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SUBJECT	Military Preparations for Atomic Warfare in East Germany	
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	THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE MATICHAL DEFENSE OF THE DESITED STATES WITH NAME MEANING OF SITUE TO ASSISTANT FROM AND THE U.S. COOK AS AMENDED. IT'S TRANSMISSION OF MESSE LATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORICED PRINCIPACE.	NO. OF ENCLS.
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- Various informers in Berlin and East Germany have been collecting data for source on Soviet atomic defense in their areas. Following are the main facts described and ascertained in these reports:
- 2. In the Soviet Occupation Army stationed in East Germany, lectures on atomic defense only began at the end of 1953. Previously, occasional lectures on this subject were given, but there were no regular courses. At present, the weekly curriculum for the troops contains at least three lectures on atomic warfare, dealing with:
  - a. Methods of protection against atomic weapons.
  - b. Recognition of the effects of radioactivity on personnel and material.
  - c. Means and methods of first aid.

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- d. Tactical atomic weapons (description and use).
- 3. Since the March H-bomb tests in the US, the Soviet Armed Forces daily "Red Star" has published four long articles with popular descriptions of the A-bomb, the H-bomb, about the peaceful application of atomic energy, and the need to disbelieve exaggerated atories of the lethal effects of the A-bomb, or of this weapon rendering regular mass land armies unnecessary. This is a remarkable change. Since 1950, Soviet antiatomic defense has invariably and consistently minimized the effects of the atomic weapons.

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- 4. Soviet regimental libraries have been provided with pauphlets on atomic defense; and on the A- and the H-bombs, but they are only available to officers in special reading rooms for secret and confidential studies and instruction. Hitherto no special antiatomic protective clothing, or other means have been issued, and Soviet readers are advised that antigas clothes and gas masks are perfectly adequate for antiatomic purposes.
- 5. Hext autumn special exercises in atomic tactics will be held. Judging by the tactical advice given during lectures on the use of tactical atomic weapons, the main subjects of these exercises will be:
  - a. The time needed for troops to get ready and mobile must be shortened to a minimum.
  - b. Rapidity, technique and organization of the dispersal of the units.
  - c. Methods to maintain operational cohesion of the dispersed units.
  - d. Defense in a dispersed condition.
  - e. Reconcentration of units, progressive and offensive autions under atomic werfare conditions.

Throughout the five phases, individual protection and defense as well as the evacuation of casualties, and so on, are to be practiced.

- 6. From information gathered on this subject it seems that:
  - a. The Soviet Command in East Germany only began to take account of tactical atomic weapons last autumn.
  - b. The Soviet idea is to minimize the effects of the atomic weapons in troop instruction, so as to avoid panis and criticism.
  - c. The Soviets intend to use atomic weapons right from the beginning of military operations.
  - d. Expecting immediate retaliation, they intend to disperse their troops in East Germany at the very beginning.
  - e. They will be kept dispersed for two to three days, until the major effect of the atomic surprise attack has been achieved and can be evaluated.
  - f. Dispersed Soviet troops must be kept ready for defense.
  - g. Subsequently reconcentrated, the Soviet troops will begin their offensive (on the third or fourth day), so as to progress as rapidly as possible, which is their major aim.
- 7. Until last winte: 1953 the Soviet command had been extremely wary in organizing their maneuvers and exercises, so as to avoid detection and observation by the local population and enemy agents. This year 1954 they seem to have reached the conclusion that the risk of being caught unprepared was a greater evil than of being detected and observed.

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