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SECURITY INFORMATION

3 October 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: SPP


SUBJECT : Review of National Policies and Their Adequacy to Support the Clandestine Effort.

REFERENCE : Top Secret Document #82885 dated 30 Sept 52.

1. Comments on this paper are difficult to make because the purpose it serves is not easy to ascertain. If the purpose is to make a critical review of many of our national policies, it will reveal that they are at best but statements concerning desirable objectives about which few can quarrel. Rarely are they spelled out in the detail required to guide the development of programs to attain them.

2. This point can best be made if a few terms are first defined and then illustrated. Most of the National Security Council papers are concerned with objectives, that is, the interest we have with respect to a given area or country in the light of the over-all international situation. Policies, on the other hand, are thought out courses of action for achieving national objectives. To illustrate our objective in the economic field with regard to Japan is to "facilitate the achievement by Japan of an economy which is self-supporting, expanding and capable of maintaining adequate living standards, supporting the defense of Japan, and contributing to the defense of the Pacific area." This statement does not offer CIA any guide to the actions it should take to gain that particular objective. In other words, the objective is stated so broadly that it would be possible to attain it by one of several different policies; namely, (a) encourage rather than restrain Japanese trade with Communist China, (b) facilitate the expansion of Japanese trade with south and southeast Asia by financial and diplomatic support, (c) lower U. S. trade barriers against Japanese goods.

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~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Copy No. 1 of 3

81172

~~TOP SECRET~~

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4. This illustration indicates the type of analysis which would be required if a review of the efficacy of existing governmental-CIA policies with respect to the attaining of already adopted US objectives is to be of any value.

5. What follows are some general observations concerning the formulation of policies which will facilitate our work:

a. They should permit maximum utilization of the existing critical but favorable factors in a given situation. They should conversely mitigate the influence of adverse critical factors in a given situation.

b. They should lead to actions acceptable to both the US and to the objective country even though the motivations leading to the action may often be dissimilar.

c. US statements of long-term policy toward a given country should not act as a roadblock to the attainment of short-term goals. (Example: US advocacy of a permanently disarmed and pacific Japan made some years back has returned as a ghost to haunt our endeavors to build up Japanese security forces.)

d. US short-term policies should lead to actions contributing toward the attainment of long-term objectives, but they need not be absolutely the same as long-term policies. (This requires that US policy be developed to unfold in a consistent pattern. This requirement should likewise discourage the US habit of ad hoc policy formation, a habit currently virulent in too many quarters.)

6. In conclusion, it is gratifying to be able to report that (a) the obvious requirement for a new national strategy will be partially filled with the presidential approval of NSC 135/2, Subject: Re-appraisal of United States Objectives and Strategy for National Security, and (b) there is presently in the mill a draft revision of NSC 107/2, Subject: Position of the United States with Respect to Iran.

7. It is hoped

-2-

~~TOP SECRET~~  
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
Copy No. 1 of 3

81173

**TOP SECRET**

7. It is hoped that the foregoing comments and advisements meet in some measure your request for comments on your paper, and that with the issue of our own checklist opus covered in conference 2 October 1951, we shall be able to develop concise and specific policies on which effective programs and operations may logically be based.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Page No. 1 of 3

81173

Van Kamm

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AS A COVER ATTACHMENT TO FORM NO. 38-13

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TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S FULL NAME	COMMENTS
		REC'D.	FWD'D.		
1. SPP	OCT	1952			<p>To 1:</p> <p>1. The attached comments, prepared by Colonels King and Kintner, as well as those of Earl DeLong (which were transmitted separately) cover the waterfront quite well, except possibly for certain points which I think deserve particular accentuation.</p> <p>2. Our basic problem in fighting the cold war is that national policy is always stated in such broad terms that no one will disagree; but when it comes to reduction of these policies to specific programs of action, the trouble begins. It is at this point that our whole cold war effort breaks down for unless the key individuals in the government who must participate in any successful program are completely agreed upon both ends and means, no effort can have the faintest hope of success. The NSC has thus far only produced ends of a very general nature. The PSB was largely designed to galvanize our instruments of national policy into effective prosecution of the means to these ends. It has thus far failed to do so. Whether it will continue to fail remains to be seen. The point is that somehow policy must be translatable into effective national action--which it is not now. Nor will NSC 135/2 change this situation.</p> <p>3. How to bring this to the minds of the policy makers in such a way as to improve the situation--particularly in an election year--is the \$64 question. At any rate, I don't think we should miss a single opportunity to sound off about what seems to me to be the No. 1 Problem in getting ourselves rolling.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">JK CFVK</p> <p style="text-align: right;">B-03</p>
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