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SOURCE Newspapers as indicated.

LOCAL POPULATION INDIFFERENT TO GUERRILLA SUPPRESSION;
TIBET TRAINS MEN TO FIGHT COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS

OUTLINES REASONS FOR BANDIT-SUPPRESSION FAILURE -- Canton Nan-fang Jih-pao, 26 Apr 50

Kwangsi -- It was expected that the bandit-suppression campaign launched by our bandit-suppression force between 12 and 29 March 1950 in Ssu-lo Hsien in Kwangsi Province would net at least 100 bandits. However, the force was able to capture or annihilate only 13 bandits in the five attacks launched against them during this period. In three of the five attacks, moreover, our force found itself attacking bandit hideouts which had already been vacated. The failure of this force to accomplish its mission was due mainly to the following reasons:

1. Lack of cooperation between the force and the local governments. For the most part, local governments felt that the responsibility of suppressing the bandits was charged to the bandit-suppression force and that their duty was only to supply the force with the basic intelligence information on the bandits in their areas. Lack of a prearranged plan of liaison between the two also contributed greatly to the failure of the campaign. In addition, the fact that the campaign was launched during the peak of the spring harvest season caused many farmers to adopt a passive attitude toward it.
2. The force could not place the local armed units under unified command during the campaign. This made it impossible to coordinate attacks against bandit hideouts. As a result, the bandits generally obtained information that they were being attacked and fled the area before the force was able to launch a surprise attack against them.
3. The discipline of the local troops was very poor. Their misbehavior caused the masses to flee whenever the campaign force approached their villages. For example, when an attack was launched against the bandit hideout in Na-t'ao village, the local troops maliciously killed chickens, ducks, hogs, etc.; and robbed the local inhabitants of their personal belongings, thus creating animosity which spread throughout the area. When the members of the bandit-suppression force attempted to stop them, the local armed troops refused to heed their advise.

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20,000 MEN TO BE TRAINED IN TIBET -- Hong Kong Shih-pao, 10 May 50

New Delhi, 9 May -- A newspaper in this city has reported that the Tibetan government is recruiting about 20,000 men to be trained for use against Communist guerrilla activities in Tibet. Another source has revealed that about 8,000 Tibetans are receiving Communist indoctrination in the area neighboring that controlled by the Panchan Lama.

A member of the diplomatic circle here reported that the Communists will not attempt to invade Tibet in 1950, as announced by Mao Tse-tung last year, since the Peiping government is too busy with battles on other fronts. Observers here believe that the next few months will be limited to Communist fifth column and other activities to create disorder and confusion among the one million subjects of the Dalai Lama.

PREDICTS TAIWAN INVASION WITHIN 3 MONTHS -- Hong Kong Shih-pao, 15 May 50

Taihoku, 14 May -- At a press interview given on 14 May, a high-ranking KMT military spokesman predicted that the Communists will attack Taiwan within 3 months. The Communists, he said, must launch their invasion within this period or the weather will force them to postpone it until next year. The postponement of the invasion, he further stated, will bring the following grave consequences to the Communists:

1. The existence of Taiwan will be not only a constant threat to the Communists but will also be a very demoralizing factor. It will undoubtedly abet anti-Communist movements on the mainland which will hamper the establishment of Communist authority. As long as Taiwan remains free from Communist control, moreover, the poverty stricken masses of China will continue to oppose the Communist regime.

2. In the past the Communist generally instituted a land-reform measure just before launching an all-out offensive to win the support of the masses. At present, the Communists are attempting to establish peace and order in the areas south of the Yangtze River. The postponement of the invasion for another year may find the Communists without the means of winning over the support of the masses for the operations, since land-reform measures will be completed by that time.

3. The Communists are now facing economic and financial crises. As a result, they are in no position to postpone the invasion until next year.

4. If Taiwan is permitted to remain outside its control, the CCP government will continue to face difficulties in winning recognition as the de jure government of China. Failure to occupy Taiwan will undoubtedly lead to diplomatic difficulties with the USSR and other democratic nations.

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