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INDONESIAN NEWS SERVICE

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3RD ANNIVERSARY
INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE
NUMBER.



*Economic, Political, Military
Duress . . . So then the Renville . . .*

STAT



At His Laughing Best.....
(Sedang Ketawa Hebat)

Amazement at the one-track mind of the man becomes major..... Unity for independence, is the one dictum President Soekarno has, for 21 years, unflinchingly pursued. Is a doctor in Engineering.

(Laabang persatuan bagi Republik Indonesia Merdeka - President Soekarno. Beliau adalah Dektor bahagian Engineer.)

**Rare Christian
Among Muslims**

(Seorang Christian dikalangan Kaum Muslimin)

Amir Sharifuddin, ex-premier, is president of the People's Democratic Front. Leader who suffered most during the Japanese regime.

(Tuan Amir Sharifuddin-Bekas P.M. Pemimpin yang banyak menderita dizaman Jepang.)



On The Distaff Side
Sebagai Seorang Ibu
Mrs Soekarno coping into a mike... or, at least, seemingly so.....

(Nyonya Soekarno berbichara dihadapan alat pembesar suara



Strong - Man of Indonesia
(Orang Kuat Indonesia)

Premier Hatta, concurrently Vice-President, is by profession an economist; finishing his Doctorate in Leiden University.

(Perdana Menteri menangkap Wk Presiden Dr. Moh. Hatta Professor Economy keluaran University Leiden)



**C - in - C of Field Troops,
Indonesia Army**
(Panglima Besar Sudirman)

Lt-General Sudirman led the Indonesians in the Battle of Ambarawa).

**Grand Old Man of
Indonesia**

(Orang Tua Indonesia yang terkenal)

Though 63 this be-whiskered Foreign Minister is still full of fun and ginger. He speaks and writes in 13 languages.

PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

(ORIGINAL WORDAGE)

— D E C L A R A T I O N : —

"WE THE PEOPLE OF INDONESIA DO HEREBY DECLARE
THE INDEPENDENCE OF INDONESIA!"

"ALL PROCESSES PERTAINING TO
THE TRANSFER OF POWER AND OTHER SUCH ISSUES
WILL BE UNDERTAKEN PEACEABLY,
AT THE QUICKEST POSSIBLE TIME".

DJAKARTA AUGUST 17 1945
ON BEHALF OF THE INDONESIANS
SUKARNO - HATTA

A LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

Dear Reader,

Special issues or numbers of any kind must obviously be released for special reasons. We forward a fairly valid one: the Third Independence Anniversary of the Republic of Indonesia.

In the process of putting out such a publication, we are beset by the great fear that the finished product may only be earmarked as one more propaganda hand-out though in a "cutified" (quoting Andy Roth) form.

As newspapers and magazines had emblazoned, ~~the~~ heavy verbal battles had raged in Lake Success over the Indonesian-Dutch issue. Reports emanating from all sources have been released for reader consumption. Thanks to journalistic ethics, whereby all correspondents have had to abide by the credo that news reports must not be coloured or slanted as per personal opinion, various news agencies and papers have, to a certain extent, managed to give an objective view of the Indonesian situation.

Yet, hampered by circumstances and the lack of proper channels into fact sources, consequent result is that a superficial aspect of the question is sometimes presented. To make up for this shortcoming, and to enlighten interested parties further on the affair the Indonesian News Service undertook the job as medium of the Singapore Indonesia Office in its dissemination of news from and into Indonesia on Indonesia and anything else tied up with it.

But apart from this connection we strive hard at all times, discounting emotionalism and pre-judices (note Tregaskis' article within, which, to a point is unfavourably revealing, though certain facts had been hepped-up for color and sensation.), to stick to cut-and-dried news. This tack will, I believe, be more effective in our line of attempt to provide our readers, sympathetic or otherwise, with reports on the true state of affairs.

On a tight budget (contrary, unfortunately, to rumour bruited around that the Indonesia Office is wallowing in ill-gotten dollars); and barely a weeks time to assemble material; haggle with printers; make faces at unfortunate suggestions; we present our "baby" with trepidation and modest down-cast eyes.

Sly digs, well-meant criticizisms, remarks cruelly decisive, and (from the really generous natured) bravos and huzzahs; will be dealt with swiftly and accordingly.

At this juncture, we will pass along the information, that the man in our front cover, wearing a "pitji" and mouthing words into a mike, is Dr. Amir Sharifuddin, then Premier of Indonesia. He says his piece before he binds his country to the Renville Agreements.

We will take a bow for now and no rotten eggs or garden products please.....

Cordially,

E. E. M.

TO SINGAPORE INDONESIANS.....

M E R D E K A !

Today the Republic of Indonesia is 3 years old. Within the span of these 3 years we had undergone tremendous sacrifices and which in return have resulted to the achievement of a fair amount of progress. To Indonesians in Singapore and Malaya the establishment of an Indonesia Office, centered in Singapore, is material proof of what has been gained.

At the celebration of this memorable day, Indonesia Office will also have reached its year old maturity. Although resultant effect of its establishment has not been felt by all Indonesians in this country; it has fairly succeeded as an apparatus for enlightening the outside world on Indonesia. For this we can attribute to the splendid cooperation shown by the Indonesians here in Singapore,..... a success which we are all proud of.

But we cannot just rest on our laurels. We have yet a great responsibility before us. There are other work to be done.

I hope this vital day will inspire us Indonesians in foreign countries to double efforts in the fulfillment of our ^{part-} defending our right

A SOVEREIGN , INDEPENDENT INDONESIA.

TETAP MERDEKA!

Dr. R. Octoyo
Representative of the Republic of Indonesia
Singapore.

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17 August 1948.

RESUME OF THE INDONESIAN POSER

- I. Foreword
- II. The Nationalist Movement and Birth of the Republic
- III. The Road to Linggadjati
- IV. The Economic Aspects
- V. The Current Political Situation
- VI. Latest Developments

I. Foreword:

The basic issue which 72,000,000 Indonesians have been trying to resolve in the dispute with the Dutch which began when they proclaimed **their** independence throughout the rich archipelago at the end of the Japanese occupation, is whether in the future they will work for themselves or for 10,000,000 Dutchmen in far-off Holland.

The Dutch have tried to obscure this one fact. Protesting loudly that all along they had intended to give the Indonesians their freedom, the Dutch have pictured the Republicans to the world as hot-headed extremists, **infected** by Communism, unfit to bring freedom to Indonesia and rule it.

For them, the issue since they returned to the islands from which the Japanese booted them out so unceremoniously in 1942, has been painfully clear: hang onto Indonesia or face the dismal prospect of finding somewhere else that 15 per cent of their national income which for

350 years provided them with one of the world's highest standards of living.

The Republican position was equally clear. They saw their people wallowing in the mire of sub-standard living while all around them were the bounties of an extractive economy unsurpassed anywhere.

Dutch Trained Colonists

The Dutch had advertised themselves throughout the world as the model colonists. They established faculties at their universities where young men were trained in the fine points of colonial administration, in the language, law, history and culture of the colony.

But the Republican view was that the Dutch had still not got down to the fundamentals of human welfare. After 350 years of Dutch rule, there were just enough schools in Indonesia to produce a literacy rate of nine per cent and just one trained doctor for every 70,000 people.

The Republicans believed that they could do better.

II. THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC

The Republic of Indonesia, sired by a Japanese occupation three and a half years old out of a Nationalist Movement 40 years old, was born in the Netherlands East Indies on August 17, 1945.

The collapse of the Japanese was the opportunity for which the Republican leaders, convinced that an

"For Brother Indonesia....."

(“Untuk Sudara2 Bangsa Indonesia . . .”).

Three of Indian volunteers at Solo Railway Station going on leave from the “front” .

Note Japanese hand grenade hanging from belt (Utusan Melayu Picture.

(Tiga perajurit bangsa India diperhentian Kereta api Solo - pulang berhat “pertempuran”.

Lihatlah bomd tangan Djepang di pinggangnya.



In Memoriam . . .

(Sebagai Peringatan . . .)

To the war-dead of Indonesia towers this memorial stone in Djakarta.

A. P. Correspondent Harris Jackson manfully improves the scenery with a nonchalant strong-man stance. Easy does it . . . A bored air with the chest muscles rigidly stuck out and presto - Atlas in mufti . . .

Pal, Eric Werner of the French News Agency, stifles a shy giggle with a delicate finger (Utusan Melayu Picture).

(Untuk memperingati parapahlawan Indonesia yang tewas didirikanlah Tugu Peringatan ini di Djakarta.

Saorang wartawan A. P. Harris Jackson, kanan dan saorang wakil Pemberita Pranchis, Eric Werner (kiri) telah pernah mengunjungi tugu tersebut.




Walls Scream Out . . .

The Tide of March will not be halt and neither can freedom for Indonesia - is the essence of the message of placards, posters and "hand-writings on the wall".

Jogja walls have become favourite media for the display of Indonesian artistic flair. The feverish chant for "Merdeka" has given way to more sober and sophisticated credos.

Note samples of modern art-work at the two lower photos. (Utusan Melayu Pictures.)



Tembok2 Juga Terus Bersuara
Sebagaimana gelombang yang begitu juga perjuangan kemerdekaan anti Belanda Indonesia berjalan terus menerus berhenti2 - demikian

Anglo-American victory was certain, had planned and organized.

They had been left to their own devices in dealing with the Japanese by the surrender of about 10,000 Dutch troops in 1942. Due to the colonial policy of the Dutch, which gave them opportunities only in the petty areas of government, the Indonesians found themselves unequipped to fight and unprepared for the disaster which had overtaken them.

Freedom was Elusive

It soon became apparent to the Nationalist leaders that freedom under the Japanese was as elusive as under the Dutch. They had been placed in the position of trading one master for another. The Nationalist Movement began actively to prepare for the end of the war in the Pacific by splitting into two groups. Soekarno, who is today the President of the Republic, took over the leadership of Indonesia in a superficial collaboration with the Japanese, and Sjarifuddin went underground as the leader of the Resistance. He has since been Prime Minister of the Republic under Soekarno. Hatta, the present Prime Minister, and Sjahrir, the Benjamin Franklin of Indonesia, also played their roles.

The major gain of the Nationalists during the occupation was the experience that thousands of Indonesians obtained in administration.

The Dutch had educated at their universities in

Holland only a select few. These were the men who assumed the leadership of the Nationalist Movement in its 40 year struggle against Colonial rule. As a consequence, they spent a good deal of their time in Dutch jails and concentration camps. The Japanese brought Soekarno out of one in 1942.

Movement Lacked Unity

Besides the lack of trained people, the Nationalist Movement in Indonesia suffered equally from a lack of unity. For a long time it had been mainly a religious movement of Moslems. Then it went through a period of militant demand for outright freedom for Indonesia. Finally, its program proposed the British Commonwealth idea of equal partnership, which the Dutch refused to accept until, under the stress of war and future uncertainties, they put it forward in an emasculated form in 1942 as their own idea.

There were few military problems facing the Japanese in Indonesia. The collapse of the Dutch had been so final, the position of the Indonesians themselves so helpless, that the Japanese were able to get along with fewer than 300,000 troops.

Accordingly, to save additional man-power, they trained thousands of Indonesians in the elementary arts of government administration and, until it suddenly rose up against them in an abortive rebellion, they recruited and trained an Indonesian army in the arts of war.

Spurred on by this challenge, the Republicans worked hard to disarm the Japanese and, consolidating their authority over Java, Sumatra and Madura - the three principle islands - began to extend it to Borneo and to the Great East - the Celebes, Moluccas and New Guinea.

At length, an Allied force was readied to land in Indonesia to accept the Japanese surrender and to liberate internees. The first plan was to send in an American force, but the Dutch at the last moment requested that the British do the job.

Trouble with British

The British were almost a disappointment to the Dutch, who expected better support for their interests from a fellow Colonial power. But the British had gone into Indonesia with large numbers of Indian troops and could not take the risk of alienating India by getting rough with the Indonesians.

Initially, the British accepted and dealt with the Republican government, which took the responsibility for the evacuation of Japanese troops from the interior and for the welfare of Dutch and other civilian internees. All this was handled with sufficient dispatch that the British command managed to stay clear off political - if not military - embroilment until the Dutch themselves were beginning to organize and return.

Trouble broke out between the Republicans and

Japan Opposed Republic

When the end came for Japan, their forces in Indonesia had no formal policy toward the Republic that was taking shape under their noses. There were those in the Japanese high command who strongly opposed the formation of the Republic; there were others who felt that the proclamation of independence would store up trouble for the Western powers; those who winked an eye at it because they felt that Japan had dealt only deuces to the Indonesians; and those who were just indifferent.

The Japanese garrisons which were over-run and disarmed by the hastily assembling Indonesian Army seldom put up resistance to the last man.

Mostly by insinuation, the Dutch have tried to create the impression that the Republic was the inspirational child of the Japanese. Had there been in Indonesia in 1942 any concrete government of the people, with coherent leadership, even under Dutch Colonial rule, this charge could be valid. But Indonesia was a political vacuum.

III. THE ROAD TO LINGGADJATI

The end of the war and the proclamation of the Republic caught the Dutch off-balance in Australia, the war-time seat of the Dutch East Indies Government. Baffled at the turn of events, they were indiscreet enough to order the Japanese to retain control until they could get there.

the British when the latter began to extend their perimeters in the major ports which they occupied. There was severe fighting in several areas, particularly in Surabaya, where Brigadier Mallaby was accidentally killed by one of his own Indian troops and the Republicans were blamed, and in Bandung.

The Dutch Face the Facts

By this time, the Dutch had taken over from the Australians in the Great East, had returned to Borneo and were pouring in increasing numbers into Java, Sumatra and Madura - the hub of the new Republic - under the British wing.

However, they faced a situation which no amount of wishful thinking on the part of the "Old Guard", who longed for a return to the "good old days" of normalcy on a rich colony, and propaganda could evaporate. The Republic was there and however much the Dutch pretended to object to dealing with so-called collaborationists, they had to do so. They could blame the British for having, in 14 months, allowed the fledgling Republic to dig itself in, but they still had to swallow their pride and negotiate. The British, with a far better appreciation of the damage that a blow-off in Indonesia could do throughout the Far East, sent Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, later Washington Ambassador Lord Inverchapel, to help the settlement along.

At a late stage of the negotiations, after Inverchapel had assumed his post in Washington, the British sent Lord Killearn (formerly Sir Miles Lampson, High

Commissioner in Egypt) as mediator to Indonesia.

The settlement reached was the Linggadjati Agreement, which was signed on March 25, 1947, after 16 months of bickering negotiation. Charles Wolf, a former American Vice-Consul at Batavia, has stated that the negotiations were "dominated by the will and stature of two men, Sjahrir and van Mook" (Hubertus van Mook, the Dutch Governor-General.)

Pressure on Negotiations

Part of the trouble on the Road to Linggadjati was that the Dutch at home were still not reconciled to negotiation with the Republic. At first they had refused to deal with Soekarno and Hatta, maintaining that these two leaders had been tools of the Japanese. The only man they would look at was Sjahrir.

Everything possible was done to complicate the task of van Mook and Sjahrir. The Governor-General was attacked by the press of his own country, as well as by Indonesian newspapers, and Sjahrir was being continually reminded of the eight years which he had spent in Dutch prisons.

Proposals and counter-proposals were the daily lot of these men and their staffs. A change of government in Holland itself held up the negotiations while the new Cabinet reviewed its Indonesian policy under strong right-wing pressure to force the final outcome. Subsequently, the formation of the new government was held to be rela-

ted to a stiffening in Dutch policy and a change of heart on the part of van Hook before the outbreak of actual war.

At the signing of the Agreement, the Dutch leaders formally met Soekarno and put their signatures to a declaration that recognized the de facto authority of the Republic in Java, Sumatra and Madura; that proposed a United States of Indonesia comprising the Republic, Borneo and East Indonesia; a Netherlands-Indonesian Union to be established not later than January 1, 1949, and dealt with other matters of common interest.

Interpretations Differ

On the surface, the Agreement seemed to favor the Republic, inasmuch as the Dutch recognized its authority over Java, Sumatra and Madura. Actually, the opposite was true.

The Dutch had got the Republic to agree to become, in the United States of Indonesia, merely a State in a Federal State. That hub of Indonesian Nationalism could therefore hope to control the affairs of the Union only because Java, Sumatra and Madura represented three-fifths of the population and two-thirds of the wealth.

Furthermore, the Dutch, soon after the signing, began to interpret the clause referring to the formation of the United States of Indonesia as meaning only that the Republic would cooperate after the formation, not that the Republic would be included in its de facto form.

The Dutch began to hold out for a Federal State

of equal parts; the Republic for inclusion in its de facto form. There was no meeting of the minds on this difference of interpretation and the situation soon deteriorated into the war of aggression by the Dutch which was terminated by the United Nations Cease-Fire Order of August 1, 1947.

IV. THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS

Indonesia is one of the world's greatest producing economies. Her products are legion - oil, rubber, tin, manganese, bauxite, kapok, timber, gold, oil palm products, tea and coffee, sugar, coconut products, rice, sago and tapioca and spices of all kinds.

It was Indonesia, probably, that Columbus was seeking when he discovered America. Subsequently, the wealth-hungry adventures of Spain and Portugal did get there, although their opportunities for exploitation were short-lived.

The Spaniards, soon to be decimated by the British Navy, could not muster the strength to reconsolidate their position, and the Portuguese passed from the picture with them. The British, becoming increasingly involved throughout the world, let Indonesia go to the Dutch more or less by default, although when they ruled in place of the Dutch while Holland was undergoing occupation by Napoleon, there was a strong bid by Sir Stamford Raffles to retain Indonesia. He had to settle for Singapore and Malaya instead and the return of Indonesia to the Dutch in

in 1814 was the great disappointment of his life.

Dutch Controlled Trade

The Dutch East Indies Company first held sway in the archipelago. The Royal Netherlands Government took over only when the Company went broke as a result of the developing complication of government and military protection of its commercial holdings.

Under the thrifty Dutch, whose genius for profitable organization cannot be denied, Holland flourished at the expense of the Indonesians.

Before the war, the Dutch held investments in Indonesia reported to be worth about four billion dollars as against British investments of about 300 million and American of 250 million.

The Dutch controlled Indonesia's trade by a most intricate system of preferences that diverted the trade where they wanted it to go. Holland and Europe generally got the best of the trade both ways. America had only a small portion. In 1939, for example, when Indonesia's total trade was worth about 700 million dollars, America could buy only 90 million dollars worth of goods and sell in return only 36 million dollars worth of goods.

This is largely why the Dutch cannot easily be dislodged from Indonesia, despite the written agreement that all foreign holdings, Dutch included, will be respected by the Republic.

Broadly speaking, the Dutch are not afraid of

having their holdings expropriated. What they are afraid of is the increased foreign competition they fear will result if the Republic controls the United States of Indonesia and hence trade and foreign affairs.

Holland, which before the war could supply Indonesia with one-quarter of her imports under ~~s~~ strongly protective tariffs, couldn't stand up against America in a free market.

Blockade Reveals Fear

This state of affairs would be assured if for no other reason than that the Republic, badly in need of consumer goods and equipment which only America can supply today in anything like the quantities ~~required,~~ would first of all sell her produce to America direct, eliminating the Dutch middleman and gathering in the dollar profits herself.

Nothing but Dutch apprehension can account for the naval-air blockade which they have thrown round the Republic, despite the de facto authority invested by the Linggadjati Agreement, to cut off completely any foreign trade until a political settlement as favorable as possible to the Dutch and their economic interests can be reached.

The Dutch view with horror the possibility that the Republic might begin a direct trade with America that would be hard, if not impossible, to terminate or reduce later.

It also explains why the Dutch have been working so feverishly, in the areas which they occupy, to increase their exports beyond this year's estimated 350 million dollars. They want the dollar profits from their investments. It explains, too why they are negotiating a 400 million dollar profits from their investments. It explains, too, why they are negotiating a 400 million dollar American loan to Indonesia. They want further to develop the resources which they hold.

Republic's Economic Principles

The Republican leaders have opened the door to the foreign investor in a way that the Dutch never did. All the necessary safeguards and incentives to foreign capital, especially American, will be provided, if it will develop the country in cooperation with the Indonesian people and their government.

At the present moment the Republic owns stockpiles worth an estimated 200 million dollars.

Only comparatively small amounts can be exported by "running the blockade". The remainder is available for immediate shipment to America when the blockade can be lifted.

In its economic policy the Republican Government has said in official statements that it will be guided by the following principles:

1. There should be free access to the material wealth of Indonesia and no monopoly will be sponsored as was the case in the past under colonial rule.

2. Foreign investments in all fields will be encouraged, in order to raise the production of the country.
3. The Government is prepared to give sufficient incentives to foreign economic groups, willing to take up economic activities in Indonesia. * Such incentives could be given in the form of special Government assistance, with regard to taxes, duties, etc.
4. The Republic of Indonesia guarantees to safeguard and protect foreign interests and will refrain from any unilateral confiscation of foreign properties.
5. As the Government is anxious to raise production as quickly and as efficiently as possible, it will encourage and sponsor to a very great extent the setting-up of private interests as long as it is not detrimental to the general welfare of the population and as long as private interests are willing to comply with the social acts and labour regulations in force which are meant to achieve a reasonable degree of social security for the Indonesian people.

V. THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION

In their war of aggression of July and August, 1947, the Dutch occupied western Java, all of Madura and East Sumatra, as well as the major ports in each island. Much of this work was accomplished during the three days that followed the U.N. Cease-Fire Order. It was not until August 4 that Dutch forces ceased to operate.

This military action was the final breakdown of the Linggadjati Agreement. The Dutch had decided to get tough.

The intervention of the Security Council probably saved the Republic from immediate extinction, a

The Renville and Indonesia (Perjanjian Renville dan Indonesia)

Aboard his ship, American Captain Tyree says his piece before the Dutch and Republican signatories sign on the dotted lines.

From his right is Paul van Zeeland, the Belgian member of the G O C; N. Narayan ex-Secretary of the UN GOC and Justice Kirby former Australian GOC member.

From Tyree's left is Mr. Graham, the American Representative to GOC (who was temporarily relieved as President of North Carolina University that he may hold the post) and Dr. Thomas Critchley, now the Australian member of the Good Offices Committee. (I. N. S. Picture).



(Diatas kapalnya, Captain Tyree (Amerika) menerangkan, bahwa perjanjian yg dibawanya telah ditanda tangan oleh wakil2 Republik dan Belanda. Dari kanan Captain itu ialah: Paul van Zeeland (Anggota Belgia), lalu N. Narayan bekas setia usaha K. T. N. dan Hakim Kerby (Anggota Australia dalam KTN). Dari kiri Tyree Mr. Cochran (Wakil Amerika) dan Dr. Thomas Critchley (Anggota Australia dalam KTN sekarang).

Kaliurang: April 19, 1948.



At the first Kaliurang Conference (Republican seat of Renville Negotiations) Mrs. Kirby wife of


Mr. Justice Kirby - then Australian Member of the GOC - went along.

At her left is ex-Vice Premier Setiadjit. Man slumped comfortably on his chair and who holds the attention of all is obviously the Kirby.

(Persidangan Pertama diKaliurang (Tempat perundingan tentang Renville didaerah Republik).

Nyonya Hakim Kirby (Anggota Australia dalam KTN) turut sama. Di sebelah kiri nyonya Kirby ialah Dr. Setiadjit (bekas P. M. muda). Yang duduk sehat diatas kursinya, dengan keadaannya yang tenang, ialah tuan Kirby.

**Doing the Van Mook Line
(Menyelenggarakan Garisan Van Mook)**




A group of Dutch and Republican Military Officers are shown surveying the territory of West Java during the final delineation of that area's status quo-line. GOC military observers were among the group. (I. N. S. Pictures).

Sepasukan Opsir2 Belanda dan Republik kelihatan memeriksa daerah Djawa Timor untuk menentukan garis pembatasan (status quo-line) bagi daerah tersebut. K. T. N. juga kelihatan bersama.)

"The Demarcation line drawn by van Mook on August 29, 1947, shall be recognised as the 'status quo-line' which separates the areas controlled by each side. The Military and police personnel of both sides shall not be allowed to pass through the status quo-line except in accordance to specified regulations."- (2nd Point Truce Agreement).

Members of the Dutch and Republican Military Officers that met for the status quo-line conference at the Priangan Sector. Lt. Col. A. Kawilarang of the Republican Armed Forces stands in front, second from right. GOC observers were present. (I. N. S. Pictures.)

(Opsir2 Belanda dan Republik Indonesia di "konferensi status quo-line" di daerah Priangan.)



**Non-Belligerence At Work
(Perajurit Keamanan Sibuk Bekerja)**

fact for which it has been grateful. Consequently, the Republic's policy is strict adherence to every decision of the Council and full cooperation with the Committee of Good Offices which was established by the Council to sit in on the settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute.

The powers of the C.O.G. from the start were limited to playing the role of a "drink pourer" at negotiations. It was given no power to arbitrate. It could relay the complaints of one party to the other, and pass on impartially gathered evidence to the Council.

Negotiated Agreement

Its initial accomplishment in the Indonesian dispute was the Truce Agreement followed by the Renville Agreement of January, 1948.

The Renville Agreement has been branded by some as a very poor bargain for the Republic, but the Republic, reposing its trust in the U.N., adheres to it strictly. It established a truce between the Republic and the Dutch, but on the basis of Dutch gains in their police action. The Republic in effect signed away territory over which it had earlier held the de facto authority of the Linggadjati Agreement.

In return for the Truce, the Republic got a promissory note in one clause of the Renville Agreement that plebiscites would be held in the disputed areas not fewer than six months and not more than one year after the final political settlement, that is, the formation of the United States of Indonesia.

The Renville Agreement also provided guarantees of freedom of speech and press, and assembly looking toward political organization.

The ink on the document was hardly dry when the Dutch held a spurious plebiscite in Madura and shortly thereafter proclaimed the creation of a new state for inclusion in the United States of Indonesia. The "plebiscite", in which fewer than half the qualified voters took part, allegedly revealed 90 per cent anti-Republican sympathy, enabling van Mook to issue his decree authorizing the new state. Two months later, 30 pro-Republicans were elected to the Madura Council consisting of 40 members.

The Dutch next called a West Java Conference. Two others followed and there emerged, as well as the pattern of Dutch tactics in the political battle for control in Indonesia, a sort of political organization for a West Java State. Later there came the establishment of a State of East Sumatra.

The Republic was being subjected to political blockade as well as economic blockade - a kind of "cutting down to size" that the Dutch could cope with.

Here was the Dutch interpretation of the Renville Agreement being put into operation. In slicing out of the Republic and setting up as new states to be included in the United States of Indonesia the areas which they had occupied, the Dutch were creating their foundation for

a United States of Indonesia of more or less equal parts. The de facto authority of the Republic was being ignored.

That the Dutch were deliberately creating "puppet states" in Indonesia was vigorously denied by Mr. van Kleffens, the Dutch Ambassador at Washington, at the Security Council's discussion of the First Interim Report of the C.O.G. last February.

Compromise Accepted

The Council heard the arguments of Mr. van Kleffens that the Committee's work was done and it could be dispensed with, and the request of Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, the Republican spokesman, that the Committee be given increased powers.

The Council passed a Canadian compromise proposal that the Committee continue its operations and a Chinese proposal that it investigate the political situations in West Java and Madura, in view of Republican charges that "puppet states" were being created in those areas. East Sumatra did not figure in the Council's adoption of the Chinese resolution because the new State was not established until later.

When the Committee's Report on West Java was forwarded to the Council and released, it disclosed that:

Despite Dutch denials that they had called the Conferences leading toward political organization, they had in fact done so;

As in the so-called Madura plebiscite, fewer than half of the qualified voters were able to exercise their franchise in the election of

delegates to the Conference because notification of election was given in some cases more than 15 days and in others only three days in advance;

Regulations pertaining to a State of war and siege were invoked by the Netherlands authorities to forbid political gatherings that intended opposition to the Conference.

Substitute Colonialism

The Dutch want a truncated Republic. They want a United States of Indonesia comprising East Indonesia, Borneo, West Java, Madura, East Sumatra and a Republic consisting only of what is left of Sumatra and Java. The existence of "puppet States" of their own creation in the U.S.

of I. will enable the Dutch, in the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, to exercise an indirect political control and economic dominance that will represent as satisfactory a substitute for colonial rule as it would be possible to imagine.

They have indicated recently by two separate actions how far they are prepared to go in blockading the Republic, one in calling a federal conference of all constituent areas except the Republic; and two, in breaking off negotiations with the Republic on the flimsy excuse that compromise proposals offered by two members of the C.O.G. were allowed to leak to the American press.

The federal conference is being held to discuss all practical steps in the formation of the United States of Indonesia. The Dutch protest that its purpose is simply an informal exchange of views on the subject.

The Republican reply is that so was the First West Java Conference an informal exchange of views, but it led to political organization.

The breaking off of negotiations may only mean that the Dutch now want to see the cards in the Republican hand. The Republicans are still willing to negotiate. But their concessions so far have been countless. They now want to see what the Dutch will do.

VI. LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The compromise proposal, offered by the American and Australian members of the C.O.G., simply would do away with the plebiscites because of the conflict over where they will be held, and substitute instead direct election of an assembly to establish an interim government leading to the formation of the United States of Indonesia.

The Dutch are understood to have objections to this plan, but this is not why they chose to rupture negotiations on the additional grounds that the proposals had been allowed to leak to the press.

The work of the C.O.G. has been distasteful to the Dutch. They have been trying to discredit its efforts for several months now, beginning at the Security Council's discussion of the First Interim Report last February when the Dutch argued that the C.O.G.'s work was done and that its services could be dispensed with.

Much to the chagrin of the Dutch delegation then, the Council adopted the Canadian compromise re-

questing the C.O.G. to continue and also the Chinese resolution that it lock into the developments in West Java and Madura.

Dutch Strongly Criticized

The Dutch have been afraid that this work would inevitably reveal to the world the facts behind the creation of the "puppet states" and similarly the degenerating effects of their economic blockade on the Republic.

At the Security Council discussion following the rupture, the Dutch found a number of nations allied against them on the side of the Republic. Sniping at the Dutch by the representatives of China, India, the Philippines and Australia was accurate and concentrated, but they escaped relatively unscathed when the Council did not adopt a suggestion by the Syrian delegate that the blame for the breaking off of negotiations be fixed.

Before the Council could meet again, the Dutch agreed to resume negotiations with the Republic.

But this more favourable turn of events could not offset the gloomy report made to the Council by the C.O.G., which had to admit that its efforts in Indonesia were not meeting with success. The report plainly indicated that the C.O.G. was discouraged. The Republicans and the Dutch were glaring at each other with suspicion across the status quo lines. The effects of the blockade on the internal situation in the Republic were becoming more severe. Nowhere did there seem to be any real meeting of the minds.

Prime Minister Hatta's Views

At this point, Prime Minister Hatta spoke up in an interview with the Christian Science Monitor, Daniel L. Schorr, and stated in effect that the situation, although sickly, was by no means beyond repair.

"In the end," said the Prime Minister, "the two countries must establish friendly relations as soon as possible. We must have confidence in each other. Quick action is necessary because of the situation all over the world.

"Holland must strengthen herself, and we can help Holland more than she thinks once we are free to exploit our natural resources and introduce economic planning. We can strengthen and perhaps save, the economy of the Dutch. We are prepared to place large orders in Holland, give them a preferred position in Indonesian economy, and ask their aid in building new industries needed for Indonesian reconstruction."

"For example, we might be in a position to guarantee a loan placed by the Dutch abroad because of our vast resources. We want economic cooperation with the Dutch; we can certainly use their technicians and experts. But we must first have confidence in each other."

Four Proposals Offered

Prime Minister Hatta listed, informally, his proposals:

1. Accept the suggestion of the C.O.G.

2. Solve the question of sovereignty during the interim period by an arrangement similar to that employed by Lord Wavell in India. The Republic would recognize Dutch de jure sovereignty, but with the understanding that the de facto authority would be in Indonesian hands.
3. Reduce the Republican army from 462,000 to 50,000 or 60,000 and place it under joint command with a Dutch force.
4. Avoid extension of the Republic's foreign relations, but maintain what has been built up so far as a contribution to the diplomatic service of the future United States of Indonesia.

These proposals of Prime Minister Hatta cover all the disputed points with the exception of the details of the proposed Union of the Netherlands and the United States of Indonesia. The Republicans view the Dutch plan as simply the establishment of a "super-state" instead of a union of two equal sovereign states.

Concessions Required

The elements for an understanding now exist. There is required only a meeting of the minds in order to achieve it. But it is apparent that concessions must be made by the Dutch, too.

In fact, it is their turn to do so. As Prime Minister Hatta declared, "If we have to abolish what we have built up, then we abolish ourselves.

"The Dutch must recognize what has happened in the past six years. We have made many sacrifices for our independence, both during and after the Japanese occupation. How can we deny ourselves by accepting the Dutch

proposals entirely? If we abolish our foreign relations and our army, then all will be arranged as it was before. The Dutch would return to their colonial conception."

The Republican view is that it is not fighting for its independence, but to retain its independence.

In that endeavor, it obviously has the full support of the whole of the Asiatic peoples in China, India, Pakistan, Burma, the Philippines, and the support also of the outspoken Australians, whose opinions about what is best for Asia and the Pacific more often than not conflict with those held in the West generally. This is a factor of growing importance which the Dutch cannot long continue to ignore.

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AUSTRALIAN COMMISSIONER ON
INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE ANNIVERSARY


The problems of Indonesia that are being discussed to-day, as they have been for the past three years, though different in practical substances are substantially the same as all those other problems, big and small, which are causing concern throughout the world.

They can all of them have but one solution. Let men of goodwill, real goodwill, get together putting aside the pre-conceived prejudices of history, forgetting selfish national ambitions, and petty self-interest for the sake of the good of the world and not the few whom they happen to represent. Then we may see the resurrection of the round table of the Arthurian legends instead of the hostile many-tongued babble that characterises so many of the international bodies and conferences convened to solve the crucial problems of the world today.

In such an atmosphere, free from fear and suspicion, we may see a plan for peace emerge. It will be a plan that will enable the world to work for the progress and betterment of humanity and not just ourselves, our own country, nation or race.

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Two Great Minds Attuned
(Dua Pemimpin Bersehaluan.)



Dr. Sjahrir, then Premier of Indonesia, gives with a wide, toothy grin, striking an indecorous contrast to India's Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's subdued lip-stretch. Occasion: Dr. Sjahrir's public appearance at an international gathering when he attended the plenary session of the Inter-Asian Relations Conference on April 1, 1948. - (G. I. I. S. Pictures).



Signing of the Treaty of Friendship between Egypt and the Republic.
Time: June 10, 1947

Place: Egypt's Foreign Minister's Office.

Be-goateed Hadji Agus Salim, then the Republic's Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and Mr. Mahmud Fahmy Nokrashy Pasha, Premier and Foreign Minister of Egypt signatories in action.

(Utusan Melayu Pictures)

Upon the Dotted Line
(Menandatangani Perjanjian.)

Stop-Over At Singapore

(Singgah di Singapore)



Sjahrir turns up to greet Kallang Airport arrivals: Amir Sharifuddin, then Prime Minister of the Republic, and Hadji Agoes Salim, Republic's Foreign Minister. Transient visitors were en route to Bukit Tinggi, Sumatra's Republican Capital, to fetch Dr. Moh. Hatta. Approaching signing of the Renville Agreements necessitated Hatta's urgent presence at Jogja.

En Route To South East Asia Confab

(Dalam Perjalanan Kepersidangan Asia Tenggara)



A brief pause at Singapore for Indonesian delegates to the South East Asian Conference at India. Man at left: Mr. Soeripno, (which should ring a bell).

RECONSTRUCTION IN THE REPUBLIC

The Minister for Economic Affairs in the Republican Cabinet, Dr. Sjarifuddin Prawiranegara, has recently completed a tour of reconstruction projects in various parts of Java and Sumatra. During his tour, the Minister was accompanied by members of the Reconstruction Section of the Working Committee of the Republican Parliament, and by officials of the State Industrial Board.

In his report, the Minister pointed out that many of the factories he had inspected were built either before the war or during the Japanese occupation. However, a number had been built by the Republic and these, as Dr. Sjarifuddin made clear, represent a considerable achievement in view of the conditions of blockade and the general shortages of labor and material in Indonesia.

Most of these new factories have been built from materials evacuated by the Republican forces from areas threatened by the Dutch forces during the "police action" last year.

New Factories

Recent Republican industrial developments include the building of a potassium factory and paper mills in the Madioen area, and the rebuilding and running of carbonic acid, alcohol, quinine and rubber processing plants. These are a tribute to the ingenuity and technical skill of Indonesians, who have succeeded in overcoming

the shortage of material and other necessities.

One of the great shortages - and one which is causing, according to Dr. Sjariffuddin, a great deal of delay in the opening of these plants - is the lack of electrical installations of all kinds, particularly generating plants. The shortage of these essential items has greatly delayed the opening of the alcohol and carbonic acid factories.

The recently-opened quinine factory, near Madioen, is now turning out 25,000 quinine tablets daily, and this output will be greatly increased in the near future as more material is made available to the factory.

Other plants in other areas have been converted to produce the materials which are most urgently required for the recovery of the country.

No Labor Shortage

For example, the coconut oil factory at Tulung-Agung has been converted into a paper mill. It is expected that the oil factory at Kediri will also be converted in the future.

Dr. Sjarifuddin's report makes it clear that the shortage of labor is not general throughout the Republic, but rather occurs in places where the normal economic life has been disturbed by war-time conditions.

In the Tjepu district, for example, where the oil wells and refineries are being used by the Republic, approximately 8,000 workers are available in excess of

the numbers required.

Speaking of his general impressions, after his tour, Dr. Sjarifuddin said that, although the Republic and the people are making very great efforts, many difficulties remain to be overcome before the demands of the country's industry can be fulfilled.

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AMERICAN PRESS ON INDONESIA

Richard Tregaskis in TRUE Magazine, June, 1948

TROUBLE IN HEAVEN

The war left its mark on Bali, but things are slowly getting back to normal, and maybe it won't be long before the islands chief attractions will be displayed again as freely as ever

(By Richard Tregaskis)

Denpasar, Bali - Your correspondent suffered a severe case of the disappointments that first day in Bali. It seemed to me certain that some very important attractions, things which had made Bali famous as a tourist paradise, were slipping - slipping under cover, that is.

Coming back to the Bali Hotel after a walk that afternoon, I kept murmuring, "Drat the Japs, drat the Japs," or something similar. For it seemed that the Japs, and influences they had set in motion (like the Indonesian revolution) had succeeded in making the people of Bali

takut, which is to say both shy and afraid. And that day Bali's traditionally chest-proud women were certainly ta-
kut about their much-advertised figures.

I had been warned about this at Sourabaya, Java, the last port of call en route, by an American who had just returned from Bali. He blamed the Jap occupation and rough handling by Jip soldiers for the new shyness of Balinese womankind, and for other changes in this vaunted paradise. The much-ballyhooed land of "temple dancers" and (incidentally, of course) bare bosoms, had been altered by the war, like everything else, said my American friend, and I had noticed certain ill omens even before.

First, there was the unexpected red tape of getting a permit to go to Bali, because it is no longer under the direct control of the Dutch in Java. Now it's part of the Dutch-sponsored "independent" state of East Indonesia. Then there was the East Indonesian customs inspection. At the airfield in Denpasar, there's now an office with a tri-lingual sign saying Bea-Douanc-Customs.

But the most grievous alteration in Bali, it seemed to me, was nothing political, but a new modesty and shyness on the part of womankind.

Riding in to the hotel from the airfield, expectantly scrutinizing the bright jungle-green borders of the road, I noticed that the majority of the cocoa-colored women we passed were thoroughly covered, not only by sarongs but also by long-sleeved kabajas, the jackets fami-

liarily worn in Java, where the feminine anatomy is supposed to be more discreetly concealed.

Other brown women plodding along the roadside, balancing bundles on their heads, wearing scarf-like pieces of cloth draped around their necks, over their chests. As our truck passed (transport has also been affected by the war in Bali), I glimpsed a couple of old women sitting semi-nude in the privacy of their split-bamboo houses, but hastily looked away; that was too much like peeping, for maybe the game wasn't worth the candle. And as we rolled into the capital town, I wondered if this were the right country, the place we've seen in movies that display bobbing bosoms strung together with some ridiculous excuse for a plot.

In Denpasar itself most of the busts were covered by kabajas; and those distantly seen which were not at first concealed, were turned away, or were hastily draped as we approached.

After a lunch of rice-strafoel, I started on foot down the main street of thatch-topped walls and thach-roofed houses, determined to view Bali's charms more closely, and saw only the following takut-stricken females:

1. Several girls padding along in sarongs and kabajas, tight sheaths of skirt and long-sleeved jackets which are as concealing as cocktail dresses.
2. A girl in a black and red western-style dress, riding a bicycle.
3. Two femmes in sarongs and kabajas, in the

back seat of a jeep driven by a Malay.

4. An old lady, naked from the waist up, who flung a protective white cloth over her upper body as I approached.

After a half-mile or so of street peopled mostly by skinny mongrel dogs, chickens and loudly-crowing roosters, rain began to fall. I stopped under the shelter of a lawang, the ceremonial gate of one of the square compounds which serve as houses here, and secretly hoped a Dorothy Lamour would pass by.

A few minutes later a young, well-bosomed, cocoa-colored girl hurried into sight; and she was uncovered torso-wise - but not for long. Spying the white man at the gate, she covered her breastworks with a wicker basket. The deep shame and fury of the unsuccessful ogler overtook me, and I thought: "Hell, I'll go back to the U.S. and visit a Chicago stripteaserie, if I want to be lecher. It's easier."

And when the rain stopped, I went disconsolately back to the hotel, cussing the Japs who were blamed for this plague of shyness, and my humiliation. And later that evening, as I surveyed the Bali Hotel dining room, now tenanted by Dutch officers, and the now-deserted dance pavilion, once gay with the splendid Balinese legongs, barongs and wayangs, I cussed the Japs again. And in the still, hot night, filled with the sinister barking of dogs and the occasional passing rumble of a truckload of armed soldiers "keeping the peace," I longed for the splendid days

of the tourists, before the Japs and the Revolution brought plenty of trouble to this Paradise.

That first day's impression, like most, was more grim than later experience warranted. Now, two weeks later, I can assure you that the Balinese Revolution (such as it was) has been pushed back to almost nothing; that the Balinese still dance and have gay times (though the war has left a mark); and that although they are shy and afraid, about half of the Balinese women still go about with bare busts - and can be photographed, if they don't see you first.

By comparison with other alleged Paradises, Bali is still way out in front. It's the closest thing this writer has seen to the South Sea islands of the motion pictures. The dances and paintings, music and carvings, the green rice fields, the coconut palms, and the beautiful people are altogether stunning, especially for a first-time visitor. And the vast majority of the people, even the Balinese intellectuals admit, are not at all interested in the political ructions which the Japs set off.

Yet the Bali of today seems to be a letdown for tourists who were here before the war. They find prices higher, the people more independent and less jolly, roads bad, transportation short. Three American couples - all residents of other parts of the East and vacationing at the partially-filled Bali Hotel - told

me the gaiety of old was sadly diminished; and the men remarked ruefully that the days of totally unhampered research into the size and shape of bosons are probably gone forever; severely curtailed are **the** joys of classifying passing native **gals** as olives, lemons, oranges, grapefruit, coconuts, spaniels' ears, etc. A majority of the women in Denpasar, and perhaps a little less than half of those in the backblocks, today hide their lights under bushols of one sort or another, it was agreed, which is downright unfair to tourists **traded** on Goona Goona, Legong and such like movies.

You can't blame the Balinese. . The first affront to their dignity with the coming of war was the grabbiness of the Jap assault troops, rough boys who were n't content with merely looking. They also had a disagreeable habit of picking up women, especially those who were a little flighty, and hustling them off to Nipponese bordellos. Many times mistakes were made, and perfectly respectable girls were carried away. No wonder the young and attractive ones were afraid to venture out semi-nude in Denpasar, the Jap headquarters. Even before the Japs came, the tourist capital had been subjected to western influences, and more modest dress was beginning to appear amongst the natives. But returning tourists say the city has never been so well under **cover** as now.

The country districts, where neither westerners nor Japs made such deep penetrations, are freer of sarto-

rial restraint. But there, too, men and women are shy, distrustful.

Bali has been more gently handled by both Japs and Dutch than Java, but the million-odd Balinese have nevertheless been through quite an ordeal, from the first Jap landing to the present, when truck loads of Dutch soldiers still hunt "terrorists" (Indonesian left-wingers) in the rice padis and jungles, and attend native dances with loaded Sten guns and Lee-Enfields.

The red-and-white flag of the Indonesian Republic, hoisted here at the end of the war, isn't seen any more, although the native Republic is strong in nearby Java. Bali is under fairly stiff Dutch control, and is willingly, say the Dutch, a hearty member of the new East Indonesian state. But there are still terrorists in the hills of central Java who feel the East Indonesian state is only a new front for Dutch control. And there are also a few Jap soldiers still at large, in the mountainous interior.

Dutch expeditions against the terrorists go on intermittently. I went on one such 400-man sweep, with mortar support and even a scouting airplane. The "police actions" are of small scale and have a comic-opera flavor. But the strife, inconsequential its the island as a whole, is grim to those natives caught in the middle of it. Often the terrorists swoop into a village, demand food, and stab or chop up villagers who don't help them.

If the villagers do help, the Dutch punish them by jail sentences or by forced work on road gangs. About 2,000 Balinese "extremists" are held in jail by the Dutch now, including not only townspeople caught in the middle, but about 1,000 leaders, including Poedje, the lawyer appointed to govern Bali. So it's no wonder some of the Balinese are takut.

The Dutch say the terrorists are outlaws and criminals, denounced by even the Indonesian government in Java. The Balinese intellectuals say the Dutch have used strong-arm methods to pacify Bali and force it into alliance with the new state of East Indonesia, making the feudal rajahs stronger and then indirectly controlling them. Most of the people apparently don't give a damn as long as they have their rice and religion, but it's understandable if they are a little confused. As for instance, in the matter of currency, The paper guilder - after three switches - now has only half of the value of the ancient silver item. The natives like money with "clinket" - it goes "clink" when you handle it.

One wise and continuing policy of the Dutch in governing Bali, however, has been a hands-off attitude toward the religious rites and festivals which are so precious to the people. The Japs made the mistake of interfering with one of the most sacred rites, the offering of rice to the Goddess of Fertility. The systematic Japs couldn't see the sense of letting good rice go to waste

on the altars when the commodity was strictly rationed and very short. The rice crops were bad during several years of the Jap occupation, and the Balinese alleged that was because the gods were displeased. This was more serious to the Balinese than the Japs' habit of picking up women and putting them in bordellos. The blunder undid much of the ambitious Japanese propanganda effort.

Still, the Jap propaganda for a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere took some roots. There was enough talk about freedom in the Bali Simbun, the Jap newspaper, to create at least a subconscious desire for self-determination. And when the Japanese surrendered, August, 1945, and the Balinese sat and waited for six months for the Dutch or English or somebody to come back and be masters, and nobody came - then the seeds of Jap propaganda began to sprout. For quite a few months after they finally arrived, the Dutch reaped a crop of minor whirlwinds. Little gusts of violence are still springing up.

The unhappiness of Bali began on February 13, 1942, when a galaxy of green and white signal lights began to blink in the night off Sanoer, at the island's southern tip. Then things really began to happen. The Nipponese assault troops, described as fat and Mongolian, marched to Denpasar and set up headquarters in the Dutch Resident's house. The police headquarters building was established in a former bicycle shop at the Rose of the Winds, the principal crossroads. The shop had been con-

ducted in pre-war days by a Japanese gent named Iura, who made a lot of helpful photos, left Bali, and returned with the invading troops as a civilian adviser.

The Jap soldiers, rugged characters in little peaked caps and wraparound puttees, found the streets of Denpasar subdued and quiet. Many of the Balinese had taken to the hills, following the example of the Dutch.

Denapasar's line of flimsy, wooden-fronted souvenir shops which specialized in selling carved statues of dancing girls to tourists, were mostly locked up and abandoned. But the soldiers broke in and helped themselves, and where the shops were open, set their own prices and paid in Japanese occupation money. When they saw a good-looking babe on the street, in the typical Balinese state of semi-nudity, some of them grabbed with their hands.

As the troops fanned out over the island to the principal towns, this happened in many places. The soldiers were rough enough so that the local Jap commander went to the rajah of the north-coast town of Singaradja, for instance, and said he was worried about his men, and would the rajah be kind enough to give him a list of eligible women so that he could set up a bordello and forestall incidents. This was done.

And in Denpasar, five joro houses were set up for the soldiers. For these, some of the known whores were recruited from the two tourist bordellos. But other

candidates were picked almost at random. Where a girl had once been felled by a Jap soldier, willingly or unwillingly, she was considered to be fit timber. And in some cases, a girl who had been involved only in an affair or two before the Japs arrived, was picked up and confined in a house of joy. Several of the Chinese helped to locate such supposedly flighty girls. One notorious procurer was Chang Ho-Sing, who owned Denpasar's one-horse movie theatre, the Hollywood.

Mistakes were made, sometimes deliberately. Among other wenchers not so spotless, friend Chang Ho-Sin procured at least one quite innocent Balinese lass for a Jap house. For this and his other misdeeds, he eventually paid the penalty: on December 12, 1945, four months after the Japs capitulated to the Allies, Chang was stabbed, shot and otherwise done in by a mob near the Bali Hotel.

The Japs took some women quite arbitrarily, on their own initiative, and without bothering to check up on reputations. Some girls were simply picked up by Jap trucks on the roads and not heard from again. In one authenticated case a lady school teacher became an inmate in a Jap house at Singaradja when a Nipponese recruiting agent threatened to kill all the people in her small village unless she gave in.

And so the people - especially the womenfolk - grew exceedingly shy. When the girls had to go to market

they wore modest kabajas, scarfs, even old towels.

Another habit of the Jap military made the women leery of venturing out on the roads; This was based on a rule that the Balinese must bow, Jap style, when a military policeman went by on his motorbike. If there was no bow, then the offending Balinese would be whacked by the policeman's baton, the standard model being about three feet long and made of heavy teakwood.

This caused a lot of minor calamities because it is the well-known habit of Balinese women to carry mountainous burdens carefully balanced on their heads. When they tried to bow, there were landslides of head-freight. Even the discipline-minded Japs could see the folly of all this. They quickly changed the rule: If the women would just stand at military attention when soldiers passed, that would be sufficient. Today, Dutch garrison troops wonder why girls with loads on their heads often face their passing trucks, standing with feet together, soldier-fashion.

But the worst thing was the rigid Japanese rationing system; rationing of rice, pork, beef and cloth. Religion plays a very big part in everyday life in Bali. Thousands of deities must be assuaged with offerings, dances, festivals. In one town, Cebood, there are eight temples, and there are sixteen festivals a year, minimum, and each time offerings must be brought for the gods; fruit, eggs, rice cakes and sugar cakes. The Tjokorde,

or feudal lord, told me that the gods were definitely displeased during the Jap occupation; rationing put a crimp in the offerings, so the gods in turn made the crops bad. It was a vicious circle.

The Balinese depend on rice for life, and a very important ritual is built around its planting, cultivation and harvesting. Offerings of rice must be made to the Goddess of Fertility and a host of other deities at many times during the growing of each crop. Naturally the Jap plans for rationing raised hell with the rice and sugar offerings. The Nips not only tried to corner all the rice produced as it came out of the sawahs, they ordered some farmers to shift over to growing cotton, badly needed for Nip uniforms.

The farmers who worked in the sawahs (most of them community property) managed to hide some of their rice output from the Japs, and there was a black market where you could buy rice for the equivalent of .2 (American) per pound. But the Japs were severe with offenders, both at selling and buying. Imprisonment or beatings were standard punishments.

The Nipponese masters also built factories: small plants for making rough cloth, and a leather works for shoes, and a sugar factory and a meat-packing plant. The Dutch had avoided such industrialization, trying to keep Bali as unchanged as possible because of the profitable tourist business.

More civilian advisers also came in after the administration changed from Army to Navy hands, and some of them imported a printing plant from Sourabaya, and began Bali's first, if propaganda-ridden, newspaper, the Bali Simbun.

The Simbun, meaning simply "newspaper", proclaimed the news with a very anti-white flavor. Apparently the propaganda took some root, for many of the Balinese today remain resentful of the presence of European bosses.

And in the Japanese scheme, Bali began to be used extensively as a rest camp, for wounded or battle-worn soldiers. One Balinese account of this is picturesque: "They were so thin when they came. And when they were thick again, they left." Recuperation centers were built at the towns of Sanoer and Kosiman, near Denpasar, and at Serak, Bockit and Tandjoeng. High-ranking officials, civilians and Army officers were lodged in the island's showplace, the Bali Hotel. Scores of Japanese painters came to record the beauties of the new territorial acquisition.

In those victorious times, the Japs were lenient even with the European painters who had been caught in Bali by the invasion. A kindly old Belgian artist, A.G. Le Mayeur, was allowed to stay in his ornately carved bungalow at Sanoer with his Balinese wife, Pollok, and work unmolested. His house, decorated with mural-like paintings of Balinese girls, was even a sort of sight

seeing mecca for Jap soldiers.

The Swiss painter, Theo Meier, was naturally respected as a neutral - and even allowed to build a new house. But the most amazing bit of kindness in the new Jap regime was that they allowed two Dutch painters, Hofker and Bonnet, to go on with their work in their homes for several months.

Had the war progressed smoothly for the Japs, Bali might have received even more gentle treatment. But the fight began to be difficult. Commander Moriozi was removed from his Bali command and sent to Guadalcanal, where he was killed. And succeeding commanders at Denpasar were not so easy. The arrival of a flight of bombing planes which killed some Japs, but no Balinese, didn't improve the temper of the Nips at all. And their plans for mobilizing Bali's farming products weren't working out too well. The Balinese might be a supine, spineless people, but they were pretty good at non-cooperation when they wanted to be. If they wanted to be. If they didn't like the idea of growing cotton instead of rice, they deliberately raised poor crops, then said the soil was unsuited. They successfully^{hid} stores of rice and even pigs from the Japs.

And the Nip soldiers weren't growing any more popular with the Balinese lasses. When the convalescent slant-eyed boys began to grow "more thick" and feel their oats as they recuperated, they often did what the

assault troops had done after the landing -- grabbed bosoms. And of course the Jap brothels were expanded as the number of troops increased. There was also an incident involving some Jap soldiers and an officer and Pollok, the beautiful Balinese wife of the Belgian painter. One of the Jap sightseers who came to Le Mayeur's splendid cottage by the seaside was an officer who brought a camera and made pictures of the cottage, the paintings and so on. He also made some shots of Pollok, modestly garbed in sarong and a length of ornate cloth. A few days later the officer came back with four enlisted men, made more pictures, and finally asked Le Mayeur if Pollok would pose nude from the waist up, as she did in scores of paintings the artist had made. Le Mayeur said no. The Jap asked why not; after all, Le Mayeur had lots of paintings and photographs of Pollok in the semi-nude around the house. Le Mayeur said that was correct in Bali, but if the Jap made such pictures the Japanese would think she was a bad woman. The Jap said Le Mayeur shouldn't be ridiculous. Le Mayeur said there was no use arguing; in Belgium when they said no, they meant no. Then, says the artist:

"First thing I know, the Japanese has struck me. I see he is getting ready to do it again. So I tell him to leave my house and never come back again. These Japs, they think with terror they can make people weak. With the Balinese, perhaps . . ."

Seeing that Le Bayeur was only enraged by the blow, the Jap and his soldiers hurriedly left the cottage. And the Belgian was brave enough to go to Denpasar and make a complaint to the commandant. Nothing, however, came of it.

The island population as a whole didn't have the courage of rashness of Le Bayeur. They apparently took what the Japs dished out to them without an audible murmur. Theo Meier, the Swiss painter, sums it up:

"The Japs were very pleased to find one million of people as cowards on their feet."

The Japanese occupation went on in relative calm, with only occasional spurts of official severity when a new governor came to the island, when there was an Allied air raid, or when the Balinese farmers and factory workers weren't producing the expected output. The Simbun continued to assure the Balinese that the English, the Dutch, the Americans were falling back before the valiant Japanese forces which were fighting the big war for the freedom of Greater East Asia.

But then, suddenly, the Japanese Empire collapsed before the Allied onslaught. In Denpasar, Ir. Iura, the former bicycle shop owner who had come back with the Japs, committed hara-kiri. There was no news about the surrender in the Simbun, at first but the people soon found out.

Painter Le Bayeur relates: "The Japs told the

Balinese the Dutch were gone for good, the English were finished, the Americans, they no longer existed. Then all at once they saw the Japs cleaning houses and streets. Why? 'The English are coming,' they said."

But the Balinese had a long wait for anybody to come and take the surrender of the Jap troops. If an American division had arrived, as was once projected, the course of history in Bali might have been different. As it was just a British or Dutch troops arrived until six months later. After all, Bali was just a small island. Only a party of American newspaper correspondents came through by plane and had a look at a dance which artist Le Mayeur scraped together from them, glanced at Denpasar and Kintamani and rushed on their way.

But the new Indonesian Republic, proclaimed by President Sockarno in Java lost no time in sending representatives to Bali. Sockarno appointed a lawyer named Poedje as governor of Bali. Poedje wasn't very popular; he had been the Number One Balinese liaison officer during the Jap occupation. But the Balinese, as usual, didn't fight about this. And the Indonesian Republic representatives who came over from Java with their new red-and-white flags were welcomed. They took over the Bali Simbun plant, and issued instead the Socara Indonesia, which daily proclaimed banner motto such as "Patriots! Hold high the Red-and-white with your Soul and Body."

And still the English and the Dutch failed to

arrive. Possibly because the Javanese envoys gave them courage, possibly because the Japs were suddenly not as severe as they had been, some of the Balinese began to be involved in minor incidents with the Japs. On one of the main streets of Denpasar, a Balinese was surprised when a Jap officer, walking alone, saluted him. The Balinese stopped, very much emboldened, and said something stern. The Jap then asked for mercy, called the Balinese a big master, and practically fell on his knees. Encouraged, the Balinese became quite a hero around the town after that.

Some of the Jap soldiers, rather than wait for the arrival of Allied troops and inevitable internment, deserted and surrendered their arms to the Indonesian Republicans. The latter, who had emptied the jails to get "troops" to meet the Dutch when they should arrive, were glad to enlist the aid of the trained Japanese soldiers.

But the bulk of the Jap soldiers remained under good discipline. They stayed close to their barracks, and ventured abroad only in groups. The Balinese, feeling more and more courageous, finally decided to raid the barracks in several towns and seize the Jap arms.

On the night of December 12, just after the procurer, Chang Ho-Sin, met his fate, a Balinese mob assembled in the Rose of the Winds at the center of Denpasar and worked themselves up into a rage - a feat, incidentally, quite easy for the Balinese; they are always going

into rages, trances and ecstasies in their dances. Armed with a few Jap rifles and pistols, and an abundance of native knives, they began to move down the street towards the high concrete walls and barbed wire of the Japanese barracks. They soon recovered from their rages and trances, however, when the Japs began to fire veritable fountains of bullets into the air. The Balinese mob was repulsed: i.e., they took off.

Next day the Japanese posted a proclamation, the exact wording of which is lost. But it is thus paraphrased by Theo Koier:

"Brothers! We fired 10,000 shots in the air last night. Not a single person was killed. But don't play with fire. We love you. But must preserve order."

After this, there were no more mass attacks. Spiteful Balinese contented themselves with an easier measure; they scattered broken glass on the roads where Jap trucks passed, causing punctures.

In mid-February of 1946 two British officers, with about twenty men, showed up to make preparations for the landing of Dutch troops, who would be along a month later. Meanwhile, some of the Balinese, at least, seemed to find their new freedom pleasant. More Republicans came from Java and brought some guns and plans for independence. Several more of the Chinese who had procured Balinese girls for Japs were murdered, and also several Balinese panders. And the Soeara Indonesia gave the

Balinese a Republican's eye view of the fighting then going on in Java. Of course, only about 20 per cent of the Balinese could read, but among these were the important ones, the leaders in any possible revolution.

Then on Sunday, March 22, the Dutch finally arrived, 2000 strong, and made their way to Denpasar. But there was inertia and indecision, and the troops stayed around Denpasar. This gave the Republican a little more time to organize. Ripe for a career of violence, they had been hopped up by steady administrations of verbal adrenalin in the Socara Indonesia (now closed down by the Dutch) and by this time there were more than a few Japanese rifles and pistols in the Balinese Republican armament.

At first, though, the intellectual leaders tried a campaign of passive non-cooperation. Ida Bagus Fidada, a Balinese who was head of the trade unions, today describes this as a "strike". At any rate, mottoes like "Sing dadi pahak ken Blanda" (Don't mix with the Dutch), illustrated with a Japanese sword dripping blood, were scrawled on sidewalks and walls. And the Balinese were supposed to stay home and not go to work.

But the Dutch played a strong hand. The same month they arrived they clapped Mr. Poedje into jail. Then they summoned a conference of the eight rajahs of the island. Exactly what happened behind the scenes is not known but shortly afterward the rajahs put out proclamations to their people that it was to the best interests of Bali to

put aside any thought of alliance with Java's Indonesian Republic, and to cooperate with the Dutch. The Dutch made it plain that they wanted to see Bali come under the control of a new native state they were setting up for all of the eastern islands of the former Dutch East Indies - the group to be called East Indonesia, with the capital at Macassar, on Celebes Island. This "East Indonesia," as Ida Bagus Pidade puts it today, mildly (for he still holds a job in the bank at Denpasar) "Is much smoother and softer than the (Java) Republic."

But whatever the theoretical politics, there was plenty of politics-in action in the months following, plenty of strife and bloodshed to terrorize the already takut-stricken majority who wanted not politics but peace.

First, the so-called strike in Denpasar was ended. "The strike lasted one month," said Ida Bagus Pidade (who looks like a younger, brown-colored John L. Lewis) "and the military police more or less kicked them (the workers) into the offices. And after the meeting of the rajahs we said we might as well go back to work; the (Java) Republic was no longer recognised by the Dutch. After the rajah meeting we sent a message to all laborers if they didn't come back to work in fourteen days they would be considered fired. But in many towns, not so much in Denpasar, they went into the hills - and then the murders started."

Terror was apparently a good word for the

things that began to happen in Bali. First, a visiting English colonel, Toy Tweedie, was stabbed to death on April 6 when he went for a walk. The killer, a convicted murderer liberated by the Republicans, was a gent named Kawi, who subsequently killed fifteen or so more Balinese before being done to death himself.

Then J.W. Van Bunge, the Dutch Resident appointed to Bali, was shot in the leg and arm as he rode along a Balinese road in his car. Both bullets unfortunately hit nerves, doing grievous injury.

All over the island the "terrorists", as the Dutch now called them, knocked down trees as road blocks, but there was one such attack at Singapdu, which the Balinese will probably never forget. There, about sixty pe-mudas (patriots) felled a tree across the road, and when a Dutch auto convoy was stopped by it, ran for the cars, waving swords. The Dutch killed three or four with rifle and pistol fire, and the rest ran off and fired with rifles from a distance. They were driven off, but the Dutch, to teach them a lesson, set fire to a house at the roadside where the pe-mudas had presumably hidden. The "house" turned out to be a temple; which didn't improve Balinese-Dutch relations at all.

The snipping at white men was nothing compared to killing of Balinese friends-of-the-Dutch which went on all over the island: and still goes on. The Dutch rounded up about 2,000 supposed revolutionaries, and they are now

reposing in various jails, but between 300 and 400 Balinese "terrorists", tough men amongst a soft nation, some of them liberated jailbirds, hid in the hills. From time to time, bands of these fellows would descend on this or that family or village which had been too friendly with the Dutch, burn down houses and hack up a few people. Often the "Brothers in the Hills" came down to the town and demanded forage. At first they got it, but the Dutch punished the townspeople who had given help; sometimes, if guilt could be centered on one or two families, jail sentences were imposed. When the townspeople grew afraid to give rice to the perudas, they began to burn down whole villages. One village near Tabanan, has been burned three times.

Atrocities were committed. Some of the boys in the hills were real thugs. They, too, wanted to teach lessons. There are well-documented cases where they skinned women's breasts, and chopped off children's arms and legs. The poor Balinese peasants, who wanted only rice, religion and rituals, were properly awed; but they were afraid of the Dutch, too.

When I reached the island, the number of men in the hills was estimated at between 100 and 200. And murders and houses burnings were still going on, especially around Tabanan, in central Bali.

Those being murdered were all natives, the perudas' objective being to keep the Balinese villagers so frightened that no demands for rice or other succor would be

trapped, and was looking listlessly down at the accordion-bellows of rice terraces that descend like steps almost to the bottom of the valley. Father De Beer came bounding up to level palm grove where we were sitting. Behind him puffed a more portly figure, also wearing an American uniform, and heavy horn-rimmed glasses. It was the other Catholic chaplain, who, I was told, would eventually relieve Father De Beer.

An Ambonese trooper expertly chopped off the tops of two fresh coconuts, and the two ~~perspiring~~ fathers ^{had} refreshing drinks. Father De Beer said his name was spelled as in beer, and that the other padre was Father D. Plum. "his name is plum, and he is the pudding."

"This should be very interesting to you," he said to me. "It is not a war - but it is just as uncomfortable. It's good it is not raining."

We sat and talked with the young Dutch East Indies Army captain Anton Garot, who was c.o. of the troops, some white and some brown, at this particular sector. He was a handsome young Javanese, in American fatigue greens. Like most of the officers, he carried his own handgun, the small holster quite rakish on his wide belt.

And now he complained to us, in a rather shrill voice, and said Fater De Beer should please carry the word back to Major Konig, at the command post, that it would be too tough a job for his men to make a search up the length of the valley, as originally planned. There were too many little valleys coming in from the sides; the men would have to search through all these little valleys. They would be

refused. But the Dutch had protective patrols pretty well organized in the dangerous area, and even the rajahs had set up native police who stood guard through the nights. Probably, however, the "terrorists" were not all such desperate men as the Dutch would have you believe. I heard of several cases where the townspeople, at the risk of detection and punishment, helped peruda gangs to evade capture.

I went out on one chase, where some of the peruda leaders were supposed to be trapped in an area one mile square. But when the sides of the square were closed in by 400 soldiers the perudas simply were not there. Undoubtedly, they had been tipped off by brothers in the town.

It was interesting to an ex-war correspondent to see how the Balinese variety of combat is conducted; pleasant to see an "action" in which the enemy doesn't shoot back.

It would be boring to go into a long account of such a chase. But the character of the "police action" is best indicated by the fact that three Dutch chaplains went along. That could mean a very dangerous mission, or an extremely safe one, with extra seats for ^{sightseers}. Of course, it was the latter.

One of the chaplains, in fact, turned out to be the life of the party. He was Father Henri De Beer, a droll figure with round stomach and receding chin, garbed in a brown and green spotted camouflage suit and an American fatigue cap, with the small visor turned up, GI fashion, giving him just the right touch of insouciance. I had gone up to the edge of the steep green gorge where the leaders were supposed to be

too tired. Besides, the river was in flood (bandjaring, they say in Bali), and the men would have to walk up to here (he indicated armpit level) in the river.

The trap being sprung had been two days in preparation. Major J.B.T. Konig had told me that morning, "We have information that this is the headquarters of all Bali. I have sent patrols yesterday. We hope, now that we are closed in, to catch them."

I had seen the plan of operation that morning, all neatly mimeographed and diagrammed; the different groups of men, about 400 strong, were numbered: 3, 4, and 6, 7, 9, etc. As usual with such plans, it was quite complicated. Groups 6 and 7 were to move in behind 9; 9 and 10 were supposed to move backward at a certain time, and 6 and 7 pass through 9 and swing to the right, etc. All groups were to be in radio contact.

Of course, as everybody who has seen an infantry action knows, in such cases 6 usually gets to the wrong coordinates, and so ends up in front of rather than behind 9 and 10. Number 7 gets altogether lost and finds itself where 3 and 4 are supposed to be. Number 6 at last gets itself oriented and takes a position in front of 9 and 10, but 10 turns to the right instead of the left. Half the radios don't work, and of those that work, the signals are muddled.

But in the case of Task Force Konig, things worked out surprisingly well. One thing in their favour

and a big one inside, with bamboo (tubes) for air. When people come, they just cover up the hole."

We returned to the command post at Tjarangsari. This, it happened, was the home-town of Colonel Rai, the rebel leader, and his widow still lived there in a rather sumptuous (for Bali) concrete house. Far from nourishing a grudge against the Dutch, she invited Konig for lunch.

He brought along his adjutant, the handsome Captain H.K. Jager; the Protestant chaplain, Rev. Frans Kooyman, and me. The meal was a Balinese version (served by the beautiful Mrs. Rai) of the Dutch rice-stapel; lots of cold rice, a few sinowy hunks of chicken soaked in sinister greenish curry sauce, potato caked that were cold and had a yellowish tinge from an admixture of curry powder, little wooden sticks with barbecued meat on them called sati, a greenish curried duck, very undernourished and a hot, red-pepper sauce called Lombok (from the island of the same name).

Major Konig, too, was a man of humor. "How many kinds of dysentery do we get from this?" he asked the tall, thin Reverend Kooyman as we passed on to the last course of the meal - sugared papaya chunks, and granular coffee.

At the command post, we found the other members of the major's staff finishing their lunch of canned American rations labelled "Pacific Midday Snack."

There had been biscuits, chocolate, meat bis-

cuit (whatever that is), sugar, sweets, chewing gum, toilet paper and fruit bars in the tins, I discovered, and the Dutch were drinking iced lemonade from a big steel hauled up on a jeep.

The signalmen rolled up their field telephone wires and we prepared to go back to town. Major Konig told me, philosophically: "With this kind of thing, you do it ten times - and one time you have luck."

By this time, the townspeople of Tjarangsari, who had been collected in the square during the morning's operations, were returning to their homes. I noticed that men and women carefully avoided looking at us white men. They had spent a hot morning sitting in the scorching sun while the soldier, white and brown, went on with the miserable business of war, or police action, or whatever it could be called.

But gradually the marks of war, waged by brown, yellow, or red-faced men, are diminishing in Bali, and the people are seeing less and less violence. Rightly or wrongly, the Dutch are gradually pacifying the island and imposing their own type of orderly government. The politically-minded "intellectual" Balinese want a greater measure of independence, but even they admit that the vast bulk of the people are uninterested in politics, so long as they can live in relative security, and in accordance with the Balinese standard of comfort (four Dutch cents a day, the equivalent of two American cents, was their

daily food cost, before the war).

And if peace and order come back to Bali, if there are no more invasions or revolutions to make the people takut, then may^{be} tourists will be able to see more of the gorgeous dances - and let us not forget, the gorgeous bare bosoms - for which Bali has become so famous.

An American newlywed couple, the Mark Masons, and I, on a sightseeing trip, encountered at least one encouraging sign. At the Temple Gwaigaja, at Bedahoe-loe, known simply as The Elephant Cave on tourist itineraries, three buxom, bare-breasted babes bounced out, smiling, and obligingly posed for pictures. Of course, they asked for a fee of one guilder each (40 cents) in advance. But the implication was plain: the Balinese national emblem, the shapely bosom, is there.

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NEW YORK TIMES, August 1

DUTCH AND INDONESIANS

The Netherlands East Indies - ruled by the Dutch for 300 years - is one of the world's richest areas in resources. Before World War II, the wealth of the Indies accounted for about 15 percent of Holland's national income - income the Dutch would like to hang on to.

Three years ago this month - after the Japanese were driven out - the three most populous islands in the Indies, Java, Sumatra and Iadoera, formed the Republic of Indonesia and issued a declaration of independence from the Netherlands.

For a year Dutch troops fought the Republic. Fighting ended temporarily in November, 1946; both sides agreed to the establishment by Jan. 1, 1949, of the United States of Indonesia (embracing the Republic of Indonesia and other islands) which would eventually become an "equal partner" with the Dutch in a Netherlands Union. But negotiations to carry out the agreement broke down and the war started again in July, 1947.

Last January the United Nations Security Council got the Dutch and Indonesians to agree to a cease-fire. A three-man U.N. Committee of Good Offices (United States, Australia, Belgium) negotiated a peace agreement between the Netherlands and the Republic - during which the details of the permanent political settlement were to

be worked out.

Appeal To The U.N.

Last month Indonesian representatives accused the Dutch before the Security Council of violating the agreement; they said they the Dutch had established a blockade around the Republic to prevent Indonesian recovery and to force the Republic to accept Dutch sovereignty. The Security Council asked the U.N. Committee of Good Offices - which has remained in Indonesia to help negotiate a political settlement - to report on these charges.

Last Monday, in a seventeen-page report, the U.N. committee backed up the Indonesian accusations. The report stated that Dutch economic regulations were largely responsible for the poor economic condition of the Republic. It cited one Dutch-imposed regulation which prohibits the Indonesians from importing any goods that might be used for war, and commented: "This measure makes possible an almost complete prohibition of imports into Republican-held territories of equipment and supplies for transportation and rehabilitation."

Last Thursday the Security Council took up the committee's report. Netherlands representatives told the Council that the economic regulations were necessary to prevent "illegal" trade and to control movement of military supplies.

During the all-day debate the delegates showed

considerable pique at what made it clear that they would not openly antagonize the Dutch. Finally the Council passed a resolution calling on both the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic to live up to all the military and economic provisions of the January truce agreement. The vote was 9-to-0- with Russia and the Ukraine abstaining.

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Paul Van't Meer in CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 30

RICHEST ISLANDS IN WORLD BROKE:
DUTCH GET ALL

Tandjongpinang - Dutch Indies, July 17 - The "richest islands in the world" are broke and none too happy about it. This year the Riouw, Banka, and Billiton Islands probably will garner \$100,000,000 from their rich tin and bauxite deposits. But all of it will flow into the coffers of the Netherlands East Indies government, leaving the natives increasingly disgruntled over their failure to participate in the fruits of their labour and heightening their conviction that their independence is slightly shadowy.

Discontent is Voiced

The island produced 16,000 tons of tin and bauxite in 1947, but the output will be quadrupled this year. Riouw, Banka, and Billiton comprise one of the

groups granted an "illusory Autonomy" by the Dutch after the end of the war. At the first session recently of the federative council, the chairman, an islander named Masjarif, voiced the mounting discontent over continued Dutch domination of the productive archipelago. There is actually a deficit in the administrative budget, and having to appeal to the Dutch government to make it up is swelling the discontent of the islanders.

Sultan is Exiled

After the capitulation of the Japanese army, the first returning Netherlands troops landed on Riouw to secure Dutch control of the priceless tin deposits. The sultan of Riouw was exiled to Singapore and his efforts to win back the sultanate are believed, in part, responsible for the unrest among the natives. The infiltration of Communists among the many Chinese labourers, as exemplified by the increasing number of strikes and other labour demonstrations, is also believed to be a factor.

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SINGAPORE PRESS

Singapore Free Press, Wednesday July 14

WHAT VAN MOOK THINKS ... AND
SAYS ...

By: Andrew Roth - well-known
American journalist

In all probability an Interim Government of the United States of Indonesia - without Republican participation - will be set up by the Dutch in August.

If the Republic wishes to join it will have to accept a small number of seats of secondary importance with its nominees subject to Dutch approval.

The Dutch anticipate that when a Republican-less Interim Government is formed areas now within the Republic will "break away" and be brought under the control of this Dutch-sponsored Interim Government.

Although most of the powers now enjoyed by the NEI government will be turned to this Interim Government the Dutch will retain military and economic powers. Furthermore, the Dutch do not expect to transfer sovereignty to it on January 1, 1949, as anticipated in the Linggadjati Agreement and expected by most Indonesians.

The Dutch feel that unless the structure of the United States of Indonesia is carefully and patiently con-



A Smile To Go Around.....

Mr. Trygvic Lie, Secretary - General of the United Nations takes time out to enjoy something pleasant, - so facial muscles will attest - with Indonesian Representative in America.

Be - goggled man from left is Dr. Tjoa Sek len, now back in Jogja to head the Social Committee of the Republican Delegation to the Dutch - Indonesian Negotiations.

Fellow, apparently dishing out the joke, is Dr. Sastroamidjojo, while Mr. Lie, on the right, smiles benignly in pleased approval. Mr. Charles Thambu and Dr. Palar complete the group on the cast.

It will be recalled that it was Dr. Palar who had made the impassioned appeal at a recent S. C. session on Indonesia, for the lifting of the Dutch Blockade on the island. "Economic Strangulation," was the adjectival phrase, (I. N. S. Picture).

.Senyum Berkeliling.....

Mr. Trygvic Lie, setia Usaha Agung Serikat Bangsa2, keluar bersiar2 dengan para Dr. Indonesia di Amerika,

Yang berkaca mata hitam disebelah kiri, ialah Dr. Tjoa Sek len sekarang sudah di kembali di Jogja mengepalai Komite Social dari delegasi Republik Indonesia dalam perundingan Indonesia - Belanda.

Yang kelihatan agak berseluro rupanya itu, ialah Dr. Sastroamidjojo, sedang di tengah. Yang kelihatan baru menarik senyum itu ialah Mr. Charles Thambu, disebelah kanan sekali Dr. Palar.

Welcome Royale
(Penerima-tamu yang megah).



Through Japanese Regime and Dutch aggression the Hotel Merdeka of Jogja has maintained its serene and sober dignity

It does its best in the way of a Welcome Royale for all visiting correspondents and similar such creatures

Mr. Sudarpo ex-"informed source" for the Republic in Djakarta must have developed a creak in the neck. Traveling from Djakarta to Jogja can be rigorous.....

(Hotel Merdeka Jogja terkenal megah sejak dari zaman Jepun hingga ke zaman penindasan Belanda.

Dengan seberapa upayanya telah melayakkan bangunannya sebagai penerima tetamu yang megah. Ia dikunjungi banyak oleh para wartawan dan pembesar2).



Four Top-Men of Indonesia
(Empat Orang Jago Politik Indonesia)

In various postures, from Sharir digging hands into pockets and Sharifuddin with arm akimbo four leaders of Indonesia say good-bye to Bukit Tinggi (Republican Capital of Sumatra).

Mr. N. Raghavan, Indian Consul-General to Batavia peers from out the head of a well-wisher to Mr. Salim.

structed this rich area will be susceptible to being picked dry by Chinese and Indian commercial interests.

These important elements in Dutch planning and thinking emerged from two long and revealing interviews with Lt. Governor-General H.J. van Mook, Holland's chief architect of Indies policy.

Dr. van Mook continues to show sharp resentment toward the Australian-American proposals for an over-all Indonesian settlement through an elected Constituent Assembly.

He appeared to be particularly annoyed at the American policy shift and indicated that he hopes it represents a temporary change or the personal initiative of members of the American delegation to the UN's Good Offices Committee rather than a permanent change in policy.

Dr. van Mook said the GOC should have used its influence to support the Dutch offer to the Republic, which he made in June to Premier Hatta. Instead, he charged, the Australian-American policy stiffened the "extremists" in the Republic and made it more difficult for Republican "moderates" like Premier Mohammed Hatta to compromise.

The Central difference between the Australian-American proposals and his own, he pointed out, was that the former emphasized popular elections first to be followed by the erection of a new governmental structure, while

Dr van Mook's plan is for "reconstructions before election".

He charged that early elections would be held under conditions "that I would mildly describe as terrorism."

He made clear that his offer to Dr. Hatta consisted largely of allowing Republican junior participation in a Dutch-influenced Interim Government. He offered Dr. Hatta a number of seats in the fourteen-man cabinet which would be slightly less than the proportion of the population - approximately 43% - under Republican control.

He disclosed that these Republicans could not have seats concerned with economic affairs or the Armed forces and, furthermore, that he expected to be able to pass on the names of Republicans submitted for the Interim Government.

In response to specific questions he stated that neither Sutan Sjahrir nor Amir Sharifuddin - both Socialists and former Premier of the Republic - would be acceptable to him.

Sjahrir, he objects to because he is a poor administrator and Sjarifuddin - generally considered an excellent administrator because he has "changed sides seven times." This interviewer got the impression that some such objection would be found to almost any left-winger nominated by the Republic.

If the Republic joins the Interim Government its army would have to be reduced further and brought under the command of the Interim Government - whose armed forces would presumably remain under a Hollander until the transfer of sovereignty.

Dr. van Mook said that the "core of the question" was the ability of this Interim Government to go into all areas of Indonesia and bring under its control all people with arms.

Whether or not the Republic accepts these terms - and its leaders have indicated clearly that they prefer the Australian-American proposals - Dr. van Mook said he would be ready to form an Interim Government in August and transfer to it about "ninety per cent" of the powers the NEI government holds now.

He unveiled his conception of this Interim Government when he said: "There are a number of Indonesians who can be inserted into the machinery and it need not stop." He declares that this central task is not a settlement with the Republic but to find "decent and capable 'Indonesians' who know how to work" so that they can be inserted into the governmental machinery.

He was certain that "with patience" and despite the establishment of an Interim Government he will be able to continue placing all the people he wants in the places he wants to put them.

Asked why so many of the people he has been selecting have come from the feudal strata, he explained that they "know how to govern" because it is in their tradition and, "they know how to work" because they were in prewar Dutch civil service.

He denied the nationalist accusation that he favours feudal elements because they are pro-Dutch.

He expressed the belief that unless the **structure** of the United States of Indonesia is built carefully and soundly, the country will fall prey to Chinese and Indian commercial interests, which he pictured as ready to loot this rich country, should it fall into a state of disorganisation.

He feels that Dutch influence will continue in Batavia for a long time because the Dutch are personally more deeply-rooted here than the English in India or Burma and because they "will work hard for little money."

Dr. van Mook feels it is not possible to complete this structure by next January, the target date set in the Linggadjati Agreement for the transfer of sovereignty.

"I cannot see how it can possibly be done," he said. "Once an Interim Government is there, the target-date as such will lose its importance because the Interim Government itself will say it is humanly impossible to make everything ready."

Asked whether he thought there might be difficulties from Indonesian nationalists who feel that January 1 is a fixed date by which time the Dutch have to transfer power, he answered: "That might be, but we'll have to face that."

He boasted of Dutch "contacts" in Republican territory and expressed his assurance that when a predominantly - Indonesian Interim Government is established, some areas now under Republican control would want to "break away" and come under the Dutch-influenced Interim Government.

"There is a sound possibility that certain parts of the Republic will be divided," he said. "We get constant appeals to come to the aid of the people - and I don't mean from Chinese. Recently we have even had appeals from central Java."

He denied the charge of Republicans that after an Interim Government is formed Dutch agents in Republican territory will "appeal for help" and the predominantly Indonesian but pro-Dutch Interim Government will send Dutch-commanded troops into Republican territory to "rescue these areas from terrorism."

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Malaya Tribune, Monday July 26

RED PAW CARESSING INDONESIA

By: E.E.M.

The plague that has stalked Malaya in the form of murder and arson, robbery and general disorder has given all those involved and their sympathetic observers, occasion to gasp in amazed shock ... trailing it with the hushed, whispered word - "Communism" ...

Malaya's plight, seen in connection with the internal events of other nations like Berlin, Eastern Europe, India, Burma, plus the strained relationship between the USSR and USA, seem to point to a well planned systematic plot to sway the balance of government powers into the sphere of Communism.

How true this may be; to include Indonesia as part of the plan; is to burst the seams of imagination. Enterprising people, putting the coincidence of events to their good use have by way of subtle and not so subtle propaganda darkly warned the world of the Red influence working in Indonesia.

A national movement that had started with an obvious aim has been declared the out-crop of communistic tendencies.

But such folly is not rare... past national movements of India and those of other nations were also at one time suspect. Time had proven the allegations groundless and like-wise the same will transpire in the case of Indonesia.

But in this crucial stage of her bitter fight for freedom Indonesia cannot afford to be misconstrued. She refuses to bear the consequences of lies and false propaganda as propounded by her enemies. Admittedly, there exists a small militant group in Indonesia, as in all other countries, which can be claimed the fulcrum of Indonesia's communistic activities but whose influence is of little importance that it is not worth the mention. At this period of Indonesia's struggle, party ideologies have been submerged to give way to the one national aim - independence.

It can probably be made more clearer to the passive and interested observer, who generally connect any would - be nationalist movement with instigation by Moscow, if we approach the question from the religious angle.

As is general knowledge, 95% of Indonesia's 70,000,000 profess the Islamic faith. Their hard-fast belief in their religion, which on occasion can tend to be fanatical, is definitely unfertile ground for the growth of communism.

Any slight deviation made from their deeply ingrained customs - as dictated by their religious beliefs - is grudgingly, if ever, made.

That Communist influence in the Indonesian national movement is of minute proportion is indicated by the National Program recently formulated by representatives of all political parties and organisations in Indonesia - left, right and moderate. The first point is specially noteworthy. It runs:

"To put all efforts toward the formation of a sovereign independent national state covering the whole of Indonesia, as based on the precepts of the oneness of God, democracy, nationalism, humanity and socialism, at a set date not later than January 1st, 1949".

Countless allegations emanating from authoritative sources and otherwise would have it that Republican leaders like Soekarno, Hatta, Gani, Sjarifuddin, and even Sjahrir, suffer from the drug of Communism. A sweeping statement such as this without corresponding proofs to bear it out has to be taken with tongue on cheek.

In this connection it seems to have been conveniently forgotten that Hatta - who it is alleged "will appoint Alimin as Ambassador to Moscow" - was at one time expelled from a certain "Union against Imperialists" in Europe, for his advocacy that the Union should not be controlled by a Communist-influenced body. He was also at one time at logger-heads with another leader who had particular leanings toward Moscow guidance. Before the out-break of the war, Premier Hatta, while in exile at Banda (near Ambon) with Sjahrir, used to write articles warning the Indonesian National movement from taking sides with any totalitarian group.

A study of Sjahrir's personal philosophy as indicated by his books, "RENUNGAN INDONESIA" (Indonesian Reflections) and "PERDJOBANGAN KITA" (Our struggle), will clearly reveal that his conception of things is a mile apart from the Communist ideology and is instead close cousin to Socialism in West Europe as had evolved after the 2nd world war.

Sjarifuddin can just as easily be dismissed in this matter ... Sjarifuddin, to begin with, is too good a Christian - belonging to the protestant sect - to leave open any inlet for the influence of the "New Style" of Communism to seep in.

Admittedly, he can be declared a Communist in the sense that he dislikes the wealth of his country being held in the grasping hands of a few individuals but believes that the system set up in Indonesia should be cut along socialistic lines.

Close contact with President Soekarno will prove most enlightening ... Amazement becomes major at the one track-mind of the man. He is the pure, undiluted nationalist whose one aim is the unity of all parties - regardless of differences in platforms and ideologies - for the national struggle. He had recently called a convention of representatives of all parties, covering extreme left to extreme right, for discussions on national interests as the only motive.

To hold that the struggle for freedom of a nation, populated by 70,000,000 is activated by "Moscow agents", principle figure of whom would supposedly be Alimin is again to tax the imagination ... To further allege that the SOBSI (Federation of Indonesian Labour Unions) had been organized by Alimin, is sheer absurdity; Alimin had not yet returned to Indonesia when the SOBSI came into being.

For all that certain individuals would drag out this man's name to be aired as the "Red Boss of Indonesia," with the accompanied dark prediction of an impending Red tidal wave sweeping over Indonesia, if this man's activities were not early and properly curtailed; facts will do better to prove a point.

Mr. Alimin has never been at any time a principal figure in the Indonesian national struggle. He has never held a cabinet post nor even been a member of the parliament. What opinion he gives voice to is only heard within the confines of his party.

A recent review of South East Asia's internal turbulence by the English journal, "The New Statesman and Nation," may also give support. In part it said:

"In Indonesia, Communism plays only a small part. The Indonesian nationalist movement is no mushroom growth; Dr. Sjahrir and Dr. Soekarno, for long its

moving spirits, are neither of them Communists. The attitude of Holland can only be explained by Dutch fear of losing their immense Indonesian assets on which indeed their high standard of living largely depends. Sooner or later they must learn to co-operate on equal terms with the Indonesians - unless they wish the Indonesian movement to become Communist, with the probable result that they will lose all they possess."

Another recent news item (July 6) of the Netherlands press, "DE WAARHEID", portends something more sinister and treacherous than Communism:

"'Het Vrije Volk' called the disclosure of the plans for resuming military action in Indonesia 'a dirty trick'. Since publicity has been given to the secret meetings of the Catholic leaders, we have received much information about preparations being made for a new military action in Indonesia.

"Propaganda has been carried on for some weeks about the so-called 'Communist infiltration' in the South East Asian countries.

"'Volkskrant' recently issued an article about the 'M-Plan' for South East Asia, stating that 60,000 Soviet agents are spreading propaganda in these areas. Other reports state that Communist influence in Jogja is so strong that the Republic cannot make any agreement without the approval of Moscow.

"In his election speech, Mr. Witteman said that the day will come when military action will be necessary again. An Aneta Correspondent informed his Agency about this important Ministerial statement. Aneta, who paid a fine for publishing a rumour-spreading speech by Mr. Mansholt in Markelo, made enquiries from Mr. Witteman's residence about the veracity of his information.

"Witteman first denied, but later confirmed that he had made the statement, after the Agency had asked the correspondent concerned to vouch for the authenticity of the report. Mr. Witteman, however, said that the words had slipped out, and were not written in his speech.

"We wonder whether Beel, Vorrink, Romme and van der Goes van Naters will also deny that a renewal of a military action in Indonesia is not part of their programme. At an unguarded moment, Mr. Witteman confirmed that it is of their programme, just as other official K.V.P. circles have done in an interview with the 'Nieuwe Prov. Goningers

Courant' recently."

Commenting on the recent elections in Holland, "New York Times," American daily, also had its say in an editorial on July 9th. The Dutch elections, it remarked, is a clear national intention to settle colonial problems, especially with the Republic of Indonesia.

There is no other means at strengthening the democracies in Europe and in the world than a just settlement in Indonesia, and in Indo-China as well. These are two big countries in Asia, still under European rule, in which nationalism is very strong it claimed.

Delaying settlement of these countries' issues, from day to day, will only give opportunity to the growth of Communism. Normal economic life in South East Asia can greatly add to the economic stability in Europe, for both Holland and France have already spent so much in maintaining their military forces overseas.


The defeat of the Communists in the election means national victory for the Netherlands, opined the New York Times; but, it warned, this victory may become empty if she continues to delay the settlement and allows Communism to grow in fabulously rich Indonesia ... a country that has for more than 300 years fed the Netherlands with its tin, oil, copra and spices. The longer the settlement is delayed the more possibility of losing all these wealth completely, judged the paper.

If, in truth, the seed of inclination towards Moscow's tentative feelers has germinated in colonial countries it could not have been fathered by any voluntary desire to be engulfed in the grimy paws of this huge Bear but is merely alternative reaction in the failure to attain that status of equality, independence and self-determination from those who would so loudly and beautifully expound them.

The insincerity of some Imperialists, which can be bitter gall to all aspiring subject nations trying to better their way of life, should stand responsible for any answering pressure given in response to that outstretched, shaggy, courting arm.

Yet the sting of this pronouncement may be deadened by a recent statement from the American State Department that, "The situation there (Malaya) appeared different from that in Indonesian since so far it appeared to lack nationalist inspiration."

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SOUTH AMERICA TAKE IT AWAY.....

Dr. A. K. Gani then Minister of Economic Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, peers above an explanatory placard. Occasion: Havana Trade Conference, December 1948. Beside him is Dr. Laoh, present Public Works Minister.

KESAN2 DARI AMERICA SELATAN

Dimeja Konferensi Havana, December 1948, kelihatan: Dr. A. K. Gani bekas Menteri Kemakmuran, dibelakang kartu yang terlukis "Indonesia Republik" Disampingnya Dr. Laoh sekarang Menteri Pekerjaan Umum: