

**S E C R E T**

19 September 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT : Inspection of the Office of National Estimates  
and the Estimative Process


1. The objectives of the ONE inspection were (a) to determine the views of the intelligence community on the quality and usefulness of national intelligence estimates, and (b) to appraise the efficiency of the estimative process and the Office of National Estimates.

2. The inspection team was not qualified to weigh substantive conflicts revealed during UKIB drafting and coordination of specific estimates. Many ONE participants in estimating cited examples of apparent deficiencies in estimating as, for example, foreseeing the impact of the Communist Chinese agricultural crisis, or assessing the operational capabilities of the Royal Laotian Army. However, the inspection team heard no proposals for modification of the existing authority and structure of the estimative system. The inspectors concluded that a national intelligence estimate undergoes as widespread, continuous and intense an evaluation as any other document produced in the intelligence community.

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~~S E C R E T~~



**S E C R E T**

3. National estimates are receiving careful consideration by the top planning and policy-making officers of the U.S. Government. This is shown in the attached memoranda covering discussions with Mr. Walt W. Rostow, Counsellor and Chief, Policy Planning Council, Department of State, and Mr. William P. Bundy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Equivalent testimony was obtained from spokesmen in the offices of General Maxwell D. Taylor, Military Advisor to the President, and Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

4. These sources were consistent in their praise of the current estimative product dealing with the Soviet Union-- particularly that on military subjects--and with alternative courses of action in various contingency situations. Less interest was expressed in the scheduled estimates on specific countries, but there was general agreement that these estimates had improved in usefulness by evolution from their earlier encyclopedic approach toward better focussed analyses of key issues.

5. The inspectors' principal findings are summarized in the following paragraphs. In general, this survey proposes measures which in our opinion would tend to increase the flexibility of ONE and USIB management within existing patterns of operation.

S E C R E T

6. The performances of the individual members of the Board of National Estimates vary in quality depending on the experience of the individual in intelligence analysis and writing and on his aptitude for the estimating process. This fact in no way discounts the quality of his previous accomplishments in other fields. The survey recommends that there be a continuing effort to upgrade the quality of Board member performance by establishing a time limit to the initial assignment of new members. Similarly as members of outstanding talent acquire seniority, attention must be given to sabbatical assignments.

The Estimates Staff

7. The Estimates Staff of ONE has yet to determine whether the talented drafter of estimates should work on a career basis. The prevailing attitude of the staff is to reject reassignment in the DD/I area unless this involves clear advancement. The DD/I is now moving to promote a freer flow of senior personnel among his offices. This survey recommends measures in support of ONE career planning.

The Princeton Panel of Consultants

8. The use of a panel of outside specialists meeting frequently at Princeton University to provide an additional check on the adequacy of estimates was an obvious need and safeguard

S E C R E T

during the early years of the present estimative process. With the growing professionalism of the ONE performance, review of estimates by a panel of outside consultants has lost its vitality in the virtually unanimous opinion of the ONE Estimates Staff. The DAD/NE, however, continues to see utility in the panel sessions both as a check for fresh views and to promote a healthy relationship between the intelligence and academic communities. The present survey recommends that the needs of the Estimates Staff be governing in this area. The present panel approach to consulting should be discontinued as a regular practice in favor of more individual contacts with a greater variety of cleared specialists of agreed interest to Estimates Staff personnel.

ONE Contact with Policy Makers

9. There is too little contact at present between ONE personnel and Government policy planners. This stems in large part from a long-standing doctrine of separation of intelligence producers and users. The inspectors concluded that the professionalism of present day estimators insures against the risk of partisan involvements. The estimators need more guidance from policy makers on the context of estimating problems. The survey recommends regular face-to-face discussions at the start of each estimative effort between ONE representatives and senior

S E C R E T

policy-making personnel. Notes from these discussions should be included in the terms of reference for each estimate.

USIB Contribution to the Estimative Process

10. The USIB organizations contributing to estimating were frequently described in CIA as a loose confederation in which each participant decides what resources he can commit to the estimating effort. Present contributions are widely uneven in quality, and some participants are not substantively qualified. The inspectors have proposed that the USIB undertake periodic assessments of the performance and program commitments of the participating agencies and recommend standards of staffing and levels of research effort.

11. Specialized USIB committees, such as the Scientific Intelligence Committee, have explicit responsibilities in their DCID charters for contributing to national estimates. The coordinating and publishing procedures employed by the Scientific Intelligence Committee are not consistent with those of the Board of National Estimates. The inspectors have recommended that the Assistant to the DCI for Coordination be charged with investigating through the USIB and recommending action to meet this problem.

12. The inspectors suggest that the senior command of CIA stimulate reaction to the estimates by direct dissemination to

**S E C R E T**

appropriate consumers, e.g., an Assistant Secretary for African Affairs at the Department of State in the case of an estimate on an African subject. Such dissemination should be accompanied by correspondence requesting comment on leading issues.

/S/ J. S. Earman

J. S. Earman  
Inspector General

**Attachments**

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- 6 -

**S E C R E T**

S E C R E T

20 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion of national estimates and the estimating process with Mr. Walt W. Rostow, Department of State, 16 August 1962

1. Mr. Allan Evans who handles coordination of national estimating for the Department arranged for us to see Mr. Rostow in connection with the inspection of the estimating system now in progress in the Agency. Mr. Rostow very generously gave us more than an hour of his time and commented freely on many aspects of the objectives and contributions of estimates to the national security.

2. Our first question to Mr. Rostow was whether he reads the estimates himself. He answered promptly that he reads them all. He added that he finds them to be of high quality in organization, clarity, management of background information, and in soundness of the judgments presented. (This response paralleled an earlier statement from Mr. Farrot of General Taylor's office that General Taylor while at the White House also read all of the estimates.) Mr. Rostow also believes that the estimates on specific areas and subjects are read in the Department by the appropriate operating officials. At a later point he observed, however, that operating officials probably still make most of their decisions without close utilization of formal estimates. He doubted further that these officials employ personal staff to provide them with anything approximating professional intelligence support.

3. Mr. Rostow then spent approximately fifteen minutes developing what he sees as two critical areas of weakness or challenge to effectiveness of performance by the present-day U.S. estimating system. The first of these was a speculation whether the estimating system is not prone today to a too even treatment of all of the facets of the given target country under estimative analysis. He thought that the effect of this tendency would be a failure to isolate and highlight areas of impending critical change.

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S E C R E T

S E C R E T

4. His second point was perhaps more speculative and concerned the capability of the estimating apparatus to fuse its findings on each segment of a target country--economic, political, military, scientific--into an effective appreciation of how these parts interact to produce events and trends of strategic significance.

5. Mr. Rostow cited the estimating problems facing the United States in dealing with Communist China in his discussion of each of the above points. He returned repeatedly to the problem of estimating the appearance and effects of the Chinese agricultural crisis and its far-reaching implications for other parts of the Chinese economy, defense system and current political posture.

6. Questions on the adequacy of intelligence research in support of estimating brought forth several interesting observations. Other observers with whom we had talked had expressed the opinion that there are important gaps in intelligence research today including, for example, economic research in free world areas, analysis of defense systems, and appreciation of geopolitical problems in Africa. Mr. Rostow commented that there is a wealth of good background intelligence analysis being produced today and that he depends on it in going behind the estimates into critical problem areas. He recalled a conversation with an associate from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which he speculated that 75% of intelligence is wasted in terms of utilization by operating officials and the friend felt that 90% was a more realistic figure. He expressed little fear of duplication of analytic effort and seemed to feel that an intelligence organization that senses a deficiency in analysis should move in and try its hand at the problem. He suggested that there is a basic weakness in the present U.S. system of collection of intelligence. Diplomatic representatives are schooled in the collection techniques evolved in the advanced Western countries. In African countries association with what might be called the standard diplomatic circles is quite inadequate as a means of appreciating the forces of change in tribal, labor and political groupings.

7. Mr. Rostow had many ideas for dealing with the problems of estimating. He spoke of his own efforts to build up the policy planning apparatus of the Department and the executive branch of

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

the Government but did not go into detail on specific measures. He agreed that there is a distinct need for close communication between planners and estimators and said that he would welcome a two-way exchange of staff between the Policy Planning Council and the Board and Staff of ONE.

8. He was particularly interested in increasing communication between estimators and operating officials. Present procedures for setting terms of reference for national estimates should be modified to include early face-to-face discussions between operators who request estimates and ONE estimators to explore issues and agree on research and estimating judgments most likely to be of significance to the operators. He thought it might be useful to append the notes of such discussions to the formal terms of reference.

9. Mr. Rostow spoke of his own visits to ONE to get acquainted with ONE personnel and the estimating system. He felt that it is very important that room be maintained on the Board of National Estimates for several members who would be quite unorthodox in background and outlook and who would help thereby to introduce real challenges to Board thinking. (His own suggestions on Board membership in the future would be of interest.)

10. On the subject of evaluation of the estimating performance Mr. Rostow again emphasized the need for fresh views and suggested that validity studies should be undertaken by outside professors who might spend a summer in ONE examining the preparation, quality, and impact of a series of estimates on a particular problem.

11. Late in the meeting Mr. Rostow referred to a forthcoming book on Pearl Harbor of which he had an advance copy. (CIA Library located a copy on Friday and will notify the Deputy Inspector General when it is received.) A paragraph in the preface of this book discusses the problem of systems coping with surprises. Mr. Rostow said he had read the pertinent passages to his own staff and proceeded to have the book retrieved from a colleague and to read them to us. This resume by no means does justice to the freshness of Mr. Rostow's thinking and conversation. It would be most appropriate to invite him to set down his ideas on estimating problems for publication in Studies in Intelligence.

cc: Executive Director  
DD/I  
AD/NE

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**S E C R E T**

be granted indefinite tenure. He was much in favor of the Board having a DD/P representative, a Foreign Service Officer, and a scientist. He considered the appointment of  to be excellent.

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6. Mr. Bundy felt that it was a waste of talent for excellent drafters and writers not to continue writing estimates when elevated to membership on the Board. He said that he often wrote estimates while serving on the Board, and he recalled that some of his Board colleagues also did so.

7. As regards careers for OMS staff personnel, he believed that these people should be rotated through other DD/I components and, on occasion, serve in the DD/P. Exceptions should be made for those talented estimators who prefer to spend their entire Agency career in estimating.

cc: Executive Director  
DD/I  
AD/NE

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**S E C R E T**

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**INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY  
OF THE  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES  
AND  
THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS**

**September 1962**

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~~**S E C R E T**~~

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S E C R E T

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
A. SCOPE . . . . .	1
B. THE ESTIMATING SYSTEM . . . . .	5
Components . . . . .	6
Estimating Procedures . . . . .	10
C. OPERATING TRENDS AND PROBLEMS . . . . .	12
General . . . . .	12
Staffing Policy . . . . .	17
The Board of National Estimates . . . . .	29
Consultants . . . . .	36
Miscellaneous Problems . . . . .	39
Administration, Support and Space . . . . .	39
Weekly Survey of Cold War Crisis Situations and Regional Surveys . . . . .	41
Priority National Intelligence Objectives . . . . .	44
Post Mortems and Validity Studies . . . . .	45
[REDACTED] . . . . .	47
Promoting the Use of Estimates . . . . .	49
ONE Guidance on ORR and OSI Research Programs . . . . .	49
Estimating Relationships between ONE and the USIB Agencies . . . . .	50
DD/P - ONE Relations . . . . .	54

25X1

S E C R E T

"Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility, but also responsibility so poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert watchman, but also the one who knows he'll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of. It includes straightforward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it is the occasion--which is usually too late."

From the Foreword by Thomas C. Schelling in Pearl Harbor, Warning and Decision by Roberta Wohlstetter, Stanford, 1962.

**S E C R E T**

**A. SCOPE**

1. The production of national intelligence estimates as a coordinated effort of the United States intelligence community has been under way since the establishment of the Office of National Estimates (ONE) in the Fall of 1950. The structure, formats and the principal procedures in estimating have shown substantial continuity down to the present time. At its present stage of evolution the estimating process constitutes a remarkably small evaluative effort at the apex of the broad collection and analytical efforts of the intelligence community. A guiding doctrine in the shaping of the system to date has been the separation of estimating from policy in order to assure the presentation by the intelligence community of unbiased comprehensive judgments to the policy makers. In this climate few participants in the estimating system will hazard a guess as to the influence of estimates on policy decisions.

2. The critical nature of the estimating function has made the system the object of relatively frequent top-level Government review and evaluation. The Hoover Commission Report of 28 December 1948 and the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Committee Report of 1 January 1949 examined the subject in detail and laid much of the groundwork for the establishment of the Office of National Estimates. The

~~S E C R E T~~

S E C R E T

Inspector General conducted a "Survey of the Office of National Estimates" in April of 1954. A Task Force on Intelligence Activities under General Mark Clark issued a report in May 1955 dealing at length with estimating. Background material in the Clark Committee files dealt with most of the key issues brought to our attention during the current inspection.

3. Another medium for more general discussions of the purposes and problems of national estimating has been the quarterly Studies in Intelligence now in its sixth year. Many members of ONE, of the Board of National Estimates, and of other components of the intelligence community have contributed firsthand accounts and judgments on important aspects of the subject.

4. Finally, in the past 12 months the Joint Study Group on the Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government and the present Director's Ad Hoc Committee on Organizational Matters both chaired by Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick have completed studies with implications for the estimating process. These were explored orally by the inspectors with Mr. Kirkpatrick.

5. A three-man team from the Inspector General's staff spent the months of July and August 1962 reviewing primarily the organizational and management aspects of the national estimating process. The



S E C R E T

bulk of the survey was concerned with the Office of National Estimates which provides most of the apparatus and the day-to-day coordination of the community's effort in national estimating. Discussions were held with all members of ONE and the Board of National Estimates, with many other senior officials of CIA and with selected contributors and users of estimates in the Government.

6. An Agency inspection of this intelligence community system necessarily stopped short of a detailed examination and comparison among the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) member organizations of their levels of effort, quality of performance, and standards of management. Such review would be essential to a coordinated USIB effort to appraise and improve the estimating process. The USIB community approach to estimating was frequently characterized to us by its participants as a loose federated system of very uneven quality and performance. The USIB does not maintain a formal management group to analyze and propose solutions to non-substantive community problems, for example, in estimating. In the past the excellence of the example set by the ONE estimators appears to have been the principal stimulus to improved community performance.


S E C R E T

7. This review of the estimating process would not be complete without mention of the continued presence at the helm of the Office of National Estimates of Sherman Kent, who has probably made the largest individual contribution to the present highly respected stature of his office. We encountered a wide range of warm personal tributes to Mr. Kent.

- 4 -


S E C R E T

**S E C R E T**



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**d. OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES**

- (1) **MISSION.** The Assistant Director for National Estimates is charged with the production of national intelligence estimates.
- (2) **FUNCTIONS.** The Assistant Director for National Estimates shall:
  - (a) Direct the production of national intelligence estimates. This includes the setting of priorities and the assignment of production responsibilities among the components of the Central Intelligence Agency, and among the intelligence agencies of the Federal Government.
  - (b) Prepare national intelligence estimates for issuance by the Director of Central Intelligence.
  - (c) Sit as Chairman of the Board of National Estimates.
  - (d) Provide CIA representation and intelligence support at the Staff Assistants level of the National Security Council Staff.
  - (e) 
  - (f) Give appropriate guidance to the intelligence research agencies.
  - (g) Give appropriate guidance to the intelligence collection agencies.

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**S E C R E T**

S E C R E T

B. THE ESTIMATING SYSTEM

8. Authority pertaining to the production of national intelligence estimates is provided in National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID) Numbers 1 and 3 and in Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) Number 1/1. DCID's 3/3, 3/4, and 3/5 which establish under the United States Intelligence Board the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC), the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC), and the Scientific Intelligence Committee (SIC) incorporate a standard paragraph providing for the participation of these Committees in national estimating. The inspectors encountered no concrete proposals for the modification of these directives.

9. Within CIA the Office of National Estimates is designated as a component of the Deputy Directorate for Intelligence, and Headquarters Regulation  specifies that the Deputy Director (Intelligence) (DD/I) is "responsible for directing and coordinating the activities of the Office of...National Estimates...." The relationship between DD/I and Assistant Director for National Estimates (AD/NE) has varied with the incumbents depending in large part on the relation desired by the Director of Central Intelligence with his AD/NE. There is an evident need for keeping the DD/I fully and promptly informed on the programming of

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ONE assignments. Further, the DD/I clearly will need to oversee the exchange of views between his staff in ONE and in other DD/I offices to insure maximum reconciliation or full identification of differences of position between himself and the Board of National Estimates on national security problems.

Components

10. The Board of National Estimates consists at the present time of 12 members selected by the Director of Central Intelligence on indefinite tenure to give both substantive and procedural guidance to the national estimating process. Present members have been selected for their civilian or military experience in academic, military or intelligence pursuits. The Board is thoroughly integrated into the ONE structure but its members are freed of all administrative duties. The AD/NE is Board Chairman, there is a deputy chairman, and the Deputy Assistant Director for National Estimates (DAD/NE), who is responsible for the administration of the Office, is also a member of the Board.

11. The Board's existence rests on the authority of the DCI. There is no cognizance of its existence and functions in the directives of the National Security Council. DCID 1/1 spells out

**S E C R E T**

Board functions in scheduling and assigning work on estimates, in setting terms of reference and in coordinating estimates for final presentation to the USIB.

12. The Board was an integral part of the original conception of the national estimating process. In the early years its composition and purpose were visualized, however, as an assemblage of independent authorities of the highest national reputation, acting in a corporate capacity, to develop the substantive product of the estimating effort. This concept has been substantially modified through time with the growing professionalism of the Estimates Staff. The Board enjoys the services of many gifted individuals, but the demands of coordination have restricted their contributions in the strictly creative sense of conceiving estimates and highlighted their skills in criticism and negotiation.

13. A second feature of the evolution of Board functions has been the sharp reduction in the functioning of the Board as a corporate body in coordinating estimates. The given estimating project is today steered through the system by a panel of two or three Board members, one of whom is designated chairman with wide latitude to impress his personal views of coordinating procedure on the community effort. Efficiency in coordination has risen through the years and the panel approach with the use of strong

S E C R E T

chairman has enabled the Board to handle a larger volume of business without community complaint concerning the objectivity and fairness of the process. Questions concerning the selection, career management, and alternative uses of Board talents are discussed in detail in Section C of the survey.

14. The Estimates Staff is a group of intelligence officers maintained in ONE to perform the final drafting of national estimates. These men are responsible first of all for keeping themselves comprehensively informed on the areas or subjects for which they have assigned responsibility. Their effectiveness at drafting derives from personal command of a subject field and from utilization of the estimative contributions from the intelligence community. Their product may in turn undergo substantial modification at the hands of members of the Board of National Estimates and during the interagency coordination of the draft prior to its submission to the USIB. The growing competence of the ONE staff has been a notable feature of the evolution of ONE to date and has contributed to a relatively autonomous status for the staff vis a vis the Board in ONE.

15. The measure of a staff man is his ability to weigh events and trends in the given area or subject field, to make perceptive judgments of their significance for intelligence and

S E C R E T

policy planning purposes, and to communicate these ideas effectively orally or in writing to the varied ranks of Government officials. Objectivity of analysis is of the essence both in the preparation of a draft estimate, a commissioned memorandum or a self-initiated appreciation of a foreign situation, and in its defense before the Board of National Estimates, and subsequently in the market place of the intelligence and policy community. The characteristic influence of such experience on the individual cannot yet be fully appraised, but there is an evident premium on initiative and forcefulness. There is a distinct pull on the most aptly suited individuals to move from this arena of evaluation into positions of command both in CIA and elsewhere in the Government.

16. The Support Staff provides for the administrative needs of both the Board of National Estimates and the Estimates Staff. These activities include maintenance of an Information Control unit, reading and reference rooms, a Publications and Reproduction unit, and research, secretarial and clerical services. There is a substantial volume of publishing and dissemination of revised drafts of estimates, much of it occurring outside regular working hours. The skills and dedication of the staff were widely commended by ONS's professional members.



S E C R E T

Estimating Procedures

17. The estimative product may take any one of many forms, depending on the nature and urgency of the problem being dealt with by the policy makers of the Government. The majority of estimative papers are commissioned by the DCI, the White House staff, the policy planning mechanism of the Department of State, policy task forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other military operations authorities. There is a substantial demand for estimative memoranda by the DCI and the USIB and, finally, a lesser volume of self-initiated ONS staff and Board memoranda. Channels for requesting estimates are informal and vary from direct contacts between outside requesters and members of ONS to command assignments delivered either directly from the DCI or via the DD/I.

18. The USIB or the DCI on its behalf must approve the scheduling of a national estimate. The USIB approves each quarter a program of national intelligence estimates for the succeeding six months which is prepared by the Board of National Estimates. The next step is the preparation of terms of reference for the estimate which define the subject to be covered, and pose the questions to be answered. The terms of reference are drafted in ONS and submitted to the USIB agencies for review. Representatives designated by the USIB agencies to coordinate the

S E C R E T

production of the estimate then meet with a panel from the Board of National Estimates to confirm the terms of reference, and to assign responsibility and deadlines for the production of departmental contributions. The contributions from all sources are delivered to the Estimates Staff of ONE and a designated estimates team proceeds to draft the estimate for Board consideration.

19. The drafting of estimates is by and large the prerogative of ONE and is the source of some contention on the part of contributors to estimates in other agencies. The problem is to produce a cohesive estimate written in an effective style. Such integration must come in the last analysis as the performance of one individual. It derives from the individual drafter's command of pertinent information, his ability to focus and make perceptive judgments on the essential problems, and his skill in presenting them lucidly and convincingly. The authors of contributions from the other agencies inevitably tend to challenge the style, if not the judgments, in the final draft and to question the discard of their own conscientious and sometimes excellent efforts.

S E C R E T

C. OPERATING TRENDS AND PROBLEMS

General

20. ONE and the estimating process have been operating in a climate of organizational stability for some years. There is a general lack of sentiment among the participants for radical change in the basic features of the system. There are a number of factors that help to account for this stability. One of the most important is that ONE has been able to attract high caliber staff and to satisfy them with the working atmosphere. ONE is a market place for ideas and it offers both the freedom and the pressures conducive to strong performance by perceptive individuals. Any tendency in the individual participant to relax in comfortable established procedures is likely, we judged, to prove a relatively short-lived condition.

21. A second factor making for stability is the reputation that the system and the product have established for themselves in the U.S. Government. There is a wide readership for estimates, tending to be more comprehensive the higher placed the individual official. Our discussions outside the Agency indicated that the estimates are read at the operating level by the authorities responsible for the areas and subject fields with which they deal. The construction and style of estimates are regarded as professional

S E C R E T

in quality. A good job is done in handling facts and background data. The timing of estimates was regarded as generally satisfactory. Every observer also had views on the inherent limitations in estimating and these are dealt with in more detail below. But the reservations were prefaced with expressions of respect and appreciation such as are noted here.

22. A third factor keeping the system on its present course is its record of substantive accomplishment. Particular satisfaction was expressed with the demonstrated capability of ONE and the DD/I area in general to help formulate as well as coordinate the estimative judgments on military subjects, sometimes involving issues that the military had failed to analyze or coordinate effectively among themselves. Independent civilian analysis of military/strategic problems was considered by at least one observer as perhaps the most significant current contribution of the estimating system to the national security. Many individuals expressed the opinion, always an intangible one as to concrete evidence, that the policy commitments of the other USIB organizations influence their estimative judgments. The absence of such commitments enhances the objectivity and usefulness of the estimative contributions produced by CIA.

23. There was also a consensus among participants and observers of the estimating process that various features and procedures in

**S E C R E T**

the system are defective but lacking obvious remedy. The broadest of these criticisms was that the estimates tend to be too general in scope and their judgments are too heavily hedged to be useful to policy makers. Since estimates deal with problems in which essential information is frequently lacking and even the policy makers of target countries are unable to foresee and control developments with precision, it would seem that this criticism is more in the nature of a description of one of the basic features of the game.

24. A close corollary to the preceding point, however, was the observation from many estimators that they have very limited contact with policy makers. They are never fully satisfied, therefore, that they appreciate the context and the precise issues in the mind of the requester of an estimate. SMIE's were judged by some participants and users to be less open to this criticism than the more formal scheduled MIE's. One highly placed user considered a recent SMIE (58-5/1-62) "Communist Reaction to Additional U.S. Courses of Action in Laos and North Vietnam" to be a model of estimative treatment of a strategic problem.

25. The relation of estimators to policy makers has long been a subject of debate, and ONE broadly speaking has been operating under a doctrine perhaps best expressed by AD/NE himself

**S E C R E T**

as follows:

"The only institutional safeguard (for impartial and objective analysis) is to separate as absolutely as it is possible to do so the staff which executes from the staff which investigates. The two should be parallel but quite distinct bodies of men, recruited differently, paid if possible from separate funds, responsible to different heads, intrinsically uninterested in each other's personal success.

For these reasons, what is unquestionably gained in guidance may well be lost in the integrity and objectivity of the operation. The absorption of intelligence producers by the intelligence consumers may prove to be too heroic a cure for both disease and patient.

The only way out of the dilemma seems to me to lie in the very compromise that is usually attempted: guarantee intelligence its administrative and substantive integrity by keeping it separate from its consumers; keep trying every known device to make the users familiar with the producers' organization, and the producers with the users' organization."

Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, Princeton, 1951, pp. 200-201.

Our review of the ONE Quarterly Report of Staff Activities tended to support the conclusion that ONE personnel at present have very limited contact with senior policy-making personnel in the Government. The record is by no means black or white and such contacts have perhaps been on the increase of late. The change in emphasis by the present national administration from regular use of the formal National Security Council policy-making apparatus to increased use of task forces and estimative memoranda were viewed favorably by many ONE personnel. The

**S E C R E T**

**S E C R E T**

change has tended to enliven the work and to increase the sense of usefulness of the estimating effort.

26. Another area of estimating under frequent criticism is the quality of performance of the other USIB organizations. The level and priority of effort and the quality of the contributions are generally regarded as uneven. Some contributions are excellent. Many are regarded by ONE as clearly deficient. The contributions occasionally fall behind schedule. Coordination is frequently characterized as cumbersome because it tends to become editing by committee rather than a lively exchange of informed views. Some participants are regarded as professional meeting-goers who make little useful contribution to the substantive questions at issue.

27. The USIB agencies make uneven investments in the research essential to estimating in their assigned areas of responsibility. Economic research on some areas of the free world, geo-political questions in Africa, interrelationships among military weapons systems were cited as examples of subjects on which community research efforts are considered deficient by ONE. Recommendations on these matters are provided in paragraph 24 of this survey.

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Staffing Policy

28. We interviewed all professional and clerical personnel on the ONE staffs. The staffs currently have [ ] professional personnel on board out of a T/O of [ ]. Without exception, we were favorably impressed with the dedication, intelligence, and intellectual curiosity of each of the [ ] professional officers we interviewed. It is significant to note that each of these officers admires and respects all of his staff colleagues, both professionally and personally. Morale, except for the overcrowded working conditions, is excellent throughout the staffs.

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29. Each member of the Board of National Estimates (BNE) rates staff personnel as high-quality and outstanding. The reputation of the staffs is also high with other CIA components as well as with outside departments and agencies.

30. The backgrounds, experience, and interests of staff personnel are, to a large extent, remarkably similar. Almost every one did undergraduate and/or graduate work in a social science at one of the better known universities. Many have had teaching experience, and there seems to be a continuing desire to write for academic journals. Interest in an academic career has never completely waned, and current job satisfaction is attributable in no small measure to the academic and intellectual atmosphere pervading ONE. A large number of staff personnel

- 17 -

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

served in OCI and/or OER and a few in the Deputy Director (Plans), (DD/P) before coming to ONE. The other staff personnel were recruited directly from the universities. All employees interviewed felt that the blending of Agency and university people is an ideal arrangement for ONE.

31. Despite the fact that the staffs are only three under professional strength, ONE has had considerable difficulty in its recruitment efforts. At the universities, ONE has encountered stiff competition from the academic community, business world, and other Government agencies. Since ONE has had only limited success in university recruitment, it would seem that most of its people in the future will again have to be recruited from other CIA components. Many able employees in other CIA components aspire to work in ONE, but their supervisors are naturally reluctant to lose these good people, particularly since they too have serious recruitment problems. To avoid animosity and friction with these components, ONE should begin to develop a program wherein the careers of its employees should include rotational tours in attractive positions in other parts of the DD/I as well as in the DD/P. At the same time other components should seriously consider and plan for the assignment of promising talent to ONE for a tour of duty. These components would be more willing to release people to ONE if

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they were assured of getting ONE people on occasion for a specific tour of duty. (See Recommendation No. 1)

32. ONE staff personnel today express little interest in working elsewhere in the DD/I area. This attitude is at least symptomatic of a condition of overcompartmentation in the DD/I Offices. These ONE personnel now view the other DD/I Offices as offering only routine assignments and limited headroom for advancement. Sharper delineation of a DD/I career service with assurances of opportunity to move with more freedom through more areas of DD/I operations should tend to remove the present somewhat parochial attitude. At stake for the DD/I is the cultivation of a corps of officers who appreciate estimating in relation to other DD/I programming problems, who bring versatility to their assignments, and who regard the entire DD/I as an exciting place in which to work.

33. ONE has had a large turnover of staff personnel over the years. At the time of the 1954 IG Survey, there were 29 officers serving on the ONE staffs. Six remain today, of whom four are serving in supervisory or specialized capacities. There is an unwritten philosophy in the office that personnel either go up or out, and we believe that this is a sound philosophy. When we consider that the national intelligence estimate is one of the most important studies produced in the United States Government,

S E C R E T

it is obvious that ONE must be staffed with top-flight career people. The caliber of the present ONE staff is most impressive, and when an estimator demonstrates outstanding talent and interest in this type of work, a career service would presumably take these factors into account in career planning.

34. It is generally recognized that four to five years of continuous estimating for most people should be followed by a change of scenery to permit the development of fresh approaches and new ideas and to prevent stagnation. A periodic change of scenery would be rewarding if it involved rotation to another stimulating DD/I assignment, a sabbatical at a university, or an overseas tour. An overseas tour, wherein he would acquire area background and experience, would be refreshing and invaluable to the individual as well as to the Agency. The individual would return to ONE with added knowledge and expertise, and his overseas performance may serve to eliminate some of the barriers and prejudices that exist between DD/I and DD/P personnel. We are not suggesting that the DD/P fill classical clandestine positions overseas with ONE personnel, although we believe that some of them could serve with distinction in such positions. However, we do believe that ONE personnel, as well as other DD/I personnel, could make significant and valuable contributions as substantive intelligence advisors to chiefs of station.

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It is recommended that:

No. 1

a. The DD/I and AD/NE develop a long-term career program for ONE staff personnel carefully articulated with the DD/I career planning policy.

b. The DD/I negotiate with DD/P the establishment of at least five slots--to be furnished by the DD/I-- at major stations in critical areas of the world and staff these positions with DD/I officers assigned to render close substantive support to chiefs of station in the respective areas.

c. ONE vacancies be announced in DD/P staffs and divisions and the DD/P regularly nominate qualified officers for each vacancy as possible candidates for staff service tours in ONE.

35. ONE seems to concentrate its recruitment efforts on the selection of people with specific area background and knowledge. In certain areas, such as Africa and Latin America, it has been virtually impossible to find these specialists. We have been repeatedly advised that an area background may not be as essential to the drafting of good estimates as the ability to think clearly and write with facility. Experience over the years has demonstrated that many of the best estimators began their ONE careers without any specific area background. Although ONE should not abandon its search for specialists, it should devote more attention to filling existing vacancies with top-flight generalists who are clear thinkers and facile writers.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

36. During the past two years there has been an increasing number of requests for special estimates and memoranda emanating from the White House and other high echelons of the U.S. Government. This has resulted in an increased workload on some ONE staffs, particularly EE and FE. There is no evidence that this workload, which has required considerable overtime, will decrease, especially since we have learned that the ONE product is respected and read with great interest by the highest levels of Government. Under these pressures it would be infeasible for ONE to recruit generalists to fill certain existing vacancies, since even the best generalist would require some training in the estimating field. We believe that the problem can be resolved by increasing the ONE staff T/O by six professionals. These officers, while serving in an on-the-job training capacity, could also assist with some of the workload. As they pick up more and more of the workload, the other professionals will presumably have more time for reading and thinking. Some ONE staff personnel have commented that they sorely miss the opportunity to read the literature and reflect on developments in their area field of specialization. They consider the knowledge acquired from a review of this literature to be a vitally important part of the estimating job. Additional staff personnel would also permit more flexibility for career

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S E C R E T

planning purposes and rotational tours as well as assure ONE of adequate manpower to fill gaps during emergencies. In view of the time, money and effort that goes into the entire estimative process and the importance of the end product, the addition of six professionals, one for each staff (see Recommendation No. 4), in a temporary training status is a very small investment.

It is recommended that:

No. 2

The DD/I initiate necessary steps to authorize an increase of six professional positions in the ONE Estimates Staff to provide increased flexibility for the AD/NE to administer his personnel program.

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37. ONE staff personnel commented favorably on the professional competence and cooperation of the OCI and ORR personnel with whom they work. The assistance, support, and contributions provided to ONE by these offices are considered to be very good. Many ONE staff personnel previously served in these offices, and this has helped immeasurably to develop the excellent rapport and relations which exist between them. The entire present complement of the EE Staff, for example, all came from either OCI or ORR.

38. On the other hand, ONE is critical of OSI. Specifically, ONE criticizes OSI contributions as being too generalized and lacking facts. OSI believes that ONE should be more specific in its terms of reference. It seems to us that the two offices have a difficult time communicating with and understanding one another.

S E C R E T

No OSI man has ever served a tour of duty with ONE, and we suspect that this may be a contributing factor to the lack of understanding between them. We believe that a resolution of the problem could begin with the assignment of an able OSI officer to ONE to work on papers dealing with military-scientific problems. Papers of this type have accounted for a considerable part of the overtime work required of some staffs.

It is recommended that:

No. 3

The AD/NE adopt a policy of filling one of his staff positions with an officer from OSI serving on a rotational basis.

39. In the organization of the ONE staffs, the combination of Latin America and Africa in one staff seems infeasible and unrealistic. This combination may have originally been a matter of administrative convenience. However, in view of the increasing worldly importance of each area per se, we believe that the Latin America-Africa Staff should be divided into two separate staffs, one for Latin America and one for Africa. We do not feel that the number of people working on any given area should necessarily determine whether that area should or should not be a separate staff.

S E C R E T

It is recommended that:

No. 4

The AD/NE divide his present Latin America-Africa Staff into separate staffs for the two regions and pursue as a staffing objective the maintenance of three or four estimator specialists in each of the new units.

40. ONE apparently views elevation to membership on the Board of National Estimates as the only financial method of rewarding its best estimators. Many staff personnel do not necessarily aspire to the Board, since they feel that the Board has insufficient opportunity for creative work and they would much prefer to continue drafting estimates. Staff personnel respect many Board members, and they feel that Board guidance and suggestions often strengthen the final estimate. However, when excellent estimators are promoted to the Board, their talents and value to the Agency are diluted, and they are truly not doing what they are best qualified to do. The importance of the estimate by itself should require that the estimate be drafted by the best available man. We feel that the DD/I and the AD/NE together should determine the worth of a particular estimator. If he is considered to be tops in his profession, the DD/I and AD/NE should be permitted to promote him up to the GS-18 level without changing his position or altering his responsibilities.



## S E C R E T

It is recommended that:

No. 5

The DD/I with the Director of Personnel devise a system that will permit the promotion to super grade of selected estimators without changing their positions or responsibilities. This should be done with the utmost discretion and only in those cases where it is determined that it is in the best interests of the Agency.

41. We discussed the feasibility of the assignment of Foreign Service and military officers to ONE staffs on rotational tours. ONE personnel do not consider this to be a sound idea, since the development of an estimating skill is in many cases a time-consuming chore. There are a few examples of military officers on active duty who in the past served with the ONE Estimates Staff, and only one of these was considered to have made a worthwhile contribution. Further, Foreign Service and military officers may not consider such an assignment to be particularly beneficial to advancement within their own major careers, which are usually outside of the field of intelligence.

42. On the other hand, many ONE staff personnel are favorably disposed toward a rotational assignment for themselves with a policy planning group in the Department of State or Department of Defense. Senior policy officials in State and Defense remarked that they would welcome ONE personnel on their staffs for tours of duty. Such an assignment would permit the intelligence officer

S E C R E T

to gain significant insight into the extent that policy planning is influenced by national intelligence estimates. His background and experience in the estimative process would also permit him to make valuable contributions to intelligence-related policy. He would be in a position to utilize his intelligence contacts to assist the policy-making machinery to the maximum extent feasible. The intelligence officer would return to ONE with broader knowledge and experience which would enable him to draft his estimates to be more responsive to the needs of the policy makers.

It is recommended that:

No. 6

The DD/I arrange with appropriate State and Defense officials the assignment of able ONE staff officers to their policy planning staffs for specific tours of duty. Reciprocal arrangements should be encouraged.

43. Over the years certain DD/I positions have been construed to be the exclusive prerogative of ONE.

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The four ONE men who previously served in this position are currently assigned to some of the most important jobs in the Agency, e.g., the DD/I himself, a member of the BNE, the DAD/NE, and the

S E C R E T

DAD/CI respectively. Although we recognize the need for some estimating background in the  job, we feel that there are DD/I men outside of ONE who may also be well qualified for this job. We have been advocating greater career planning for ONE personnel, but we do not mean to imply that the better DD/I jobs be given exclusively to ONE. We feel that one of the ways that other DD/I offices may be made more attractive is for the DD/I to designate all positions as DD/I slots rather than as slots belonging to a specific office. Within this framework the DD/I can still assure that the best estimator will spend most of his career in the estimating field. At the same time morale in other DD/I components will be considerably strengthened by the knowledge that ONE is not getting preferential treatment for the better jobs. We stress the need to assure that interesting and stimulating careers are planned for ONE personnel, but we do not feel that the impression should continue that certain jobs are available only for ONE men.


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It is recommended that:

No. 7

The DD/I insure that any of his employees with proper qualifications will be considered for any existing vacancy in his directorate. Care should be exercised to insure that no position, particularly those overseas, be identified with any one DD/I office.



**S E C R E T**

The Board of National Estimates

44. The Board of National Estimates (BNE) is at the apex of CIA's estimative process and as such is responsible for the estimates produced. The Board reviews the terms of reference and the draft of an estimate before it is coordinated with the USIB agencies. A Board member is assigned to chair the meetings during the interagency coordination process. The BNE decides when an estimate is ready for USIB consideration, and the Chairman of the Board and the member charged with responsibility for the particular estimate attend the USIB meeting to defend the paper on behalf of the interagency group producing it.

45. The concept of the Board dates back to an IAC meeting in October 1950 when General Smith, then DCI, referred to "a panel of five or six individuals constituting the top brains" of the new estimates organization. The BNE was mentioned in ONE's first approved Table of Organization in January 1951. The present group is made up of 10 members plus the Assistant Director for National Estimates, who serves concurrently as Board Chairman, and the Deputy Assistant Director. Of these 12, two have been on the Board of National Estimates since its inception, four are alumni of the ONE staff, one is a senior economist from the Office of Research and Reports, and three are retired general and flag

**S E C R E T**

rank officers representing the three services. Of the remaining two members one has a legal background and came to the ENE a decade ago from ECA while his colleague, coming from the State Department, joined the group not long after. A senior station chief from the Deputy Director (Plans) will join the Board in a few weeks. With the exception of the retired military and some of the DD/I office alumni, the Board members have been in place for over half a decade.

46. The original Board was largely composed of individuals described as "outstanding scholars of national repute, experts in the fields of strategy, political science, economics, and other social sciences...." We believe the concept of having both outsiders and insiders, as it were, on the Board is a healthy one. The possibility of eventual promotion to the Board gives the senior staff member a goal. The outsiders bring to the Agency a fresh approach and help to stifle any tendency towards intellectual inbreeding.

47. It is apparently difficult to attract "name" scholars to become semi-permanent members of the Board. The inspection team believes the concept of part-time or short-term Board members from the outside is to be encouraged. For several years a member of the Princeton faculty has spent the bulk of his summer holiday

**S E C R E T**

serving as a most useful and productive Board member. We believe this infusion of fresh ideas should be encouraged and that a vigorous attempt should be made to attract other eminent academicians from different disciplines to join the Board for a number of successive summers, for a sabbatical year's leave or even a semester.

48. There is an almost unanimous opinion that the quality of the Board is uneven. In particular, we were advised that more than half of the military officers who served on the Board over the years made negligible contributions, although the contributions and performance of some military members have been outstanding. The general feeling exists that there is no longer any justifiable need or significant reason to continue to have representation from each of the three military services. We believe that there should be some military representation on the Board, but the abilities and qualifications of each individual candidate should be carefully and thoroughly assessed by the DD/I and AD/NE to eschew possible error. There should be no compulsion to recruit one officer from each of the services and to maintain three military officers on the Board at all times. If, on the other hand, one service were to nominate two outstanding officers for Board membership at the same time, we see no reason why both officers could not be appointed.

**S E C R E T**

**S E C R E T**

Board members must be selected because of their over-all skills and talents and not solely because of their past military affiliation.

It is recommended that:

No. 8

The policy of having a representative from each of the three military services on the Board be reconsidered.

49. We would favor bringing one or more senior foreign service officers and a scientist onto the Board. The nature of the Board does not lend itself to rigid delineation of the type of individual desired. Once again, we stress the need to insure that the individual is selected solely because of his outstanding qualifications. To get the high-level foreign service officer ONE seeks, it will probably be necessary for the DCI personally to approach the Secretary of State with a request for the services of an individual of ambassadorial rank and definitely one who has not retired. In the case of a scientist, since there are a limited number of NIE's with scientific overtones, we believe he should be sufficiently broad to be able to deal with problems outside his own field--possibly the type of individual desired is a professional writer on scientific subjects.

**S E C R E T**

It is recommended that:

No. 9

The AD/NE request the Director of Central Intelligence to ask the State Department for the services on the Board of National Estimates of a named individual of ambassadorial rank.

50. Since the Board's inception there has been a change in the nature of its contribution and in its work habits. Originally it was thought that a Board composed of prominent men with nationwide reputations was needed in order, through their quasi-judicial procedures, to enhance the estimates by conferring on them the Board members' own prestige and authority. The NIE is now recognized as authoritative in its own right. The workload in the early years was light enough so that the final form of each estimate represented the Board's corporate view. The increase in demands on the Board's time has made the corporate deliberation impossible in most situations and almost all NIE's are now handled by a panel from the Board consisting of the paper's chairman and two panel members. The chairman lends an aura of impartiality to the interagency discussions of the paper and the staff personnel are freed to concentrate on substance. Also there are public relations overtones to placing the Board's stamp of approval on an estimate or memorandum.

51. The increasing workload appears to have curtailed quite sharply the amount of time the individual Board member can devote



**S E C R E T**

to creative thought and writing on intelligence problems. The role of Board members has become largely critical. By promoting one of the luminaries of the Estimates Staff to the Board, OME in effect promotes him to a position where his specialized knowledge has less impact as time passes. The survey team is strongly of the opinion that greater opportunity should be provided for the younger members--Board members range in age from 41 to 64--to replenish the wellsprings of creativity. We are of the opinion that there is high caliber manpower available here that is not being sufficiently stimulated intellectually and that some revitalization of the EME's role is necessary.

52. Board appointments are made personally by the Director of Central Intelligence. At times, earlier DCI's have sought the views of Board members on a variety of problems. It may be that the present EME is not to be utilized in this manner. We would favor some experimentation to achieve a more stimulating role. It is possible that a closer relationship between the DE/I and the Board whereby the latter would serve as a high caliber reservoir to be tapped as needed for staff work would provide the creative opportunities now lacking. The team sees no loss in reducing the size of the Board panels to provide the DE/I with this informal staff assistance.

**S E C R E T**

It is recommended that:

No. 10

The AD/EE explore with the ID/I ways and means of enhancing the Board's role so that good men can be attracted and stimulated.

- 35 -

**S E C R E T**

S E C R E T

Consultants

53. Since early 1952 there has been a continuing program to associate leading civilian specialists in international affairs and former members of ONE with the CIA elements of the estimating process. The roster of consultants now stands at 23, including two in processing. Nine are former members of the Board of National Estimates and three are former members of the ONE Estimates Staff. Available consultants are assembled periodically at Princeton University as a panel to consult with appropriate Board and staff members on current estimates and estimating problems. The frequency of meetings during the early years was eight times annually. Currently this is declining to an average of four meetings per year. Several of the consultants serve periodically in ONE, and others in Government assignments are in frequent contact with the Agency on official business.

54. The original objective in establishing the consultant panel was to obtain independent expert judgment on national security problems and to guard against gaps and deficiencies in ONE staff and Board analysis. But the increasing professionalism of the ONE performance and the superior sources of information available to ONE have combined to alter the nature of the consultant relationship. Working staff were virtually unanimous in their

S E C R E T

judgment that the relationship had lost its principal intended value. It is now described as a one-way relationship on substantive problems in which the consultants are recipients rather than genuinely constructive contributors to the ONE analysis.

55. The potential value of the individual consultant is by no means ruled out, particularly in areas and subject fields where ONE experience is limited or where the pre-eminence or freshness of view of the potential consultant practically guarantees useful discussion. In the case of the Princeton panel, however, the ONE staff finds the corporate approach often superficial and time consuming. No satisfactory way has been found to prune from the panel those members who by staff consensus have ceased to make useful contributions.

56. Panel procedures were also criticized with respect to the time allotted participants--usually overnight--to familiarize themselves with the texts and critical problems analyzed in the estimates. An inordinate amount of group time is then expended making up for lack of "homework". Preferred approaches to consulting would include longer sessions with smaller groups thoroughly prepared for the discussions, or employment of the consultant at Headquarters to assist in the drafting of the estimate.

S E C R E T

57. Other values have been and continue to be attributed to the ONE consultant program. The consultants provide a link to the universities which is of potential value in promoting favorable attitudes toward intelligence and in assisting ONE with its recruitment problems. Such benefits are difficult to measure and it is questionable whether the present composition of the panel represents a broad enough approach to the universities in the matter of countering hostile attitudes towards intelligence. The team did not find convincing evidence that the consultants had lived up to their potential in either field.

58. In summary, the frame of reference for the present ONE consultant program has changed due to the growing competence of ONE personnel, the lack of flexibility in reaching experts who can make a significant contribution, and due to growing dissatisfaction with the consulting procedures.

It is recommended that:

No. 11

- a. The AD/NE terminate as a matter of regular practice the use of ONE consultants in panel consultations.
- b. The AD/NE pursue a policy of consultation with properly cleared individuals regarded by his staff and Board as capable of making constructive contributions to specific estimates particularly in the drafting phase.

S E C R E T

Miscellaneous Problems

Administration, Support and Space

59. ONE has succeeded ever since its inception in keeping its administrative, support and secretarial elements to a minimum. Out of a total on board strength of [ ] secretaries or typists and a Support Staff of nine. The latter group is composed of an Information Control Branch of [ ] who perform the normal document routing and registry functions for the office. The group also handles document logging for the DD/I's immediate office. A Publications Branch of [ ] individuals cuts stencils on the drafts of NIE's, proofreads drafts and printer's galleys of NIE's and runs off such other documents as the Daily Status Report. The Reading Room Branch with a staff of [ ] handles the library facilities in the special intelligence area.

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60. ONE is having a difficult time in finding and keeping adequate clerical assistance. ONE's situation in this regard is not unique but is a part of the larger Agency problem of encouraging secretaries to commute to the Headquarters Building. The team does wish to record its belief that ONE requires a high priority for secretaries in view of its already spartan staffing arrangements and, if necessary, its clerical grade structure should reflect this priority.

**S E C R E T**

61. ONE's administration is generally supervised by the DAD/NE. Day-to-day administrative problems, however, are concentrated in the hands of [redacted] a competent GS-12 who is one of ONE's charter members. This individual is responsible for preparing the budget, looking after travel, and selecting and supervising the secretarial-clerical members of the office. She has no designated assistant or deputy. The team understands that in her absence the administrative problems that cannot be postponed until her return are handled on a catch-as-catch-can basis. We are of the opinion that ONE should have a designated individual, in the grade range of GS-7 to 9, assisting the Administrative Officer and trained to take over during her absence.

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It is recommended that:

No. 12

The AD/NE take steps to acquire a slot and recruit an Assistant Administrative Officer.

62. The most serious single complaint voiced to the inspection team was the problem of crowded working conditions for the Estimates Staff. With the exception of the staff chiefs, the estimators are two or three to a room. Privacy for the production of thoughtful ideas couched in finished prose is unavailable. A number of staff members indicated they wrote the bulk of the work

S E C R E T

over the weekend when a modicum of privacy is available. It would appear to be outrageous economics to house the comparatively well-paid estimators under these rabbit warren conditions. We believe the minimum adequate for the individual is a single room, however small. If space is available elsewhere in the Headquarters structure other than on the seventh floor, we believe the need for space outweighs the convenience of being close to ONE's front office.

63. Security is also a potential problem under such close working conditions. There is a diffusion of responsibility, and when in a small complex, such as the EE Staff with [ ] people, some individuals have special clearances while others do not, risk of compromise is ever present.

25X1

It is recommended that:

No. 13

The AD/NE request the DD/I to make the strongest possible representation to the DD/S to make minimal adequate space available for the now badly overcrowded Estimates Staff.

Weekly Survey of Cold War Crisis Situations and Regional Surveys

64. The "Cold War Survey" evolved as an ONE publication about a year ago. The creation of the weekly is very largely in response to a request from General Maxwell Taylor, then Military Advisor to the President. It is understood to be for the consumption of top policy level readers and not for the country specialist.



S E C R E T

65. The Cold War Survey presents a capsule judgment of crisis areas--in essence almost an OCI handling of crisis situations. The "estimative" quality of ONE is brought into play by the function of a weekly review of current and potential problem areas and the decision as to which merit attention. The NIE process is brought to bear by means of a Board chairman, interagency coordination and USIB approval. The format of the Survey calls for the introduction of New Situations, changes in areas discussed in earlier issues and a checklist of watched areas.

66. Normally crisis situations are discussed on Fridays by the Board and Staff members assigned to the Survey along with two substantive representatives of OCI. The OCI personnel normally draft a third or more of the publication. The DD/P does not participate in the initial drafting. However, his comments are solicited on each draft prior to final publication. From first composition through USIB approval takes from Monday morning through Wednesday noon of each week.

67. This publication differs from the weekly report of the Watch Committee in that the latter covers military--hot war--situations while the Cold War Survey is more deeply involved in judgments of political situations, which in some cases have obvious military or counterinsurgency overtones such as recent Indonesian-West New

S E C R E T

Guinea developments. The team has been advised that the Watch Committee's general coverage is probably going to be restricted to the Sino-Soviet Bloc military threat. Such a development would throw a greater workload on the small group producing the Survey and their numbers may have to be enlarged. OCI is probably the place to look for such assistance.

68. The survey team discovered mixed readership interest in the publication. We were repeatedly assured that General Taylor found it very useful and liked the present format. A senior State Department official stated he read it faithfully and never found any "surprises" in it. A senior Pentagon official reported that it has a wide readership and that it is a useful publication. ONE staff generally were of the opinion that the publication is too costly and adds little to an understanding of the areas involved. In view of this mixed reaction, we believe that the views of the intelligence community should be solicited from time to time.

It is recommended that:

No. 14

The AD/NE poll the intelligence community periodically to determine the continuing usefulness of the Cold War Survey.

69. During the Summer of 1962 ONE initiated a new publication identified as the Regional Estimative Review. This publication

S E C R E T

is designed to provide a general estimative outlook on an area as a whole, the kinds of change considered likely to occur, and the foreseeable contingencies which might precipitate such change. We feel that such innovations are to be commended. An analysis of regional interrelationships should prove to be of value to policy makers concerned with such problems.

Priority National Intelligence Objectives

70. NSCID No. 1 lays on the DCI responsibility for identification on a current basis of Priority National Intelligence Objectives (PNIO's) and for their issuance to the intelligence community. PNIO's should be valid over a period and limited to those critical factors requiring special attention over and above normal collection and research efforts. The PNIO's have been divided into four broad categories of criticality and disseminated as per DCID No. 1/3 (Revised 7 March 1962). OME staffs out the PNIO's annually utilizing the NIE coordination mechanism. Submissions are received from contributing agencies, an OME draft is coordinated and the final draft goes to USIB for approval. No suggestions were proposed for modifying the existing system.

S E C R E T

Post-Mortems and Validity Studies

71. The post-mortem is a study prepared after the completion of a national intelligence estimate to record and highlight the deficiencies and gaps in information pertaining to the estimate. The study is coordinated and approved by the USIB and disseminated as an official USIB document. Essentially the post-mortem represents a guide to the collector, but the extent to which the collector relies on this study per se is dubious. There is naturally considerable overlap between the deficiencies recorded in a post-mortem and the regular requirements submitted by other CIA components and the rest of the intelligence community. The usefulness and value of a post-mortem is questioned by ONE, but two examples were cited wherein specific collection action was undertaken in apparent response to a post-mortem.

72. Initially a post-mortem was prepared routinely after the completion of each estimate. Fewer post-mortems were prepared in succeeding years despite an increase in the number of estimates, since ONE often considers a post-mortem unnecessary and of dubious value. There appears to be no clear-cut policy pertaining to the preparation of post-mortems. Today a post-mortem is prepared only if the drafter or chairman of an estimate or a USIB representative determines it to be worthwhile.

S E C R E T

73. The validity study is a review of the last estimate on a given subject to determine how accurate that estimate appears to be with the passage of time. It is usually undertaken about one year after the completion of the estimate and just prior to the beginning of a subsequent estimate on the same subject. The validity study is coordinated and approved by the USIB and disseminated as an official USIB document.

74. We understand that initially validity studies were regularly prepared for most estimates. The number of validity studies has decreased immeasurably over the years, since ONE has considered these studies to be too perfunctory. ONE feels that it is more useful and valuable to prepare a study assessing the validity of estimates completed over a period of several years on a given area or subject. Here again, the policy is unclear, and the decision to prepare a validity study is left to the discretion of the drafter or chairman of an estimate or to a request from a USIB representative.

It is recommended that:

No. 15

The AD/NE, in consultation with USIB representatives, establish firm guidelines delineating the conditions under which a post-mortem and/or validity study be prepared.

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**S E C R E T**

Promoting the Use of Estimates

78. We have ascertained that the national intelligence estimate is read with great interest by the highest levels of Government. However, it is still dubious whether the estimate is read as extensively as it should be throughout the Government. In view of its importance and potential impact on the making of policy, we feel that a campaign should be undertaken to insure that the estimate definitely reaches all appropriate senior officials. In this connection, we suggest that a personal copy of each estimate be sent to appropriate officials in State and Defense, e.g., an assistant secretary. This copy should be accompanied by a personal letter from the DCI, DDCI, or DD/I requesting an evaluation and comments on its utility. We feel that a promotional program of this kind will eventually insure a greater use and influence of the estimate on the policy-making apparatus.

It is recommended that:

No. 17

The DD/I transmit a personal copy of each estimate to selected Government officials to widen the readership and increase the influence of estimates among policy makers. Each copy should be accompanied by a personal letter from the DCI, DDCI, or DD/I requesting an evaluation and comments on its utility.

ONE Guidance on ORR and OSI Research Programs

79. The planned research programs of ORR and OSI are submitted to ONE for comments and suggestions. This system permits ONE to

**S E C R E T**

offer constructive suggestions and call attention to problem areas where these offices may be required to prepare contributions for national intelligence estimates. In this way the research programs can be streamlined to be more responsive to upcoming ONE requirements as well as to anticipate and eliminate unnecessary duplicative research. Regrettably in past years ONE only glanced at these programs and reacted in a very perfunctory manner. However, ONE took time and responded in some detail to OPR's latest research program. OPR was pleased and impressed with ONE's critical review and suggestions. Constructive criticism of research programs is a salutary and useful function and serves to develop a greater understanding between producer and consumer. ONE should be encouraged to review these programs regularly in a detailed and meaningful manner.

It is recommended that:

No. 18

The AD/NE insure that ONE review and comment constructively on the OPR and OSI research programs on a regular basis.

Estimating Relationships between ONE and the USCIB Agencies

80. Reference has been made previously to the limitations on an Agency inspection of an interagency process. There are severe restraints on identifying both substantive and management deficiencies in other agencies and in making practical



**S E C R E T**

recommendations for dealing with them. This survey presents very limited findings in this area. Presumably a USIB management mechanism or a White House Commission would be required to deal with this subject comprehensively.

81. Assignment of substantive jurisdictions to the USIB agencies as provided in NSCID No. 3 is regarded by many USIB observers as unnecessarily rigid. There is no obvious mechanism for review and redress when the level of research and estimative effort of a given USIB agency is regarded in ONE as deficient. None of these observers expressed fear of unnecessary duplication of effort among the agencies. Quite to the contrary, many individuals supported the right of any agency to prepare estimative contributions on any subject and endorsed the proposition that the criticizing agency institute its own research program to remedy the deficiencies it identified in the program of another agency. CIA research on military defense systems and on economic problems in western countries were the two examples on this point frequently cited to us.

82. The USIB specialized committees (e.g., the Scientific Intelligence Committee) do not appear to employ a policy of coordination of their estimative contributions consistent with the doctrine on this subject employed by the Board of National

S E C R E T

Estimates. The inspection team did not examine this subject with representatives of such committees, nor was there time to review a further proposal that the SIC, for example, should be provided with its own documentary series in which to publish interagency studies that present detailed analyses outside the accepted scope of the national estimate.

It is recommended that:

No. 19

The AD/NE submit to the USIB via the DD/I a proposal for review of USIB committee coordinating and publishing procedures; that the review be performed by the Assistant to the DCI for Coordination.

83. Many individuals with whom we discussed the estimative process suggested that the terms of reference for preparation of national intelligence estimates are now too formalistic and fail to insure that producers and consumers of estimates are fully informed of the context and core elements of each other's needs. There was general consensus that the remedy is to be found in face-to-face discussions of proposed terms of reference between appropriate representatives of ONE and the senior responsible officials in the policy-making offices of the Government. These observers believe that both parties would profit immensely from one or two early discussions of each forthcoming estimate and that the notes of such discussions

S E C R E T

should be published as a major element of the formal terms of reference. The press of business on senior officials would require that the AD/NE and DD/I provide the leadership in arranging these discussions.

It is recommended that:

No. 20

The DD/I establish the policy of holding face-to-face discussions between appropriate estimators and U.S. policy-making officials on the terms of reference of each forthcoming national intelligence estimate; that the notes of such discussions be appended to the present terms of reference for each forthcoming estimate.

84. The subject of appropriate level of research and estimative effort within each member agency of the USIB encompasses a variety of substantive and management issues. With respect to substantive performance we have recommended that there be a re-evaluation of the need and purpose of validity studies by ONE personnel and consultants. These studies should take poor performances to task wherever identified. On the subject of management of the USIB estimative process, we have commented earlier that the agencies participating in estimating are regarded as a loose confederation in which excellence of performance by the given agency is the principal means of bringing pressure to bear on deficient performance. There are no standards and no provisions for enforcement of community objectives concerning the

**S E C R E T**

selection, training, and career management of estimators. There is no formal provision for community review of the staffing and programming efforts of each member agency, for enforcement of deadlines, and for correction of deficient personal performances in writing and coordinating estimative drafts.

It is recommended that:

No. 21

The DD/I in concert with the Assistant to the DCI for Coordination propose to the USIB a review of management aspects of the USIB estimating process for the purpose of recording agreed deficiencies in estimating performance, improving procedures, establishing standards of personnel selection and career management, and evaluating periodically the objectives and levels of research effort in the intelligence agencies.

DD/P - ONE Relations

85. There is no formal requirement that the DD/P provide regular contributions to the national estimating process. However, DD/P suggestions are invited on the scheduling of topics for future estimating and on the terms of reference for specific estimates getting under way.

86. Most ONE staff with whom the subject was discussed considered that their communication with the DD/P was satisfactory and that the DD/P was becoming increasingly frank and cooperative in describing its programs and objectives in areas under estimative analysis. Exchange of personnel between the two areas

S E C R E T

has been rather limited in the past and this survey has provided recommendations on this subject earlier in this Section.

87. Appraisal of the significance of estimates to the DD/P involved substantive questions which could not be fully investigated within the scope of the present inspection. An example illustrating the fact that NIE's and operational programs are not always in accord concerned estimative views on covert action projects now under way in [ ] ONE staff members observed that, in their judgment, these projects in the past have been oriented too narrowly to the support of political factions hostile to any accommodation of their parties vis a vis the [ ] Without judging the merits of this particular issue, it would seem essential that wide disparities of view between the DD/P and the DD/I be recognized and re-examined frequently. One means of insuring such exchange of views would be to solicit DD/I-ONE comment annually on the Related Missions Directives of the DD/P for foreign countries. The DD/P should on such occasions brief key DD/I personnel on the general scope of their covert action programs. No recommendation is offered on this point since it applies to DD/I-DD/P relations in general and not alone to the ONE-DD/P relationship. In addition, the small size of the ONE Estimates Staff and the heavy workloads carried by

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S E C R E T

its senior members preclude any major increase in activity in this area. We believe, however, that the major objective here is valid, namely that estimators acquire a sharp appreciation of the policy positions and operating problems of intelligence consumers.

- 56 -

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