

**INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT**

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S E C R E T


25X1

COUNTRY	East Germany	REPORT	
SUBJECT	Popular Reaction to Geneva Conference	DATE DISTR.	8 August 1955
		NO. OF PAGES	1
DATE OF INFO.		REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
PLACE ACQUIRED		This is UNEVALUATED Information	
DATE ACQUIRED		<b>BY CABLE</b>	

25X1

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

1. Inhabitants of East Germany are generally disappointed with the outcome of the recent conference of the Big Four at Geneva, since they had expected concrete results affecting the German question. Any hopes for a miracle to come from Chancellor Adenauer's visit to Moscow have now been replaced by a feeling of resignation. 25X1
2. The initial satisfaction over the positive attitude of the Western powers towards the German situation has been replaced by disappointment that the West, because of its "trusting nature", had been misled by the Soviet Union. In particular, there is a decrease of confidence in the United States and a tendency to make comparisons with the meetings at Yalta and Potsdam. Some people conjecture that President Eisenhower has made a deal with the Russians at the expense of Germany.
3. It is felt that Chancellor Adenauer was the loser at Geneva, and that therefore his visit to Moscow will be barren of results. There is some tendency to accept the SED allegation that Adenauer is an enemy of reunification.
4. Despair is felt over the Soviet attitude. The Russians are thought to have gained all their objectives without making any concessions. Further, it is expected that the Russians will stand to gain by a lessening of the cold war, and that any relaxation will help them to repair their economy, with the result that they will be less ready in the future to make concessions in the German question.
5. The visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev was viewed apathetically by the East Germans. 25X1



S E C R E T

STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	FBI	AEC				
-------	---	------	---	------	---	-----	---	-----	-----	--	--	--	--

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#")

25X1

**INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT**