

REPORT TO THE NSC ON NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAMS

GENERAL

The Central Intelligence Agency, in conformity with NSC 10/2 and 10/5, has developed covert programs on a world-wide basis in support of national psychological objectives.

From a covert point of view, there is need for forthright exposition and constant repetition of what the U. S. stands for in the present day of international tension. This declaration should reaffirm those principles which characterize our position in the Community of Nations; our respect for the dignity of the human being; our belief in a just economic system which respects the rights of private property; free enterprise, which recognizes the responsibilities and privileges of labor and management; recognition of our international responsibilities; our determination not to withdraw from the affairs of Europe; our concern for the cultural, political, and economic integrity of the peoples of Asia; our equal determination to assist the unfortunate peoples of the Satellite States in regaining their lost liberties; our friendship for the peoples of the USSR; our dedicated belief in the future of the United Nations; and, finally, our determination to maintain the security of the free world.

This statement of principles is vital at this time to give meaning and justification to the activities of Radio Free Europe, as well as other covert activities pertaining to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Orbit in general.

Immediately following is a general report by geographical area of the status and progress of covert activities for the past fiscal year with respect to U. S. national psychological programs.

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D. What are the major factors which now impede the successful prosecution of our national psychological program? Indicate the strength of the enemy and other deterrents, such as prevailing conditions in certain areas (nationalism, economic instability, etc.). Indicate also the extent to which our major alliances represent an impediment to the successful conduct of our national psychological program.

1. Europe:

a. Western Europe:

The successful accomplishment of a cold war program is contingent upon the development and maintenance of solidarity and cohesive strength of the Western Powers.

b. Eastern Europe:

The greatest single obstacle to the attainment of our national psychological programs is the presence of powerful contingents of the Red Army in East Germany, Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.

c. Southeastern Europe and Satellite Countries:

The security police forces are the greatest deterrents for realizing our national psychological program. The Balkan peoples reportedly feel that little can be done by the West with respect to the Communist-controlled police forces, except under conditions of war, to free them from the Communist yoke.

d. USSR:

The existence of a controlled police state which has employed every physical and technical means to isolate its people from

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people from contact with non-Communist nations and peoples; a militant ideology under firm party propagation; ability under its system to employ coercion without regard to law; documentary controls on the movement of peoples and concomitant vigilance which such checks afford; makes agent recruitment and utilization of indigenous personnel a formidable obstacle. There are, however, administrative

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


2. Middle East:

Major deterrents to successful prosecution of a national psychological program in the Middle East area are the rise of irresponsible nationalism, accompanied by anti-Westernism, anti-colonialism, religious extremism, and xenophobia; economic instability and social unrest; racism; regional disputes, such as the Palestine and Kashmir problems; international disputes, such as the Anglo-Egyptian, Anglo-Iranian, and Franco-Tunisian controversies; and political ineptitude and irresponsibility.

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### 3. Far East:

The major disadvantage accruing to the U. S. Government in the Far East is the fact of its over-all position of relative weakness militarily, economically, and psychologically. Inability to bring the Korean war to a satisfactory conclusion and the continued threat to Indochina are factors militating against the restoration of stability in the Far East. Present status of recognition and non-recognition of Communist China among the Allied powers is a special factor impeding U. S. psychological programs; likewise, the conflict in attitudes and objectives in Southeast Asia between the U. S., Britain, and France.

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The proven efficiency and extent of Communist administrative and police control are additional restrictive factors to the success of U. S. programs. The nationalist aspirations of peoples striving for release from colonial dominance (Indochina, Malaya) and the political immaturity and ineptitude of those recently released (Indonesia, Burma) are inhibitions which consciously makes them suspect of U. S. motives and efforts, no matter how well intentioned. The fear in these peoples of economic dominance by the U. S. has superseded the fear of political subservience. British and American conflict on policy with respect to China

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4. Latin America:

U. S. concentration on European matters, and particularly the large quantities of money expended in that area, have given rise to Latin American charges that the U. S. is neglecting its natural and truest friends. This, however, should have little effect on covert missions, with the possible exception of the mission to combat anti-Americanism in the area.

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5. International:

Factors that impede the successful prosecution of a national psychological program are:

- a. The continuing inequality in the distribution of income in Western Europe, particularly France, Italy, and Germany, and the very limited success that MSA (and ECA) has had in bringing pressure to bear to change this situation.
- b. The excessively militaristic and aggressive tone of some of the statements made by our Government officials which play directly into the hands of the Soviet peace offensive.
- c. The inability of the U. S. Government on specific issues relating to colonialism to take a firm and clear stand because of the exigencies of the European alliance system.
- d. The Achilles heel of the racial issue in the United States and the ineffective efforts to date to deal with the exploitation of this situation by the Communists.
- e. The McCarran Act and its limiting prohibitions on immigration into this country.
- f. The fact that our tariff structure runs directly counter to our efforts to expand international trade and severely limits the ability of foreign countries to export to this country.

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PART II

AREA COVERT OPERATIONS

A. USSR

1. What information is available through covert channels to indicate

a. Whether Voice of America broadcasts are audible in spite of Russian jamming?

b. Whether they are proving effective in achieving our objectives?

c. Whether the Soviets have begun to put into effect measures designed to seal off the Russian radio audience from any penetration by our radio programs?

Information received in 1950 and 1951 through covert channels indicated that VOA broadcasts were audible in the USSR. The areas from which these reports originated covered the Baltic countries and the Ukrainian SSR. Recent intelligence, however, indicates that the severe jamming instituted by the Soviets has considerably reduced the audibility of the VOA broadcasts. This is further substantiated by the information obtained from returning German Prisoners of War, Soviet refugees and defectors, who indicate that considerable segments of the USSR population continue to listen to VOA broadcasts despite the jamming and the risk involved.

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Inasmuch as the only intelligence obtained through covert channels on the VOA broadcasts has come primarily from the Baltic countries and the Ukrainian SSR, it would be extremely difficult to determine at this time whether these broadcasts are proving to be effective in achieving our objectives. Information obtained through the interrogation of Soviet defectors, former German Prisoners of War and recently arrived refugees generally indicates that the VOA broadcasts are not sufficiently forceful and that a considerable portion of the programs is devoted to irrelevant matters which have no direct effect on the present struggle between the East and the West. There has also been considerable criticism emanating from the ethnic minority emigre groups, particularly the Ukrainians, who claim that the VOA broadcasts are not sufficiently representative of the desires and aspirations of the peoples inside the USSR. The Ukrainian emigre leaders insist that the VOA Ukrainian broadcasts should be made more national in character and should take cognizance of the Ukrainian struggle for liberation.

In general, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that, despite the apparent imperfections which may be inherent in some of the VOA programs, these broadcasts play an important psychological role in reminding the peoples of the USSR that there is an alternate way of life and, at the same time, providing them with a hope of ultimate liberation from the tyrannical oppression of the Soviet Regime. The effectiveness of these broadcasts, however, should not be measured in terms

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
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be measured in terms of immediate reactions or attainment of short-range objectives. Their value lies more in the field of preparation for a long-range psychological conditioning which serves to reinforce all other efforts directed to win the support of the peoples of the USSR to our cause.

There is no definitive evidence obtained through covert channels which would indicate that the Soviets have begun to put into effect measures designed to seal off the Soviet radio audience from any penetration by western radio programs. Obviously, jamming has been instigated for this specific purpose. In addition, there are some unconfirmed reports which indicate that the recent models of Soviet manufactured radios are being designed to prevent tuning in to the broadcasts originating from outside the USSR.

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Security Information

C. Communist China

1. What evidence is available through covert channels of the effectiveness of

a. Voices of America, and

b. Radio Free Asia

in getting their messages across to the Chinese?

CIA has received little evidence through covert channels of the effectiveness of VOA or RFA to date. The scarcity of radios on the mainland and the system of controls imposed by the Communist Government are, of course, contributing factors; more specifically however, our agents on the mainland at this time are too few and too busy to handle anything but the highest priority intelligence.

Intelligence reports indicate that broadcasts to the mainland of China via RFA reach only those government officials who are allowed radios, and official radio operators. Expansion of facilities for broadcasting to the mainland of China would appear to be useless.

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
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FAR EASTA. Korea


1. Has the Korean debate led to any conclusion as to the adequacy or otherwise of coordinating machinery in the psychological warfare field, both with civilian and military authorities?

Coordinating machinery as operating between civilian and military authorities in the field of psychological warfare in Korea has given evidence of certain inadequacies. Inasmuch as responsibility for tactical psychological warfare is vested in the military, a quasi-military organization headed by a designee of the theater commander

 was established. This organization has served as a coordinating element in tactical psychological warfare measures operated both on the part of the military and CIA, but has failed to include the operations of USIE services in Korea.

Two major plans formulated by the Psychological Strategy Board regarding the overall propaganda approach to Korea have to this date failed to produce anything concrete as to an agreed upon coordinated effort especially where command and support are concerned. Likewise, policy with regard to the Korean situation has been inadequate in meeting current and long-range propaganda requirements. It has often been necessary for the field to formulate its own policy to meet situations as they arise.

2. Has the experience



3. It is possible, from guerrilla activities in Korea, to draw any useful conclusions which might become practical in other areas



Original CIA efforts in Korea were designed to recruit, train, equip and launch classical guerrilla teams who were assigned the task of organizing a resistance organization simultaneously with and as a result of guerrilla operations. However, after a year of directing and supporting this operation, the program was reoriented so that the first objective of the new program would be toward the establishment of a political/psychological resistance organization



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
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has been able to support the military with battle intelligence. In psychological warfare operations, the Eighth United States Army in Korea and CIA have for some time worked in close cooperation in implementing their different responsibilities.



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LATIN AMERICA

1. What plans are under consideration to utilize all possible covert resources to check the recent rapid growth of

a. Communism, and

b. "Peronism"

in certain Latin American countries?

(1) Communism. There is a very strong Communist drive throughout Latin America. It is aimed not so much at converting the Latin Americans, but at paralyzing action on their part through separating what are largely pro-U.S. governments (now more responsive to public opinion than formerly) from the people. Communism in general presents its threat through alliance with those nationalistic and social forces on an anti-U.S., anti-free-enterprise basis. The great period of growth of the Communist parties in Latin America was in the two or three years after VJ-Day, and generally speaking they have declined somewhat in strength and influence since then. The "recent growth", therefore, is limited as to size and influence to Guatemala and to a lesser extent Bolivia, and as to influence to Argentina and to a lesser extent Chile. The most basic underlying influences to be dealt with in Latin America, however, are the tremendous drives for nationalism and social justice going on in those countries as they emerge from semi-feudalism into the modern social and industrial revolution.

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
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