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(NEED TO KNOW)

ANNEX (G)1. Objective

To assist, in Korea and contiguous areas, UN military operations.

2. Discussion

a. In achieving the above objective it is necessary that both overt and covert psychological warfare be employed to the limit of our capabilities. Such action, however, must be governed by considerations of the politico-military North Korean and Communist China situation developing.

(1) Detailed plans must be prepared for engendering or inciting, in the North Korean and Chinese troops and civilians, conduct antagonistic to the Soviet-led Communist regimes, such conduct to range from non-cooperation through passive resistance and augmented confusion to vigorously prosecuted guerrilla warfare.

(2) To insure proper planning and appropriate executions

(a) Detailed planning will be the responsibility of the Government department or agency having primary responsibility in execution of the operation concerned.

(b) Detailed plans will contain an estimate of the political, economic, military and psychological feasibility, acceptability, and applicability of the operation concerned.

(c) Detailed plans will provide for adequate coordination at all levels and will recommend regarding the situation which should surround the moment of execution for producing maximum desired effect.

(3) Execution of detailed plans must be in accordance with political and military considerations surrounding the developing North Korean situation.

3. Action Effects Desired

a. Interference, confusion, and disruption in all aspects of North Korean and Communist Chinese military operations; and in other activities, military or

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civilian, where interference, confusion, or disruption would directly affect Communist military operations in Korea. Such action effects might include:

- (1) Increased guerrilla activity in North Korea and Communist China.
- (2) Interference with and disruption of enemy lines of communication and supply - including destruction of or interference with rail lines, motor transport, telegraph and radio facilities, etc.
Consideration should be given to inciting attack on communications at points of greatest vulnerability, such as motor transport at its source of fuel; urging political interference with or actual sabotage of vessels under non-Communist flags engaged in supplying Communist China, etc.
- (3) Confusing of Chinese economy and civil administration with resultant heightened confusion in and restriction upon operations in the military field.
- (4) Defection of Chinese Communist and North Korean troops.
- (5) Passive resistance and non-cooperation, both military and civilian.

4. Psychological Effects Desired

- a. Lowered morale of North Korean and Chinese troops and civilian supporting Soviet-led Communism.
- b. Heightened morale of North Korean and Chinese peoples desiring defeat of Soviet-led Communism.
- c. An attitude of violent antagonism to Soviet-led Communism in the minds of North Korean and Chinese peoples.
- d. Hopelessness in the minds of North Korean and Chinese Communist leaders, both military and civilian, regarding the military situation.
- e. Explosive three-way distrust between Pyongyang, Peking, and Moscow.
- f. General confusion in the minds of North Korean and Chinese Communist leaders.

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5. Actions Possible to Secure Psychological Effects Desired

a. The below listed actions are considered to have principal application in achieving the above psychological effects:

- (1) Overt and covert political action.
- (2) Overt and covert propaganda activities.
- (3) Direct action, such as a massive leaflet drop against China mainland population centers.
- (4) Overt and covert economic activities.
- (5) Guerrilla activities.
- (6) Other covert activities.

6. Recommended Action

The following recommendations are made regarding courses of action already being followed, in accordance with established command authority:

a. Department of Defense

- (1) Increase field propaganda activities by UN armed forces against North Korean and Chinese Communist troops.
- (2) Increase efforts to instill in North Korean and Chinese Communist prisoners-of-war an action-creating antagonism to Soviet-led Communism.

b. Central Intelligence Agency

- (1) Increase covert propaganda activities directed at North Korean and Chinese peoples and troops outside the immediate battle zone.
- (2) Conduct such additional guerrilla activities and special operations as may achieve either action effects or psychological effects desired.

7. Recommendations Regarding Special Opportunity Action

The following additional and "other than usual" action is recommended:

a. Department of Defense

- (1) Plan for, and at such time as it may become politically and militarily feasible and acceptable, prepare for and execute massive

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
leaflet drop over population centers of the China mainland (See Appendix (1) to this Annex for some considerations in this operation).

- (2) Develop through estimate stage, and submit to the Psychological Strategy Board for consideration, additional "other than usual" actions for employment in Korea and contiguous areas to assist UN military operations.

b. Central Intelligence Agency

- (1) Develop through estimate stage, and submit to JCS for consideration, additional "other than usual" actions for employment in Korea to assist UN military operations.
- (2) Develop through estimate stage, and submit to the Psychological Strategy Board for consideration, additional "other than usual" actions for employment in areas contiguous to Korea to assist UN military operations.

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ANNEX (G)APPENDIX (1)CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON A LEAFLET DROP OVER THE MAINLAND OF CHINA

1. A leaflet drop over cities of Communist China might be of very great psychological advantage to the United Nations and the United States in bringing about a state of mind among the Chinese people so to influence or deter the Peiping Government in its courses of action.
2. A main reservation as to the utility is in relation to the consideration that the Peiping Government may have pretty thorough control over public opinion in China. That is to say, it has placed impediments to the formation and focusing of group opinion among the Chinese people. Thus the regime has made itself relatively independent of autonomously generated group opinion. The basic consideration as to the value of such a leaflet drop therefore is whether it would serve to break through the control now exercised by the regime.
3. Such leaflets should carry a dignified and complete statement of the case of the United Nations and the United States. It should deal respectfully with the Chinese people. It should concentrate on the points that the United Nations and the United States have acted from no aggressive intention but only to repel aggression, that the interests of the Chinese people have been made subject to designs of action which are contrary to their welfare, that peace is attainable at any time on the basis of true recognition of the motives and the purposes of the United Nations in the Korean struggle. It should emphasize the United Nations framework as distinguished from the United States aspects of the interposition in Korea. By indirection it should raise the question in the minds of the Chinese people whether the Chinese Government does not now act in subordination to alien interests.
4. Such a leaflet drop should be undertaken, if at all, only after the

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struggle has entered a new phase in which the wraps have been taken off air operations beyond the confines of Korea and into China proper. It should be borne in mind that the leaflet drop would involve derogation of air sovereignty over China and would therefore be construable as an act of violence.

5. A relevant question is the question of auspices for the air drop. Whether the authority of the United Nations could be stated on the leaflets without recourse to consent from the other governments involved in the Korean-United Nations operation is a question which would have to be settled in advance.

6. If carried out, such leaflet should aim at maximum coverage in a one-time operation. The planes should fly as far inland as possible and cover as many cities as possible. It might be particularly important to cover the city of Sian as this is reported to be designated as the Chinese Communist capital in the event of the outbreak of a general war. Such leaflets should carry the implicit message that they might have been bombs rather than leaflets. The impact of such a message upon the Chinese people should be carefully estimated by persons conversant with the Chinese background and the present situation.

7. The message should be carefully coordinated by individuals aware of the content of the United Nations' and United States' policy and individuals familiar with Chinese culture and capable of evaluating Chinese reactions. It would be necessary to see that the translation into appropriate dialects was undertaken by individuals capable of dealing with the nuances both of the policy and of the Chinese idiom.

8. An important consideration is as to the precise result to be achieved by such an air drop. To gain maximum advantage it should be planned and executed not merely to create dismay and dissatisfaction among the Chinese people but also to focus their dismay and dissatisfaction in such a way as to bear upon the conduct of the Chinese Communist rulers.

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