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COPY NO. 44

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington, D. C.

9 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Walter B. Smith
Director of Central Intelligence

Subject: Draft Psychological Strategy for Southeast Asia

Pursuant to the Board's decision of December 18, 1952, regarding completion of pending planning projects, I enclose a copy of the draft of Psychological Strategy for Southeast Asia for consideration by the Psychological Strategy Board on January 15, 1953.

In order to meet the Board's deadline, it has proved necessary to curtail the usual period for co-ordination of agency and PSB staff comments on the panel draft. Some changes are therefore to be expected in the present text, and if any agreed revisions are received before January 15, 1953, they will be transmitted to the Board as corrigenda to the basic paper. I hope, therefore, that by the time of the Board meeting, the paper will be in such shape as to permit at least approval in principle.

It is my feeling that if time had permitted, a more succinct and better-integrated plan would have furnished more useful guidance. On the other hand, it is evident that the panel, in addition to supplying a wealth of illustrative suggestions for subsequent implementation-planning, has constructively clarified some of the problems of psychological strategy which have hitherto impeded U. S. operations in Southeast Asia. If the Board ratifies the panel's work, it will thus permit a swift development of U. S. psychological programs in a critical area.

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of the enclosure, and that access to it be restricted on a need-to-know basis.

Director

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Enclosure:

PSB D-23, Psychological Strategy 44
for Southeast Asia, Copy No. _____

NSC review(s) completed.

Identical Memo Prepared
for:
Deputy Secretary W.C. Foster
Under Secretary D.K.E. Bruce
Mr. W. Averell Harriman

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
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY

for

SOUTHEAST ASIA

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APPENDIX A - PSYCHOLOGICAL CIRCUMSTANCES



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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY

for

SOUTHEAST ASIA

SECTION I

PROBLEM

To develop basic direction for U.S. psychological activities in and pertaining to Southeast Asia.

SECTION II

AREA DEFINITION

This plan interprets the term "Southeast Asia" to include Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

SECTION III

APPLICABLE APPROVED U.S. POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES

A. POLICIES

*prom. U.S. int. in SE Asia
Philippines*
NSC 48/5, 84/2, 98/1, 124/2

B. OBJECTIVES (As set forth in NSC 124/2)

"To prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the communist orbit, and to assist them to develop the will and ability to resist communism from within and without and to contribute to the strengthening of the free world."

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5 January 1953SECTION IVANALYSISA. ASSUMPTIONS

1. The USSR and Communist China will continue to present a serious threat to the U.S. and the free world interests in Southeast Asia.
2. Sufficient time is available to intensify present, and to undertake additional psychological operations which will assist in attaining U.S. objectives in the area.
3. In the event of identifiable Chinese Communist oppression in Southeast Asia, responsible Government agencies will implement courses of action set forth in NSC 124/2.

B. CONDITIONING FACTORS

1. Communist domination of Southeast Asia, whether as a consequence of identifiable Chinese Communist aggression or of successful communist subversion, would:
 - a. In general, seriously jeopardize fundamental U.S. and Western interests; and
 - b. In particular, make it extremely difficult for Japan and India to resist eventual accommodation to communism.
2. The military, geographic, and political strength of Communist China, which has the capability of conquering mainland Southeast Asia through aggression, will provide the strategic shield and psychological impetus for the continuance of the cold war in Southeast Asia through:
 - a. Internal subversion;
 - b. Military action by indigenous communist elements assisted and logistically supported by Communist China; and
 - c. Political warfare, including the encouragement of extreme nationalist, neutralist, and anti-colonialist sentiments.

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3. Therefore, developments in and concerning China are important in the execution of Western courses of action in:
 - a. Mainland Southeast Asia; and
 - b. Such areas as India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Formosa, and Japan, whose security would be seriously threatened by communist domination of mainland Southeast Asia.
4. Psychological activities in Southeast Asia must at all times consider the fact of Soviet-directed Communist Chinese undercover interference in the area, and efforts must be made to reduce, or at least counteract that interference. In addition, it must be considered constantly that Chinese Communist overt armed aggression against Southeast Asia is a possibility, and steps must be taken to dissuade the Chinese Communist leaders from initiating such aggression. This latter action should comprise active efforts to prevent Soviet pressure on Communist Chinese leaders for overt military moves into Southeast Asia, and, also, the developing of psychological deterrents aimed at the Chinese leaders themselves. To this end, it is essential that with regard to Southeast Asia mutual distrust between the Kremlin and Chinese Communist leaders be developed and intensified, that free nation determination to resist communist aggression in Southeast Asia be strengthened, and that the flanking position of Formosa be exploited to discourage Communist Chinese military adventure to the southward. *how?*
5. In solving the Southeast Asian psychological problem, U.S. psychological effort alone will not be sufficient. It is important that the U.S., British, and French psychological efforts be made mutually reinforcing. In addition, it is necessary that strong support, to the maximum extent possible, for the U.S. psychological effort in Southeast Asia be developed in and drawn from the South Asian nations, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Nationalist China.
6. Effective psychological activities in Southeast Asia will require the arousing of the peoples, and where necessary the governments, of that

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area to the undesirability and actual danger of further communist advances in Southeast Asia; the bringing of the peoples and governments of Southeast Asian countries into increasingly active resistance to communism in all of its aspects; and the procuring of the wherewithal necessary for effectively resisting the communist psychological attack on Southeast Asia.

7. U.S. Government operations in Southeast Asia must take into account several important psychological factors (See Appendix A -- Favorable and Adverse Psychological Circumstances). Many elements in Southeast Asian populations fail to recognize the need for foreign aid, and such elements tend to view U.S. economic assistance with attitudes varying from skepticism to distrust. Foreign pressures of any kind designed to bring about changes in the present activities or attitudes of Southeast Asian nations are resented and resisted. Thus, the intense nationalism of the people and their deep suspicion of any activities by western nations impose stringent limitations on the number of U.S. personnel who can be utilized to advantage and on the nature of the work they can do. There exists a point of diminishing return. Serious consideration must be given, in planning any additional projects for individual countries in Southeast Asia, to their probable effect on the over-all program of the U.S. in the country in question and in the area as a whole. It is generally agreed that in certain Southeast Asian capitals there are too many Americans at high salaries living in a way that contrasts harshly with local standards. It is probable that new projects involving the assignment of American personnel should be considered only as old ones are phased out, thus permitting the new undertaking to be introduced, when approved, without increase of personnel. Rather, emphasis should be placed on developing programs which utilize indigenous personnel. The position of the American Ambassador as chief representative of the U.S. in a given country, and his primary responsibility for coordination of U.S. activities, should be taken into account in all planning of psychological strategy programs.

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1. The over-all U.S. program in Southeast Asia comprises the following fields of activity: political, propaganda and cultural, economic and technical assistance, and military assistance. These activities operate principally through and under the general supervision of the U.S. diplomatic and consular missions and posts in each country.

2. Political Activities - U.S. diplomatic and consular personnel in Southeast Asia, supported by the prestige of the American Government, exert considerable influence upon officials and others who are in a position to affect the actions of the governments in the area. Our representatives, through their official and private contacts, continually strive to forward the foreign policy objectives of the American Government, including most of those stated in the present paper. In general, our diplomatic efforts in Southeast Asia during the past year have resulted in a continuing improvement in our relations in the area as well as in our strategic position vis-a-vis the communist bloc.

3. Propaganda and Cultural Activities - In Southeast Asia, U.S. propaganda agencies, operating through the usual programs of exchange of persons, information media, etc., work toward the following policy objectives:

a. To expose the Communist imperialist threat to the area; to identify this threat with the Vietminh, the Associated States and with the Huks in the Philippines; and to strengthen the will to resist Communist influence in any form.

b. To strengthen the confidence of the peoples in their own governments, and to awaken them to the necessity for an informed politically active citizenry for the development and/or maintenance of popular democratic institutions.

c. To endeavor to enhance the prestige of the National Government on Formosa in the eyes of overseas Chinese and others in Southeast Asia, by pointing out progress made in economic, educational and other fields;

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to assist, in appropriate ways, the Chinese National Government in its efforts to achieve more active cooperative relations with overseas Chinese communities in the information field.

d. To explain the nature of the Korean conflict, its implications for Southeast Asia, and the Asian as well as the American contribution to the United Nations action against the Communist aggressor.

e. To explain the nature of the struggle in the Associated States and Malaya, and the relation of these struggles to that in Korea -- the defense of the free world against the Communists.

f. To explain American aid to the area -- economic, technical, and military -- and reasons therefor: to strengthen the economy and security of the region within the free world; and to create, where necessary, an atmosphere favorable to the reception of U.S. military aid.

g. To assure the people and governments of the area that the U.S. has no imperialistic designs; that the American people are genuinely interested in their welfare and progress.

h. To strengthen the American reputation for honesty and fair dealing, sometimes involving direct or indirect refutation of Communist lies about the U.S. and its motives and actions.

i. To manifest respect for and genuine interest in the cultures of Southeast Asia, and to acquaint Asian peoples with, and foster corresponding interest in, American culture.

j. To encourage among the countries of the area mutual understanding of their national aims and common problems, and cooperation with each other and with the rest of the free world in seeking to attain those aims.

K. To explain U.S. policy toward Japan; the importance of assuring a secure and independent Japan; to create a favorable atmosphere for the increasing resumption of normal relations between Japan and Southeast Asian countries, including mutually advantageous trade; to create confidence in Japan, understanding of her need to rearm; and to explain her

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potential contributions to the security and economic progress of the entire area.

l. To cooperate, as appropriate and feasible, with British, French and national governments' information services.

m. To expose to overseas Chinese communities the true nature of the Chinese Communist regime, its subservience to Moscow, its denial and destruction of all intrinsic Chinese values.

n. To encourage the development of anti-Beiping movements among Chinese and other national groups.

Within the last year or two, there has been a growing tendency to work more closely with indigenous individuals and organizations, stimulating and assisting them to carry on activities -- writing, speaking, publishing, etc. -- which strengthen those of the U.S. program. Influence in this regard, though indirect, is steadily growing.

It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of this program but it can be fairly said that the propaganda and cultural activities have played an important role in exposing the falsities of communist propaganda and increasing understanding of and sympathy with the policies and aims of the U.S. and the free world. This is particularly true in Burma and the Philippines. The work of the USIS libraries and related activities, film shows and the Exchange of Persons program are generally regarded as the most effective attributed media in this area.

4. Economic and Technical Assistance - Southeast Asia was included in the U.S. foreign aid program only as late as mid-1950, with but a very few exports and commodities actually reaching the recipient countries before mid-1951. Because the funds earmarked for economic and technical assistance to the area are limited, such funds have been committed to produce improvements at carefully selected, particularly neuralgic spots in the socio-economic structures of the countries concerned. Despite the relatively small dollar amounts involved, some results are beginning to emerge, such as: large

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areas have been sprayed with DDT; scientific and professional apparatus has been procured for hospitals, laboratories, and agricultural research stations; equipment and U.S. instructors have been provided for technical schools; a few hundred Southeast Asians have received intensive specialized training in the U.S. Expressed in purely economic terms the impact of the two-year old program is still small, of course, but the great potential importance of U.S. aid for modernization of the area is increasingly recognized, if not yet by the people at large, at least by many technical and economic experts and by political leaders and officials in the various fields concerned. Expressed in more general terms, the technical assistance program has stimulated interest in self-improvement, which development, if encouraged and perused, can be of major importance.

5. Military Assistance - Joint Army-Navy-Air Force MAAGs are operating in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indochina. The MAAG in Indonesia consists of Army personnel only. There are no MAAGs in Burma and Malaya, though the British maintain a service mission in the former and armed forces in the latter. With respect to Indochina, the U.S. is providing from 30 to 40 percent of the total cost of the war. In addition to military materiel and technical assistance in the area, training of indigenous military personnel is being conducted in the U.S.

D. GENERAL GUIDANCE

NSC 124/2, prepared in cognizance of the Assumptions, Conditioning Factors, and Present Psychological Program summarized above, delineates the courses of action or missions best calculated to achieve our over-all national objective -- "to prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the Communist orbit, and to assist them to develop the will and ability to resist Communism from within and without and to contribute to the strengthening of the free world."

This NSC envisages two situations, one actual and one potential. So long as the Chinese Communists do not shift their strategy from unrelenting

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cold war tactics to overt aggression, our most effective strategy is to continue present U.S. efforts, including military and economic assistance to appropriate countries of Southeast Asia, and to initiate or increase overt and covert psychological programs designed to weaken or eliminate the psychological appeal of Communism to the peoples of Southeast Asia in order, thereby, to contribute to the support of non-Communist governments and to increase sympathy toward U.S. objectives on the part of the governments and peoples. In the event the Chinese Communists do exercise their strategic initiative and invade mainland Southeast Asia, we will have laid the maximum groundwork consistent with our current major policy objectives, and will have in the area our maximum capabilities and resources.

The following strategic concept will be governing:

a. Because of the existing vulnerability of mainland Southeast Asia (especially Indochina and Burma), the initial main psychological effort shall be made there, to encourage the greatest possible increase in the will and capability effectively to resist Communism from within and without. So long as the non-Communist governments of those countries show reasonable prospects of survival and continue non-Communist in orientation the weight of our psychological programs (official and non-official) shall be directed toward, be in support of, and, where possible, be in cooperation with those governments and the majority groups. At the same time, the necessary groundwork should be laid, under the provisions of NSC 10/5 or 10/2, for the development of a covert program in support of U.S. objectives capable of early activation in case of need, provided, however, that due regard is given to the maintenance of good relations with those existing governments and majority groups.

b. The strategic and psychological importance of both Indonesia and the Philippines is such that psychological effort toward promoting their stability and free world orientation should also be strengthened.

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SECTION VPSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVESA. WITH REGARD TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

1. To assist the peoples and governments of Southeast Asia to develop concerted and active resistance to communism in all its aspects.
2. To develop popular support for and internal stability of the indigenous non-communist governments of Southeast Asia.
3. To increase the internal security of the countries of Southeast Asia.
4. To generate among the peoples of Southeast Asia an awareness:
 - a. That Chinese Communist and Soviet imperialism is incompatible with nationalism and independence;
 - b. That the peoples of Southeast Asia must develop a will to resist such imperialism individually and collectively;
 - c. That the countries of Southeast Asia cannot solve their problems by pursuing strictly nationalist and neutralist policies alone; and
 - d. That the countries of Southeast Asia can best develop national security, political stability, and economic strength by cooperating with other countries in the area and in the free world.
5. To generate among the peoples of Southeast Asia the conviction:
 - a. That U.S. aim is peace;

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- b. That if war is provoked by the Soviet, it will be fought energetically and successfully by the U.S. in the interest of all free nations; and
- c. That victory against communism is inevitable.
6. To avoid the antagonism toward the United States which is generated by forcing official, public professions of anti-communism and pro-Americanism from Southeast Asian governments.
7. To allay Southeast Asian fears that U.S. aid is basically a device to insure American political or economic hegemony; strengthening conviction that U.S. concern with and support for Southeast Asia, while motivated in part by U.S. own interests in world peace and economic progress, are nevertheless also in part the result of traditional U.S. sympathy for struggling nations and deep-seated sentimental urge to render help and improve living conditions.
8. To encourage Southeast Asian belief that U.S. assistance is of vital technical importance -- regardless of political aspects -- for fulfillment of national aspirations and transformation of young, less developed nations into strong modern states.
9. To develop confidence throughout the area in U.S. and U.N. subjective willingness and objective capability to continue support, especially economic support, beyond immediate future.
10. To encourage dependence upon and responsible participation in the United Nations by the nations of Southeast Asia.
11. To develop a U.S. policy for China designed to reduce the power of Communist China, and achieving maximum U.N. support for that policy.
12. To promote and develop Formosa as an effective Chinese rallying point; and, in this connection, to increase Chiang Kai-Shek's and the Nationalist Government's prestige in the area.
13. To allay Southeast Asian fear, wherever it may exist, that with U.S. help Japan might grow from a useful and cooperative member of the Far Eastern

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group into a new economic or political threat to the nations dominated by Japan during World War II.

14. To encourage development of Japanese trade with countries of South-east Asia so as to utilize Japanese industrial capacity and skills to facilitate the economic development of these countries as a bulwark against communist aggression.

15. To reduce to a minimum Soviet Bloc economic influence in Southeast Asia.

16. To weaken and eventually to eliminate communist activities in and concerning the area by all means available, including, but not restricted to, the following:

a. Strict control, and ultimately elimination, of communist and communist-front mass demonstrations.

b. Harassment, restriction, and ultimately elimination, of the printing, sale, and distribution of Soviet, Cominform, Communist Chinese, and local communist literature of all sorts.

c. Prevention of use by the communists of other domestic information media.

d. Drying up of communist party income derived from local sources in Southeast Asian countries, especially income derived from commercial firms dealing with the Soviet Union, its European Satellites, and Communist China, and income derived through contributions from local business enterprises of any sort.

e. Elimination of illegal movement and caching of weapons and other military and para-military supplies.

f. Effective strengthening and enforcement of existing measures toward military security, including measures to prevent communist sabotage.

g. Nullification of communist merchant shipping, and merchant shipping, under the flags of non-communist nations that in any way supports the communists.

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- h. Protection of individuals against communist threats, intimidation, blackmail, and retaliation.
 - i. Elimination of communist influence in government and autonomous agencies in the fields of defense, internal security, public information, education, and economy.
 - j. Elimination from key positions of members of communist and communist-front organizations.
 - k. Development of anti-communist pressure groups, particularly those of youth, agriculture, labor, women, the intellectuals, and religion to force a general anti-communist stand in military, economic, political, and psychological fields.
 - 1. Deviation of great numbers of persons from the communist party and destruction of communist-front organizations.
 - m. Discrediting of communist, communist-front, and communist-supported propaganda and political organizations.
 - n. Discrediting and harassment of business firms and individuals doing business with communism.
 - o. Development of aggressive indigenous anti-communist propaganda.
 - p. Discrediting of the fear of communist strength and further communist successes.
 - 2. Destruction of communist military and guerrilla forces operating in Southeast Asian countries.
- B. WITH REGARD TO THE FREE WORLD
- 1. To intensify over-all free nation psychological resistance to advances of communism in Southeast Asia.
 - 2. To strengthen the conviction among the peoples of the free world of the strategic and psychological importance of Southeast Asia to the free world.
 - 3. To encourage colonial powers to grant, and to advertise widely the granting of all prerogatives of self-government consistent with physical security.

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4. To impress upon the former colonial powers that the U.S. does not desire to supplant them in their privileged positions in their respective former colonies.

5. To further understanding on the part of our Allies that U.S. commitments in Southeast Asia presents heavy burdens accepted out of a sense of responsibility rather than with an eye on specific economic or political advantages to be obtained by the U.S. at the expense of friendly powers.

6. To achieve the highest possible unity among U.N. nations regarding action and policy in Southeast Asia or in other matters of importance to Southeast Asia.

7. To intensify overt and covert U.S.-Allies cooperative activity in economic, political, and other matters concerning Southeast Asia where possible to do so without adverse effects in Southeast Asia.

C. WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET BLOC

1. To discourage any Soviet pressure on Communist China for further interference in Southeast Asia.

2. To decrease the effectiveness of Soviet-directed communist interference in Southeast Asia.

3. To dissuade Chinese Communist leaders from increased interference or overt aggression in Southeast Asia.

SECTION VI

PSYCHOLOGICAL UNDERTAKINGS

A. WITH REGARD TO SOUTHEAST ASIA AS A WHOLE:

1. In general, exploit the favorable, and counter the adverse psychological circumstances listed in Appendix A.

2. Develop pro-U.S. and anti-communist action cadres of indigenous Southeast Asian personnel to operate in political, informational, economic, and military fields. Unless the local governments should cease to be

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non-communist, however, the major consideration should be to take no action that would involve serious risk of alienating the local governments.

3. Continue to explore with other nations, including at least France, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, means to ensure that Communist China remain in no doubt regarding the grave consequences of Chinese aggression against Southeast Asia.

4. Encourage and promote bilateral and multilateral mutual assistance agreements.

5. Display U.S. naval and air strength in Southeast Asian countries when such display is consistent with the existing political situation and with normal operations schedules, as a gesture of friendship and to quell fear of and tendency to accommodate to communism.

6. Encourage and assist Southeast Asian groups (e.g., Buddhists, Moslems, craftsmen, and intelligensia) in actions which strengthen and gain prestige for their basically anti-communist heritages. Such encouragement and assistance should be primarily by unofficial means, although dignified official publicity can be given to such events as the convocation of the Sixth Great Buddhist Council.

7. Expand exchange and other cultural programs along existing lines but with increased emphasis on:

a. Establishment of informal as well as formal contacts with indigenous intellectuals through the use of both U.S. and other Western 'cultural emissaries,' official and unofficial.

b. Encouragement of exchange and other cultural contacts between nations within the area (e.g., Philippine-Indonesian contacts), between the area and suitable elements in other Asian nations such as Japan and India, and above all, between the area and anti-communist elements in Western Europe.

c. Stimulation of indigenous writing, publication and scholarship along suitable ideological lines within the area, particularly some development of Formosa as an ideological and cultural base.

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- d. Translation into English and appropriate distribution and publicity in the U.S. and the free world of representative indigenous works of literature, folklore, and songs; and exhibitions of indigenous art in the U.S. and other countries of the free world.
- e. Making available both in English and in indigenous languages, as cheaply as possible, serious U.S. and Western books and periodical literature of an ideologically appropriate nature.
- f. Stimulation of greater interest and inventiveness in adapting Western science and technology to the requirements, resources and cultural patterns of the area.
- g. Exploitation of private agencies, organizations and individuals, indigenous, Western, international and U.S., to promote the objectives of the plan in the cultural, political and development fields.
8. Encourage by all possible means the non-communist orientation of overseas Chinese groups, for example, by the recruiting of anti-communist teachers, by lending support to projects to send overseas Chinese students to Formosan universities for higher education, and by influencing overseas Chinese to refrain from trading with and sending remittances to the communist mainland. While the government on Formosa should be held up as the center and symbol of Chinese resistance to communism, the identification of overseas Chinese with the country of residence, and their support for non-communist local governments, should be encouraged at all times.
9. Insofar as possible, improve the quality of U.S. representatives (and their families) in Southeast Asian countries by careful selection, indoctrination, training, and discharges or transfers as necessary.
10. Improve U.S. indoctrinational methods and intensity and increase the numbers of indigenous Southeast Asians indoctrinated in the U.S. by augmenting the number of Southeast Asians visiting the U.S. in "Exchange of Persons" programs, including Southeast Asian military personnel as practicable.
11. Whenever and wherever practicable, persuade Southeast Asian

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governments to take legislative, administrative, military and police actions which will, in every possible way, result in harassment, restriction and ultimately destruction of communist influence and activity of every sort in Southeast Asia; and seek such results either by supporting actions of the governments of Southeast Asia or by independent action.

12. Through public utterances of officials, official correspondence and contacts with members of Congress, make clear to the American people the importance of Southeast Asia to the security of the U.S. and encourage U.S. allies to take similar action so that all the peoples of the free world may be psychologically prepared for any courses of action taken in implementation of this plan.

B. WITH REGARD TO INDOCHINA

1. Build up faith of indigenous population that communist aggression ultimately will be defeated by the joint efforts of French and Associated States' forces supported by U.S. economic-military aid.

2. Instill the idea into the local population that U.S. economic aid will contribute toward their efforts to restore their war-torn economies.

3. Continue military aid to the French and Associated States on a high priority basis with a view towards the Associated States assuming a constantly increasing share of the burden of their own defense.

4. Commence talks with high-level French officials designed to reach agreement on the desirability of U.S. development of the political and resistance potential among selected nationalist groups, and implement such positive agreements as are reached.

5. In the event positive agreements with the French are not reached, cultivate and train, and develop united action among indigenous leaders and groups who can be counted on actively to fight communist subversion, sabotage and invasion and, in an emergency, form the nuclei of organized political and military resistance forces. However, the major consideration should be to take no action that would involve serious risk of alienating the governments of France or of the Associated States.

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6. Identify U.S. support as on the side of true nationalism.
7. Identify Viet Minh as acting in subservience to the interests of a foreign power rather than in accordance with the national interests of the Indochinese.
8. Assist in inducing defections among the Viet Minh.
9. Increase popular support for the governments of the Associated States, by publicizing the facts that:
 - a. Alternative would be Chinese domination;
 - b. Associated States already have a large measure of independence including:
 - (1) Membership in U.N. bodies;
 - (2) National armies; and
 - (3) Other attributes of national sovereignty.
10. Take appropriate steps to develop the military, economic, and political strength of the indigenous governments and to have the French promote the growth of stable independent governments by providing more effective political, economic, military and social guidance.
11. Exert every effort to have the Associated States recognized and accepted by other non-communist countries and by the United Nations.

C. WITH REGARD TO THAILAND

1. Continue to assist the Government of Thailand in maintaining and improving internal security, in becoming a stabilizing force in Southeast Asia, and in maintaining its alignment with the free world.
2. Develop in Thailand the belief that U.N. (U.S.) growth in strength will deter further communist aggression.
3. Without making commitment, maintain Thai belief that U.S. will render assistance to Thailand in the event that an aggression is committed against her.
4. Utilize tactfully the demonstrated willingness of the strongly anti-communist Thai Government to cooperate with the U.S.

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5. Cultivate and train, and develop united action among indigenous leaders and groups who can be counted on actively to fight communist subversion, sabotage, and invasion and, in an emergency, form the nuclei of organized political and military resistance forces. Unless the Thai Government should cease to be non-communist, however, the major consideration should be to take no action that would involve serious risk of alienating the Thai Government.

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D. WITH REGARD TO BURMA

1. Promote increased stabilization of, and public support for, the present or a similar successor government by:
 - a. Developing a greater will and capacity on the part of that government and people for resistance to internal subversion and external aggression; and
 - b. Continuing assistance in economic rehabilitation and development of the national resources.
2. Create within the government and among the rank-and-file of the people a feeling friendly to the U.S. and the West and antipathetic to the Communist world.
3. Take appropriate steps to encourage the Burmese Government to cooperate fully with the anti-communist nations.
4. Develop united action and cooperation among indigenous, anti-communist groups in Burma to resist communist encroachments. Make preparations for the establishment of guerrilla forces among suitable ethnic groups for possible use against the communists. Unless the Burmese Government should cease to be non-communist, however, the major consideration should be to take no action that would involve serious risk of alienating the Burmese Government.

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5. Prepare to give unofficial assistance (and seek opportunities for such) when requested by the Burmese Government in matters where an open request is not feasible.
6. Be prepared to furnish to Burma any military equipment and supplies needed to complement that being furnished by the British.
7. Through all practicable means reduce and destroy the capabilities and potential of indigenous communists.
8. Promote belief of Burmese in the capacity of their moderate leaders to continue meeting national problems, and, with U.S. financial and technical assistance, to achieve economic progress.
9. Allay fear that cooperation with U.S. might involve country in open conflict with Communist China; and, at the same time, weaken gradually Burmese faith in the concept of neutralism as a practicable proposition, not by requiring public declarations contrary to policy of neutrality, but rather by emphasizing that U.S. respects Burma's independence.
10. Alleviate the fears of the Burmese regarding Nationalist Chinese troops in Burma and alleged U.S. support for those troops.
11. Maintain continued consultation and cooperation with the British Government in connection with developments in Burma; especially the matter of military assistance.
12. Attempt to arouse the Burmese (and Indian) governments to the dangers of Chinese Communist expansion and to the need for effective military defense against it, including coordinated military action with other Southeast Asian countries.
13. Increase information and economic assistance programs in Burma which will have maximum short-term favorable impact upon the Burmese people and government.

E. WITH REGARD TO MALAYA

1. Give moral and, where possible, appropriate materiel and technical support to the British in their efforts to:

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- a. Suppress and destroy the terrorist guerrilla action now actively and effectively being sponsored, supported, and conducted by Chinese Communists.
 - b. Destroy the attitude of tolerance to communism prevalent among the Chinese population by exposing the true nature of the communist menace.
 - c. Conduct effective military operations designed to eradicate the communist guerrilla forces and effective psychological operations designed to influence the Malaysians to recognize and oppose communist imperialism.
 - d. Educate and influence the Malaysians toward acceptance of and cooperation with U.N. aims in the Far East and towards distrust, fear, and hatred of Soviet aims.
 - e. Curtail and eventually terminate all shipments of strategic materials (particularly rubber and tin) to Soviet Bloc countries in Asia without destroying the economic stability of Malaya.
 - f. Establish a more even political and economic balance between the races of Malaya and a greater economic diversity in the country as a whole.
 - g. Stimulate interest in self-government and construct a firm foundation on which future self-government can be based by (a) developing and strengthening moderate local political groups, and (b) educating the population in both the techniques and the advantages of self-government.
 - h. Develop and strengthen labor groups, groups within the Chinese communities, and other organizations in order to deny these elements to the communists and to elicit their support for Western policy.
 - i. Create greater racial harmony in Malaya as an essential to Malaysian unity and eventual nationhood.
 - j. Convince the population that communist guerrillas can and will be defeated and internal peace restored.
2. Make clear that the U.S. is sympathetic to the British in Malaya, not out of predilection for "colonialism," but because British presence and

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political, economic, and social experience are essential for the country, which is presently split into antagonistic racial groups and faced with economic disruption caused by small, but active, subversive elements.

3. Foster impression among the peoples that the U.S. is not prejudiced against any of the rival ethnical groups (Malays, Chinese, Indians), but is interested only in their improved cooperation for the common good of all the peoples of Malaya.

4. Reduce suspicion that U.S. concern for and economic aid (small scale) granted to Malaya is dictated not by any sympathy for that small country but only interest in rubber and tin. Reassure opinion in Malaya on the future rubber and tin policy of the U.S., chief customer of these vital Malay export on the world market.

F. WITH REGARD TO INDONESIA

1. Cooperate with and assist the Indonesian Government in establishing an effective, independent government eliminating the armed dissident groups presently threatening internal security, combatting the subversive activities of foreign powers aimed at the overthrow of Indonesian independence, develop a strong and expanding economy for the benefit of the peoples of Indonesia, and participating in measures which support the security of the area and Indonesian solidarity with the free world.

2. Maintain the confidence of the population in the capacity of moderate leaders: (a) to organize effective administration; (b) to mobilize, with U.S. financial and technical assistance, the country's great potential wealth; and (c) to raise low Indonesian living and educational standards.

3. Influence Indonesian public opinion away from tolerant acceptance of communism as an ideal by exposing it as a threat to hard-won Indonesian national independence.

4. Counter the present tendency to suspect the U.S. of imperialistic motives in its relations with Indonesia, allaying the suspicion that the U.S. is bent on pressuring the strategic island republic into open alignment with the West and, at the same time, undermining Indonesian belief in

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neutrality as a practical long-range proposition.

5. Convince Indonesian leaders and people that their own self-interest dictates their cooperation with the free world and U.N. organizations.

6. Cultivate and train, and develop united action among indigenous leaders and groups who can be counted on actively to fight communist subversion, sabotage, and invasion and, in an emergency, form the nuclei of organized political and military resistance forces. Unless the Indonesian Government should cease to be non-communist, however, the major consideration should be to take no action that would involve serious risk of alienating the Indonesian Government.

7. Neutralize the efforts of Communist China to use Chinese minority groups for their own purpose; and turn these groups toward support of non-communist objectives.

8. Encourage Indonesian leaders and people to continue negotiations with the Dutch for a peaceful solution of the New Guinea dispute, but not in such a manner as to give the impression that the U.S. had assumed a position on the issue.

9. Convince leaders and masses that the U.S., which supported Indonesia in her struggle for independence, has no intention of substituting U.S. indirect domination for Dutch colonialism.

10. Promote better understanding, at least among leading Indonesians, for U.S. rubber and tin price policy.

11. Encourage hope, to the extent that it can be reasonably justified, that Indonesia will be able to secure from the West, including Japan, increasing quantities of urgently desired capital goods.

12. Treat with understanding, patience and mature forbearance the convictions of neutrality on the part of Indonesian leaders, making it clear that the U.S. respects the independence of their country and believes that the best interests of such independence will be served by Indonesia remaining outside the Soviet Bloc.

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1. Encourage and assist the Philippine Government and people to increase the internal strength and security of the country by:

a. Developing a strong indigenous political and military leadership;

b. Improving the moral fiber, the governmental efficiency, and the national economy by:

(1) Increasing civic responsibility and standards of public morality.

(2) Creating realization that the Philippine people themselves have primary responsibility for solution of their problems and cannot always look to the United States for relief from economic difficulties

(3) Continuing the development of democratic institutions and insistence on free and honest elections.

(4) Carrying out of recommendations of the "Bell Report," particularly in the fields of landholdings and labor laws.

c. Assisting in the establishment of an honest and efficient government dedicated to:

(1) Making the Philippines a showcase of democracy in the Far East; and

(2) Eliminating the appeal and strength of the communist-dominated Hukbalahap movement.

d. Encouraging the cessation of anti-Chinese discrimination by the Philippine Government in order to assimilate the Chinese minority and encouraging Chinese cooperation with the government. At the same time, persuading the Philippine peoples that the Chinese community is an asset to the nation and the repressive measures against its members are unwise; and

e. Developing among the Philippine people full support for continued effective campaign against the Hukbalahaps.

2. Assist the Philippines in developing her anti-communist leadership potential among the nations in Southeast Asia.

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3. Continue to encourage the military leadership of the Philippine armed forces to develop their forces as a defensive and potential offensive weapon against communist aggression.

4. Create in Philippine minds a psychological awareness of the desirability of accepting and ratifying the Japanese Peace Treaty, the Bases and Military Assistance agreements, and of recognizing the Associated States of Indochina.

5. Encourage acceptance of Japan's reentry into the family of nations and, insofar as possible, create a desire for economic cooperation and collective security with Japan.

H. WITH REGARD TO COMMUNIST CHINA

1. Decrease the effectiveness of present Chinese Communist interference in Southeast Asia by:

- a. Convincing Communist Chinese leaders and the Kremlin that this interference will, in the long run, be unprofitable;
- b. Overtly and covertly attacking this interference at its source, and enroute to and in Southeast Asia;
- c. Overtly and covertly exposing, where consistent with U.S. and Allied intelligence interests, the nature, extent, and specific instances of this interference;
- d. Developing increasing economic pressures on Communist China which will result in burdensome economic requests by that nation on the USSR (to assist in accomplishing the psychological undertakings stated in paragraph VI, R. 1, below).

2. Prevent increase of Chinese Communist interference in Southeast Asia by:

- a. Developing, whenever and wherever possible, with regard to Southeast Asia, Sino-Soviet friction, divergence of purpose, and conflict of action;
- b. Instilling doubts in the minds of the Chinese Communist leaders

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regarding the true Soviet interest and purpose in the Southeast Asian situation, and fear for the safety of Chinese national interests. (For instance, increase of Chinese Communist pressure on Southeast Asia might be prevented, were Communist Chinese leaders to suspect that greater occupation on their part with that area might allow the Soviet freedom of action for further predatory moves against Manchuria, Sinkiang and the controlling ports of North China);

c. Convincing the Chinese Communist leaders that there will be determined U.N. resistance to further communist interference in Southeast Asia, which in high probability will result in U.N. counteractions which will cause irreparable damage to their own national interests and possibly complete loss by them of their control over the Chinese peoples.

3. Dissuade Communist Chinese leaders from overt military adventure in Southeast Asia by:

a. Weakening the political, economic, and moral strengths upon which their external military capabilities depend. Specifically, by actions which will increase internal difficulties for the Chinese Communist regime, such as those:

- (1) Augmenting existing and creating new political, economic, and psychological confusions and dissatisfactions in Communist China;
- (2) Intensifying determination among the peoples of mainland China to resist Communist Chinese regimentation;
- (3) Inciting and increasing hatred in the minds of Chinese people for their present rulers, identifying those rulers as responsible for all of the difficulties of the Chinese people and as subservient to the interests of a foreign power rather than to the national interest of China;
- (4) Convincing the Chinese peoples that the conduct of their communist rulers is isolating China from the society of decent nations (presenting always to the peoples of Communist China the proposition that their entry into the community of nations is dependent upon national good behavior and reliable guarantees of peaceful intention);

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(5) Maintaining hope that a free China, including Formosa and Manchuria, will finally be re-established, and that U.S. economic and technical assistance of the type now being given to Southeast Asia will be available to a truly independent China.

(6) Encouraging expectation that U.S., now promoting Japanese-Southeast Asia mutually profitable trade, will also sponsor resumption of vital trade between Japan and a China having regained true sovereignty; at the same time, allaying fear that U.S. may sponsor Japan as a dominating power in the Far East.

b. Convincing Chinese Communist leaders that overt military aggression against Southeast Asia would be met by Western counter-military action of unacceptable magnitude, would require economic and military assistance beyond that which the Soviet Union is prepared to give, and would result in irreparable damage to China's national interests.

c. Keeping Chinese Communist military, political, economic, and moral strengths unsettled and dispersed by overt and covert operations.

d. Increasing in the minds of Chinese Communist leaders, the political, military, and economic risk for Communist China of overt military aggression against Southeast Asia by increasing and exploiting psychological and military strength factors inherent in Formosa.

4. In the event of identifiable Chinese Communist aggression against Southeast Asia take appropriate military action against Communist China as part of U.N. collective action or in conjunction with France and the United Kingdom and any other friendly governments.

I. WITH REGARD TO FORMOSA

1. Stimulate and assist the Chinese Nationalist Government to develop on Formosa an administration which by its probity and strength can command respect in Southeast Asia.

2. Encourage the Chinese Nationalist Government to increase its anti-communist activities among the overseas Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia.

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3. Discourage the Chinese Nationalist Government from unilateral actions and statements which imply that the U.S. is planning offensive military action against the mainland of China from bases in Southeast Asia and Formosa.

4. Develop Formosa as a Chinese rallying point outside China proper.

In pursuing that end, include the following actions:

a. Continue to discuss with U.S. Allies the resolution of policy problems relating to Nationalist China.

b. By the coordinated control of the scope and pace of U.S. aid programs, utilize the leverage thereby achieved to encourage and assist the Nationalist Government of China in effectuating a thorough reform of its military and political institutions, not only to insure more efficient utilization of aid but also to promote confidence in the government among Chinese outside Formosa.

c. Promote confidence of Nationalist Government and of its military organizations in U.S. intentions to provide them with military assistance by steadily increasing the flow of military supplies and equipment which have been promised for fiscal years 1951 and 1952. Without encouraging belief in an early return to the mainland, focus MAAG training program on building up, as fast as delivery of armaments warrants, sound all-around Nationalist military force capable of either defensive or offensive action.

d. Contact and support suitable guerrilla forces on mainland of China for activation against the communists in the event of aggression.

5. Ensure the internal security of Formosa by developing and maintaining the will and capacity of all Chinese on Formosa to resist communist pressures of any sort.

6. To the extent allowed by political prudence, develop Formosa as a psychological and actual military threat against the South China Coast and as a base for possible future collective action against mainland China.

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8. Improve the morale and combat effectiveness of the Chinese Nationalist military forces.

9. Strengthen the conviction of Formosans that U.S. influence and economic aid will secure steady improvement of their economic situation and socio-political status.

J. WITH REGARD TO JAPAN

1. Encourage the Japanese to feel that their national interests in Southeast Asia and the interest of the U.S. and its allies in that area are compatible and harmonious.

2. Encourage consultation and coordination among the participants of Pacific Security arrangements affecting all participants thus reducing suspicion and fear of steps taken by Japan to secure its own defenses.

3. Assist Japan to become a U.N. member and thereby improve Japan's relations with Southeast Asian countries.

4. Encourage the negotiation and implementation of realistic and mutually beneficial economic agreements and closer trade relations between Japan and Southeast Asian countries.

5. Stimulate expectation that U.S. will continue using its influence to expand Japanese-Southeast Asian trade, while U.S. effort to develop Southeast Asian economy is bound to result in ever larger Southeast Asian markets for Japanese products.

6. Promote political cooperation between Japan and the non-communist countries of Southeast Asia.

K. WITH REGARD TO INDIA

1. Encourage the non-communist government of India to strengthen its ability and determination to resist communist imperialism and to participate in and contribute to the solution of problems arising in Southeast Asia.

2. Persuade public opinion that U.S. efforts to aid Southeast Asia are not aimed at transforming comparatively weak countries of the area into U.S. "satellites" where Indian influence would be more or less excluded.

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3. Develop an attitude in India which would assist the U.S. and its allies to obtain the facilities desired in time of peace or required in the event of war in Southeast Asia and which would cause India to deny such facilities to the Soviet Bloc.

4. Treat with understanding, patience, and mature forbearance the convictions of neutrality on the part of Indian leaders, making it clear that the U.S. respects the independence of their country and believes that the best interests of such independence will be served by India remaining outside the Soviet Bloc.

5. Foster official Indian understanding (1) of parallelism between U.S. and South Asian interests in Southeast Asia; (2) that the loss of Southeast Asia to communism would result in catastrophic deterioration of India's strategic position; and (3) that such a loss, in the long run, can be prevented only through the cooperation of India with the U.S.

6. Encourage the creation of an atmosphere favorable to Indian economic development consistent with U.S. security interest in Southeast Asia.

7. Remove Indian doubts regarding U.S. neutrality in the Western New Guinea dispute and make it clear that the U.S. looks to peaceful negotiations between Indonesia and The Netherlands as the best means for solving the problem.

8. Nourish carefully the increasingly firm stand of the Indian Government against communism within India.

L. WITH REGARD TO PAKISTAN

1. Encourage the non-communist government of Pakistan in its ability and efforts to resist communist imperialism in South and Southeast Asia.

2. Encourage the creation of an atmosphere favorable to Pakistani economic development with regard to Southeast Asia consistent with U.S. security interests in that area.

3. Encourage increased Pakistan participation in, responsibility for, and contribution to the solution of problems arising in Southeast Asia.

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4. Persuade Pakistan opinion that U.S. efforts to aid Southeast Asia are not aimed at transforming comparatively weak countries of the area into U.S. "satellites" where Pakistan influence would be more or less excluded.

5. Foster official Pakistani understanding: (1) of parallelism between U.S. and South Asian interests in Southeast Asia; (2) that the loss of Southeast Asia would result in marked deterioration of Pakistan's strategic position; (3) and that this loss can be prevented only by cooperation of South Asian nations with the U.S.

6. Remove Pakistanian doubts regarding U.S. neutrality in the Western New Guinea dispute and make it clear that the U.S. looks to peaceful negotiations between Indonesia and The Netherlands as the best means for solving the problem.

7. Develop an attitude in Pakistan which would assist the U.S. and its allies to obtain the facilities desired in time of peace or required in the event of war in Southeast Asia and which would cause Pakistan to deny such facilities to the Soviet Bloc.

M. WITH REGARD TO AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

1. Intensify existing Australian and New Zealand disposition to cooperate with the U.S. in all matters concerning Southeast Asia, and encourage their participation in coordinated plans for the economic development of Southeast Asia.

2. Encourage maximum participation, as British Commonwealth representatives and as responsible U.N. member states, in the defense of Southeast Asia in the event of Chinese Communist aggression.

3. Strengthen the realization that the U.S. is neutral in the Dutch-Indonesian dispute regarding Western New Guinea, and is in favor of the solution of the problem by peaceful negotiations between the two parties to the dispute.

N. WITH REGARD TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

1. Reach a resolution of British-U.S. differences on Asian policy as related to Southeast Asian problems. Failing this, make clear to the British

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that, whatever the differences of U.S. and British policy regarding other parts of Asia, basic interests of both in Southeast Asia are similar.

2. Engender British conviction that in spite of ^{the} former negative attitude in some U.S. circles toward "colonialism," U.S. opinion as a whole is now persuaded that British presence in Malaya is advantageous to the free world.

3. Remove any British fear that U.S. economic policy in Southeast Asia is designed, in part, to weaken British position and influence in the area.

4. Seek an agreement with the British on psychological programs for joint or unilateral implementation in Southeast Asia.

5. Seek an agreement with the British (and the French) on actions to be undertaken in the event of certain Southeast Asia exigencies.

6. Continue support of the British program in Malaya.

7. Influence the British to support U.S. policy with regard to any South and Southeast Asian initiative toward regional cooperation.

0. WITH REGARD TO FRANCE

1. Persuade France to carry out in letter and spirit its existing agreements with the Associated States.

2. Fortify French belief that U.S. support in Indochina is due not only to realistic recognition of French responsibility but also to a genuine understanding of the French dilemma and sincere appreciation of French sacrifices in defense of the area.

3. Reassure the French that the U.S. is not scheming to replace French cultural, economic, and political influence in the Associated States, but is merely eager to help the French build the Associated States into strong and vital anti-communist nations.

4. Increase the effectiveness of existing agreements for joint psychological activities in Indochina.

5. Seek a satisfactory agreement with the French (and the British) on actions to be undertaken in the event of Southeast Asian emergency situations.

6. Maintain the will of the French people and the purpose of the French Government to continue to fight communism in Indochina.

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P. WITH REGARD TO THE NETHERLANDS

1. Encourage the Dutch toward implementing a mutually beneficial trade policy with the Indonesians which will strengthen the stability of both the Indonesians and The Netherlands and result in mutual financial benefits.
2. Attain Dutch acceptance of the thesis that any aid they give Indonesians in developing and equipping their internal security forces will redound to Dutch advantage through securing their economic investments.
3. Encourage The Netherlands Government to continue negotiations with Indonesia on the political disposition of New Guinea, but not in such a manner as to give the impression that the U.S. has abandoned its position of neutrality.
4. Persuade The Netherlands Government to make every effort to prevent actions by its subjects which would increase Indonesia's internal security problems.
5. Take measures to soften any Dutch bitterness toward the U.S. in general; and the actively anti-U.S. attitude in many Dutch businessmen and government advisors in Indonesia in particular.

Q. WITH REGARD TO THE WORLD AT LARGE

1. Stimulate awareness and support for programs designed to strengthen and retain the independence of the nations of Southeast Asia.
2. Identify U.S. purposes in Southeast Asia as:
 - a. Based upon desire for peace in a pattern of international responsibility without surrender to Soviet domination.
 - b. Representing the principles of the U.N. and the interests of all free nations rather than the particular interests of the U.S.
3. Identify the communist purpose:
 - a. As seeking the subjugation of the Asian nations to Soviet imperialism.
 - b. As a challenge to the security and independence of all states.
4. Further the belief that U.S.-Southeast Asia policy will benefit

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the world economy by increasing productivity (raw materials) as well as purchasing power (enlarged market for finished and semi-finished goods) of this important and populous area.

5. Maintain alertness to the possibility of increased communist aggression in Southeast Asia and conviction of U.N. (U.S.) will to resist it.

R. WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET UNION

1. Induce the Kremlin to restrain Communist Chinese leaders from increased interference in Southeast Asia. Specifically, by action which will convince the Kremlin that U.N. (U.S.) reaction to greater Chinese Communist intervention in Southeast Asia, (e.g., increased support of the Viet Minh) especially overt military assistance, would result in unacceptable military and economic demands by Communist China upon the USSR, the refusal of which would lead to a weakening of the bonds now holding Communist China in the Soviet orbit.

2. Convince the Soviet leaders that pursuance of their policy of aggression by proxy in Southeast Asia is resulting in increased anti-communist determination on the part of free nations and the extension of that policy would be met by collective economic and military counteraction sufficiently punishing to weaken their global position and which might spark a global war for which they are not yet prepared.

S. WITH REGARD TO SOVIET SATELLITES

1. Reduce the effectiveness of their diplomatic services as agents of Soviet policy in Southeast Asia.

2. Negate the Soviet-directed program for increased communist trade with South and Southeast Asian countries.

3. Encourage comparison between economic aid policy of the U.S. in Southeast Asia and economic exploitation practiced by the USSR in Soviet Bloc countries.

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The Director, Psychological Strategy Board, shall be responsible for continuing coordination, review, and evaluation of this basic plan and departmental and agency supporting plans and operations. The Director, in his discretion, may establish in Washington, D.C., a coordinating panel of interested departments and agencies.

B. SUPPORTING PLANS

Supporting plans prepared by the Department of State, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director for Mutual Security shall be submitted to the Director, Psychological Strategy Board, for review and such coordination as is necessary.

C. LEGISLATIVE

Congressional support for legislation necessary to further the objectives of this plan will be developed by the departments and agencies concerned in accordance with normal programming procedures. In addition, the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board, using the resources of the PSB member departments and agencies and of other departments and agencies of the government, will review other current and proposed legislation which impinges on or importantly affects the strategic psychological objectives of the United States in Southeast Asia. Based on this review, he will recommend such Board action as seems appropriate and desirable in relation to the successful execution of this plan.

D. PUBLIC INFORMATION

Where appropriate, U.S. domestic public information programs in support of the general objectives of this plan will be developed by the member departments and agencies.

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1. General acceptance and admiration for U. N. and its Charter.
Close identification of U. S. with establishment and principles of U. N.
Demonstrated determination (Korean intervention) of U. N. (U.S.) to honor commitments and defend victims of aggression.
2. U. S. reputation as traditional champion of progress, freedom, and anti-colonialism (see, however, paragraph B. 9), with concrete examples of integrity of U. S. belief in democratic and non-colonial processes:
 - a. U. S. development from colonial status to world power and maintenance of historical policy in support of national self-determination;
 - b. Voluntary granting of U. S. of independence to the Philippines;
 - c. Support by the U. S. of return of sovereignty to Japan and U. S. disinterest in imperial aggrandizement as demonstrated by U. S. occupation policies in Japan;
 - d. U. S. assistance given Indonesia in gaining independence.
3. Concrete demonstrations of U. S. friendship, generosity, and desire for peace. Willingness of the U. S. to share its wealth and technical skills as shown by MSA, Point Four, and MAAG programs.
General acceptance of the necessity for raising Asian living standard.
Desire on part of Asians to modernize, and a natural tendency to turn to the U. S. for technological guidance and equipment. The great practical importance of the U. S. foreign aid program for "modernization"

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of Southeast Asia increasingly recognized, if not by Southeast Asian peoples at large, by many Southeast Asian technical and economic experts and political leaders and ranking officials who are actually responsible in their respective countries for national welfare in general or for progress in specific fields (Agriculture, Public Health, Education, Labor, Transportation, Industrialization, etc.)

4. Fact that Kremlin direction and control of apparently indigenous political movements is being revealed by increasing controls and overt participation by Russian and Chinese personnel.

5. Rumors of Chinese Communist oppression emanating from the mainland and from overseas Chinese.

6. Awareness of historical examples of the predatory nature of Chinese imperialism in Southeast Asia and the unpopularity of Chinese generally through the area. Genuine fear of Soviet expansionism and communist subversion in all the "moderate" groups, including Burma Socialist, which now happen to be in power throughout Southeast Asia.

7. Growing political maturity of the new nationalist states and leaders, causing them to make more realistic appraisals of the international political situation.

8. Beneficial effect of private Western philanthropic and developmental efforts.

9. Presence of strategically located groups which are basically anti-communist.

10. Conservatism and religion as anti-communist and stabilizing influences, with inherent anti-communist leanings of conservative groups and of important religious segments of Southeast Asia. U. S. identification with freedom of religion; communism with persecution of religion.

11. Potential usefulness of the various overseas Chinese communities in the area which, because of their inherent pragmatism, can be expected

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to respond favorably to any apparently successful demonstrations of strength by the Chinese Nationalists or Western-supported local governments.

12. Southeast Asian instinctive respect for the unique power, including economic power, of the United States; and Southeast Asian memory of demonstrated U. S. World War II military power and the successful use of that power.

13. Success of the Philippine Army in reducing the Hukbalahap potential and appeal.

14. Strong pro-Western policy of the government of Thailand.

15. Existence of a nucleus of military and civil leaders in various Southeast Asian countries who have been trained and influenced by American and British civil and military officers and who might be expected to exert their leadership, particularly in the event of communist aggression.

16. Inherent spiritual vitality of the Japanese people; recovery capabilities and ultimate economic and industrial potential of Japan.

17. Awakening of the Indian Government to the dangers of communism and its increasingly firm attitude against communism.

18. U. S. best market for some of most important Southeast Asian exports.

19. U. S. chief actual and potential supplier of capital goods absolutely essential for economic advancement advocated by most active and articulate Southeast Asian leaders.

20. The very limited shipping space available to Soviet bloc as well as to Southeast Asian countries and the "hostile" nature of land frontiers between Communist China and Southeast Asia (high mountains on Burma border, combat area near Indochina border) constitute serious obstacle to volume trade between Soviet bloc and Southeast Asia. Even should Soviet bloc and Southeast Asians agree on considerable exchange

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of Southeast Asia's raw materials for Soviet bloc finished goods (which Soviet would probably be unable to furnish in quantity anyway), the fact remains that only the West can actually transport commodities from and to Southeast Asia on large scale and Soviet-directed communism cannot make good on its propaganda promises regarding trade with Southeast Asia.

B. ADVERSE PSYCHOLOGICAL CIRCUMSTANCES:

1. The long domination of the peoples of Southeast Asia by the white race has developed a basic attitude of suspicion and distrust.
2. The effectiveness with which the communist regime has consolidated its military and governmental control of mainland China.
3. The failure of the U. S. and European publics to realize the strategic (psychological) significance of Southeast Asia.
4. The non-existence so far of careful U. S. planning for a systematic psychological campaign in Southeast Asia; failure of the U. S. Government to recognize fully the decisive importance of intangibles involved in Southeast Asia problem; and shortage of U. S. personnel with psychological qualifications necessary to deal successfully with Orientals.
5. The apparent conflicts in U. S. foreign policy; the presence of admittedly unsolved problems in U. S. foreign policy; the lack of complete U. S. public agreement with present U. S. foreign policy; foreign fears of instability in U. S. foreign policy; and lack of Western and U. N. agreement on basic matters of Asian policy.
6. The fact that Southeast Asia is a highly diversified area in which narrowly nationalistic forces exceed tendencies toward regional cohesion and cooperation.
7. The failure of the U. S. to adequately consider indigenous psychological and political attitudes and sensibilities in the formation and execution of U. S. psychological, political, and economic programs

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for Southeast Asia.

8. Conviction on the part of Southeast Asians that U. S. does not really understand or appreciate Southeast Asia's cultural and spiritual traditions.

9. The conflict between necessary U. S. support of Western European governments (colonial and former colonial) and the announced anti-colonial policy of the U. S. in Southeast Asia.

10. The lack of significant assimilation of Chinese minorities in various countries, causing discrimination and resentment on the part of host countries and governments.

11. Local support, monetary and otherwise, of communist activities in Southeast Asia.

12. Psychological inroads being made in Southeast Asia by communist economic approaches, gestures and invitations.

13. Impediments (fear of nationalization, double-taxation, etc.) to the investment of U. S. private capital in the countries of Southeast Asia.

14. The existence in Southeast Asia of the following considerations and attitudes susceptible to communist manipulation and exploitation:

a. Pervading subtle terror of communist power and fears of retaliations in case of the success of that power; and tendency in some areas to accommodate to the looming threat of that power.

b. Weakness, lack of mature experienced leadership in depth, and lack of material assets (military and economic) on the part of the new nationalist states, each of which is faced with the following major tasks: (1) maintenance of internal stability, (2) development of governmental apparatuses and initiation of domestic programs to meet the needs of their underprivileged, diverse, and largely illiterate populaces, and (3) formulation of foreign policy during the present period of world crisis.

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- c. Illusion on the part of certain Southeast Asians that involvement in the world conflict can be avoided by maintaining a strictly "neutral" attitude.
- d. Tendency on the part of Asiatics, ideological and moral considerations aside, to take pride in demonstrations of power by Asiatic forces (e.g., Communist China).
- e. Continuing conviction on the part of native nationalists-- amounting to a political shibboleth--that "Western Imperialism" is a worse and more immediate menace than communism, coupled with an apparent lack of comprehension of the dictatorial and repressive practices of communist imperialism which inevitably obtain following an accommodation with communism.
- f. Misconception that the U. S. may be more intent on war than the U.S.S.R. which continuously stresses peace motif in its propaganda.
- g. Opinion held by many Southeast Asians that the U. S. is closely aligned with colonial and ex-colonial powers or with "reactionary" indigenous elements, subservient to the West.
- h. Suspicion held by many Southeast Asians that even where the U. S. takes a stand against colonialism, such attitude motivated by desire to weaken French, Dutch, British influence in interest of U. S. "imperialism."
- i. General attraction communism holds for violently nationalistic elements, because of its apparently zealous espousal of Asian nationalism.
- j. Special attraction communism holds for workers, peasants, and intellectuals because of its promises of radical economic and social reforms.
- k. Special attraction communism holds for nationalist elements because of its rationalization of confiscation of foreign enterprise.

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l. The sensitivity of nationalist leaders, proud of their recently achieved independence, to any implication that they are dependent on foreign (Western) advice or guidance.

m. Doubts concerning U. S. trade policies in Southeast Asia:

(1) Growing impression that the U. S. intentionally or otherwise withholds from Southeast Asia urgently needed capital goods.

(2) Uneasiness caused by U. S. demands for restrictions on Southeast Asian trade with Soviet Bloc and demand that Southeast Asia rely exclusively for buying and selling on Western markets.

(3) Fear that the U. S., chief customer of important Southeast Asian exports, may use position to influence world market prices in manner unfavorable to Southeast Asia.

n. Doubts concerning U. S. economic aid to Southeast Asia:

(1) Many Southeast Asians consider acceptance of U. S. economic aid necessary but humiliating, while others suspect U. S. motives and see in aid program merely a tool of U. S. "economic imperialism" or a move to "lure" Southeast Asia into Western camp. Still others feel that aid actually granted is on too small a scale, particularly if compared to U. S. funds made available to Europe.

(2) Doubts among elements inclined toward cooperation with West regarding extent of U. S. willingness and capability to continue present aid policy beyond immediate future.

o. Doubts concerning U. S. ability and intention to protect Southeast Asia effectively in case Southeast Asia is overtly attacked.

p. Present economic and political weakness of Japan.

q. Such Southeast Asian antipathies to Japan as remain from

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World War II.

r. The existence in Southeast Asian countries of communist-led dissident groups (of varying degrees of strength and organization) available to spearhead the disruptive attack phase of communist rebellion aimed at creating chaos and then assuming political and military control:

(1) In Indochina, Ho Chi Minh's "Democratic Republic" with its powerful armed forces.

(2) In Burma, the dissident communist groups now trying to promote alliance with other insurgent elements including the non-communist, but anti-government, Karens.

(3) In Indonesia, various disgruntled groups ranging from communist, including well-organized Chinese groups, to rightist religious fanatics (Darul Islam) and including professional bandits.

(4) In Philippines, the Hukbalahap rebels.

(5) In Malaya, the 3-5,000 hard-core Chinese rebels, backed by 100,000 supporters and effectively holding down more than 100,000 British and colonial troops.

(6) In Thailand, small communist groups among the overseas Chinese and the Vietnamese minorities are believed to be organized, but held in check by the alert Thai internal security forces.

15. Direct and by-products adverse psychological effects of:

a. Flow of weapons and other military supplies from Communist China into Southeast Asian countries.

b. Flow back into the countries of Southeast Asia of large numbers of indigenous agitators trained in Communist China.

c. Trade, legitimate and undercover, in strategic materials to Communist China from certain Southeast Asian countries.

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- d. Anti-Western activities of communist diplomatic personnel in Southeast Asian countries.
 - e. Comparative freedom of action enjoyed by communist propagandists in Southeast Asian countries.
 - f. Support by individuals and business concerns of Southeast Asian communist parties.
 - g. Presence of communist-controlled merchant shipping in Southeast Asian ports and waters.
 - h. Inadequate anti-Communist attitudes and legislation in Southeast Asian countries.
 - i. Communist influence in government and autonomous agencies in the fields of defense, internal security, public information, education, and economy in Southeast Asia.
16. Communist overt and covert propaganda and related psychological activities designed to promote the effectiveness of the subtle terror of communist power while, at the same time, promoting admiration for Communist China and concurrently intensifying Asian fears of:
- a. Political domination by the U. S. through:
 - (1) Identifying true nationalism with communism rather than with U. S. democracy;
 - (2) Emphasizing the friendship of the U. S. for former colonial powers;
 - (3) Exhibiting the military sections of the Mutual Security Act as evidence of U. S. imperialistic design.
 - b. Economic domination by the U. S. through:
 - (1) Identifying U. S. efforts to obtain strategic materials with economic exploitation;
 - (2) Describing U. S. economic assistance programs as "dollar imperialism";

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(3) Promoting trade with the Soviet world as the counter to capitalistic monopoly.

c. Cultural domination by the U. S. through:

- (1) Emphasizing U. S. discrimination against colored people;
- (2) Disparaging U. S. culture as crass and materialistic;
- (3) Promoting communistic culture through special missions to communist countries.

d. National destruction from war through:

- (1) Advertising communist desires for peace;
- (2) Prosecuting atrocity charges against the U. S.;
- (3) Hypothesizing for other nations war damage similar to that in Korea;
- (4) Magnifying the military strength, industrial potential, and physical proximity of Communist China.

17. Size of U. S. staffs in diplomatic and special missions in the area causes suspicion of U. S. motives and brings about harmful local repercussions, especially because their manner of living is similar to that of former colonial masters.