosecution of our national psychological program? Indicate the strength of the enemy and other deterrents, such as prevailing conditions in certain areas (nationalism, economic instability, etc.). Indicate also the extent to which our major alliances represent an impediment to the successful conduct of our national psychological program.

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Enclosure 2

SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

Source
Data
available

I. SOVIET ORBIT

A. USSR

SR

1. What information is available through covert channels to indicate

a. Whether Voice of America broadcasts are audible in spite of Russian jamming?

b. Whether they are proving effective in achieving our objectives?

c. Whether the Soviets have begun to put into effect measures designed to seal off the Russian radio audience from any penetration by our radio programs?

2. Can any progress be reported in the penetration of the Iron Curtain—and particularly the USSR frontiers—by means other than radio?

SR

3. What progress has been made in discouraging and restricting East-West trade—and particularly trade with the USSR—in strategic materials by covert methods?

EW

B. Satellite States

1. Are plans now under consideration to meet the ^{situation} contingency which would arise if the satellite governments followed Moscow's lead in developing an interference-proof radio communications system?

2. Has the

2. Has the method of preclusive buying and other economic restrictions on East-West trade been proving effective in bringing about economic deterioration within the satellite states?

EW

3. Is the number and quality of defectors from the satellite states increasing? Are plans being considered to further increase the defection of key personnel from Government, the armed forces, key industries, the political parties, etc.?

EE

4. As a matter of national policy, should not greater emphasis be placed on the psychological aspects of defector programs?

EE

East Germany

1. Has the number of defectors from the Soviet armed forces in East Germany increased or decreased during the past twelve months?

EE

DO no comment

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C. Communist China

1. What evidence is available through covert channels of the effectiveness of

FE

a. Voice of

a. Voice of America, and

b. Radio Free Asia

in getting their messages across to the Chinese?

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Policy

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III. MIDDLE EAST and AFRICA

A. Middle East



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B. Africa

1. In view of the great American interest in Africa from the viewpoint of strategic materials, as well as in other respects, has work begun on plans to check the efforts of Communism to get control over the colored races throughout Africa, and particularly to seize the leadership of colored labor organizations everywhere?

NE

IV. SOUTH and SOUTHEAST ASIA

1. What progress has been made in laying the foundation for effective guerrilla activities in the event of the countries in this area being over-run by the Communists?

FE

V. FAR EAST

A. Korea

1. Has the Korean debate led to any conclusion as to the adequacy or otherwise of coordinating machinery in the psychological warfare field, both with civilian and military authorities?

FE

2. Has the experience of CIA in Korea raised any significant problems with regard to cooperation with other countries participating in the UN operations?


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3. Is it possible

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3. Is it possible, from guerrilla activities in Korea, to draw any useful conclusions which might become practical in other areas



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
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4. Has the support given CIA by the United Nations Command in Korea--and vice versa--proved generally satisfactory?

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5. Can CIA report satisfactory progress on developmental programs; i.e., programs laying the groundwork for future operations in



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VI. LATIN AMERICA

1. What plans are under consideration to utilize all possible covert resources to check the recent rapid growth of

WH

a. Communism, and

b. "Peronism"

in certain Latin American countries?

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2. <i>JUL 5</i>					<i>81497-B, 4 of 20</i>
3. <i>CDY/SP</i>		<i>1415</i>	<i>79 July</i>		<i>For your information</i>
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