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SEARCH for Neville George Cleavey help Heath, who the police believe was help them to solve the murder of Margaret Gardner, at Brixton last night.

CAIRO ANNOUNCEMENT
AT NIGHT IN PARLIAMENT

PARLIAMENTARY
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COMMISSION
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THE REPORT
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First, the Japanese terrorists must go
... tomorrow

COMMISSION
IN INDONESIAN STATES GENERAL

COMMISSION
IN INDONESIAN STATES GENERAL

RECEIVED

MAY 5 1948

Translation

25X1

of

THE REPORT

of the

Parliamentary Commission

(States-General)

Dutch East Indies

TRANSLATION APPROVED OF BY

C. L. van der Bilt

PROF. IR. C. L. VAN DER BILT



PRINTED BY „DE HOFSTAD“, THE HAGUE

INTRODUCTION.

During the sitting of the Second Chamber of the States-General at The Hague on May 6th 1946, Mr. van Poll, Chairman of the Parliamentary Commission which had visited the Netherlands East Indies, made the following statement regarding the Commission's report:

Mr. Chairman — A few other statements have been made, attacks on the accuracy of the Commission's report, which I will not now pursue, but I want to give a reply to one remark which at least has the appearance of being true.

Some honourable gentlemen — I believe there were a few, but especially Mr. Palar — have reproached the Commission that it has not heard progressive elements in Java among the Nationalists, especially those belonging to the group Sjahrir. In itself, this fact is correct, but I would like to point out that the Commission went to Indonesia to supply the Chamber with certain facts.

Before it left for Indonesia, the Commission contacted the Minister of Overseas Territories. As is also shown by the public statements made by the Minister of Overseas Territories in Parliament, His Excellency was very worried that this Commission should interfere in the negotiations taking place between the Lieutenant Governor-General and Mr. Sjahrir. In other words, it would damage the position of the Lieutenant Governor-General as a negotiator.

It was the explicit wish of the Commission — and the Minister will confirm this — to give His Excellency before their departure the express assurance that they would not interfere with these negotiations and because the Commission has adhered to this promise it has avoided contact systematically with the gentlemen of the group Sjahrir, to such an extent even that the Commission decided, should Mr. Sjahrir, for instance, telephone, to refer him to the Lieutenant Governor-General.

I believe that no objections can be raised against this attitude."

INTRODUCTORY LETTER

to the Chairman of the Second Chamber of the
States-General

The Parliamentary Commission Dutch
East Indies has the honour to hand you
herewith a report of its experiences
in the Dutch East Indies.

The Parliamentary Commission,
J. VAN ANDEL Gzn.
Secretary

REPORT

To both Chambers of the States General.

The Van Poll-Commission, formed out of both Chambers of the States General, which, in accordance with the motion, adopted by the Second Chamber on January 17th 1946, started for the Dutch East Indies on March 16th last to collect information which would enable the Chambers to form an opinion about the policy followed by the Minister of Overseas Territories and the Lieutenant-Gov.-General of the Dutch East Indies, has ended its mission in these territories and has returned to this Country.

It is with deep regret that the Commission commemorates the death of Jhr. Mr. B. C. de Savornin Lohman, a member of the First Chamber, who had an active share in the preparation of de Commissions itinerary and whose further assistance they have missed very much.

The Commission wishes to express its thanks to the Dutch Government and to the Dutch East Indies Authorities for the generous way in which they have complied with the wish expressed in the decision of both Chambers to aid the sending of the Commission to the Dutch East Indies. Without this collaboration it would not have been possible to complete the task in this relatively short time, even with the utmost exertion, had the aeroplane provided not been available.

With this help the Commission has been able to visit the following towns and in each to confer with all groups of authorities, private persons, committees of native representatives etc.: Batavia, Bandoeng, Semarang, Soerabaja, Den Pasar (Bali), Makassar, Ambon, Koepang, Balikpapan, Menado, Bandjirmasin, Medan and Singapore. One of the members also visited the island of Billiton. In the neighbourhood of Batavia the Committee also visited a number of native villages; at Batavia, Soerabaja and Semarang, it paid a visit to the front-lines of the Dutch Occupation Troops. On visiting Borneo, the Great East and Timor the Committee was divided into two parts.

The data and documents provided from all sides are so extensive that it is impossible to compile them all in one report, before the date fixed for the approaching General Election.

However, the Commission feels it incumbent to also inform the present Chamber which decided to send it to the Dutch East Indies, about its experiences.

They thought it of prime importance because in their view also the Dutch people ought not to be left ignorant of the experiences of the Commission sent to the Dutch East Indies by their representatives, especially now that our nation has to

express itself within a very short time with regard to the Government's policy followed in this territory.

The Commission deems the inadequacy of this report to be of smaller importance than delay.

It is also prepared to accept the risk of inaccuracy in details or other facts of an inferior nature that may in the hurry have crept in, rather than to resign itself to leaving the Chamber and the Dutch people ignorant of its observations.

Should the Chamber desire a more extensive report the Commission will willingly prepare it.

For the rest it hopes to meet the above objections by abstaining as much as possible in this report from pronouncing a private opinion and will adhere, in general, to observed facts.

Where an occasional opinion is given, however, the unanimous judgment of all members of the Commission is always rendered, which has emerged irresistibly from the observed facts, conditions and relations.

The most general incontrovertible fact, about which no difference of opinion exists among those concerned with the Dutch East Indies is this, that the character of the present revolutionary situation over there was definitely brought about by the Japanese occupation during almost 3½ years and the immediately following events.

The influence and the consequences of that occupation on every way of life and on all circumstances have certainly been more profound and extensive than those of the German occupation in this Country; because in the Netherlands the oppressor met a practically unanimous population of which only a small group took their side because of idealistic or other considerations; whereas in the Dutch East Indies the oppressor found a population consisting of many different races which he could try to play off and stir up against each other.

The Japanese did so, right from the beginning of the occupation with really devilish refinement. Doing so they changed their methods and purposes as their diminishing chances of winning the war made it desirable. One thing however, was unchangeably pursued: stirring up the racial hatred, performed with the most disgusting and untruthful means of putting Asiatic against European, of brown against white.

This campaign of hatred was chiefly directed against the Dutch, but in the beginning more especially against the English and Americans in whom were seen great enemies of the so-called liberation of Asia under Japanese autocratic rule.

Very early in their campaign, the Japanese thought they had settled with the Dutch; some weeks after their invasion in Java the Japanese had them fully in their power, so that they could restrict themselves to highly humiliating and cruel treatment by which the last bit of prestige, appreciation and sympathy

among the native population was thought to be destroyed. But with the English and Americans a military settlement still had to take place and therefore the native population should be especially stirred up against them and should be made mellow in order to support Japan in its struggle against these mighty enemies.

By the end of the war, however, when no further military success could be expected, the stirring up adopted a particularly anti-Dutch nature, because this offered the best chances to provide the Allies with post-war difficulties.

Keeping in mind this possible influence of the Japanese occupation on all relations after the war, the Commission has tried to investigate on the basis of practical facts how that influence was manifest in the various groups of the population, how the mutual relations between those groups were affected, and what have been the international consequences when, at the moment of the Japanese capitulation, troops under Allied supreme command were summoned to occupy the Dutch East Indies. In other words:

1. what were the relations and opinions among the Dutch colony before and after the capitulation?
2. what were these relations and opinions among the native population before and after the capitulation?
3. what were they among the remainder of the groups of population, to mention by name, the Indo-Europeans and Chinese?
4. what are the relations between these groups?
5. what is the position of the occupying Allied Forces; how do other Nations view their actions?

FIRSTLY: THE DUTCH COLONY.

a. The concentration camps.

After the military defeat (an investigation into this is badly needed) most of the Dutch, prisoners of war as well as civilians, men, women and children were interned in camps under Japanese control. The few exceptions were formed by a small group of civil administrators and military personnel who could evacuate to Australia, some specialists the Japanese needed for various purposes and some Dutch born in the Dutch East Indies. The first group formed the Government of the Dutch East Indies with Brisbane as their Headquarters. The military personnel afterwards distinguished themselves under Australian command in the fighting against the Japanese in New-Guinea and on certain outposts of the Dutch East-Indies; as regards the activities of a number of the said specialists a report will be made by a clearance-committee. The group of civil administrators who formed the Government at Brisbane will be referred to later on.

Within the group of internees were also to be found high government officials, members of the Advisory Council of the Dutch East Indies (Raad van Indië), governors, residents, etc. The Japanese did their utmost to degrade all these internees as much as possible in the eyes of the native population.


There has been terrible suffering in the concentration camps, military as well as civil. Of the prisoners of war, many have been used in Japan and also elsewhere, for very heavy labour a.o. for the construction of railways in Thailand, for Japanese defence-works, mining, etc. The food was totally insufficient, medical treatment almost entirely absent. The clothes of many prisoners of war consisted during the last period of the war of nothing but a few square inches of cloth. The deathrate was appallingly high. The exhaustion often was so great, that strong men could only proceed by crawling. Even in this physical state they constantly had to undergo ill-treatment.

Even worse, if possible, were the conditions in the civilian concentration camps and especially in the women's camps. The Commission has visited some of these camps, now that they are under Dutch control. They now contain less than half the population housed there under the Japanese when 40 and more women and children were packed in each of the small houses without sanitation and with the merest minimum of water supply. These conditions surpass description.

On top of this the utmost humiliations and the most horrible ill-treatment were daily occurrences. Weights of 36 kilos (a little over 5½ stones) or thereabouts for an adult strong woman were no exception. Examples of ill-treatment were:



The „Leader“ speaks.....
Sukarno addressing a meeting.



Effigies of Churchill and Roosevelt, condemned by Sukarno to be burned
at the stake.



The Prime-Minister.
Sjahrir, the Sumatran, the man who was kidnapped by his own forces.



Javanese „Hitler-Jugend“ in procession with banner:
„Amerika dan Ingris Moesoeh Kita“ (America and England our enemies).

overfilling the stomach with water, hanging by the hands behind the back, beating and chastising and the infliction of burns over the whole body by means of burning cigarettes and cigars.

That the spirit remained unbroken notwithstanding and a strong front was kept up against Japanese presumptions, forms one of the most admirable pages of the history of the Dutch race. With certain exceptions, the attitude of the Dutch women, in the infernal circumstances of the women's camp could form the subject of a national epic.

In the camps for men similar symptoms of underfeeding, ill-treatment and endless humiliation existed; they met with the same unbroken spirit; the circumstances were a little better, however, because the men took, the risk to get foodstuffs through the intermediacy of the Japanese campguards, especially Heihos, which made it possible for the physically stronger to keep up a certain amount of physical resistance. On the other hand, the women were fiercer and less willing to compromise.

Many high officials and other civil servants, teaching personnel etc., were interned in these camps for men. This being together made it possible for them to confer regarding the political situation of the Dutch East Indies after the war — and the measures to be taken after the Japanese capitulation, — because the expectation that Japan would lose the war never faded.

It is a remarkable phenomenon, that over there, as well as in this country, all who busied themselves closely with the problems of the Dutch East Indies, formed the general opinion, that after the war a greater degree of independence would have to be granted. Without knowing the speech of Her Majesty the Queen of December 7th 1942, general opinion was in agreement with the plans of political reform put forward in this speech. And, in fact, the conferences in concentration camps had incorporated these ideas in a plan of measures to be taken on the capitulation of the Japanese.

Medical examination of the internees was therefore established. The doctors interned in the camps examined the other internees chosen and established the grade of fitness which they possessed. On these lines everybody's working capacity was fixed and the task he would be able to fulfil was established. In this way a complete plan was worked out to take over the Government of the Country after the Japanese capitulation.

These plans, however, have never been put into effect. The reason for this can be found in the measures taken by the inter-allied command and the Brisbane Government which returned to the Dutch East Indies.

It is necessary to examine the activities of the small group of higher Government-officials which evacuated to Australia, because this touches a deeprooted and regrettable controversy

in the Dutch colony and especially in the civil-administration machinery.

Here also the Commission will keep to the observed facts.

Generally speaking the situation in the Netherlands East Indies concerning the construction of the Government is just the reverse of that in Holland. Here, with a few exceptions those who formed the Government in London, have not been included in the Cabinet formed after the liberation of our Country. On the contrary, the Underground Movement has had a great influence in the composition of the Cabinet Schermerhorn-Drees, of which almost every member had been interned or had taken part in the Underground Movement.

In the Dutch East Indies the situation is totally different. There the Brisbane Government took the lead.

Those members of the Advisory Council (Raad van Indië) who had been interned and had had an active part in preparations for taking-over the Government after the Japanese capitulation, and who were to be appointed to leading positions were immediately asked to resign. It can only be said formally that the resignation made the impression of being voluntary. So at present the Advisory Council (Raad van Indië) no longer exists.

A Council of Heads of Departments has been formed, in agreement with which Council, the Lieutenant-Governor-General is qualified to issue ordinances for the arrangement of the internal affairs of the Dutch East Indies.

Some of these Heads of Departments are also ex-internees; the way however, in which this Council has been used in the Government machinery calls for the same complaints as were repeatedly heard in our Second Chamber; very important documents were placed before this Council at the very last moment, in such a way that members at the meeting saw them for the first time and then instantly had to voice their opinion, after which the documents were re-collected.

In general, one can say that the Heads of Departments had or have practically no influence on the policy of the Dutch East Indies Government. In their own departments, though, they have great freedom of action.

b. The Underground Movement.

The Underground Movement in the Dutch East Indies, which acted heroically during the years of occupation, and whose members were, beside Dutchmen, especially Amboinese, but also Javanese, has not received after the war the sympathy to which it was entitled. As to the activity in this regard of white men particularly, this was practically impossible from the beginning, because the difference in colour made the task of the Kempetai (Japanese Gestapo) extremely easy, so that the

greater part of those who dared to work illegally had to pay for this with their lives. Therefore the courage of those who gave themselves up to this work is greatly to be admired.

For the few surviving, the Brisbane Government, however, showed as little interest or estimation as for the fallen men of the Underground Movement.

At Antjol near Tandjong Priok 250 of these Dutch and Amboinese heroes, who were executed there by the Japanese, rest in a communal grave.

The Japanese at least had fitted this grave with a concrete tombstone enclosed by a small wooden fence and with a wooden cross above it.

At present practically all traces of this grave have been obliterated, the fence has for the most part been destroyed, and the whole is covered with tropical grass (alang-alang).

This lack of interest typified by neglect of this burial ground, has caused great embitterment in the Dutch Colony.

c. Controversy between ex-internees and the Government of the Dutch East Indies.

Controversy has been caused by the way in which the interned higher officials and their preliminary work have been ignored.

There exists a controversy in the Indies, which divides the Dutch into two sharply opposed groups. The sharp conflicts which here in the Netherlands have found an echo in the bitter and personal tone of the criticism on the Dutch East Indies policy, are hidden to some extent, from those not in possession of full information, but this does not alter the fact, that in the Indies the contrast lies deep and the embitterment is great. Where no representing body has yet been formed to replace the functions of the People's Council (Volksraad) and the Advisory Council (Raad van Indië) and the Government has a pronounced personal character and no free Press exists in Batavia, the controversy is acquiring a bitter and personal character.

The Commission has to state this as an incontrovertible fact but wishes to be kept from this fight round one person and will only try to expose the controversy in a businesslike manner.

The ex-internees put forward the following thesis:

If, immediately after the Japanese capitulation (medio August 1945) the Government had been taken over, in the absence of the Governor-General, by Mr. Spit, the interned vice-president of the Advisory Council (Raad van Indië), which would have been in accordance with the laws of the Dutch East Indies;

if the other interned civil-administrators, who after medical examination could be regarded to be fit, immediately had re-

turned to their stations and there, as far as possible, had repaired the native government machinery and police;

if the physically suitably fit men, from the camps had immediately been given Japanese weapons and the Japanese were instructed under the highest leadership of this reorganised Dutch Government, to maintain order;

then all that has happened now could have been avoided; because after the Japanese capitulation the native population was very favourably inclined towards the Dutch, and the Japanese were extremely subdued and ready to obey commands.

Undoubtedly, order would then have been maintained; the moderate nationalist movement would have been fully acknowledged and the rise of extremism and gangs of murderers and robbers would have been largely prevented.

The reason why this did not happen, must be sought in the fact, that already in the first few days following the capitulation, an order was proclaimed by Lord Louis Mountbatten, with the concurrence of the Brisbane Government, by which all internees were ordered to remain in the camps, or even to return there. Consequently, Mr. Spit was one of those who went back to internment, and some 18 prominent men, who went to Batavia to take over the most important posts, were returned to the Kramatcamp in that town.

Dutchmen who refused to go on working under Japanese command, because Japan had capitulated, were ill-treated by the Japs even weeks after the capitulation. Consequently, the internees' plans were shelved for the time being.

The Dutch East Indies' Government and the Brisbane Authorities however, who have some followers outside their own circle (a third group not daring to form an opinion) maintain that the ex-internees have cherished an understandable but, nevertheless, dangerous illusion.

Firstly, it would appear that they had strongly overestimated their energies. The physical condition of almost all would have been such that they could not have been expected to take over their tasks of before the war.

Secondly they had underestimated the real inclination of a great part of the population. Their return to former posts would, as is the contrathesis, have ended in bloodshed.

The internees argue that medical examination had proved their physical fitness, that many of them up to that time had done daily ten hours heavy labour under Japanese pressure and that furthermore almost all important Governmentposts are occupied by ex-internees at the moment.

This cannot be denied; but from the other side it is argued

that those ex-internees who are now working again have had time to recover and besides it often happens that one after the other collapses.

Controversy between the ex-internees and the Brisbane Government reaches its summit on the opinion about the native population's inclination. The ex-internees say that, despite their internment, they had been kept constantly informed of conditions in the Dutch East Indies through various channels, whilst the Brisbane Government was not so well informed.

Now the facts definitely prove that the Government in Australia was not well informed during the occupation about the happenings in the Dutch East Indies especially in Java. Espionage attempts by means of submarines and other landings, nearly all have failed and have not resulted in acquisition of any useful information.

This is also admitted by the Brisbane Authorities. When they arrived in Batavia, at the end of September 1945, they could act only on the basis of very recent observations and information on the one side and, on the other hand on the basis of a pre-conceived mentality as regards the nationalistic movement.

The Brisbane Government has been reproached by the great majority of ex-internees and others for acting on this preconception.

This contrast which causes a large divergence of opinion within the group of the Dutch population all over the Dutch East Indies, is made still sharper because the Brisbane-group which has come into power did not feel anything of the horrible pressure of Japanese occupation during its residence in Australia; the ex-internees, however, felt this burden in the most painful manner.

The Commission will not and is not allowed to keep it a secret that among the evacuees to Australia, there are people who lived in luxury far from the hardships, and that, up to this moment, to the great shame of all those concerned, there is libertinism and a show of luxury amidst general misery which ought to be thought intolerable by men who take a leading position in East Indian society. ¹⁾

As to the essential difference of view the Commission, 8 months after the time at which a decision had to be taken, will not presume to judge, whether the opinion of the internees is to be considered right or not. The circumstances would have seriously hampered any Government and the risk in taking over management without real power would have been very great indeed.

The Commission wishes, however, to point out that there

¹⁾ The Lt. Gov.Gen. who evacuated to Australia at the express desire of Gov.Gen. Jhr. Tjarda van Starckenborgh Stachouwer, is not criticised in this respect.

have indeed been certain facts which support the point of view of the internees.

First:

In the South and East Province of Borneo some Dutch Authorities who had only very little power at their disposal have, by firm action killed the development of the situation as it arose in Java, in the bud.

Second:

The readiness of the Japanese to accept and execute orders of the conquerors immediately after their defeat was such that Dutch prisoners in Japan commandeered trucks and motorcars which were loaded by Japanese and used for Allied work. These commands were accepted by the Japanese occupants without questioning.

Third:

At the time of the occupation of Bali and Lombok some months later, effected by only a small force of Dutch troops, the Japanese were most obedient; the officers handed in their samurai-swords with a bow; the non-commissioned officers and men could be ordered about immediately for every purpose.

Fourth:

Also in Sumatra and Java the Japanese, for a long period, carried out the task of maintaining order.

Fifth:

— Last but not least — it is a fact, in the unanimous opinion of all parties that the population of Java and Sumatra too showed to the Dutch a kind and friendly attitude during the first 6 weeks after the surrender. We shall return to the subject when discussing the influence and the results of the Japanese occupation on the native population.

However, those facts do not yet give conclusive proof that in Java and Sumatra measures proposed by ex-internees would have led to satisfactory results as later on the extreme nationalistic elements proved to be stronger in Java than elsewhere. The question is whether those elements would have had a chance to organise, join together and obtain Japanese support as has happened, should the internees have acted as proposed.

In judging this question the mental inclination of the judge regarding the strength and value of the nationalistic movement

— insofar as this movement in its extreme form aims at total national independency — will have a decisive influence.

But the controversy between camp-mind and Brisbane-mind which may be thought to have lost reality, as things have taken another turn remains however very real for (in the opinion of the internees) the same mentality, the same mental view of the Brisbane Government which declined the internees' proposals still dominates the whole political situation.

All the following facts: carelessness regarding the fallen Dutch heroes of the Underground Movement; lack of interest in the suffering of Dutch internees, in particular after the action of extremists against women and children in the camps; ignoring and disregarding of high officials and others from the camps, and moreover the manner of their dismissal; declining any scheme elaborated in the camps; abolition of the Advisory Council (Raad van Indië); taking little notice of the Council of Heads of Departments (Raad van Departementshoofden); basing the administration on personalities; the way in which negotiations at present are held with more and more abandoning of the original point of view; all these facts are explained by the internees to arise out of one cause only: viz. the over-estimating of the nationalistic movement in its extreme form of aiming at total independence in a „Republik Indonesia" acknowledged by the Netherlands.

So far the facts given relate to the Commission's report on the state of affairs in the Dutch Colony. Separate attention will be paid to the Indo-Europeans.

In this case the Commission believes that the way in which high officials among the internees are ignored and disregarded especially those among them, who had resisted courageously Japanese oppression in the concentration camps during 3½ years and who had exerted their strength to build up the N.E.I. in an independent and post-war state, can hardly be considered judicious, no more can it be deemed to show a psychological insight that is rightly so much appreciated nowadays.

Rupture and, alas, deeprooted suspicion which is now evident in the Dutch Colony could have been avoided if an advisory council ad hoc had been constituted from interned high officials whose names could be submitted for consideration and who enjoyed the confidence of their fellow internees. Such a council ought to be the least they could expect after un-interrupted striving, in the most difficult circumstances, for the future reconstruction of the N.E.I. of a post-war state.

d. Lack of free public criticism.

The natural wish to place from the beginning representatives of Dutch internees round the very restricted Brisbane-group which formed the factual Government, is the more important

as there was lack of any opportunity to free and public criticism by Dutch people. There are no representative organs. Apparently the two newspapers which are edited at Batavia cannot be considered to give sufficient opportunity to a public treatment of public affairs.

At Batavia two newspapers are issued in Dutch; „Het Dagblad” and „De Nieuwsgier”. „Het Dagblad” is financed by the Government. It started as a newspaper and was technically directed by Mr. Belonje, a journalist of experience. However, it was required that Government sponsored leading articles should appear in the newspaper. Mr. Belonje not being in agreement in every way with the government policy had scruples about writing such articles. Consequently they were written by Mr. Posthumus, leader of the Governments Bureau of Information (Regeeringsvoorlichtingsdienst). As one of his articles led to difficulties with the English Authorities, Mr. Belonje was urgently asked once more to take up the writing of these articles. Finally he did so, but then, though moderately and prudently composed, the newspaper gave remarks which did not agree with the policy of the Lieutenant Governor-General. An article about „democracy” led to a conflict. After that Mr. Belonje was soon asked by telephone by Mr. Posthumus when he would be ready to leave the Dutch East Indies as a Skymaster was already at his disposal. Mr. Belonje refused to go. The managers of „Het Dagblad” refused to dismiss him and were ready to publish the newspaper at their own risk. Then Mr. Posthumus threatened to withhold the newsprint required. Now Mr. Belonje has been dismissed. In the opinion of the Commission it would be wisest not to publish the correspondence concerned but to put the documents on the files for examination.

The other newspaper „De Nieuwsgier” is not printed but stenciled. The editor is Mr. Ritman who was obliged to do some work for the Japanese so that he is suspected. This prevents him from expressing himself freely.

These two newspapers which are moreover very small are the only public editions in Dutch in Batavia. Practically speaking, therefore the population is unable to form a sound opinion because of a total lack of uncensored information. As a result, in closed circles criticism on Governmental policy flourishes and is becoming more and more uncontrollable.

On the other hand the „Republiek Indonesia” has a rather extensive press printed with machinery and material belonging to Dutch printing-offices occupied by partisans of the republic. The legitimate owners not being allowed to claim them as this would „provoke” the partisans of the republic.

Nor are Dutch newspapers allowed to put right or dispute false information and lies in those newspapers, because of „the delicacy of the situation”.



National army charged to wipe out the (white) enemy. (see also ph. 4).



The results of the education of 6-year-old boys and upwards.

e. Unsatisfactory inside and outside information.

Generally speaking it is a fact that information both in Holland and the Dutch East Indies is very insufficient. People in the Dutch East Indies are insufficiently informed either about the state of negotiations at Batavia or about the situation in Holland.

Moreover, the information is not only insufficient but also often wrong. A typical example is the following article in "Het Dagblad" of Febr. 11th 1946 (Nr. 91, 5th column):

"The motions of the House (de Kamers) are approved

As we learn both Chambers of the States-General have already approved the motions which the Dutch Government handed to Soetan Sjahrir yesterday". This indisputably false report was strikingly published by "Het Dagblad" and never contradicted by the government.

Besides the Commission has been in a position to ascertain how extremely restricted information from the Netherlands is. On its return to Holland, after 5 weeks, it appeared to have lost all contact with what had happened in Holland during their absence.

International information is more extensive than that from Holland. It stands to reason that this is little conducive to the maintenance and strengthening of the relations between the parts of the Kingdom.

Publicity in foreign countries is still worse. In the first period after the return of the Brisbane-government it is true, reasons of impotence may have existed which could not then be changed concerning reception, showing round and information to representatives of the worldpress on the spot, but at present these reasons do not exist any longer. Some amelioration on this point is indeed to be seen, but enlightenment abroad about the real situation in the Dutch East Indies is still absolutely insufficient. This question has already been discussed so extensively in the two Chambers, that in this report it will be sufficient to mention the fact.

Finally the Commission has to state that according to communications from several parts, reports to Holland about the situation and conditions in the Dutch East Indies were hindered because letters and correspondence also those directed to Dutch newspapers often did not reach their destination, apparently owing to a severe censorship.

f. Dutch people still kept in prison.

At present more than 8 months after Japan's surrender many thousands of Dutch people, for the greater part women and children, are still kept in camps which are inaccessible to their relations. This fact is a burden hard to bear for the Dutch colony

in the Dutch East Indies already so much afflicted. The uncertainty about the destiny of those unhappy people in the camps embitters the population and is a continual source of suspicion of the real intentions and methods even of those partisans of the „Repeblik“ with whom negotiations are now going on. It is felt as an attempt at blackmail in the negotiations and the continuation of kidnapping of persons of either sex and any age strengthens this conception. The maintaining of the camps by the „authorities“ of the „Repeblik Indonesia“ forms one of the greatest obstacles for the rapprochement between the Dutch population and the leading persons in the Indonesian society.

SECONDLY: THE NATIVE POPULATION.

a. Treatment of the Indonesians by the Japanese.

The native people are ignorant of the heroic battle of the Dutch fleet and the Dutch airforce before the Japanese landed in Java and the other islands. Only a few Indonesians witnessed the defence of some spots like Balikpapan and the battle in some islands.

The only thing they did see, particularly in Java, was the disorganised retreat of the Dutch army, which, with the exception of some local opposition, was trampled underfoot by the Japanese and forced to surrender within a few days. On account of this, Dutch prestige suffered a heavy blow. The intellectual Javanese in particular realised that their country had been practically undefended. The great majority of the population kept more or less aloof of what was happening: it cannot be denied that in some places the invaders were hailed with cheers.

After having interned the Dutch, the Japanese immediately started the organization of the government. The way in which this happened, especially the efforts to win the native population for the Japanese pan-asiatic ideas and to organize them as a resource to Japan deserves an extensive description.

The Commission obtained important documents concerning this but is obliged to keep within the bounds of this report.

The Japanese policy especially in Java is to be divided into 5 marked periods.

The first period is from March 9th to December 8th 1942.

In this period the military government is established, the state of siege is proclaimed. The Dutch civil administrators replaced by Japanese, but the native machinery of government was maintained. The Japanese flag, Japanese stamps etc. are introduced. At the same time the natives are favoured above the Eurasians, Chinese, Arabs, etc. The Japanese try to eliminate every trace of Dutch influence. Every utterance of western civilization and culture is suppressed. All clubs and societies are forbidden. The new movement „Tiga A” only is permitted. It is destined to propagate Japanese ideology. Freedom of press is abolished.

The second period is from December 8th 1942 till June 15th 1943.

During the war some facts occurred which brought the initiative on the side of the Allies. It is necessary to prepare Java's defence against possible attacks from Australia. On December 8th 1942 Lt. General Okasaki, chief of the military government delivers a speech in which he says that „for the moment” Japanese military power is sufficient to defend East Asia but

the entire population has to cooperate to relieve the task of the army.

In order to reach this the „Führer-principle“ is entirely accepted. The regency councils are closed. The local leaders see their positions strengthened by a police-system. The regents instructed by the Dutch and other native dignitaries, who were „infected“ with western ideas and regret their strongly reduced wages, are instructed in such a way that it must open them to the „new ideas“. A system of reciprocal tale-bearing is built up. The whole organization becomes that of a police state. There are three kinds of police: the „Kempetai“ or M.P., the name of which in itself already brings fear to everyone. It corresponds with the Gestapo and has full authority. Secondly „the Keimubu“ which takes the place of the former Dutch police. It consists of natives, commanded by Japanese. It assists the Kempetai, and has posts in all towns and regencies. It is also charged with the instruction and the education of the „Keibodan“, the third police organisation consisting of Indonesian volunteers, which has 1.300.000 men and has the functions of ear and eye of the oppressor, even in the smallest dessa! The whole system is based on fear and terror.

The police-organization is completed by the „Seinendan“, a kind of „Hitlerjugend“, which instructs young men from 14 to 25 years of age in the defence of their native country.

The whole of the remaining population has to take part in a movement called „Poesat Tenaga Rakjat“, abbreviated to „Poe-tera“ i.e. „Collection of national power in times of War“.

The direct result of this police-system is that the Japanese oppression becomes very unpopular, the economical sweating of country and population on behalf of the war which directly attends this system, still increases this unpopularity.

The third period runs from the 15th of June 1943 until the 7th of September 1944.

As the strategic circumstances are growing more and more dangerous, the Japanese try more and more to involve the population of Java in the war. Now the Japanese try to get popularity by apparently involving the population in the Government of their own country. Advisory councils of the whole of Java (Tyuu Sangi-In) and for each regency (Syuu Sangi-Kai) are established. The members are partly elected and partly appointed according to a complicated system which guarantees the victory of the official candidates. These councils do not possess any real authority.

Next follows the appointment of Indonesian advisors, the transfer to the autonomic rulers of education, registration, public health, relief, agriculture, etc. and the acknowledgment of noble titles. Every real power remains in the hands of the Japanese Military Government. The aim of the change is the increase of the military incorporation of the Indonesians. The

incorporation in the Japanese military forces is started. In October 1943 the „Balaitentera Pembala Tanah Air" is established, the „army to defend the native country", which comprises volunteers (Soekarilla's) as well as recruits (Heiho's). Every regime has to build an autonomic unit under Japanese command in order to defend its territory by their own means. The skeleton exists of natives, but the instructors are Japanese. The troops are principally recruited from the Keibodan and the Seinendan, because these gave a preliminary military training. All inhabitants are called up for the defence of the territory under the command of these troops.

At this time the Japanese want to enlist all Asiatics in the defence too. Chinese and Arabs are joined together in one Asiatic Front with the Indonesian ;the „Poetera" is replaced by a much bigger organization, called the „Djawa Hookoo Kai", whose aim is to make all inhabitants perform their duty by sacrificing themselves in this holy war.

In order to strengthen the Japanese hold on the population, local clubs (Tonarigumi) are established, which bring 10 to 20 families under the command of a chief (Kumityoo), who is subordinated in his turn to the local chief. The task of these clubs has been regulated accurately. They form the „cell of the native front".

At the same time economic measures have to be taken since food-conditions and those of raw-materials are growing serious. A system of rationing is established; however the distributed quantities of rice, oil and so on are insufficient. Inflation and the black market begin to arise. Now the population starts to compare the time of the Dutch Government with that of the Japanese. A general enmity arises which is increased when many Javanese are obliged to work abroad for the Japanese.

The fourth period from September 7th 1944 until the capitulation is characterised by the announcement of general Koiso, that the Japanese government intends to acknowledge in the very near future the independence of the Dutch East Indies.

This must be seen as an emergency measure born from the circumstances. The military situation was such that the Japanese had to try to gain all Javanese assistance for carrying on the war by giving them this decoy.

In Java this announcement had indeed some effect, the Japanese government never having shown such an intention. It was greeted with pleasure by the intellectual part of the population and by the Mohammedan leaders, who in the prospect of founding a kind of theocratic state no longer refused to cooperate. The above mentioned advisory council for the whole of Java was convened at once and on September 11th 1944 „a motion of gratitude and solidarity" was accepted unanimously, which said, that „the Indonesians in life and in death would adhere to the side of the Japanese before the independence

was given and in life and in death would remain on the side of the Japanese until the final victory was gained". The red-white flag was acknowledged just as the national anthem, again some sham measures followed in order to increase the participation of the Indonesians in the government; but the real purpose was the reconstruction of the army into a power useful to the Japanese. At this moment Sukarno who had supported alle measures to strengthen the Japanese hold on the population demanded the institution of conscription for the sake of the Japanese.

The military events, the collapse of Germany in May 1945, the invasion of the allies in Northern Borneo, obliged the Japanese to accelerate the movement for independence. On the 22nd of May a new committee came to Batavia to draw up a new constitution. Sukarno was given the opportunity to establish communications between Java and the other islands. A.o. he visited Celebes and Moh. Hatta Borneo. By the middle of August the committee would come together again completed by representatives of other islands under the name of „committee to prepare the independence". On August 9th Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta left for Indo-China by aeroplane. It was there that they met General Terauchi, who appointed them president and vice-president of the committee and who assured them that the independence would be granted them on the date of their choice. When they passed Saigon on the 13th, they were informed that Soviet Russia had taken part in the War against Japan. Certain of the fact that after this the war could not last much longer, they decided to return to Java on the 14th and proclaim the Independence in concert with the military government on the 24th of August.

The fourth period of the Japanese influence on the autochthonic population in Java ends with this; the capitulation follows on August, 15th.

The fifth and last period is formed by the hastily taken measures of Sukarno c.s. in cooperation with the Japanese in the first few days after the Japanese capitulation.

There are some uncertainties about this period concerning the discussions which Sukarno had with the Japanese authorities. Most probably, the succession of events has been as follows:

On their way back Sukarno and Hatta were kept in ignorance about the development of events. They were prevented from listening to the radio and they even were not permitted to read the Domei-dispatches.

Returning to Batavia on the 15th, they learned from friends, that in the town rumours circulated concerning the Japanese capitulation. They went to see the Japanese authorities, but got an evasive answer. In the night of the 15th of August some young nationalists called on Sukarno and Hatta and asked

them if the report about the Japanese capitulation was correct and if on the strength of this news the moment had not come to proclaim the independence.

The two leaders answered, that in concert with the Japanese military Command another date had been fixed and that they would have to wait for this. This answer was not to the liking of the hot-headed young men, who kidnapped Sukarno and Hatta and brought them outside the town. In the morning of the 16th the Japanese learned with a shock what had happened. They ordered Soebardjo one of Sukarno's assistants to contact the kidnappers in order to bring back to town Sukarno and Hatta. In the evening Soebardjo succeeded in achieving this. At once the Committee for the preparation of The Independence assembled at Sukarno's and at four o'clock in the morning of the 17th of August in the presence of only very few people the independence was proclaimed.

At the same time secret discussions were probably held with a Japanese General and with one of the leaders of the Kem-petai, who had gone about all during the war in Javanese dress. At these secret discussions the lines of conduct were drawn up and the transfer of Japanese weapons was regulated.

Thus the „Republik Indonesia" was born, made in Japan, under Japanese supervision and under two leaders who during the years of oppression had served the Japanese war effort and supported by a power which was instructed and educated by the Japanese and was penetrated throughout by Japanese ideas.

b. The Japanese education of youth.

People cannot imagine what this means, if they do not know how the Japanese have established and directed the power behind this „Republik". Not only were the Dutch, English and Americans presented in press, posters, radio-announcements and youth-organizations, as the hereditary enemies of the Asiatic population — especially the Dutch as the enemies of the Javanese and the other Indonesians —; but also the military training was devised in such a way as to rouse a Berserker fury, in order to make them fight in the war against the Whites.

For this purpose they let them do spear- and bayonet attacks against stuffed dolls. Those attacks had to be done under loud roaring and they had to thrust as hard as they could. When the roaring was not loud enough and the thrusts not deep enough, the attacks had to be repeated so long till the desired degree of excitement had been reached. Nothing was left untried to bring the fury against the whites to the boiling point. If they have succeeded only partially in this — the result of it especially on the younger people, showed some time later in murders and nameless horrors — this was surely not the fault of the

efforts of the Japanese, but of the abovementioned discontent with the hard reality of the Japanese oppression which placed the population against the proclaimed theories and of the charges against the whites. But especially the younger people and those groups which had a favoured position in the army during the Japanese government, have been infected by this education and they constitute the real authority which supports the republic.

c. The consolidation of the „republic government“ during the weeks elapsing between the Japanese capitulation until the arrival of the first allied troops.

When in Batavia the first bills appeared proclaiming the independence, they were torn off by the Japanese police who apparently had not been informed of the arrangements made. The Japanese Military Government allowed the papers to issue the proclamation, but they immediately demobilised the Indonesian troops, viz. 30.000 volunteers and 70.000 heiho's. Owing to this a seizure of the power by the republican authorities was made impossible. The committee for the preparation of the independence was constantly assembled. On the 18th of August it adopts six new members, among whom three held communist conceptions. It publishes the constitution of the „Indonesian Republic“, appoints Sukarno president and Hatta vice-president and decides that the president shall be assisted by a national committee. The constitution maintains that Indonesia is a republican unit, the sovereignty belongs to the population and is carried out by parliament. The president must be a Moslem. He is assisted by his ministers. The state is democratic and collectivist. Freedom of conscience and religion are admitted. On the 29th of August the national committee assembles. It starts an energetic campaign on behalf of the republic. On the 6th of September the names of the first cabinet are published.

The campaign for the republic was the only way to win the population which was convinced of the return of the Dutch government after the capitulation, for the republic.

There is no doubt that immediately after the capitulation the attitude of the population towards the Dutch internees in the camps and towards all Dutchmen was very friendly. If there was one thing on which evidence was unanimous during the time the Commission held sessions in the Dutch East Indies, it was surely about this. The population took fruit and food; possessions of internees turned out to have been kept by former servants; helpfulness and sympathy were generally shown. All over Java the Dutch could travel freely. Rapwiteams were dropped and met with a kind reception.

In Sumatra it was the same. In the North-East of Sumatra around Medan the managers who visited their plantations were received with open arms. Strongly the mandoer and coolies insisted that they should stay on their plantations. Travelling from Padang to Medan was still possible.

On account of this attitude which they observed around them, the ex-internees held the above-mentioned conviction that if the government had been taken over without delay and interned administrators had immediately returned to their former posts, the consolidation of the republic put together by the Japanese might have been avoided.

When once the instigation had started the change in the attitude of the population began in the second part of September. This was the consequence of the terror with which the pupils of the Japanese who at first stayed in the background, now dared to begin. People were forced to put out red-white flags and to wear red-white badges. Every contact with the Dutch became dangerous. The attacks against the women camps were prepared.

The evolution of events in this period has already been described so often, that the commission has not thought it necessary to repeat it. The only power which obstructed the consolidation of the republic during this period was, especially in West -Java, the Japanese. To this power, many Dutch women and children, to their own annoyance owed their lives, when the attacks on the camps began, from Indonesian side, which for the first time shook the courage of our women, who had expected the liberation. That so little notice was taken by the government of these attacks has embittered many of these women; they ascribed this to the policy of the Brisbane Government not to „hurt“ the feelings of the republic. In mid-Java and Eastern Java the Japanese worked together with the men of the republic.

The position of the republican government nevertheless was still rather weak.

A shrewd neutral observer wrote in those days as follows, which „pris sur la vif“ as it is can still be considered of actual importance.

„La force du Gouvernement Indonésien doit être correctement appréciée. Elle ne réside ni dans la volonté populaire, ni dans l'autorité et la valeur des chefs. La masse qui a été durement exploitée par le régime nippon reclame de la nourriture, des vêtements, une administration propre, la punition des oppresseurs et de leurs collaborateurs. Les chefs, c'est la conviction que j'ai acquise en m'entretenant longuement avec les cultivés et les plus intelligents d'entre eux, ignorent complètement les questions internationales. La propagande nipponne leur a donné un relief factice. En

réalité leur participation au pouvoir était uniquement nominale. Ils n'ont encore aucune expérience politique: L'anecdote suivante est assez révélatrice. Comme je demandais à Mohammed Hatta, Vice-président de la république et grand spécialiste des affaires économiques, si Java disposait actuellement de stocks importants de sucre, de caoutchouc, de thé et de café, il me répondit: „je ne sais, les chiffres et les statistiques ne m'étaient pas communiqués”.

La force du gouvernement repose sur trois facteurs principaux:

- 1e. le magnétisme des mots indépendance, liberté, démocratie, sur lequel comptent les dirigeants pour s'attirer la sympathie de l'opinion internationale et échapper aux conséquences de leur collaboration avec les nippons;
- 2e. l'armature totalitaire du régime nippon utilisée au profit du gouvernement republicain. Celui-ci est en mesure de transmettre son impulsion jusque dans les coins les plus reculés du pays par le canal des Tonarigumi ou associations de voisins. Il dispose grâce aux Seinendan (troupes de jeunes) aux Keibodan (police auxiliaire) d'une milice pour forcer le peuple à l'obéissance. Les fonctionnaires par intérêt, crainte, ou conviction lui sont dévoués;
- 3e. l'appui des nouvelles couches sociales acquises à l'idéologie asiatique. Depuis l'occupation, de nombreux emplois administratifs ont été créés. En l'absence d'élites instruites, des candidats recrutés pour leur ardeur à servir la cause nipponne ont été choisis. Si les soldes des agents de l'Etat sont très basses, les pratiques de corruption permettent à ceux qui savent monnayer leur autorité de vivre confortablement. Ainsi toute une catégorie de fonctionnaires à demi-qualifiés, incapables en temps normales de remplir leurs emplois, sont les défenseurs du régime nationaliste, qui, espèrent-ils, les maintiendra en activité. Les indonésiens ont acquis une conscience nationale et asiatique plus développée, un sens de la discipline inconnue auparavant. L'apologie de la violence, l'exaltation du patriotisme, les exercices militaires, ont développé chez les jeunes l'esprit combattif. N'ayant pas l'expérience de la guerre ils ont tendance à surestimer leur force. Aveuglés par leur haine des hollandais, le nationalistes ne se rendent plus compte de leur médiocrité”.

How later, when General Christison had landed and in his first proclamation by radio acknowledged the „Repeoblik Indonesia” and announced his intention to occupy only Batavia and Soerabaja, and when afterwards the discussion between the representatives of the Republic and the Dutch Authorities began, the position of the Republican Government at least outwardly became ever stronger, need no further elucidation here.

d. The real meaning and the character of the „Repeoblik Indonesia” at this time; the menacing disintegration of Indonesia as a unity, the situation in Java.

The preliminary history of the origin of the „Repeoblik Indonesia” has once more been investigated very accurately by the Commission, because it held the view that without this it could not obtain a sufficient and sound insight into the real importance and character of the republic at this moment. On this point especially the Commission has concentrated its attention. It wishes only to mention the facts which speak for themselves.

The first question that faces us is the following: Does the so-called government of the so-called „Repeoblik Indonesia” in fact represent the whole of Indonesia, the whole territory of the Dutch East Indies?

During its visit to Makassar the Commission, after long and frank discussions with representatives of all ranks of the population about the condition of South-Celebes came to the following conclusions:

A small group adopts a waiting attitude as to the discussions held in Java. If Java should become a republic — rumours of this had reached Makassar — then this group would claim the same right for South-Celebes.

The greater part of the population however, does not sympathize with the republic. They want a more far-reaching influence of the Indonesians on the government, especially also in the higher functions, as far as there are suitable native personalities for this, though they wish to continue too the relations with the Netherlands. The member of the council, Abdoellah Dating Mapoedji has founded a society which tries to find a solution as to the relation Holland-Indonesia in accordance with the speech of Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands on the 6th of December 1942. This society has many members. The representatives of the native population whom the Commission met were unanimously of the same opinion and appeared to dislike especially anything that might resemble a Javanese supremacy. In the acknowledgment of the government of Sjahrir over Java and Sumatra they saw such a domination.

In the European group at Makassar the Commission could not find any supporter of the policy aiming at the acknowledgment of the republic Indonesia; neither among the Chinese. In Amboina the attitude was, if possible still more disposed against the republic Indonesia. Without any exception all representatives of the native population with whom the members of the Commission spoke, held the point of view that nationalistic aspirations should aim at a cooperation with Holland to form one union. Among them there were three Javanese-Amboinese who supported the declaration of the government of the 10th of February, but had agreed with the Amboinese of Amboina itself that, if the republic Indonesia should be acknowledged, the Moluccas would have to detach themselves from this republic in order to maintain the governmental union. In one respect the Moluccas went further than the leaders in South-Celebes. They wished their islands to form an independent unit at the voting for independence after a certain period, as granted in the government declaration of the 10th of February. Under the Moluccas they meant the old district of the Moluccas i.e. Amboina with Ceram, Boeroe, Ternate, Tidore, New Guinea and surrounding islands. They would not hear of the foundation of a separate council for the South-Moluccas which was prepared by the government, realizing that in this way the unity of the Moluccas with the mother-island Ceram would be broken up. They wanted one Molucca-council, if need be with two chambers. There was a striking frankness in these discussions, which was pleasing. They demanded extension of participation also in the higher government functions and especially extension of education, particularly agricultural and technical instruction. There was a fierce resistance against the efforts from Java to stir up part of the Papoeas against the Amboinese. It was pointed out that these Papoeas until this time were proud of calling themselves Orang Ambon and the instigation from Java not to join the Amboinese evoked a purely artificial contrast.

Similar experiences were gained in the discussions at Koe-pang. Members of the Persatoean Democratis Indonesia, a Timorese party, also took part in these as well as the Democratic League established in Java, which also had its members here. The two parties appeared to have many points of agreement and took as their basis the proclamation of the government of the 10th of February.

Neither here, however was the Indonesian republic wanted, and here too it was wished to understand the proclamation of the government in this way, that also Timor and the other islands Sawoe, Alor, Roti, Soemba, Flores, Soembawa with more than 2 million inhabitants, would be able to decide independently if in due time they would break off relations with Holland or not. In the constitution of the Commonwealth of

Indonesia they wanted to stipulate clearly the rights of the minorities and of the independent parts as to self-determination.

Here too there was an evident and frankly expressed fear of a Javanese domination if on this point no sufficient guarantee should be given. In all parts of these islands the conditions are very satisfactory and quiet. The population is glad that the Japanese oppression has come to an end and the Dutch Government has returned.

Typical for the situation is, that in the large island of Flores with a population of about 500.000 inhabitants order can be maintained by 50 M.P.'s only. Similar experiences did the Commission gain in the southern and eastern parts of Borneo at Bandjermasin, where among others discussions were held with 8 native chiefs, where the same problems were discussed and where reactions were alike, as well as at Balikpapan, where in a public-meeting of about 4000 men, in the middle of November 1945, while hoisting the red-white flag, the „Republik Indonesia" would be proclaimed, but where, thanks to the courage and sense of duty of the Dutch officers and soldiers stationed there, under the command of the naval captain-lieutenant Molenaar and notwithstanding the presence of Australian soldiers who tried to rouse ours to mutiny, this meeting was dispersed and since then no other rebellion has been noticed there. On the contrary, the disposition of the population has become of such a nature, that at the time of the visit of the Commission, e.g. without any stimulation from European side, preparations were started for a very big festival on April 30., 1936, in honour of Her Royal Highness Princess Juliana's birthday.

The feeling of the representative figures of the Indonesian population in the southern and eastern department can be expressed as follows: people do not wish to obtain greater independence and freedom in a revolutionary way; remarkable is that people declared, they only followed Sjahrir because they were not opposed to the Dutch Government that had consented in negotiating with Sjahrir.

The experiences at Menado do not deviate from those mentioned above. The riots that took place in the middle of February were of an incidental character. They were soon finished thanks to the action of military and civilian Menadonese themselves. More urgently than anywhere else information was asked for here. There were grievous complaints about the unsatisfactory present situation, which results in people still being afraid of the Japanese who, for instance, had sent the Hei-Hoos home with the message that the Japanese would be back within six months, as their Emperor had stopped the war now out of humanitarian considerations about the atombomb, but that Japan had not been defeated in reality. Besides, for years the population has been reading Japanese newspapers, while since V-J day hardly anything has been

done by the Dutch, concerning a regular distribution of news. This was the first and most important item that should be undertaken. The general opinion of the population of Menado was that undoubtedly, exact information will have the results desired.

The western department of Borneo was not visited by the Commission but it had the privilege of having an interview with Hammid II, Sultan of Pontianak, in Java, whose entire family was murdered by the Japanese. This highly educated prince did not want to have anything to do with the „Republic Indonesia“. He would prefer leaving Indonesia and living in Holland to becoming a subject of such a republic.

In Bali the Dutch after their landing which happened without any incident, generally were hailed with satisfaction. A large part of the island is again under Dutch administration and is quiet. Without any disturbance the Commission has been able to attend a performance in the dessa, amidst the people which was presented to it on the night of its visit by the Anak Agoeng of Gianjar. Only west and north of Tabanan the population is still being terrorized by a number of armed pemoeda's. The western part of the island lies open for infiltration from Java and the situation in the parts of the island not yet altogether pacified, shows much resemblance to that in Java. The population of the dessa's in this part has no courage to show itself when Dutchmen, soldiers or others, enter the territory. There is a panicky fear of revenge of the pemoeda's if members of the population should establish any contact with the Dutch. The local Dutch Authorities, however, had confidence in soon being able to re-establish a normal state of affairs, also in this part of the island.

As soon as the population is aware of protection or finds a leader who has courage enough to take measures against the terrorists, the oppression of the pemoeda's is soon brought to an end.

This part of Bali is the only part of the „Buitengewesten“ (outer islands) — except the four largest islands — where the „Republic Indonesia“ has some real influence. As is known, occasional attempts are being made to rouse the population of the „outer possessions“ by sending, from Java, propagandists in armed prahus, sometimes provided with a motor, who give absolutely untruthful information about the power of the Republic, the weakness of the English, the disappearance of the Dutch, etc. When visiting Amboina, the members of the Commission learned that recently this had taken place at Boeroe without any lasting result, however.

In Lombok, which had just been liberated when the Commission visited Bali, the liberation festivals were going on for 5 days at a stretch. The population is very glad that the Dutch have come back. The native officials appointed by the Japanese

immediately handed their task to the Dutch with a sigh of relief. They were thoroughly fed up with the responsibilities loaded upon their shoulders by the Japanese.

And as for Sumatra, in this large island, the situation is more deplorable and chaotic than anywhere else in the Dutch East Indies.

The phenomena, which point to a break-down of Indonesia, as a unity as soon as the Dutch Government has been eliminated have progressed here further than anywhere else.

As far as it is possible to get information — at Medan it was given to the Commission from different sides — the situation in Sumatra shows the following picture.

In Atjeh the Imams have seized power. Complete Oelebalang-families are said to have been murdered. Subjugation to the Republic Indonesia is out of the question; the Imams are trying to restore the Atjeh — Empire. Characteristic for the situation in this part of the island is, so it was stated to the Commission, that at this moment— 8 months after the capitulation of Japan — a complete armed division of the Japanese Imperial guards camped in or around Koeala-Simpang, prevents the Atjeh republicans from breaking through to the south and protects the oil-fields. In the Batak country, the leaders of the Marga have joined hands and the old ideal of a united Batak State is reviving. An army of 35,000 men, that according to information is believed to possess 20,000 rifles — the English commander in Chief in Medan, however, doubted the exactness of this number — is said to have taken its positions from Taroetoeng to Pematangsiantar.

From Minangkabau there is but little information, but it seems to be fairly certain that there too, people do not want to be ruled by a republic government situated in Java.

On the North-East Coast there is some contact between a few thousands of pemoeda's, in power for the time being — except at Medan, part of which (Polonia) is occupied by English troops — and the republican leaders in Java.

The inhabitants, however, are very much against these pemoeda's, especially the odd-120,000 Javanese coolies on the estates who with their wives and children, together amounting to about 500,000 people are living under very deplorable circumstances and to whom the republican authorities do not pay any attention. Besides, they have only very little influence upon the gangs of robbers — estimated at a few thousand— from outside the province, consisting of inhabitants of Atjeh, Batak and Minangkabau, who terrorise the population of the once so prosperous province and menace it with total destruction. The stocks of rubber of the estates the value of which has been estimated at 36,000,000 guilders have been seized by these gangs; and this stolen rubber is nowadays sold regularly to Chinese in Malaya, who in their turn, supply weapons for the

pemoeda's in Sumatra. Part of the proceeds of these stocks of rubber seems to land in the treasury of the Republic.

The Malay population in these countries sticks to their self-governors who have been robbed of their power by the extremists and many of whom have been murdered. Generally these self-governors sympathize with the Dutch Government, but the ordeal which they endure, might last too long, if this government is not able to show its power. In these countries, however, there are no troops of any importance.

It is characteristic of feelings, the Commission learned during discussions with self-governors, that they look upon the Javanese emigrants in the Lampongs as a „state in the state“.

The last question which arises is: what is the real significance of the government of the „Republic Indonesia“ in Java itself?

In answer to this question it must be pointed out immediately that the western part of Java, Bantam, has separated itself from the Republic and has formed a kind of independent state of its own.

In other large parts of Java the government of the Republic has only very little influence, which is only too evident, when it has to admit openly that things are happening against which it is powerless and for which it refuses responsibility. For instance, the evacuation of the Indonesian population from South-Bandoeng; the foolish destructions before the evacuation of this part of the town, which the Commission has been able to note being the first Dutchmen who visited this part of the town — here and there still burning — immediately after the occupation by British troops and now the recent murder of Australian officers near Buitenzorg.

In the above mentioned parts of Java local armed organizations — perhaps because of the establishing of an army in each residency under the command of the Japanese — are actually in power.

Moreover, the old evil: the appearance of gangs of robbers is gradually increasing. Many members of the republican army now called T.R.I. are said to carry several badges of more than one armed gang and are believed to operate now in this and then in another capacity.

Often such gangs prove to be under Japanese command or to be supported by Japanese.

These armed gangs or organizations bring pressure to bear upon the population. All kinds of despotic measures like toll-barriers on the roads etc. are regularly occurring now. And there is no saying whether these measures are taken by the rulers of the republic or by robbers.

In one respect, however, all these organizations agree: by terrorist methods the population is prevented from communicating with the Dutch government.



The Indonesian army marching with the fascistic parade-step.



„Hitler-Jugend“ in a bayonet-exercise.

Capital punishment is the penalty for accepting „Nica-money“.¹⁾

Indonesians who sell agricultural produce to the Dutch in the territories occupied by the English or the Dutch, are menaced.

In several cases this terror had led to nameless horrors, for instance the attack on the Christian congregation, at Depok, the oldest in the Dutch East Indies, where the Commission went to see what happened. What happened there and in that neighbourhood, cannot be described. The Commission has read the reports — confirmed by the perpetrators — about murders on European women and on a native woman, who lived with a European; red-hot bars were put in the vagina and after that her stomach was burned open in the same way. Further particulars are not suitable for revelation.

A 19-year-old European girl was taken from a train; one of the perpetrators stated with a grin — whereupon an Amboinese soldier killed him — that she had „a strikingly beautiful face“; which did not prevent them from dragging the girl, who was constantly praying for mercy, away by her legs, and hanging her with her head over a pit, in which they later buried her alive. In Depok alone there are said to be 150 victims of these massacres. Senseless damage has been done to all houses. Furniture and pianos had been smashed, mattresses cut open, etc., graves were opened and devastated.

A tenth part of such horrors performed anywhere else, would have caused the world-press to shudder with indignation. Here, however, it has been decided to conceal these horrors as they might influence the general opinion about the „Republik Indonesia“ unfavourably; and because of this preconceived ideology it was necessary in the name of freedom, democracy, right of self-determination etc. to write in favour of this republic.

How far the republican government in Central and East Java succeeded in establishing a more regular situation, cannot possibly be said, because no Dutch or other Europeans are allowed to enter these territories.

It is also very difficult to say what power and influence the different organizations have in the republican government.

Some time ago, in the first days of the stay of the Commission at Batavia, word was received, that the communistic leader, Tan Malakka, had been arrested by supporters of Sjahrir, which was looked upon as an evidence of the increasing power of the Sjahrir-group in the republican government. Soon however the Commission learned from a reliable source that an arrest of Tan Malakka was out of the question and that this

¹⁾ The pictures on the paper-money of the Dutch East Indies, consisting of an aeroplane, a completely armed soldier, and a cruiser must be considered psychological mistakes, the more so as the word „Nica“ has more or less the same sound as a Malay-word, that stands for devilish power. In the propaganda against the Dutch this fact is being abused.

news should be considered camouflage, so that it would appear as if certain groups, with which the Dutch Government had opened discussions had much influence in the Republic Government.

According to reliable information it is clear that a number of Japanese officers are regularly working as advisors of the Republic and that Sukarno declared that they should be maintained in this position. It is clear too, that the army of the republic around Djocja and Soerakarta is being trained by Japanese instructors. The interior government is still using the organization built up by the Japanese and that has the same characteristics as the German, Italian and Japanese systems.

Up till now the republic has not succeeded in shaking itself free from using its „vitium originis“, its Japanese origin; hence the terror methods, which are being practised in its name and its leaders.

THIRDLY: THE INDO-EUROPEANS AND CHINESE.

In general the Chinese — as the Commission learned in numerous conversations — sympathize with the Indonesians as regards their wishes for greater independence. By joining the „Democratic League“ they support these endeavours.

They have their own wishes too; Indonesian citizenship, guarantees for the minorities, obtaining the right of owning land, etc.

The Chinese as a group however, do not sympathize with the building up of an independent Republic Indonesia. They are very much afraid of the terror of the pemoeda's and other armed organizations of the republic and therefore they individually like to keep themselves in the background instead of openly showing their feelings, though there are amongst them who have done much for the Dutch. As a group however, their feelings for the Dutch are just as sympathetic as for the Indonesians. This is a sufficient reason for the extremists to apply their methods of terror also against the Chinese. The foolish devastation of the Chinese quarter of Bandoeng must be considered as a revenge of nationalistic republicans for those feelings of the Chinese part of the population. It cannot be denied that rumours about the republic being acknowledged by the Dutch Government have caused some anxiety among the Chinese part of the population; but the fear of reprisals mostly prevents the Chinese from letting the Dutch Government know about this anxiety of which the Commission was informed by the Chinese. The Chinese feel that a recognition of the republic means being abandoned by the Dutch, despite their loyal attitude.

The same things are also felt by the population with mixed European and Indonesian blood, though their feelings are much stronger.

All during the war against the Japanese this group, in general, has shown character and when the war was over they unanimously wanted a tie between the Netherlands and Indonesia. This group is not unfavourably inclined to the independence of Indonesia within the unity of the Netherland Kingdom, but it is afraid of getting into a desperate situation should the „Republic Indonesia“ be acknowledged.

The supporters of this republic are not kindly disposed towards this group to put it mildly. It is accused of a kindly disposition towards the Dutch, at the time of the attacks on women's and children's camps, which happened in the first period of the republic (purposely, and according to a carefully worked out system) many outrages against Indo-Europeans living outside the camps are said to have taken place.

Again it is very difficult to state how far the responsibility of

the republican government reaches, as regards these horrors; but it is clear, that especially the Indo-Europeans of Dutch nationality do not expect much from a republic, the authorities of which up till now acted like this or, at any rate showed them but little affection. They fear, that there will be no longer a possibility for them to live in such a republic, and look up to the Dutch Government for assistance. They even think about mass-emigration, for instance to „New Guinea“.

FOURTHLY: THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE VARIOUS PARTS OF THE POPULATION.

The Commission has studied the following problem: whether the organized instigation of the autochthonic population, first by the Japanese and afterwards by the leaders of the Republik Indonesia would leave traces on the broad masses of the population, which would result in a definite alienation of the Dutch on the one side and Asiatics — especially Indonesians — on the other.

As regards the Chinese, there is no reason to be afraid of such a situation. Their native-country was at war with Japan at the same time as the Netherlands. This caused such a contrast between the Chinese and the Japanese that the first were practically immune from the Japanese propaganda. And later on the propaganda from the side of the republic, which was more concentrated on the Indonesians than on the Chinese, has had no visible influence on the Chinese. It may be said, that their relations both with the Dutch and the natives have not changed noticeably. Only the Chinese self-consciousness will increase considerably, if China succeeds in surmounting the recent difficulties.

As was explained above, the Japanese, in spite of their terrific propaganda, have not succeeded in rendering the broad masses of the population unfriendly disposed towards the Dutch Government, because of the rudeness of their methods of oppression. It is true that this was attained with certain groups, trained by and privileged under the Japanese Government; but even Heiho's have often helped the Dutch inhabitants of camps. How far the second instigation campaign by the republicans has permanently influenced the greater part of the population of Java (as for the outer possessions see above) may be judged from the following facts:

first: that in Batavia the native population is working quietly again just like the Chinese from the time they knew themselves sufficiently protected against terror, though there is still an Indonesian mayor and Sjahrir has a house in town;

second: that the native population of the campong Buddingh, in the centre of Batavia under the command of a brother of the former Member of the People's Council Thamrin, has cleared its campong of all extremist elements, though, remarkably indeed, the campongheads were not able to obtain any official authority from the Government;

third: that everywhere in the area, occupied by the Dutch troops, it is quiet again and the population feels liberated from heavy terror. Everywhere the population sympathizes with the Dutch. Once they know themselves protected against reprisals of the Pemoeda's and other armed organizations of the republic,

their real disposition is shown and they denounce the terrorists. There is kindness again and kind-heartedness, but nowhere slavish subjection, the rejectable characteristic of the „colonial relationship“.

A Dutch Government official, on a tour with two members of the Commission as far as 40 km from Batavia, was justified in saying: „Indonesia Merdeka — that is here and only here“.

fourth: that in all dessa's liberated by the Dutch so many want to join the Dutch policetroops that a great part of them cannot be accepted;

fifth: that in the liberated territories a political party-system is coming into existence, which cannot happen anywhere else, because there the „Republic Indonesia“ opposes by methods of terror the growth of groups that want another political resolution than the 100% independent republic. From letters directed to H.M. the Queen by Mr. Mas Slamet it is clear that those, who want to oppose that method of solving the national problem, are also being terrorized.

Now that in the towns there is less fear of this terror, it becomes clear that the nationalists who wish another solution for the Indonesian independence, are more numerous than those who want a republic. During the stay of the Commission in Java a regional Democratic Union was established. Immediately 160 members joined.

In Batavia there is also an important branch of this union under the Chairmanship of Mr. Rubini, a Madurese.

Also in Bandoeng and Semarang, whereas the union has branches outside Java as well. Members of this union are natives, Dutch and Chinese; consequently a practical application of the equality of races. During the long discussions, which the Commission had with the Executive Board of this party in Batavia, it became clear that all felt equal. The Board admitted that only in the four large cities parties can be formed, because they are free from the republic. First of all they want to re-establish peace and order, in order to enable freedom of opinion and they are convinced that a large part of the conservative groups, at the moment still cooperating with the republic because of the circumstances, are of the same opinion.

Other parties like the Indo-European Union, the Unity Group, etc. are developing again.

It should be noted that Mr. Slamet himself, whose fierce aversion to the republic is sufficiently obvious from his letters, has kept himself in the background to make room for the Democratic Union. Mr. Slamet had intended to go to the Netherlands to inform our people — and afterwards other countries — in the same way in which he already wrote several pamphlets about the Japanese tendencies of the present republic. In his second letter to H.M. the Queen he has informed Her of his

being refused to go to the Netherlands. The Governments Information Service has demented this in the press. Of course this has not been refused to Mr. Slamet, they said, but he wanted priority in a Skymaster, which could not be permitted.

The objection of Mas Slamet to the republic in its recent construction is, that it uses fascistic instead of democratic methods. He also wishes to establish first of all the possibilities to utter a free opinion; and after this a decision about the political relations between the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies.

With personalities like Mr. Slamet and in general with all those natives, who demonstrated a faithful attachment to the Dutch Government, the rumours concerning recognition of the „Repeblic Indonesia“, roused embittered reactions. They are convinced that there will be no place for them in their native-country; and here and there the Commission already met with the opinion, that the Dutch are handing over their friends to their adversaries. In relation to this the word unreliability has been mentioned already.

**FIFTHLY: THE ENGLISH OCCUPATION AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.**

a. The Christison period.

The two Chambers of the Dutch Government are aware of the fact, that as a result of negotiations between the Allied Nations, the British of their own accord were charged with the occupation of the Dutch East Indies, after the capitulation of Japan.

In the name of the Allies, the British commander-in-chief, Lord Louis Mountbatten, was charged with the responsibility for:

1. accepting the Japanese capitulation in the Dutch East Indies;
2. disarming the Japanese and removing them from the Dutch East Indies;
3. assuring the transmisson of Japanese war-material;
4. liberating the allied prisoners of war and if necessary sending them home;
5. assuring the security of over 100.000 internees, chiefly women and children.

It is also known, that owing to the Japanese capitulation at an earlier moment than had been expected, there were not enough troops to perform this task on August 15th 1945.

There is no need for the Commission to state again which were the results of the arrival of the first very small British unit, more than six weeks after the capitulation when it was announced publicly that they would occupy Batavia and Soerabaja only.

The Commission has not succeeded in solving the problem whether the arrival of General Christison at Batavia with his small unit had taken place against the advice of the British Intelligence-Service, or of Rapwi-teams dropped and at the insistence of the Dutch to send troops as quickly as possible, however small the unit might be. This is rather important, because this may have been the motive for some of the measures the British General has taken immediately after his landing. Perhaps these measures should be attributed to the fact, that he was totally surprised at the situation he met upon his arrival and therefore, out of anxiety for the face of his troops, has taken measures, which have had a very unfavourable influence on the political situation.

These measures were said to have been taken so as to stay out of the political problems and not to interfere with the re-



The auxillary army (Hei-ho) with baboo-lances.



Excited „Hitler-Jugend“ on exercise.



A sniper.



Another example of education. Boys of the youth movement armed with wooden guns and spears.

lations between the Dutch and the Indonesians. In reality they resulted in a marked preference for the so-called Government of the „Repeeblik Indonesia" and its representatives. The first proclamation of General Christison already contained an acknowledgment of the actual „government" of the „Repeeblik Indonesia", when he announced that he „intended to ask the actual leaders of the movement to assist him in performing his task", and that „the actual Indonesian authorities (were) responsible for the government in the territories where they now ruled".

About what has happened during General Christison's period the Commission has gathered full particulars which, however, are not mentioned in this report for three reasons. Firstly because of lack of time; secondly because much of this is already known; thirdly because this period is now finished and the present situation must be considered to be more important.

The Commission restricts itself to state that the information received shows the bitterness of the Dutch about the attitude demonstrated by British troops on several occasions. The Dutch Government has not omitted to protest strongly against those occurrences.

On the other hand it should be mentioned with gratitude, how by the action of British troops, especially in Soerabaja, the lives of many Dutch women and children were saved.

b. The present situation.

Fortunately this period is over now and it is to be expected that the danger of an alienation between two recent Allies will be avoided.

It certainly is not the fault of the commanding generals and other officers of the occupying forces in the Dutch East Indies if there are still some difficulties. The members of the Commission met many of them and they spoke very frankly with them. The Commission was very favourably impressed. These men uphold British dignity.

But even the British commanders must obey the orders of their government; and the British Government has to take into consideration political factors which the Commission cannot judge.

The Commission only states that during its stay in the Dutch East Indies, more than eight months after the capitulation, the orders of the Allied Nations given to the British occupying troops have not yet been carried out. This has caused much discontent among the Dutch Colony in the Dutch East Indies. Especially so because, as a result of this, the transfer of Japanese arms to the extremists, the training of the army of the „Repeeblik Indonesia" by Japanese instructors and the construction of the „Repeeblik" on the foundation of Japanese organizations, totally anti-democratic, could continue.

Enquiring into the actual situation, the Commission has concluded that the present situation is caused by the fact that the Dutch sovereignty, over the Dutch East Indies, which is acknowledged by the allied nations, is not carried out by the Dutch Government or by the Government of the Dutch East Indies, but by the occupying forces.

Even at this moment the Dutch East Indies, in a juridical sense and according to international law, are considered by the allied nations occupied enemy territory. There is still an enemy force of 325.000 men, which has up till now not been brought under the control of the occupying forces. During the stay of the Commission in the Dutch East Indies it was announced that 290.000 of these 325.000 men had been brought under allied control. The term „under control“ not to be taken at face value. It is stated that there were at that moment still 35.000 men of the Japanese forces who could act totally independently without any control of the forces who had been charged with their disarmament.

On April 19th 1946 the Commission received the following information from the Dutch Head-Quarters in the Dutch East Indies about Japanese prisoners of war.

	Total present	Total disarmed
Sumatra	45.270	5.710
Java	72.412 ¹⁾	30.710 ¹⁾
Great East-Borneo	165.863	160.354
Total	283.345	196.774
Totally evacuated to:		
Sumatra	Rampang-Galang	Japan
Bangka-Billiton	77.191 ²⁾	
Riouw		
Soembawa		6.500
Further there have been evacuated 14.993 from Sumatra to Malakka ²⁾		
Totally evacuated till 11-3-'46	77.191	
	6.500	
	14.993	
	98.684	

The evacuation of Borneo and the Islands east thereof will begin on the first of May 1945, and then Soembawa, Menado, Manggar, Sanga 2), S.-Celebes, Ceram, Kei-islands, Halmaheira, Sorong, Manokwari, Sarmi, Timor will follow.

¹⁾ Including Bali and Lombok.

²⁾ Not included in the total of Dutch East Indies.

As long as this situation will go on the Dutch East Indies will be considered occupied enemy territory, and as the governmental power in those territories is carried out by the commander-in-chief of the occupying forces, the real sovereign power will be carried out by this commander-in-chief. Such a situation can easily be a cause of continuous difficulties.

The Commission does not want to consider some phenomena, difficult to accept for the Dutch population which, however, are a result of these circumstances (which cannot be disallowed according to international law), phenomena the Dutch population also met in Holland when, for instance, our farmers, who live near the border, were not allowed to bring back to their own country their cattle grazing on the other side of the border.

The Japanese have requisitioned all kinds of goods from the Dutch population during the war. These goods now belong to the booty, and the conquerors — the occupying forces and among them also the Dutch who live in the houses furnished by the Japanese — for instance at Timor — are using them at the moment. The Dutch population thus sees its own furniture, refrigerators, etc. being carried off by the occupying forces, for the greater part British-Indian troops, which is, of course, a very unpleasant experience.

Should these be the consequences of the war which, as already stated, have to be accepted, the rule of conduct, penetrating into the whole organization of social and political life is something quite different.

The entire food distribution, transport-organization, the allotting of goods to retail trade, in short all those things, which in normal times are settled by free social influences, are now supervised by the government. Formerly this was done by the Rapwi (Relief Allied Prisoners of War and Internees), which, whenever necessary, was charged with all kinds of measures, which did not really form part of the task of this corporation. During the stay of the Commission in the Dutch East Indies these were transferred to another organization, the Amacab (Allied Military Administration Civil Affairs Branch). Our former residents are now called C(ommanding) O(fficer) Amacab or in the outer possessions C.O. Nica. Consequently they belong to the military hierarchy and are subordinated to a British officer. This means that all the organs of the recognised sovereign need for each of their actions the permission of a representative of the occupying forces.

In the outer provinces, in so far as they have been occupied by Australian troops, this situation has ended now, as the Australian troops have retreated, but in Java and Sumatra it still continues to exist.

This situation, which is the same as for instance in the occupied parts of Germany and Japan, is endurable only because of the personal qualities of the representatives of the occupying

force, most of whom are very pleasant, and who leave to the Dutch Authorities as much as possible. This, however, does not change the fact, that such a situation is absolutely impossible in a territory, in which the Dutch sovereignty has been explicitly acknowledged by the Allies and by the occupying forces; which forms the real difference between other occupied enemy territories, where the occupant is in control, as long as a treaty of peace has not been signed.

The result of this peculiar situation, territory of an allied state where the sovereign has returned and which, notwithstanding this was considered occupied enemy territory for over 8 months — becomes more serious however because of the fact that the occupying forces, on the ground of an order of their government, had to accept as their rule of conduct that the sovereign, acknowledged by their own government, has to be treated in the same way as the so-called „government“ which has settled on the territory of this sovereign, and which claims authority over the population. For this is the meaning of the rule of conduct according to which the occupying forces are not allowed to take sides between the acknowledged sovereign and the so-called government of the „Republik Indonesia“.

The results of this conduct were demonstrated to the Commission when attending the activities at Batavia required to obtain a building formerly used by one of the departments of the Dutch Government. In Batavia there is a „Burgomaster“ of the „Republik“ and according to the above mentioned situation, he must be informed of steps to be taken to put such a building at the disposal of the acknowledged sovereign. When the Commission was informed of this interesting case, the object in view had not yet been obtained; but it was assured that in due course everything would be alright. And the „Department“ of the „Republik“ where some officials were wasting their time, would be accommodated in some other building!

Also the military forces of the sovereign are not allowed to do anything without permission of the military commanders in chief of the occupying forces. And then again, these officers have to keep in mind the above mentioned rule of conduct, according to which for instance no firing is allowed before the „troops of the Republik“ have fired, a measure which the Commission can hardly bring into accord with the idea, that the occupant does not want to interfere with the relations between the Dutch and the Indonesians.

Another instruction is that in certain cases no patrolling is allowed within a circle of four miles drawn on the map from an occupied point. But the country has the peculiarity not to mind circles drawn on a map; and it often happens that all kinds of points in the territory just on the edge of this circle, for instance houses, hills, riverbends, etc. are extraordinarily

suitable as strongholds for the opponent from where Dutch troops are attacked. They cannot be cleared as they are situated outside the permitted territory of operations.

The points of contact between the Dutch and the British troops also cause difficulties.

Without the above mentioned qualities of most of the commanding officers these circumstances would no doubt have resulted in many difficulties, but it is evident that where human lives are at stake, even when people are willing to do their best, contrasts and undesirable differences of opinion cannot always be avoided.

It is very difficult for those who have to act in a situation as described above to avoid all its unfavourable inherent consequences.

c. International relations of the „Republik Indonesia“.

The Commission has gathered information from which it is evident that relations exist between the Government of the „Republik Indonesia“ and communist organizations abroad. Pamphlets and folders which were issued among the native population, proved to have been printed in Australia and to have been issued by the communist party there.

There are also signs of contact with Chinese communist organizations which are very active e.g. in Malaya.

Branches of these organizations were also established in Sumatra. At Medan, as a kind of Headquarters, there is a „Union of Chinese Youth“ with 15 departments for the East-coast of Sumatra. Furthermore it is known that from December 11th till 14th 1945 at Fort de Kock on the Westcoast of Sumatra a communist congress was held, where representatives of the communist party from China were present.

**FINAL REMARKS CONCERNING THE ECONOMICAL
SITUATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH.**

Total damage caused by the war to estates, factories, houses, etc. is estimated at 8 milliard Dutch pre-war florins. For a country with a population with so little economical resistance as the Dutch East Indies such a damage is considered catastrophic by all insiders. Only by investment of new working-capital would it be possible to relieve-at least for the first time — the results and to diminish them by and by. But these investments will not be possible, the Commission concluded from repeated discussions, before peace and order are restored, and the safety of the investment is sufficiently guaranteed.

Dutch industries are willing to invest new capital.

All insiders, even those who were not concerned in any way in such investments and are only able to give their opinion on account of their scientific-professional knowledge apparently agreed to the fact that the Indonesian republic loosened financially from the Netherlands, undoubtedly could obtain loans on the international money-market but only on the condition that all real power in these territories should be in the hands of the money-lenders.

The present situation where parts of towns are occupied by the Allied troops as well as the situation in the rest of Java have to be considered as unbearable. Practically all food has to be imported, as there are no sufficient agricultural districts in the surroundings of the Allied occupied areas. In Batavia the markets are increasing which proves that the population around Batavia is feeling safer. And Bandoeng has to be supplied partly by air. In the long run this is far too heavy for the economical resistance of the country.

More serious, however, is the economical situation in the rest of Java, where the great impoverishment is already shown by the clothing of the population. Numerous are the natives who are dressed in rags or in gooney bags. Because of the activities of Australian Trade Unions which prevented the shipment of relief-goods, the Dutch have not been able to do the thing they would have liked to do. The distribution of clothes in the dessa — the Commission has attended such a distribution-consequently could only take place on a small scale.

The most serious problem is the food-supply.

It is impossible however to obtain a complete survey of the crop and the „authorities“ of the „Republic Indonesia“ go on asserting that there is enough rice but all kinds of phenomena indicate that in the near future difficulties are threatening and already exist.

It is doubtful whether the native farmer has used all possibilities of planting. Here and there the irrigation-works have

been damaged, so that the insufficient water-supply causes the sawahs to be irrigated only in turns. This causes unsimultaneous ripening of the rice which promises rat- and mice-plagues, which already occur on an alarming scale at the moment. Moreover, the charming carelessness of the population is the reason that repairs of drains etc., easy to perform, are delayed. The natives are used to receive instructions from the Dutch and as such is not the case at the moment, these simple reparations and up-keep-jobs are not done.

Even if, notwithstanding these difficulties the harvest were sufficient, there would be the great difficulty of transporting the rice from districts with a surplus to the districts where there is a shortage.

There is lack of transport and the condition of the roads is very bad. During the Japanese occupation the beautiful roads of Java have suffered very badly. They can hardly be used. From the side of the „Republik Indonesia" nothing has been done in order to repair them. The Dutch immediately started in the districts under their control and good progress has already been made, in spite of lack of material.

Transport will meet with difficulties in every respect and the result might prove to be most serious for the 45 million people living in Java.

In the outer provinces, except Sumatra, the economical situation of the population is almost everywhere better, which can immediately be seen by the clothes.

South-Celebes, where the rice harvest is promising, will certainly have an export-surplus; Bali and Lombok, too have possibilities for export; but the means of transport by sea are even more scarce than the means of transport by land. Cooperation of everybody is needed in order to avert disasters. This must also be known by all leading personalities of the „Republik Indonesia", who know something about the situation. The public health situation is probably even more critical than the food-supply. Many hospitals are in the hands of the „Republik Indonesia" and not only in Java, but also in the outer-possessions, people acquiesce in this situation, as a consequence of the above mentioned policy.

The hospitals which are still being used and which are under native control for the greater part prove, that when the Javanese miss the capable Dutch organization they cannot do much. Even when they have very competent native physicians it occurs very often that there are mistakes in the management. Parts of instruments are lost and a situation of general neglect exists as a result of lack of organization and discipline.

In general there still is, in the Dutch civil and military hospitals too, a severe lack of important medicines.

Here too, the Australian Trade Unions which have prevented the shipment of relief-goods, must be held responsible.

Nevertheless, much is done by the Dutch. Under Prof. Baas-Becking a hospital has been arranged where Dutch nurses¹⁾ are working, e.g. near Buitenzorg, in the territory which is under control of the Repoeblik Indonesia". It is not possible for Dutch people to travel by land to Buitenzorg without risking their lives but during the stay of the Commission at Batavia Prof. Baas-Becking made his 59th journey there. He is always received with open arms, even by the extremists who appear to accept good nursing, even by the Dutch, with gratitude.

From this it can be seen how unsatisfactory the medical care must be in the parts of Java not occupied by the Dutch. This situation may have very serious results, especially so, should epidemics break out.

It is to be hoped that in this regard, as well as in many others, there will be close co-operation between the Dutch and the Indonesians very soon, first of all in behalf of the bereaved population of the overseas territories of the kingdom, the chaotic situation of which has worried the Commission with a view to world-peace that is not served by a chaos in this part of the world.

The Hague, May 1st, 1946.

The Parliamentary Commission
Dutch East Indies,

w.s. M. J. M. VAN POLL, President.

H. A. KORTHALS,

H. J. W. A. MEYERINK,

CH. J. I. M. WELTER,

Members.

J. VAN ANDEL Gzn., Secretary.

¹⁾ The Commission wants to express its appreciation for the activities of the Dutch nurses in the Dutch East Indies, which form a worthy pendant to the activities generally performed with such an enthusiasm and devotion by the Dutch troops over there. Concerning the atmosphere of the troops, their mental and material care and their state of health, the Commission got a favourable impression wherever it was in touch with units.

Approved For Release 2003/12/01 : CIA-RDP80-00926A000300040002-4



PRINTED BY "DE HOFSTAD" THE HAGUE (HOLLAND)

Approved For Release 2003/12/01 : CIA-RDP80-00926A000300040002-4