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REPORT

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1. Number in Sinkiang: The Russians living in Sinkiang are also referred to as Kuei-lua (naturalized people). According to a 1941 survey they numbered 13,408 or slightly less than .47% of the total population of Sinkiang.
2. History in Sinkiang: The relationship between the peoples and governments of China and Russia, up to 1917, was filled with mutual trust and was unusually cordial and friendly. Up until the twentieth century other foreigners in China were referred to, by the Chinese, as "white devils". Russians were excluded from this category. As further concrete evidence of good relationship between China and Imperial Russia, it is interesting to note that despite their lengthy common frontier, up until the end of the Tsarist rule and the advent of Soviet Government, Russia had never been involved in a war with China. The only exception to this statement would be the Boxer Uprising (1900), when Russian troops joined an international force to quell the killing of foreign residents in China.

In Sinkiang, Chinese-Russian relations were equally good. During the Zhab Beg rebellion (1862 to 1874), however, Russia brought to the attention of the Chinese Government the unrest and disorder along the Russian-Sinkiang border and offered to help administer the region until China could do it herself. The Chinese Government at that time was too busy with the internal strife in China proper and therefore ignored Russia's complaints together with her offers of assistance. Under these circumstances, Russia was forced to take the matter into her own hands. She dispatched her troops into Sinkiang under the command of General Kolpakovsky in 1871. Russian troops occupied the northwestern portion of Sinkiang, the Ili, Tarbagatai and Altai Regions, and brought peace and order to that portion of the province. The main bulk of her troops were stationed at lake Sairam Nor and in the village of Tura Su, in the Borokhoro Range. Evidence of these two encampments is still to

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be seen. In July 1881 a treaty was concluded between Russia and China concerning Sinkiang. Under this agreement, Russia withdrew her troops from Sinkiang, but was granted the right to conduct free trade there and to establish and maintain four Russian consulates for the protection of its citizens in Sinkiang. These consulates were established in Chuguchak (Tahcheng), Kuldja (Ining), Urumchi (Tihwa) and Kashgar (Shufu). Only one other country was allowed to establish a consulate in Sinkiang. That country was the UK, it established its consulate in Kashgar. In the four cities where the Russian consulates were maintained, they were allowed to also maintain their own residential concessions, in which they owned property such as homes, churches and warehouses. No other government was granted this privilege in Sinkiang.

Up until the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, the Russians residing in Sinkiang were small in number and consisted mostly of merchants, traders, technicians and professional men. In May, 1918, the first group of Russian Cossacks entered Sinkiang. This group consisted of approximately 500 Semirechinskii Cossacks. When the new anti-Bolshevik front was established in southern Siberia, this group requested from Governor Yang Tseng-hsin (Governor of Sinkiang from 1911 to 7 Jul 28) permission to re-enter the Semirechie region, now part of the Kasakh SSR. They were not only allowed to re-enter Semirechie, through Chuguchak, but Governor Yang had the goodness of returning their arms to them. This was a period of intense civil and military strife in Semirechie, where Cossack bands held positions along the frontier until the collapse of Admiral Kolchak forced first one group and then others to cross into Sinkiang.

After the fall of Semirechie and Siberia, in March 1920, the Sinkiang border was crossed by the remains of the Semirechinskii Cossack brigades of Ataman A I Dutov and Ataman General N P Scherbakov, and the Semirechinskii Cossack partisan divisions of Ataman B V Annenkov and a corps under General Bakich. These Cossack forces, which totaled more than 20 thousand men, were partially disarmed by Sinkiang border troops and given the choice of either remaining in the province or proceeding farther east. The officers were allowed to retain their arms for the purpose of controlling their men. The Sinkiang authorities, and especially Governor Yang himself, were very sympathetic and provided every possible comfort and aid to these men. For instance, the troops under Ataman Dutov in Suiting and those under General Bakich outside of Chuguchak remained as military units for almost two years, being fed, clothed, and sheltered entirely by the Sinkiang Provincial Government. After these men started breaking away from their military units and either settling in Sinkiang or moving on farther east, they were aided in accomplishing their choice by either the Sinkiang Government, or more often by personal funds of Governor Yang Tseng-hsin. Those who elected to remain in Sinkiang found a true and sincere friend in Governor Yang. He not only used a few as his personal advisors, but employed large numbers in the Sinkiang Provincial Government and placed Cossack officers in charge of provincial troops. By 1928 there were no more than three thousand White Russians remaining in Sinkiang.

In 1928 the second wave of Russian emigrants streamed into Sinkiang, continuing until the fall of 1933. It coincided with the collectivization of farms and the subsequent famine in the areas of the USSR which adjoin Sinkiang. This wave brought approximately 28 thousand Russians into Sinkiang. Of this number some 20 thousand settled in Kuldja, four thousand in Chuguchak, three thousand in the Altai Region and one thousand in Urumchi. Thus, by 1933 the Russian population in Sinkiang had swelled to well over 31 thousand people.

After the assassination of Governor Yang on 7 Jul 28, the White Russians in Sinkiang lost a great deal of their influence but still managed to get along fairly well. Their position was strengthened after the start of the Mohammedan religious uprising in February 1931. Governor Chin Shu-chen upon finding his own forces poor in quality enlisted the aid of the White Russians to fight against the Tungan General Ma Chung-yin, leader of the Mohammedan forces. Their participation in this military struggle on the side of the Sinkiang Provincial Government was an important factor in the victory over General Ma Chung-yin in 1934. Governor Chin was replaced, as Governor of Sinkiang,

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by General Sheng Shih-tsai on 12 Apr 33 with the aid and backing of the White Russian forces. It was learned by the White Russian troops, during the siege of Urumchi, the capital, that Governor Chin was planning to have them annihilated and replaced by Soviet troops which were standing by at Changki. These Soviet troops consisted of two regiments of one thousand men each, who wore Chinese uniforms and who claimed to be White Russian volunteers from the Tarbagatai and Altai Regions. The White Russians refused to be disarmed and to march out of the city as ordered by Governor Chin. Instead, they joined forces with the Manchu troops of General Sheng, defeated the Chinese forces of Governor Chin and proclaimed General Sheng as the new Governor of Sinkiang. In the autumn of that year it became evident to the White Russian leaders in Sinkiang that Governor Sheng, as Governor Chin, also had strong pro-Soviet leanings. Therefore, to prevent the Soviets from gradually taking over the province the White Russian leaders, General P P Papengut, General K V Gmirkin, General N I Behteev, Centurion I V Mogutnov, Colonel A V Hilovsky and Lieutenant P P Voieikov undertook a plan to throw White Russian know-how and troops in support of General Ma Chung-yin, who then would be assured of final victory. This move would have terminated further Soviet penetration of Sinkiang, which was the main concern and interest of the White Russians. A message written by Papengut to Gmirkin was intercepted by Governor Sheng and thus the plot was revealed. The above mentioned six men were immediately arrested, imprisoned and never heard from again. Governor Sheng continued as Governor of Sinkiang until 2 Sep 44, permitting the Soviets a free hand in the province. The White Russian population during his term as Governor of Sinkiang decreased from 31 thousand to approximately 13 thousand. The difference of 18 thousand people was due to the White Russians either having been killed in battle, imprisoned and executed by Governor Sheng following the revelation of the plot against him, or being arrested, imprisoned and then returned to the Soviet Union for public trial, and execution. The latter was done for the purpose of impressing the people of the USSR that all enemies of the State, no matter where they may seek refuge, are eventually caught and punished. For a detailed description of the role that the White Russians played in the Sinkiang war against General Ma Chung-yin and his Moslem followers, see enclosure. This information was furnished by a different source. From 1933 to 1943, Sinkiang was almost completely dominated by Governor Sheng's Soviet advisors. In 1943 Governor Sheng made a complete turnabout in his policy toward the USSR. The White Russians who came to Sinkiang prior to, or during, the Bolshevik Revolution were all eliminated. Therefore, of the 13,408 remaining in Sinkiang in 1941, almost all were of the type who took no firm political stand. Prior to 1943, the White Russians who remained in Sinkiang were forced to accept Soviet passports and the approximately 1,200 who resided in Urumchi were ordered to move to either Kuldja or Chuguchak and some ultimately to the USSR. After the Soviets withdrew from Sinkiang in 1944 they were able, in September 1944, to sponsor a rebellion in the northwestern part of Sinkiang which again put them in control of the Ili, Tarbagatai and Altai Regions of Sinkiang. These three regions proclaimed their independence from Sinkiang and took on the name of the East Turkestan People's Republic. Thus, the remaining Russians in Sinkiang again found themselves under Soviet control. A few of those residing in Kuldja were able to escape to the east in late 1946 during a temporary relaxation of East Turkestan-Sinkiang border controls. The Soviets used a trick in 1947 to weed out the remaining Russians, in the East Turkestan People's Republic, who were not content to remain under their influence. They advertised in all the Russian language papers in the East Turkestan People's Republic to the effect that all Russians must register with their local police as to their country of preference. This notice continued to explain that an agreement had been concluded with the US, UK, France and other non-Soviet nations that they would accept those Sinkiang Russians who wished to move to their countries. Most of the Russians saw through this obvious trap and indicated the USSR, or Sinkiang, as their preference. Those who failed to see through the trap, or would not let themselves see it, and indicated the US or some other country other than the USSR, mysteriously disappeared never to be heard from or seen again.

3. Concentrations: Most of the White Russians in Sinkiang used to live in the urban centers of Kuldja, Chuguchak and Urumchi. There were, however, very few, if any, Russians residing in Urumchi between the years of 1943 and 1949. Another concentration of Russians was located in the Altai Region, in and around Sharasume (Chenghwa).

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4. Occupations: As the group with highest average of education and technical training in the province, the White Russians have been useful both in time of peace and in periods of internal strife. Most of them are peasants and laborers, however, they have also served as automobile drivers and mechanics, aided in the training of provincial military forces and made use of their military experience in actual combat. Normally they lead an existence much like that of other White Russian emigre communities in China. They had their own organizations, published their own newspapers and otherwise attempted to preserve their cultural identity. In comparison to the other peoples of Sinkiang they were considered to be heavy eaters, their diet consisting of approximately 50% cereal, 40% meat and 10% vegetables. In general they accommodate themselves to shifting political tides in so far as these do not threaten their very existence.

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1. In February 1931 a Moslem uprising started in the city of Hami (Qomul). Sinkiang Provincial troops were dispatched from Urumchi (Tihwa) to punish the inhabitants of Hami for killing a government tax gatherer. The Moslems within the walled city of Hami fought off these Chinese troops with rifles and boiling oil, but finally were forced to retreat to the nearby mountains. The word of this uprising spread throughout Sinkiang and soon all the Mohammedan peoples of Sinkiang flocked to the area to join the "Religious War". It was decided by the Sinkiang Islamic peoples to enlist the aid of General Ma Chung-yin, "Big Horse", a Tungan warlord who dominated western Kansu Province. Yolbars Khan, the "Tiger Prince" of Hami and Hodja Nias Hadji went to Kansu Province to persuade General Ma Chung-yin to be their military leader. He accepted and in April 1931 made an amazing dash across the Gobi Desert, with an initial force of 500 Tungan cavalry troops. Governor Chin Shu-jen, found that his Chinese troops were no match for these skilled Tungan warriors and so enlisted the aid of the White Russians, who were remnants of Cossack forces and therefore were also skilled horsemen and fighters. The first White Russians to be mobilized into the Chinese Army were those who resided in Urumchi and in other eastern areas of Sinkiang.

2. In the spring of 1932 the Sinkiang Government mobilized the male White Russians in Kuldja (Ining), for the purpose of replacing the Russian divisions which were stationed in Chikurting (Tsikiotsing), near the town of Hami. They were able to mobilize only three hundred men. The normal quantity should have been approximately 500-550. Each group of one hundred men was an independent unit. There was no overall command and each unit left a week apart, one after the other. The unit into which I was mobilized, left Kuldja on 1 Oct 32. We were ordered to Turfan and in proceeding there we did not use the main roadway but travelled through the Tien Shan mountains. Each unit was supervised by a Chinese officer. The entire three units, of one hundred men each, were not armed. Our unit arrived in Turfan on 25 Oct 32 and the men were quartered in the local camel caravan-sarai. We were later joined, in Turfan, by one of the other units. The third unit, we learned, was sent to Shanshan (Pichan). In the middle of November, the brother of Sheng Tupan (General Sheng Shih-tsai) visited both Shanshan and Turfan and brought with him, from Urumchi, rifles for all the men and 13 shells per person. In the middle of December we received orders to advance on Hami. Our two units left separately, as before, and stopped at Chikurting. We later learned the reason why, for such a long period of time, our units were not armed. It turned out that the Chinese first disbanded the Russian division in Chikurting, sent all the men to Urumchi through Kuchengtze (Kitai), and then passed their weapons on to us. Prior to the arrival of the Minister of War, from Urumchi, we were assigned duties and commissions.

[redacted] Esaul Gudoshnikov was appointed commander of our unit. Ivan Vasilievich Mogutnoy was appointed Senior Officer and Commander of the first platoon of our unit. The second platoon was to be commanded by Ljubshkin, the third by Lazar Starkoy, the fourth by Podergaul Shereley and the quartermaster for the entire unit was to be Filonakiy. The latter was also appointed Chaplain.

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3. When our unit was leaving Turfan, Centurion Mogutnov and Bahrey, from the third unit, and I were left in Turfan for the purpose of transmitting money to Kuldja to the families of our unit. The money had to be given to a chauffeur, Grigoriy Leonidovich Ivanov, who was returning from Hami. He was to transmit the money to Kuldja. We spent three days in Turfan awaiting the arrival of Ivanov and only on the fourth day were we able to give the money to him and leave Turfan to catch up with our troops.
4. When we rode up to the fortress of Shanshan, we noticed that the city gates were closed and soldiers stationed all along the city walls. We walked to the fortress to eat, since all the restaurants outside of the city gates were closed. When we found a restaurant in the fortress and sat down to eat, we were approached by the local Chief's interpreter who asked us to immediately report to the local Commander. When we arrived at the local Chief's office, we were met by his wife, who was a Russian. She immediately asked us if we had received her message. We received no message and she was very surprised that we hadn't. At this point, the local Chief came into our room and told us that on 25 December our third unit had been in battle with the Moslems near a fortress, the name of which I now do not remember. We were told that the dead and wounded were scattered throughout the area adjoining this fortress. The local Chief announced to us that we could go no farther because the Moslem forces in the area totaled approximately 300 men and there was no way by which we could penetrate their lines and join our forces. He offered that we temporarily move to and live in his Yamen, which we did. After this, he summoned us and asked us to look over the fortress so that we could give him our opinion as to how it could be best defended in case of an attack by the Moslems. The local Chief warned us that the 60-man garrison in the fortress was composed entirely of Tungans, as were also their officers. After we discussed the best means by which this fortress could be defended, we asked the Chief to send a telegram to Sheng Tupan asking that he immediately send us several "ishik" (local donkeys), shells for our rifles and 25 pistols with shells. We then appointed our own guards on the fortress walls and a duty officer. By the way, in addition to the two other officers and myself, we also had five Cossacks. All together, there were eight of us.
5. On the next day, at approximately 9:00 to 10:00 a.m., the duty officer informed us that the rebels were approaching the fortress. We Russians and the local garrison immediately took positions on the fortress walls and awaited the rebel attack. The rebels did not immediately attack the fortress, they stopped and grouped themselves in a large orchard five to six miles from the fortress. When dusk was approaching, the rebels went to the Tungan village near the fortress. In the early morning they began their attack on the fortress but did not attempt to penetrate. They merely tried to feel out our strength and influence the local garrison, all Tungans, to join them. They shouted that the garrison should turn against the Chinese Chief and their officers because this was a religious war and since they, the Tungans, have the same faith, they have no business defending the Chinese. The Tungan garrison, at our direction, retorted by giving several volleys as a reply to their proposal. The rebels withdrew from the adjoining village back to the orchard and remained there until the next day.
6. On 29 December at 3:00 a.m. the rebels again advanced on the fortress and within half an hour had already broken through the gates and captured most of the fortress city. The Tungan garrison retreated to their quarters and fought off the rebels from there. The rebels made no concentrated or serious effort to capture them, but turned all of their attention on us and to looting the town. We occupied a corner of the Yamen and were under constant and heavy attack from all directions. At this time, in addition to the eight of us, there were also two Chinese officers who had brought us the shells, rifles and pistols from Urumchi. We had to hold off the attack until 9:00 a.m. and only at this time did we receive the unexpected news that all three Russian units of 100 men each, and a Chinese squadron under the command of General Siun, had forced the rebels to evacuate the fortress and to take up battle on the open fields surrounding the fortress. One of our units sent a platoon to the fortress,

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which we were able to hoist up to the fortress wall by use of a rope and then clear out the fortress of all rebel forces. By this action we were able to clear the fortress and open the doors to allow one of the units to enter the fortress and to garrison the fortress walls. With sunset, the rebels withdrew to the nearby mountains. In this battle, the Moslem residents of Shanshan and the surrounding area, totaling approximately one thousand people, took part in the firing against our forces. Some of the Moslem troops were armed with fire-arms, but the majority were armed with steel spears which were formed out of telegraph wire. They obtained this telegraph wire by cutting the existing telegraph connections and utilizing the cable.

7. On the next day by the order of General Siun, who took command of all of our forces, all the three Russian units formed into one group and as a result of a vote taken amongst the Russian officers, Centurion Mogutnov was appointed Commander. Mogutnov in turn appointed Shevelev as his Chief of Staff. I was appointed Quartermaster for the whole Russian division. The next few days were spent in pursuing the rebel forces. On 7 Jan 33 General Siun gave command to the Russian division and his squadron to move on to the Lukchun (Lukotsin) fortress and from there to the town of Turfan. The reason for this was that we had obtained information that the rebel forces which we had dispersed had decided to move against this town. We stayed there overnight and then headed in the direction of Turfan. Upon reaching the village of Halakocho, we were met by the rebel forces and fought with them for two days. They seemed to lack rifle fire using primitive fire-throwing weapons and steel spears exclusively. General Siun did not execute the plans that he himself had made. He was unable to join our forces and was captured by the rebel forces which had already captured Turfan. On the third day, having lost our Commander and realizing that we did not have sufficient ammunition, and Turfan having already been captured by the rebels who were able to regroup and rearm there, decided to withdraw our headquarters in to Shanshan where we had left a supply of ammunition.
8. We had to withdraw under fire and when our wagons with the wounded, under protection of one group of 100 men, reach Halakocho they were approached by two rebel messengers, one of which was a Russian, Poltavskiy, and the other a Tatar, Gaica, (his family name I do not remember, but he was a former Russian officer). The messengers announced that Turfan was in their hands, General Siun and those Russians who were with him were captured but are alive and being treated well. They offered that we proceed to Turfan to see, with our own eyes, that they are being treated well and later turn in our weapons for which they would guarantee our immediate return to Kuldja. The messengers also demanded that the wagons which were carrying the wounded and the accompanying group of 100 men also return and proceed to Turfan. Centurion Mogutnov, it seems, agreed to this offer and dispatched Captain Tokarev with the order that we return immediately. The wagons with the wounded were under my charge.

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After approximately an hour or two, Captain Tokarev again made his appearance and said that we were once again commanded to return to Halakocho, because that is what the rebel messengers demanded. We held a meeting of all the officers, discussed our position and announced that not only we, but the Cossacks also would not return, but would proceed to Shanshan where we have additional ammunition and where we could leave our wounded. Early the next morning Captain Tokarev announced to us that we could proceed to Shanshan, but that he would keep a few Cossacks and remain in Lukchun for the purpose of keeping Lukchun from falling into the hands of the Tungsans. That night we arrived at Shanshan, and several hours later Captain Tokarev also arrived with his small group. The following night Esaul Zibarev arrived from Halakocho and announced that the regiment, under Centurion Mogutnov would

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leave that evening destined for Shanshan and that he was sent to us with a fictitious command to return to Halahocho, but that this was merely to confuse the rebels. Sure enough, after several hours, our forces under the command of Centurion Mogutnov arrived and Mogutnov thanked us for not obeying his command. It seems that our refusal to return prolonged the negotiations, gave them a chance to regroup and await the right moment for withdrawal from the area. We learned that after the withdrawal of our wagons and men the rebels had completely surrounded the remaining forces.

9. When our division arrived in Shanshan the rebels gave us only one hour to rest and then started a battle by attacking the fortress. The battle was hard and constant, from the hour of 9:00 a.m. to sunset and continuing for two days. Our position became very critical because of the loss of many men and the shortage of ammunition. In addition to the rifles, we had two machine guns, but the rebels not only had many machine guns but also cannons. After the last battle, we decided to retreat to the mountains and traverse the mountains to Kuchengtze. This plan was quite hazardous because the mountains were covered with snow. However, we realized that we could not hold off in Shanshan indefinitely. By this time, there was no communication with Urumchi or any other towns because all telegraph lines had been severed. After the last battle we moved the wagons, with the wounded, into the mountains under the protection of one group of 100 men and left two groups in Shanshan. The following morning the rebels approached Shanshan with a force of several thousand horses and men and with orders to immediately capture the fortress. This battle raged all day and by evening the rebels had penetrated our flanks. We thus had to retreat within the walls of the fortress. One group took up positions within the fortress and the other one immediately outside. The rebels this time did not retreat to the hills, but stationed their forces in a village post outside of the fortress walls. At dusk, an airplane appeared and dropped a message into the fortress. The message asked us to hold on to the fortress since additional forces were on their way to rescue us. This message raised our spirits, but we were concerned about our wagons with the wounded and the group of one hundred men that accompanied it. We were almost ready to send parties out to search for them when it got dark, when our guards informed us that something was moving on the road to Shanshan on "arbul" (carts). We sent a party to investigate and when they returned it was reported that it was our group of 100 with the wagons returning because they had met a Chinese division which was coming to our aid. This information was correct because after several hours our forces and the wagons returned, following the artillery and tanks. The cavalry and infantry detachments of the Chinese division together with their Commander, General Sheng, stationed themselves outside of the fortress walls. On the following day, early in the morning, there was a battle and the rebels after holding off for several hours retreated to Turfan.
10. After the withdrawal of the rebels, Sheng Tupan asked for Centurion Mogutnov to report to him and they decided to change our division to a regiment consisting of three hundred men. The Commander of the regiment was to be Centurion Mogutnov and the Chief of Staff, Rekut. They named me Quartermaster for the regiment and adviser to the Commander on all matters pertaining to supply and finance. After spending approximately ten days in Shanshan, Sheng Tupan left two regiments in Shanshan, under the command of General Tun, and the rest of his troops and our regiment advanced on Turfan. They left me in Shanshan with the wounded and assigned ten men for garrison duty. The forces that left Shanshan occupied both Turfan and Toqsun (Tokosun). After this, Sheng Tupan left for Urumchi taking Centurion Mogutnov with him. The Commander of the remaining forces was General Yang, and Rekut was left in charge of our forces. Approximately two weeks passed when a division of rebels under the command of Hodja Nias Hadji arrived from Chikurting. This division circumvented Shanshan and occupied the fortress of Lukchun. Some troops were sent from Turfan to Lukchun and it was liberated from the rebels.
11. At this time we received a telegram from Urumchi through Chikurting that the rebels were already in Urumchi and had occupied the entire city. In the same telegram we were commanded to abandon all of our past stands and to retreat in the direction of Urumchi in two columns. We were ordered to retreat from

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Shanshan to Kuchengtze and from Kuchengtze to Turfan and from Turfan to Urumchi. Everyone started preparing to retreat and we Russians who were left in Shanshan decided to retreat with the Chinese forces to Kuchengtze. On the night of the second day after receiving the telegram, however, our group of 100 men arrived. They had been operating south of Lukchun and brought me an order, that under the protection of this force of 100 men, we were to join with the regiment in Turfan. After many arguments with the Chinese Commander, we left for Turfan. In Turfan we joined with our own regiment and two days after our arrival, we left Turfan for Urumchi. Two days prior to our arrival, Centurion Bakut was relieved of his commission and was replaced by Captain Tokarev, who was previously Commander of the first group of 100 men. The first day of our trek was without any spectacular happenings, but beginning with the second day and until our arrival at Urumchi, we advanced amid battle.

12. We arrived in Urumchi in the first few days of March 1933, and after having stayed there for two to three days our regiment, together with the Chinese forces under the command of Sheng Tupan, was sent to the mountains which lie between Urumchi and Kuchengtze. A large concentration of the rebel forces was reported to be located there. The rebels were forced to abandon their positions in that region but were not annihilated because they had carefully preconceived plans for retreat. When the regiment was returning to Urumchi, every step of the way had to be won from the rebels. After this campaign, the entire regiment was given several days leave and it was planned then to send it back to Turfan. By the way, when our regiment arrived from Turfan to Urumchi, a second Russian regiment was already formed, composed of Russians from Urumchi and Chuguchak (Tahoheng). After several days three more separate groups of 100 men each arrived from Kuldja. These were assigned to serve in the 3rd Regiment. The 3rd Regiment was composed mostly of Cossacks who had served in the 1st Hami Division.
13. When our regiment received orders to again leave for Turfan, the Cossacks and their officers asked the Commander of the regiment, Centurion Mogutnov, to request Governor Chin Shu-jen to postpone the march on Turfan for several days in view of the fact that in several days it would be Russian Easter and the men wished to celebrate this holiday in peace. We were to go to Turfan, together with the Chinese forces, under the command of Sheng Tupan. Governor Chin refused the men's appeal and commanded them to immediately leave for Turfan. The Chinese forces had already left Urumchi and were waiting our arrival south of the city. Somehow we found out that our regiment was not being sent to Turfan, but for some reason, was being sent out to certain massacre. At that time, the 3rd Regiment was not armed. When Centurion Mogutnov arrived from Governor Chin's headquarters and announced the new order, the Cossacks refused to comply because they had already learned of the plan to dispose of them. The Commander of our regiment immediately went to the 2nd Regiment and gave me the order that Cossacks from the 3rd Regiment would arrive and that I was to issue them hand weapons, rifles and shells. In this manner, within several hours, we managed to arm over 100 men of the 3rd Regiment. On the next day, this was 12 Apr 33, Centurion Mogutnov departed for the 3rd Regiment early in the morning and after approximately one hour sent an order to his second-in-command, Captain Tokarev, that he slowly, several men at a time, start sending men into the fortress. The second group of 100 with full military gear and weapons was sent first and then the third group was sent over into the fortress in the same manner. I was ordered to remain with the wagons and wounded men and the first group in the Yang Han. We, who remained in the Yang Han, did not know what was happening and only at about noon did we hear shooting in the fortress. This battle within Urumchi did not continue for a long time. After this, Captain Tokarev received from the 2nd Regiment, orders that he establish communication with the fortress which had been wrested from the hands of Governor Chin. Communications were immediately set up and messengers were sent every one or two hours. Until dusk we received messages that everything was in our control. The situation looked very good for us, since the Russian forces had full control of the city. The local arsenal was in our hands, out of which the whole of the 3rd Regiment was armed.
14. At approximately 11:00 p.m. a messenger arrived with an order that we get the wagons and the wounded ready and that everyone should be ready to march again. At the exact moment that we received this message, we heard new shooting in the

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fortress. After approximately one hour after receipt of the message which instructed us to march out of the city, we received a new message which ordered us to immediately advance on the fortress in the direction of the airdrome. Captain Tokarev decided to retreat only if he received further orders. At about 4:00 a.m. the wagons, protected by several Cossacks, departed from the city, but the rest remained with Captain Tokarev in the Yang Han. When the wagons reached the airdrome they were shot at from the radio station, but were able to reach the fortress gates anyway. Approximately one hour later, the wagons with the wounded were joined by the group of 100 men under the command of Captain Tokarev.

15. When we arrived in the fortress, we found out that the Russian leaders had heard that Governor Chin had the intention of sending the 1st Regiment out to certain massacre and then was intending to send the 2nd and 3rd to be annihilated, the 3rd Regiment having been ordered to leave the city without any weapons. He then planned to invite Soviet troops who were standing by at Changki, and by this method to rid himself of our influence and to gain the military strength of the Soviet Army to help him crush the rebels. It was learned that there were two Soviet regiments standing by at Changki, awaiting word from Governor Chin to step into the conflict. They had arrived there by truck from Chuguchak (Tahsheng). In view of this, the Russians decided to start a revolution of their own. They first occupied the Yamen of Governor Chin and later the fortress walls. Everything went beautifully. Governor Chin's convey was annihilated, his cavalry and soldiers on the walls were also defeated. The entire fortress was in the hands of the Russians, with the exception of some small little corner where the Chinese held out. By evening the picture had changed completely. The Chinese under the guise of sympathy with our cause, started going up into the fortress and onto the city walls. They brought our Cossacks cigarettes and alcoholic beverages, but later attacked them, killed most of the guards, took their weapons and opened fire on the Russian forces within the city. By morning, the situation became critical and our Commander decided to retreat from Urumchi. That is why we received the order in the Yang Han to retreat towards the fortress, it was for the purpose of uniting all of the Russian forces. When we arrived in the fortress, our Commander formed a new council and decided to send Centurion Mogutnov to Sheng Tupan, asking him to join his forces with ours and at the same time offered the Manchurian officers to gather up arms and help us. Mogutnov returned after having met Sheng Tupan and reported that he had agreed to join our forces if we would allow him to be the next Governor of Sinkiang. The Manchurians had also agreed to bear arms for us. After these councils and the arming of the Manchurians, Sheng Tupan marched on the fortress and the Chinese forces were forced to withdraw. Governor Chin, with several of his officers and soldiers from Urumchi, retreated to Chuguchak. The fortress was then occupied by Sheng Tupan and the Yang Han by the Manchurians.
16. On the following morning, our regiment went back to the Yang Han to our assigned quarters. The 2nd and 3rd Regiments remained in the fortress. During the upheaval, the rebel Moslems, stationed their armies near Urumchi but were in some sort of confused or divided opinion as to what their next move should be and therefore, did not take advantage of the internal upheaval. The Soviet troops also failed to move and withdrew under the coverage of darkness. After this upheaval, which was called the revolt of 12 April and was celebrated every year, our regiment rested for a long time. Part of the officers and Cossacks were allowed to return home for reasons of bad health or inflicted wounds.
17. During the autumn of this year, 1933, there was a revolt in the fortress of Kure, 40 miles west of Kuldja, which was started by a Chinese commander called Chang, against Governor Sheng Shih-tsai. The reason for this revolt, as stated by Chang, was that Governor Sheng had gone to the USSR and signed some sort of treaty which was not profitable for China. After this revolt, all three Russian regiments were organizing into a single Russian division whose appointed commander was Captain Pavel Petrovich Papangut. His Chief of Staff was to be Nikolai Ivanovich Behtsey. Commander of the Yang Han was to be Captain Nikolai Nikolaevich Antonov, and the Quartermaster was to be Konstantine Vasilievich Gmirkin. All of them were commissioned as generals in the Chinese Army. The rebels entered Chuguchak and the 2nd Regiment was assigned to fight in that area. The man who was assigned to command the 2nd Regiment was Colonel A V Hilovsky. Hilovsky's

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Chief of Staff was Captain Dimitriy Karpovich Shelestiuk. In the autumn of the same year, 1933, after the battles in Chuguchak for reasons not known to me, General Papengut, General Behteov, and General Gmirkin were arrested. Lieutenant Pavel Petrovich Voieikov, Captain Shelestiuk and Centurion Mogutnov were likewise arrested and killed in the Yamen in Urumchi.

18. In December 1933 Urumchi was completely surrounded by the rebel forces, which numbered some eight thousand men. The siege of Urumchi continued for two months. In the beginning, just as the rebels approached the town, it was proposed by Governor Sheng that an offer be sent to Kuldja to mobilize more Russians, but this offer was declined. After the fiercest battle, which took place on 19 Jan 34, when the rebels broke through into the town, the White Russian forces received a message from Governor Sheng which said that fresh forces from Tarbagatai and Altai, under the command of an officer calling himself Vasiliev, would soon join the struggle. Shortly after this message, approximately 15 biplanes, with Soviet markings, started flying over the town dropping bombs onto the positions of the rebels. It became clear to us that under the guise of White Russian Tarbagatai and Altai troops, Soviet troops had entered this conflict. Upon reaching Manass (Sullai), the Soviet troops were unable to advance any further because part of the rebel troops were withdrawn from Urumchi and were transferred to meet the oncoming Soviet force. The 3rd Regiment of White Russian troops was dispatched from Urumchi to aid them. These troops were under the command of Herunshage Chunad. With the arrival of our regiment, the rebels were defeated and withdrew back to Urumchi and the next morning abandoned the siege of Urumchi. All of our three regiments and the Soviet forces, which consisted of one cavalry and one infantry regiment, were ordered to chase the rebel forces which were retreating in a southerly direction. During this period when we fought side by side with the Soviet troops, we were able to observe a number of things about them. They were dressed in common Chinese Army uniforms with no insignia at all. Their officers wore either black or grey fur coats with side arms. The cavalry regiments consisted of only four to five hundred men, whereas the infantry regiment had a complement of one thousand men. They were equipped with an assortment of fire-arms. Some had English carbines, some old-type Russian rifles and others were armed with new Soviet "trich lineiki" semi-automatic rifles, with a five-round clip. These Soviet troops were also equipped with many "dihmiar" machine guns, one battery of heavy artillery, trucks and armored cars. None of their equipment, as their uniforms, had any identifying markings at all. As mentioned previously, these Soviet troops had constant aerial support. The biplanes which they used were extremely valuable in tracing the rebel movements and positions. It is interesting to note that after the initial bombing flights over Urumchi, at which time the biplanes were plainly marked with Soviet markings, their markings were painted out. I believe I can say, without prejudice, that our White Russian troops were far superior to the Soviet troops. Their soldiers showed no individual initiative or ingenuity, they were like automatons who only acted upon the advice, or command, of someone else. They certainly were no match for the crafty Moslem tribesmen. During the chase of General Ma Chung-yin's forces toward Kashgar (Shufa) there were innumerable times when our ill-equipped Cossacks had to rescue the Soviet forces from complete annihilation. The rebel forces were finally defeated and their general, Ma Chung-yin, on 10 Jul 34 crossed over with a few of his men into the Soviet territory at Irkeshtan, the rest of his forces remained in the town of Khotan (Hotien). This, for all intents and purposes it can be said, ended the religious war of that period.

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