

MAR 1952

CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTED
 SECURITY INFORMATION
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 INFORMATION FROM
 FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS

REPORT
 CD NO.

STAT

COUNTRY China
 SUBJECT Economic - Agriculture, five-year plan
 HOW PUBLISHED Daily newspaper
 WHERE PUBLISHED Peiping
 DATE PUBLISHED 4 Aug 1953
 LANGUAGE Chinese

DATE OF INFORMATION 1953
 DATE DIST. /O Dec 1953
 NO. OF PAGES 4
 SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Jen-min Jih-pao

PROVINCIAL PARTY COMMITTEE SCORES FAULTS
 IN AGRICULTURAL PLANS FOR HEILUNGKIANG PROVINCE

[Summary: The Heilungkiang Provincial Party Committee, in a report to the Northeast Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, scored some of the faults found in the agricultural plans for Heilungkiang Province.

In general the plans for increased agricultural production were criticized as too grandiose. The party committee charged that goals set were unrealistic, that supervision had been inefficient, and that purchase of new tools and use of new techniques had been made with improper planning and guidance.

An editorial note added by the Jen-min J'h-pao commended the report as indicating important problems connected with the policy for increased production and stated that the problems, faults, and wrong thinking analyzed here also exist in other provinces.]

A report of an investigation of the work in country villages made to the Northeast Bureau of the CCP by the Heilungkiang Provincial Party Committee points out serious mistakes in implementing the agricultural program for 1953.

The report states that substantial progress was made in the spring of 1953 but that several mistakes and misunderstandings must be corrected lest they affect seriously future production. Specific points made are:

Unrealistic Goals

There was not sufficient study of the actual conditions within Heilungkiang Province before setting the agricultural production goal for 1953 or for the more distant goal of the next 5 years. The plans are too

STAT

CLASSIFICATION		<u>RESTRICTED</u>		DISTRIBUTION									
STATE	NAVY	NSRB											
ARMY	AIR	FBI											

RESTRICTED

STAT

extensive and the goals too high. The goal is 100 percent increase within 5 years over the base production figures of 1952. The Agricultural Production Cooperatives are to modernize methods of farming with unit production 20-30 percent higher than that of the best local mutual-aid teams. Twenty percent of the land must produce 15-20 piculs of grain per hectare. The cooperatives are to set a new record for from a half hectare to a whole hectare of over 20 piculs per hectare. As seen today this figure is too high.

In the matter of increased acreage under cultivation, the goal of 5 million hectares under cultivation by the year 1957 is too high.

The demand is that within 5 years 80 percent of the farm households will have joined agricultural production cooperatives or collective farms. With 25 households in each cooperative this would mean a total of 34,268 cooperatives. The plan calls for 100 collective farms to be established with 100 households in each. This all fails to coincide with the facts. In 1953, the goal was the establishment of 1,200 cooperatives. So far, only 717 have been organized. As for collective farms, it is very difficult to maintain the two now existing and quite useless to think of forming new ones.

In the matter of the establishment of Credit Unions it was insisted that within 5 years every Consumer Cooperative should establish a Credit Union Department, two thirds of them to be established during 1953. For this reason some Consumer Cooperatives have compelled the farmers to deposit money with them and even to turn over to them cows and horses. This has caused general dissatisfaction and increased the worries of the people.

When the leaders make such excessive demands it directly influences each hsien and ch'u to do likewise and to make too extensive plans. For example, the 14th Ch'u of Hai-lun Hsien demanded an average production of 15 piculs per hectare, which was far beyond the range of possibility.

Inefficient Supervision

There is insufficient control over the policies of some cooperatives and a blind rashness in the actual guidance of their work. The agricultural production cooperatives accumulated too great assets and put on too big a display. Their debts were too heavy. They had no definite aim in operation, but talked too loudly of collectivism and a unified plan for expenditures.

In Sui-hua Hsien the party committee suggested that there should be a general establishment of cooperatives in the area of Min-chi Ts'un. After approval by the provincial committee and publication of the plans in the party newspaper it was felt the action was too hasty and local leaders were informed that they must stop proceedings.

In the matter of animal husbandry there is a real tendency toward cooperative work. However, merely to promote active extension without definite rules for gradual individual experimentation is to have insufficient control with resultant mistakes from seeking too speedy accomplishment.

On the two collective farms established under the direct leadership of the Provincial Party Committee the members immediately began taking their meals together [evidence of leftist deviationism], with considerable resulting influence on agricultural production cooperatives. The collective villages made too many loans, another example of blind, overzealous leadership.

Reckless Expansion

In the matter of promotion and reform of agricultural techniques there has also been a serious tendency toward reckless advance. In expanding the use of farm tools quantity has been emphasized rather than quality. There has

- 2 -

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

STAT

been insufficient instruction of the way to use horse-drawn machines, resulting in serious loss and waste. Some 698 horse-drawn machines were issued to mutual-aid teams. This constituted 57 percent of the total number of such new machines. The small acreage cultivated by the mutual-aid teams, lack of animals, and failure to remove boundary markers between the fields made it very hard for the new machines to prove their usefulness.

Each new machine can plow 80 hectares but the total acreage in the whole province plowed by the new machines is only 24,000 hectares so that each machine plows an average of only 2¹/₂ hectares. Experimentation in 1952 proved that each hectare could increase its production 2 piculs by using the machines. Each machine, plowing 20 hectares would add to production 40 piculs, or 6 million yuan (150,000 yuan per picul of kaoliang). However, the capital invested in each machine is 50 million yuan to be repaid in 3 years, 20 percent the first year, 30 percent the second year, and 50 percent the third year. The farmers then would have to pay back for each machine 15,400,000 yuan (equal to 102 piculs of grain) the first year, 19,220,000 yuan (128 piculs of grain) the second year, and 27,700,000 yuan (184 piculs of grain) the third year. When the cost of inspection and repairs has been added, the farmers would lose 50-60 piculs of grain each year on each machine.

In the matter of improvement of old agricultural tools there is a repetition of the old mistakes, with lack of clear aims. Most of the old fashioned agricultural tools are manufactured in bulk lots by orders of the higher authorities. The people are seldom encouraged to make them on their own initiative. As a result, the tools are roughly constructed, not uniform, poor in quality, and unusable. They are expensive, consequently, marketing and consumer cooperatives on the various levels have a large accumulation of unsold equipment.

As to natural and chemical fertilizers, the trading agencies, disregarding the actual requirements of the farmers, blindly purchase and blindly sell. With no proper consideration of the capital involved there is a great accumulation. Large quantities of manure were purchased from a wide area extending to Inner Mongolia, Dairen, Shen-yang, and Harbin. In all, 196,460 tons were purchased, but only 11,770 tons were sold. In pushing the sale of ammonium sulfate they did not take into consideration the nature of the soil or the needs of the crops. The black soil of the north has no deficiency in nitrogen but trading agencies continued to push the sale of this fertilizer. In Pai-ch'uan Hsien there are 50,000 hectares of soybeans. They pushed sales of 60,000 bags of bacterial fertilizer although 50,000 bags would have been sufficient, since one bag will do for more than one hectare.

The whole province has an estimated accumulation of 83,000 cattles of Sa-li-san insecticide. In many places there has been force allocation of purchase. In Hai-lun some of the farmers who were forced to buy Sa-li-san dug a pit and buried it. In K'o-shan Hsien Sa-li-san was sold to farmers who planted no wheat. The general impression was very bad.

In the matter of revolutionary change in farming techniques there is not a gradual extension of new methods following experimentation but rather a peremptory ordering of change. For example, last fall the Provincial Bureau of Agriculture and the Provincial Committee on the work in agricultural villages several times sent telegrams urging every hsien to hurry with the fall plowing. The work was important but the urging was overdone. When the earth was already frozen they still sent urgent telegrams. In Hai-lun some farmers were compelled to plow at night by lantern light.

- 3 -

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

STAT

In the matter of the propagation of animals and the improvement of breeds there has also been blind claims. In the Sa-erh-t'u Animal Husbandry Experiment Station the true situation is portrayed in the contrast between the many and the few. Much fodder is used, little breeding is done; miscarriages are many, foals few, many die, few live.

In the fall of 1952, the Provincial Bureau of Agriculture purchased 2,000 head of cattle from Inner Mongolia, for 20,100,000 yuan, loudly claiming they were improving the native stock. They neglected to inspect the cows carefully, and some of them brought with them a lung disease. The cost was higher than the local variety, being 840,000 yuan per head, which was 200,000 yuan above the medium-grade cows of the local market. It is known that already more than 400 of these cows have died, the Government paying a recompense of 200,000 yuan for each. The people are not happy about this.

The establishment of technical guidance centres is needed and this work has been effective. But in their extension work emphasis has been on quantity rather than quality. There are 201 agrotechnical stations in Heilungkiang with 1,034 personnel. The technical skill of some of the cadres is very inferior. The orders from their superiors are quite contradictory. From departments above the province seven directives have been received and provincial authorities have issued four sets of rules, each with a different connotation, all resulting in general confusion.

Since the autumn of 1952 state farm leadership has made considerable progress, but there is still much left to be desired. Leaders still reveal zeal without knowledge and there is still a regrettable shortage of leaders. Costs are still too high; planning is not based on sound factors. There is waste in building and in opening up new land that cannot be properly cared for. Reports from 30 state farms indicate that an average of 23.2 percent of personnel is not directly engaged in production. Throughout the province in 1952 grain production on state farms averaged 2,390 catties per hectare. The goal for 1953 is 5,560 catties, obviously an impracticable one.

Provincial rural work teams still reveal many shortcomings. They lack timeliness, accuracy, and sufficient analysis in their control measures. They lack long range plans and they fail to maintain sufficiently extensive field surveys. These and other faults such as over-enthusiasm and willingness to accept plans in lieu of accomplishments result in much derogatory opinion of leadership in general.

- E N D -

STAT

- 4 -

RESTRICTED