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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY **Yugoslavia**
SUBJECT **General Critique of Yugoslav Political Situation**
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REPORT NO. 25X1

DATE DISTR. **8 Jan. 1954**


NO. OF PAGES **14**

DATE OF INFO.

REQUIREMENT NO. 25X1

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
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Stability of the Tito Regime

1. At the present time and under the current set of circumstances, the Tito regime is backed solidly by the police and the army. His security forces exercise complete control over the population in all parts of the country and any organized uprising has not the slightest chance of success. With American aid bolstering the Yugoslav economy, not even passive resistance is possible for a long period of time; and a threat to the regime from the anti-communist masses is unthinkable as long as Tito enjoys this Western support.
2. There are today only two main, though persistent, threats to the Tito regime. One is the possibility of a "palace revolution" by those who have so far been successful in disguising their real feelings and maintaining superficial loyalty to Tito. Tito understands the nature of this threat and from what direction it may come. Thus the vigilance of his security forces is mainly directed against the Cominform and its potential exponents. Such exponents, if detected, or exposed by provocation, are immediately eliminated from influential positions or brutally suppressed.

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3. As long as Tito enjoys Western support, the rank-and-file of his Party have no reason to fear for their privileged positions, and the potential "palace revolutionaries" have little chance to win them over; for the security organs will stay with Tito and successfully control the situation in the army and in the Party. However, if Western help were discontinued and the very existence of the regime once more became dependent on Moscow, the potential conspirators would have a better chance to capture the remainder of the Party for themselves and for Moscow. Under such conditions the security organs would lose their grip on the Party cadres, and a "palace revolution" would become almost a certainty. Tito and his clique would be eliminated. Should Tito's elimination be impossible, for some reason or another, a schism in the Party and a civil war would surely follow. Once resort to arms is made, Tito and his anti-Cominform group would probably command a large part of the lower Party cadres, and for a while also a large part of the general populace, especially if the West intervenes actively, or until the danger from the Cominform group had been removed. However, should Moscow intervene actively and on a large-scale, Tito would have no chance for survival.
4. The second danger facing the Tito regime is the recent development of friendlier relations between Moscow and Tito. Since the bulk of the Yugoslav Party desires a rapprochement with the Kremlin, it may well happen that Moscow is extending a friendly hand in order to push the Party cadres into some provocative action against the West with the end result that Western support is killed and Yugoslavia made dependent on Moscow. The Trieste question might provide a basis for such action. Should this happen, Tito and his clique would be liquidated while the population would either remain passive or be pushed into some desperate action against the pro-Soviet regime, hoping for active Western intervention.
5. The key question revolves around the Soviet attitude and actions, for the Soviet Union took the initiative in expelling Tito from the Cominform. The final step, therefore, belongs to the Soviets; re-consolidation with Yugoslavia as it presently exists, or liquidation of Tito and his clique.
6. There is no question about Tito's ability to make friends. His wartime mysticism, and his post-war propaganda have definitely left a residue of some sympathy or admiration for him as a personality. Further, he has often found ways to show his disapproval of some of his own regime's unpopular administrative measures, with the result that people often wonder whether Tito himself is not after all only a benevolent person surrounded by common criminals who terrorize and exploit the populace behind his back. Following the Tito-Cominform break in 1948, Tito's personal position in the eyes of the common man in Yugoslavia increased. His stature increased until he gave a speech in Kraljevo in 1952 in which he brushed away all allegations that he might be abandoning a strict communist line by identifying himself completely with the Party. After the Cominform break, the imprisonment of non-communists (so-called reactionaries) continued along with the persecution of Cominformists. At the same time, however, people felt that with increasing Western economic and military assistance, the political and economic system in Yugoslavia should have softened. But at Kraljevo Tito uttered threats against reactionaries who dared raise their heads and threatened the opposition with a second great purge, worse than the one in 1944-46. Consequently, if the Yugoslav people in general ever respected Tito as a national hero and as a person with the welfare of his people in mind, he proved amply that he is and remains a communist dictator who offers

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no hope for a brighter future to the suffering population. Today the Yugoslav populace consider Tito directly responsible for all hardship brought upon them by the regime. In fact, with respect to the actions of the UDB, Tito is held directly responsible and not his Minister of the Interior Rankovic.

Popular Attitudes and Resistance

7. Hatred against and opposition to the regime is prevalent throughout the country. Tito's efficient control is least effective in the Republic of Serbia. This is due largely to the patriotic feeling, passion, patriarchic social structure, and rebel tradition of the Serbs. In times of strife, the regime will face its toughest problem of control in Serbia because of the Serbs' indomitable spirit of freedom.
8. On the basis of logical reasoning, however, the most widely organized opposition in a time of great crisis would arise in Slovenia because of the well-known sense of organization and realism possessed by the Slovenes. Against the possibility of a prolonged, successful resistance in Slovenia is the Republic's well-developed system of communications and its geographical position along the path of aggression.
9. Tito is strongest in Montenegro because in the wild fighting between communists and nationalists during the war the latter suffered heavy losses, and because Tito rewarded his Montenegrin followers with the high positions in his administration. However, it must be remembered that pro-Russian sentiments used to be strongest in Montenegro.
10. Bosnia-Hercegovina is equally amenable to control due to the terribly suppressed standards of life and urgent need for food and shelter existing in this area. For a handful of "something" the regime can impose its authority among the populace of Bosnia-Hercegovina.
11. The most anti-communist social class is the peasantry throughout the country. With the dissolution of collectives, Party control over the peasant masses will become more tenuous. The few independent artisans are also staunch anti-communists. On the other hand, factories, collective enterprises, and the new voluntary cooperatives, represent Tito's occupational strong-points in the country, as did once the German garrisons.
12. Another important factor to be considered when assessing Tito's internal position is that of national unity. The present regime has inherited the pre-war distrust among the various Yugoslav peoples, a distrust which during the war was aroused to peaks of hatred and desire for annihilation. The communists used this mutual hatred during the war as their main source of recruitment. After the war, the regime continually preached and stressed unity and brotherhood among Yugoslav peoples. By adopting this policy definite merits must be credited to the regime. The hatred between Serbs and Croats has been reduced partly by measures taken by the regime and partly by the common distress suffered by Yugoslavs of all ethnic origins. However, the national problem of Yugoslavia has been solved by the regime only temporarily. It might break out again some time in the near future during a time of national crisis.
13. The average well-educated Yugoslav believes that his liberation from the communist yoke can come only through war or foreign intervention. The Yugoslav people in general desire war also because they view it as the only means of their liberation from communism, but the general populace

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is tired, demoralized, apathetic, and expects aid from abroad. There are many signs of impatience, however, and many people are inclined to fight rather than suffer indefinitely. Assistance through war is expected particularly from the United States, while Britain is considered guilty of treason by the Yugoslav masses.

14. Yugoslav people in general view war as inevitable partly because they cannot wait any longer for liberation, and partly because they view with optimism the enormous efforts made by America in the armament race. They believe that this war material must be put to use or wasted, and they are convinced that the United States will not allow a tremendous wastage of economic resources and allow its rivals to reach a position of equality in the field of technology. Thus they expect the United States to launch a preventive war in order to save herself and the rest of humanity from final disaster.
15. Regarding Yugoslav-Soviet relations, the people are cognizant of the possibility of a rapprochement and the dangers of such action. A realignment with the Kremlin would expose the populace not only to Tito's limited power but to that of the entire Soviet orbit. People in general, however, do not believe that a return to the Soviet orbit is possible as long as Tito and his clique are in power. The widespread feeling that Tito represents the lesser of two evils helped Tito and his regime considerably during the last economic crisis, when a decisive peasant effort could have completely undermined the regime. American aid to the regime and its demoralizing effects on the general populace also precluded any positive action at that time.
16. Non-communist Yugoslavs would accept any return to the Soviet orbit with fear and disillusionment. In the present situation the masses must suffer the Tito regime and its representatives but they are still able to find ways to resist. Popular resistance or passive resistance, especially among the peasants, has already produced some fruits, and the regime has been forced to make concessions in many areas. This, together with the material aid from the West, had made the situation much better. The terror has grown less acute; the police have been paying more attention to possible activities of pro-Soviet sympathizers, and their attention has been divided between "the reaction" and Cominform followers. Thus non-communists in the middle have not had to bear the entire burden of the police state. Another important factor to be considered in this connection is that the terror has been limited to Yugoslavia's borders, that is to say that there is now no possibility for the regime to dispose of whole sections of the population by sending them to Siberia. However, although Tito needs some evidence of popular support in his disputes with the East and the West, the masses will never be a decisive factor in a possible rapprochement with Moscow. The masses have no power without foreign help or plans.
17. At the moment there exists no organized resistance in Yugoslavia; there are not even any potential organized resistance groups. Resistance takes the form of a spirit and willingness to stand up when the proper time has come. Foreign intervention would assure any chance of success which individual leaders or groups might have. The present Western attitude of helping Tito has greatly disorientated potential opposition groups and has definitely postponed the appearance of any. In the event of war or foreign intervention, however, resistance groups would spring up all over the country. These groups would be bound together by one common denominator: hatred against the communists. Joint organized action with a common operational objective could be imposed only from the outside. It

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is commonly expected that the territory liberated by the Allies would stay occupied for a considerable period of time, but it would be a grave mistake to allow either German or Italian troops to act as so-called liberators or occupiers. The American army is viewed by the general populace as the preferred occupational force in the event of war.

18. In the event of liberation and occupation by American forces, anti-communist Yugoslavs would advance the following alternative to the Tito regime: a temporary administration composed of the liberation organs and such political organizations that have a positive following in the populace. Opposition would be advanced by the old political groups, if still in existence, or groups which maintained a more or less passive but anti-communist attitude. As soon as possible, under the supervision of the occupying forces, free elections should be organized in order to produce a genuine popular representative form of government. Collaboration with the old political parties in Yugoslavia would probably prove a failure. Except for some followers of the Peasant Party leader Macek in Croatia, clericals in Slovenia, and monarchists in Serbia, the old parties have lost all contact with reality in communist Yugoslavia.
19. After the fall of communism in Yugoslavia, all ethnic groups will be occupied in attempts to eradicate everything connected with communism. This urgent desire will keep national unity intact for a short period of time. The accumulated hatred of communism will provide sufficient time for the liberating forces to prevent excesses and establish a new order and administration before the consequences of ethnic differences become acute once again. Later, however, these differences will appear once again, especially because of a previous dispersion of portions of ethnic groups. The post-war emigrants, with all their mutual distrust and hatred accumulated during the war and the long period of exile, should be prevented from becoming influential before order has been thoroughly enforced and a new democratic system firmly established. The liberating army should not be guilty of bringing these "old sinners" back to Yugoslavia on its bayonets.
20. How the general populace would act in the event of war and large-scale guerrilla action led by Tito depends largely on the nature of this guerrilla war. If it were directed against the Soviets, the populace would probably support the guerrillas, or at least would be successfully forced into such support. This support would last until a Soviet victory appeared positive. At this moment nobody would risk exposure to the Soviets by supporting a lost cause. Thus in choosing between Tito and the Soviets, the general populace would favor Tito as the lesser evil until the chances for his success appear dead. Should Tito receive Western support, the populace would probably support any guerrilla action against the Soviets, in the hope that by so doing the country might be rid of communism altogether. Such help would in reality be aid to the West, not to the Tito clique, and would be so viewed by those who supported Tito.

The Union of Yugoslav Communists - Its Orientation and Factions

21. The entire Party will remain solidly behind Tito as long as he gives evidence of being firmly in power and as long as he manages to keep out of direct conflict with the East or the West. Conflict with either the West or the East would expose differences in the Party, because the most important incentive for communist followers in Yugoslavia is to stay in power and to retain their lucrative posts. This incentive to remain loyal to the current

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- regime would be severely strained should war occur; too much uncertainty would be prevalent and too many Party members would be choosing one side or the other in an attempt to escape from being on the losing team.
22. Tito's personal guard can be considered completely loyal; they are selected for this reason. The regular army cadres are also personally loyal to Tito. This does not include, however, the reserve personnel who would make the bulk of the army in the event of mobilization.
 23. The old communist cadres, those who have been communists for a period of time longer than they have known Tito as a leader, or who have grown together with Tito under Moscow influence, are loyal to the communist cause rather than to Tito as an individual. Many of these men are disillusioned and have been put aside or liquidated. This kind of communist will be against Tito in the event of a showdown with the Kremlin. They will remain with Tito only as long as Moscow does not intervene directly. An outstanding member of this faction is Edvard Kardelj and his followers. It is inconceivable that these people would march against Moscow; although the West might conclude that they are ready to do so because of their "present clowning". Even now, the break with Moscow is for these people a matter of personal and doctrinal distress which they hope will not last forever. However, as long as Moscow does not intervene directly, this faction will remain ostensibly loyal to Tito because the members of it can thereby retain their decisive roles in the regime by which they are able to secure and maintain communism in Yugoslavia.
 24. The relatively new members of the Party, those springing from other ideological ranks or those who because of their service to Tito have been placed in lucrative positions, represent some fifty to seventy-five percent of the Party. They are opportunists, and in the event of a crisis will side with the winning party. Until then they will maintain their undecided, vacillating attitude. They will commit themselves only after the final issue has become certain or clear. A typical figure in this group is Air Force General Uleplic. There is a large percentage of this younger group, however, who have grown up ideologically not so much under communism but under Tito and his system. If such young communists do not fall directly under some hostile leadership, they can be considered loyal to Tito.
 25. Should Tito decide to accept a rapprochement with Moscow, the Party would produce very few rebels, much less an organized faction opposing such a move. Only a few officials such as General Ambrozic¹ and others disillusioned with communism might go underground or search for some other alternative. Kardelj and his clique are most probably the decisive factor in the Party's attitude toward Moscow.
 26. As for the Party hierarchy, following the "big five": Tito, Kardelj, Rankovic, Djilas, and Pijaca, the following members must be viewed as top-ranking: Koca Popovic, Feko Dapcevic, Vukmanovic-Tempo, Petar Stambolic, Mijalki Todorovic, Frank Leskosek, Vladimir Bakaric, and Bozo Jovanovic. In this second level should also be included all members of the Federal and Republic Executive Councils because their official positions are based on their Party standings.
 27. In the event of Tito's normal death, his normal successor would be Kardelj. Under these circumstances, Kardelj would probably receive the solid backing

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of all Party factions. He has sufficient authority and enough good relations with other important Party members to succeed Tito without instigating a palace revolt. Rankovic and Dapcevic, based on their respective positions as head of the UDB and the army, would also have a good chance of succeeding Tito. However, their positions would be based only on fear and blood for they are not regarded highly by their Party colleagues, not to speak of the general populace. Moreover, their capabilities on the political level are virtually non-existent. Djilas, as the Party's theoretician, appears better prepared and more acceptable than either Rankovic or Dapcevic, but he could exclude Kardelj only by receiving the backing of these two men. Should Tito be forced from power by the Cominformists of the Soviets, his personal clique would probably fall with him. In such a case, Koca Popovic or Dapcevic would be likely successors, unless the Soviets were to impose someone like Rokossovski in Yugoslavia.

Reliability of the Party in the Event of War

28. An attack from the East by the Satellites only would find the Party cadres virtually solid in their support for the regime. Prestige factors would dictate a solid front and the Party could probably successfully employ nationalist slogans against the Bulgarians and the Hungarians. It could also successfully appeal to the younger Party cadres and mount something like a patriotic resistance against the aggressor. The Party would thus remain compact, unless some heavy military defeat was suffered. Should this occur, Soviet bloc propaganda would cause the older cadres to defect to the East, the opportunists to melt away, and the younger cadres to be uselessly sacrificed.
29. However, an isolated attack from the East without Soviet intervention is practically inconceivable. Under the more likely circumstance of direct Soviet assistance, the older Party cadres would try to get rid of Tito and his clique and the opportunists. The younger communist class would probably resist as long as Tito is with them and until the first grave defeat; then everything would disintegrate. Western intervention would increase the resistance of the younger cadres, but without direct military help on a large scale resistance would be impossible. It is also questionable how the older, thoroughly communist groups would regard direct aid from the West in view of its various implications and possible consequences following the fighting. In any event the Party would remain united only until the foreign intervention brings about a showdown. Only peace can save the Yugoslav communist structure given its present composition and attitudes. Tito and his leading comrades are actually walking on the razor's edge; his position is weak and delicate and demands great ability.

Current Party Policy

30. It may well be that the Party cadres feel more at ease with the coercive methods, such as continuous threatenings, blackmail, obligatory self-criticism, etc., are mitigated or discarded. However, the time elapsed since the Sixth Party Congress in November 1952 is too short to pass judgment on the final effect of the new Party approach to government. Party members are still regimented in strict discipline and obedience. And it is doubtful that the Party leaders will ever allow their members to relax under an "educational approach" to the masses; the fear of punishment must always be present for those who deal directly with the populace and popular organizations.

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31. Further, the educational methods will have little effect in recruiting new Party members. It is too late now. In the past persons were practically forced to join the Party or lose their positions. Promotions have always been connected with Party membership. The attitudes of the general populace have changed. Party members are no longer respected, though they are still hated, and they are no longer feared as before, except in higher levels. People are now more prone to disapprove of Party members; they have started to criticize and if possible oppose them. The public blames them openly for prevailing conditions in all areas. Many Party members in unimportant posts are ashamed of their membership, but they cannot resign because this would mean certain personal disaster.
32. With the softening of Party policies toward the masses, which cannot be readily attributed to any specific individuals but only to the failure of other means of government, people are more reluctant to participate in public meetings; they will not voluntarily listen to the same old stuff with which they had been "blessed" so abundantly in the past. But to neutral onlookers even the smaller attendances resulting from less coercion will register a better impression.

The Yugoslav Army

33. The peace time strength of the army is approximately 140,000, including KMOJ and militia, plus a relatively high number of officers, about 60,000 including UDB officers. The total never exceeds 200,000 except during periods of mobilization. Official figures on army strength are merely propaganda. The high number of officers is explained by the fact that almost all Party officials, even when not in service, hold officer rank as a reward for their past service. References to armies, corps, and divisions in the army and the air force have no real meaning or consistency. These designations serve to impress foreigners. In addition, their "existence" provide lucrative posts for old communists with partisan experience who are incapable of commanding large, organized units.
34. The higher echelons of the Yugoslav army are composed of either old revolutionaries who obtained their present ranks during or after the last war as reward for their loyalty, or of former regular army officers of the pre-war regime who joined the partisans during the last war. Those in the first group acquired their military abilities in the Spanish Civil War and as officers under Tito in Yugoslavia during the Second World War. Their military knowledge has been improved by short courses in the Soviet Union or in special schools in post-war Yugoslavia. Their ability to handle the complex problems of modern war is inadequate. In regular warfare they will prove failures like the old Soviet marshals. The principal officers in this first group are Peko Dapcevic, Kosta Nadj, Koca Popovic, Ivan Gosnjak, Kupresanin, and Bosko Siljegovic. Their value for Tito lies far more in their political reliability than in their professional capabilities.
35. The former royalists comprise a number of capable persons who distinguished themselves in the pre-war period, during the war joined Tito and eventually the Party. They had adequate pre-war training, gathered some experience in guerrilla warfare, and received some training or "gleichschaltung" in some Soviet schools or courses. The most prominent members of this groups are Generals Mihail Apostolski, Velimir Terzic, Zdenko Ulepac, Bozo Lazarevic (Deputy Commander of the Yugoslav Air Force), and Vlado Matetich (Air Force Commander in Sarajevo), and staff officers like General Kolb², General

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Tomac (fnu), Klisanic³, (fnu), and Colonels Babic (fnu), Djuric (fnu), etc. These regulars, however, are either too old or their jump from pre-war field grade rank to the highest echelon left a serious vacuum in their ability to handle higher staff problems.

36. These pre-war officers will always remain a political liability for they are opportunists. The majority of this group if given the choice between Tito and Moscow would lean toward Moscow for reasons of opportunism. They believe that the Soviet Union is already far beyond the revolutionary period and needs experts rather than revolutionaries lacking professional backgrounds. Thus they assume that they would have better opportunities under a professional Soviet army than in Tito's revolutionary system.
37. The fighting core of the army is composed of officers and NCO's solidly trained in the post-war academies and schools. But even at the regimental level the "sinecura system" begins and a few months or weeks of special training for such commanding officers cannot be counted on to provide a solid know-how required by a large-scale war.
38. There is no such thing in Yugoslavia as army cliques or "personal groupations" of officers. Any cliques, or even social gatherings, not sponsored strictly along Party lines, would be suspected and the participants dispersed to far away garrisons, or in more serious cases, immediately suppressed. To my knowledge there have been no pro-Cominform officers arrested during the last few years.
39. It is fairly well established that in the event of an isolated satellite attack the army would stand its ground, at least until the first major defeat. However, no prolonged resistance is possible unless some foreign power provides ammunition, fuel, and spare parts. Local production is far from sufficient to support even a limited war. In the more likely event of a large-scale war with the Soviet orbit, the army cannot be considered reliable owing to its ideological disharmony. One must keep in mind the following facts: the army is commanded by communists, the officers in the middle echelons are for the most part opportunists, younger post-war educated officers are trained in the spirit of Titoism and are imbued with nationalism, and, finally, the masses who will enter the army in the event of large-scale mobilization are mostly peasants or other anti-communists.
40. The disharmony produced by a communist officer corps and an anti-communist base will in any case present a serious problem. Against the West, the base would not be reliable; against the East the higher commanding echelons not only pose a grave threat but a positive danger. Since the organization and authority of the commanding communists is absolute, there is a great danger that defecting higher commanders could take along with them whole units to the East. The opportunists would hold out until an initial disaster occurred and then would join the victors. The younger permanent cadres and the post-war officers would probably follow Tito loyally, but the broad recruit masses would fight without enthusiasm or remain passive, looking for the first opportunity to disappear.
41. The active participation of the American army in the defense of Tito would raise enormously the fighting spirit of the younger classes. It might even furnish enough inducement to the opportunists to throw their lot in with Tito, and it could be expected that the broad peasant masses would fight

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with decision in the presence of American troops in the hope that ultimately an American victory would mean the end of communism in Yugoslavia. However, the active participation of American forces might induce anti-communist soldiers to desert their units and attempt to join American units; such a situation would create many political problems. Moreover, owing to the ever present possibility of defection to the Soviets, American units should always keep in mind their own protection on their flanks and secure their retreat and communication lines. Also, among the Yugoslav liaison officers in American units one can expect to find potential Soviet spies.

42. For domestic as well as foreign consumption, the war plan of the Yugoslav army is to resist along the borders with locally available troops, and then to launch a large counter-attack. However, conditions for mobilization, concentration, strategic deployment and solid logistic preparation are poor. Therefore, even in the case of an isolated satellite attack, the attackers would be so far advanced in time and preparations that any massive offensive action launched by them is bound to have initial success. In the event of an offensive from Bulgaria, the Varder Valley can be easily reached and the line to Salonika cut. A large-scale attack with direct Soviet assistance would preclude the possibility of a successful defense of the Belgrade-Nis-Salonika line without timely and large-scale Allied support.
43. Consequently, for reasons of prestige and fear of dangerous developments in his Party and the army, Tito must by all means avoid any initial major disaster. Thus, except for a very favorable situation with Allied support, a successful defense of the borders is a bad risk from Tito's standpoint. Defense in prepared interior mountain zones offers a much better chance and would secure more time for effective allied assistance.
44. There are military preparations taking place in various mountain areas, the Rog in Slovenia, the Lika, etc. This building of army depots, military railways of narrow gauge, the creation of forbidden zones all lead to the conclusion that the main effort in the case of a large-scale war will be made in the mountains with final gravitation to Bosnia.

Edvard Kardelj and Yugoslav Foreign Policy

45. Kardelj's influence on the conduct of Yugoslav foreign policy is almost absolute. He dominates all elements in the Yugoslav Government concerned with the formation of foreign policy: the Advisory Council, Institute for Foreign Research, headed by Stanoye Simic and Sava Kosnovic, and the Information Service in the Foreign Ministry. Tito's role is merely to proclaim the decisions prepared in the appropriate organs under Kardelj's direction. This is generally true in other areas of government as well; Tito acts merely as the Party's megaphone. Koca Popovic can act independently only in routine matters, and is Kardelj's executive hand. During the last war I was able to observe the most friendly relations between Kardelj and Koca Popovic, and it is my opinion that Popovic was appointed Foreign Minister at the explicit request of Kardelj.
46. All communications and orders between Belgrade and republican organs in Slovenia go through Kardelj's personal cabinet. The regime in Slovenia is considered by the population to be stricter than in the other Republics. The peasants in Slovenia complain that they have to bear more burdens than those in Croatia; this situation is attributed to Kardelj's "brutal, sectarian nature".

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47. The suppression of all legal opposition in Yugoslavia following the war was engineered by Kardelj.
48. Any sudden or rude changes in Yugoslav foreign policy can be attributed to Kardelj's brutal, sadistic, vindictive, and unapproachable nature. Tito, on the other hand, is felt to be more polite and calm; a person with whom one can defend opposite views. It is my belief that the noisy and brutal reaction of Yugoslavia on Trieste can be blamed on Kardelj, and that Tito could not help but agree to this extreme reaction once it had begun.
49. In their joint public appearances one can usually see Kardelj gesticulating with Tito in a didactical manner. Kardelj always tries to impress onlookers with the fact that he, in contrast to other Yugoslav officials who show their servility to Tito, is on the same level.
50. In 1948 Kardelj apparently gave his full support to Tito at the time of the Cominform Resolution. Last year, however, following the change in administrations in the United States, Kardelj began sending feelers to Moscow without Tito's knowledge. At least this is the view commonly held in higher Yugoslav communist circles. As a result, Tito has been faced with an accomplished fact and has been forced to agree with this policy of establishing closer relations with Moscow because of its great popularity among the old communists.

Soviet-Yugoslav Relations

51. A genuine, conciliatory approach by the new Soviet regime would be accepted by the Union of Communists with the greatest enthusiasm. The present leadership of the Party might have some doubts about the sincerity of any Soviet inducement and fear for their personal welfare, for it is doubtful that Tito and his clique would ever trust Moscow. However, they would either be forced to accept a Soviet offer or would be subverted by the remainder of the Party which feels that a reconciliation with the Kremlin would end the confusion of being a communist against communism and pro-West without being Western. The current good relations with Greece and Turkey would quite naturally be sacrificed should Moscow's offers be accepted.

Yugoslav Officials Sympathetic to Return to Moscow

52. In principle all Yugoslav communists are sympathetic to the re-establishment of intimate relations with Moscow, especially the new Soviet regime, because they all know that their very existence as communist bosses of Yugoslavia is conceivable only as long as the Soviets protect communism and communist regimes throughout the world.
53. Assuming the unwillingness of the top five in the Yugoslav Party to risk their necks by accepting a Soviet offer, there remain many officials, even in higher levels, who have always carefully avoided exposing themselves as radical anti-Soviets. On the contrary, they have been known as pro-Soviet to the bone and have been careful not to burn all their bridges. Men in this group include Koca Popovic, Vukmanovic-Tempo, Kupresanin, Terzic, Frank Leskosek, Miha Marinko, Zdenko Uleplic, etc. Although there is no direct evidence that either Leskosek or Dapcevic are more pro-Soviet than they are pro-Tito, they are suspect because of their passive attitudes during 1948.

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54. The most prominent person with a pro-Soviet record is Koca Popovic, despite his present and past positions. Before the Cominform break he was under the direct influence of Soviet organs in Yugoslavia, and was the officer who, following Soviet requests, was responsible for laying mines in Albanian waters which resulted in the damage of some British ships.
55. It is generally believed that Kardelj himself is one of those who have pro-Cominform sentiments. However, he is one of those directly responsible for the break with Moscow. Whether this paradoxical situation is part of his play for power remains to be seen.
56. Vukmanovic-Tempo vacillated considerably and tended toward Moscow for a while during the summer of 1948. At that time he was political and personal director in the Ministry of Defense. From that position he was demoted and put into another which was not commensurate with his high rank. In 1949 it was reported that he had been completely "rehabilitated" which cleared the way for his present assignment.
57. Milan Kupresanin and Peko Dapcevic have been reported as urgently advocating rapprochement with the Kremlin in the interests of the Yugoslav army, which they contend can be properly developed only with Soviet assistance.
58. Zdenko Uleplic, Air Force Chief of Staff, attended Soviet schools in 1944 and 1945, but was never seen by other comrades in the USSR at that time. In fact, he frequented NKVD courses, according to the chief Soviet instructor in the Soviet mission at Zemun, General Obraskov.
59. General Terzic is at the moment in retirement, but this is due more to his personal quarreling with Peko Dapcevic than to his known pro-Russian feelings.

Religious Persecution in Yugoslavia

60. The church is not free, for the regime is doing all it can to restrict religious practices. This policy is one of the chief sources of resentment and hatred against the regime. Church services are well attended as a sign of protest against the regime and its policy of persecution. In Slovenia the old liberals, who before the war refused to waste their time in church, have become assiduous churchgoers. They too regard church attendance as a form of protest. Even members of the Party go clandestinely to church to receive the sacraments.
61. The church hierarchies of all three of the principal religions in Yugoslavia are solid in their stand against religious persecution. The Orthodox identify themselves with the Catholics in the fight against suppression of religion. Among the lower clergy the regime has succeeded in organizing some pro-regime groups, but the priests belong not so much for ideological reasons as for reasons of life, freedom, and bread. Only in the regime's organizations of Orthodox priests can one find approval of the regime's policy toward the Vatican.
62. The lower Moslem clergy is more dominated by the regime than the others. The reason for this lies largely in the low educational level of Moslem priests, their miserable life, and nationalistic and racial animosities.

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Economic Policy

63. The Sixth Party Congress in Zagreb set forth the principle that managers of state enterprises should be selected on the basis of their skills and not because of Party membership. The Party was forced in this decision because of the great lack of experts in the Party itself. Among old reliable Party members few experts are left. Moreover, most of these men have been appointed commissars in the political field and have taken a liking to these sinecures. Younger Party members who have attended technical schools and courses are without practical experience and for many years to come will not be able to assume the role of efficient managers. Thus the Party has been forced to depend upon non-communists, though with little appreciable results.
64. Whenever a manager in industry is a non-Party member a Party member is assigned to his office as control. In such cases the Party man is the real boss, though he carries no responsibility for production. The non-communist official must have all his decisions approved by the Party man but only he bears the responsibility. Consequently, experts with no Party affiliation shun positions where their success will be largely dependent on the questionable cooperation of the Party man at his side.
65. The entire industrial problem has been one vicious dilemma with no exit. At the present time many old hands are being approached by the regime with offers to manage their old enterprises. But these old engineers and managers are generally reluctant to accept such positions because they are unfamiliar with the new system.
66. The person primarily responsible for this incredible chaos in the Yugoslav post-war economy is the late Boris Kidric, an unsuccessful student but a fanatic communist and assiduous worker. His assistant was Vlahko Begovic, a professional revolutionary and an unknown quantity in the economic field.
67. The new economic dictator, Vukmanovic-Tempo, has less understanding of economic matters than Kidric possessed, and Kidric could at least learn from his errors. Attached to this inexperienced half-wit remains the same Begovic who had proven such a failure with Kidric.

The Tito-Cominform Rift and the Cases of Hebrang and Zujovic

68. The Tito-Cominform rift originated in the different approach to political and economic problems of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; it was not the result of a personal prestige quarrel between Tito and Stalin. Moscow wanted the rigid application of Soviet methods in Yugoslavia, but Tito wanted to apply his control according to the local situation. Moscow wanted the communist party to remain apart from other progressive forces which were supposed to be relegated to a subordinate category. Tito connected the Party to the national front, although he saw to it that this body was completely permeated with communists. Moscow wanted Tito to be chief of state and of the party as well, but Tito wanted to head the national front, too, in order to attract support from abroad. Moscow wanted the peasant classes immediately suppressed, but Tito favored the gradual conversion of the peasants to collectivization. He could not very well annihilate the class which produced the largest number of partisan fighters.

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69. The arguments between Belgrade and Moscow went on for months before the actual break. However, Tito did not expect the Cominform to publicly condemn him without attempting to reach a compromise; so, nothing was left for him to do but to fight back. He lost no time in eliminating potentially dangerous men like Andrija Hebrang and Sreten Zujovic, and later many others like Arso Jovanovic.
70. Hebrang's opposition to Tito was based primarily on realistic rather than ideological grounds. Hebrang, as chief of Yugoslavia's industry, opposed Tito's plan for rapid industrialization, and in this respect his ideas coincided with those of Moscow. Thus in opposing the unrealistic industrialization of Yugoslavia Hebrang contributed to the popular resistance engendered against the extreme economic measures adopted by the regime. This is why he was dangerous and had to die. Zujovic's case was quite different. His argument with Tito was strictly limited to Cominform problems. Zujovic possessed an exuberant character and used to shout openly against Tito's policy toward the Kremlin. Since he represented a threat to the Tito regime in the form of one whom Moscow might select as a successor to Tito, he was removed. Later, when the rift between Moscow and Belgrade was judged incurable, Zujovic with his pro-Soviet feelings no longer represented a serious threat to the Tito regime, since the general populace was anti-communist. Thus he was eventually given the chance to repent in public and was set free.

The Case of Blagjoe Neskovic

71. Neskovic, although a prominent Serb communist, has always been a lonely man in the Party without a following or a clique of his own. He has always been pro-Soviet. Following the Cominform break, Neskovic's attitude was equivocal, and he used to question the wisdom of the Party leadership in causing the break with Moscow. His communist ideology has never been questioned. His downfall can be definitely attributed to his pro-Soviet feelings and behavior.

25X1 [REDACTED] Comments

1. Probably General Vladimir Ambrozic, who was chief of civil aviation and reportedly Chairman of the Physical Culture Committee and member of the Pan-Slav Committee before the Cominform break.
2. Possibly reference to General Egidiya Vjekoslav Kolb, currently military secretary to Defense Minister Gosnjak.
3. Probably reference to Major General Vjekoslav Klisanic.

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