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1. Analysis of the fulfillment of priority construction projects, third quarter 1952:

The following list gives the status of priority construction projects of the various Reichsbahndirektionen (RBD):

RBD Berlin

4.26 RBD-Bezirk, repair of tracks and switches

Total cost and annual installment for 1952 was 2,040,000 DM (14.7 % fulfilled). There was a shortage of material for superstructures

4.37 Seddin-Belzig line, reconstruction of the second track

Total cost and annual installment for 1952 was 5,600,000 DM (3.9 % fulfilled). This construction project was closed down on 21 August. After the completion of the connecting curve at Wildpark all available manpower was to be reassigned to the completion of the Seddin-Belzig project.

4.38 Jueterbox-Grossbeeren, second track

Total cost and annual installment for 1952 was 9,350,000 DM (12.9 % fulfilled). In this project the cleaning of the roadbed was 97 % finished. 90 % of the sleepers needed for the Ludwigsfelde-Trebbin section were on hand. Deliveries of rails amounted to 5,000 meters. Because of a shortage of iron fittings, sleepers and the necessary rails, firms employed at the project were transferred on 30 July to the Grossbeeren-Seddin project and to the "3. Stopfung SAR." 1

4.86 Grossbeeren-Seddin, second track

Total cost and annual installment for 1952 amounted to 4,880,000 DM (4.9 % fulfilled). Twelve kilometers of track were in operating

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condition. Because of material shortages the project could not be completely realized.

3.26 Frankfurt/Oder, bridge across the Oder

Total costs amounted to 3,230,000 DME (72.9 % fulfilled). This project was completed with the exception of dismantling work. Approximately 300,000 DME were needed to complete the project. Assessment of the project was begun.

3.27 Kuestrin, bridge across the Oder

Total cost and annual installment for 1952 amounted to 1,597,000 DME (67.6 % fulfilled). The necessary heavy plate was delivered on 25 September.

3.30 The Havel bridge Werder

Total cost and annual installment for 1952 was 500,000 DME (62.3 % fulfilled)

RBD Cottbus

4.80 Guben-Falkenberg, second track

Total cost and annual installment for 1952: 27,415,000 DME. (Fulfillment - 22 %). Material for tracks was in short supply, but work progressed normally.

4.85 Elsterwerda-Ruhland line, second track

Total cost and annual installment for 1952: 4,250,000 DME. Fulfillment: 31%. The Elsterwerda-Boihla-Plessa section of the line was completely laid (vorgestreckt). Tracks for the Plessa-Ruhland section were delivered only in part.

RBD Dresden

4.76 Chemnitz-Hilbersdorf-Niederwiesa line, second track for local passenger trains

Annual installment: 940,000 DME. Fulfillment: 18%. Planning for the project was completed, and grading work was completed. The Rosswein curve entrance was being installed.

4.77 Dresden-Schoena, second track

Annual installment: 8,000,000 DME. Fulfillment: 34%. The Heidenau-Pirna section of the line was in operation. There were, however, shortages of bolt hooks, gravel, material for superstructures, tracks, and manpower.

4.78 The Chemnitz-Kappel-Siegmars-Schoenau line, second track

Annual installment: 1,330,000 DME. Fulfillment: 12%. Project planning was completed and signaling devices were under construction. Material for a superstructure and switches were lacking; delivery of these articles was considered doubtful.

RBD Erfurt

4.76 Reinsdorf, connecting curve

Planned sum: 700,000 DME. Fulfillment: 73%. The curve has been partially in operation since 10 August. The hand-operated signalling installation (Waerterstellwerk) was completed except for the installation of safety devices. The station block was installed. No difficulties had arisen. 30,000 DME were saved.

RBD Greifswald

4.78 Templin-Prenzlau, reconstruction and improvement of the line

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Total cost: 15,100,000 DME. Annual installment: 7,600,000 DME.
Fulfillment: 33%. Grading work (Erdarbeiten) was in full swing and 30,000 cubic meters of earth had been moved. The construction sites were provided with electric lighting so that work could be carried on at night too. Difficulties had arisen in the procurement of coal, diesel fuel and motor oil for the steam shovels.

4. 79 Britz, connecting curve

Total cost and annual installment for 1952: 1,600,000 DME.
Fulfillment: 66%. Grading was 80% finished and 70% of the material for the superstructure had been delivered. Construction of the CTC illuminated control panel (Bildstellwerk) had begun. Progress on the project was termed good.

4. 80 Neustrelitz, connecting curve

Total cost and annual installment for 1952: 2,621,000 DME. Fulfillment: 43%. Work on laying track, grading and bridge construction was proceeding according to plan. Difficulties in the procurement of paving material had arisen. The curve was to be put into operation on 11 October 1952.

4. 82 Oberswalde, connecting curve

Total cost: 5,196,000 DME. Annual installment for 1952: 2,449,000 DME.
Fulfillment: 100%

RBD Halle

4. 76 Laying of the Geiselalbahn

Total cost: 18,990,000 DME. Fulfillment: 59%. Because of extremely bad weather in early September, a great deal of repair work was necessary.

RBD Magdeburg

4. 77 Huettenkombinat West, second section of construction

Total cost and annual installment: 3,152,000 DME. Fulfillment: 71%.
Work was proceeding according to plan, but difficulties in procuring wood for the construction of roofs for the locomotive sheds had arisen. 6 WE (sic) were lacking.

RBD Schwerin

4. 77 Buetzow-Schwaan, reconstruction of the line

Total cost: 3,735,000 DME. Fulfillment: 90%.
The line was put into limited operation with a speed limit of 40 kilometers per hour. No difficulties were reported; very little work still had to be done on the project.

2. The following are the basic reasons why the plan to increase rail capacity was only 41% fulfilled as of 25 September 1952:

Shortages of materials for superstructure: rails, iron fittings and manpower. The manpower situation was particularly acute in the Berlin area. The main reason for the difficulties incurred was the transfer of materials for permanent roads, heavy equipment (steam shovels), and manpower from one project to another. The results of such transfers can be seen in the Seddin-Belzig project. Because of the importance of the special project to construct a connecting curve at Wildpark, heavy equipment and labor were transferred from the Seddin-Belzig project so that it had to close down completely.

3. In order to speed up the dismantling of lines and tracks and to mobilize the internal reserves of materials for superstructures
a special staff, Sonderstab Winzer, was created. Moreover, five special track laying control groups were formed; they conducted invest-

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gations of construction material and of the depots for material for superstructures. Through this action the last remaining reserves were to be collected and the circulation of material for superstructures was to be speeded up. Delivery of sleepers, formerly a bottleneck, was causing no trouble as of October 1952.

4. The Berlin special program had an especially bad effect on the realization of the investment program. In spite of the many measures undertaken, it was not possible to increase the Reichsbahn fulfillment status (Erfuellungsstand). In order to make sure that large sums of money were not tied up uselessly in projects which could not possibly be realized because of shortages of materials, an assessment of all overlimit projects (Ueberlimit-Vorhaben) was initiated. The assessment was to cut all projects by the amounts which were no longer needed in 1952. On the other hand, the Reichsbahn was forced to accept into the 1952 plan several projects which absolutely had to be realized. Assessment revealed that a total of 63,001,000 DME could not be realized. The draft of a government resolution which had already been forwarded to the competent offices made provisions to use the 63,001,000 DME to help finance extra projects amounting to about 70,000,000 DME. The State Planning Commission was to make up the 7,000,000 DME difference from funds taken from the vehicle program of the Reichsbahn.

1. Comment: Not further identified by source.

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