

Executive Registry  
77-2022

11 August 1977

DD/A Registry  
77-4522

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT : Preparation of Briefing Materials for the DCI

1. As you know, Admiral Turner will be on leave until 19 August. He has requested that important materials we may wish to call to his attention be pouched on 17 August for his reading while returning from the West Coast. [redacted] and I will assemble, and you should be advised that rather than receiving a large bundle of correspondence, he will be furnished copies of the DCI Daily Journal, as well as Minutes of the Morning Staff Meeting, annotated as appropriate.

2. Topics which are not time urgent should be reported on in accordance with the attached guidelines for a briefing book. We will assemble here and provide for his weekend reading (20-21 August). Contributions are due here by COB 19 August for Mr. Blake's review.

STATINTL

STATINTL

[redacted signature box]

B. C. Evans  
Executive Secretary

Attachment

- Distribution:
- D/DCI/NI
- D/DCI/IC
- DDA
- DDI
- DDO
- DDS&T
- GC
- LC
- IG
- Compt
- A/DCI/PA

Preparation of Briefing Books for the Director and Deputy Directors

1. As a general rule, we should not report in the briefing book on items which will be presented to them separately, such as minutes of the Morning Meeting, intelligence publications, correspondence, cables, etc.

2. We should include a brief, concise, up-to-the-minute statement about significant things that have happened during their absence about which they should be made aware as promptly as possible. Normally, if we refer to correspondence, it should be summarized rather than enclosed. There may, of course, be exceptions. Some events may not lend themselves to adequate coverage in the briefing book. In this case, it might be desirable to include enough to alert them and follow up with a fuller briefing at their earliest convenience or submit a fuller memorandum. Trivia or routine things about which they have no need to learn promptly, if at all, should not be included.

3. As to format, the briefing book will include exactly what is served up. In order that the total package may have some uniformity, material should be prepared on 8 x 10<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> paper suitable for insertion in a three-ring looseleaf notebook.

DD/A Registry  
File O & M

Executive Registry  
77-8294

ES 77-10

DD/A Registry  
77-4027

14 July 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

Until further notice, the only changes in correspondence format presently used by the O/DDCI will be accomplished as follows:

--ON INTERNAL CORRESPONDENCE:

MEMORANDUM FOR: (Addressee)  
VIA: (As appropriate)  
FROM: John F. Blake  
Acting Deputy Director of  
Central Intelligence (NOTE: Use two lines)  
SUBJECT: (As appropriate)  
REFERENCE: (As appropriate)

Type Mr. Blake's name only, initial caps, in the signature block area.

--ON EXTERNAL CORRESPONDENCE:

Use DDCI letterhead with the following signature block.

Sincerely,

John F. Blake  
Acting Deputy Director

[Signature Block]

B. C. Evans  
Executive Secretary


STATINTL

Distribution:

DDA GC  
DDI LC  
DDO IG  
DDS&T Compt  
D/DCI/NI D/Pers

ILLEGIB

14 February 1977



ILLEGIB

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/IC

DDI  
DDO  
DDS&T  
DDA  
D/DCI/NI  
General Counsel  
Inspector General  
Comptroller  
Assistant to the Director  
Assistant to the Acting Director

FROM

George L. Cary, Legislative Counsel


SUBJECT:


Questions and Answers for Admiral Turner's Confirmation Hearings

1. On shorter notice than we might wish, we ask you to review the attached questions and answers prepared in the Office of Legislative Counsel for consideration by Admiral Turner as he prepares for his confirmation hearings.

2. We ask that you give us your responses, comments and coordination by noon on 15 February so that we may have the final submission ready to go the Admiral by the evening of 15 February.

STATINTL

3. If you have problems with this, please call 



STATINTL

4. Thank you for your forbearance.



George L. Cary  
Legislative Counsel

STATINTL

11 February 1977

For the Turner Confirmation Hearings:

QUESTIONS & ANSWERS

CM's Draft

Suggestion: Read liberally before beginning to edit; some subjects not covered in response to one question may be covered in another.

Four general sections:

1. Personal questions, for most of which he may best provide his own answers.
2. Questions on Intelligence generally
3. Questions relating to CIA
4. Questions relating to the Congress

To keep in mind: I tried ~~fox~~ write for the Admiral, not so much for CIA.

DDA Registry

File

QEM

DDA 77-0850

15 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Legislative Counsel

FROM : John F. Blake  
Deputy Director for Administration

George:

1. This is an "unfancy" reply to your issuance of yesterday on the questions and answers for Admiral Turner's confirmation hearings. You asked for the reply by noon.

2. My comments are as follows (the pages were unnumbered but I have numbered them all and my remarks are cross-referenced to them):

- a. Page 23. Delete "managed by his National Intelligence Officers". The answer to the question can stand without this language and I think you are opening up Pandora's box by making reference to NIOs.
- b. Page 35, second paragraph of the answer. You oversimplified the matter of obtaining a Reserve release and make it read as if it is automatic when accompanied by a Presidential determination. It is my understanding that access to the Reserve must be had not only through OMB but the appropriate Congressional committees.
- c. Page 45, second paragraph of answer. I think you would be wise to add the Senate Select Committee to this answer.
- d. Pages 34 and 49. Pages 34 and 49 both address themselves to the "Team A/Team B" exercise. I believe the answers are in conflict. Page 34 says he would be "reluctant to comment" and page 49 has him expanding beyond a "no comment" position.
- e. Page 54. I challenge that we have reduced by 50 percent the number of materials classified. Suggest you merely state that an "appreciable reduction" has been made.
- f. Page 58. The second sentence of the answer could offend, at the minimum, Senator Stennis and Congressman Nedzi.

3. End of contribution.

[Redacted Signature]

John F. Blake

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PERSONAL

1. Why do you feel that you are qualified to assume the responsibilities of Director of Central Intelligence?
2. Do you see any potential conflict of interest in your serving as DCI and your holding any of your present financial interests?
3. If requested by this Committee, on the basis of conflict of interest, will you divest yourself of any assets?

4. Your predecessor has stated that the Director of CIA must be someone who has the trust and confidence of and direct access to the President. Reports have indicated that you and President Carter were not even acquainted while at the Naval Academy, and your careers have certainly diverged since then. What would encourage this Committee to believe that you have the trust and confidence of, and direct access to, the President?



3  
1. What is your concept of your role as Director of Central Intelligence?  
Especially with respect to responsibilities to the so-called Intelligence  
Community? (See attached paper on "Role of DCI")

cf

~~1~~ Published reports have indicated that your military colleagues have admired your skills as a manager, skills surely required by the person in the position of the DCI. Would you describe your managerial experience? How much of this included managing significant numbers of non-military people?

5

23. Accepting that any of us would be reluctant to refuse a call to office from a President, you are clearly risking, and perhaps taking yourself out of consideration for higher Naval commands. Did President Carter make any commitment to you about further Naval assignments after a period of service as the DCI, or did he otherwise discuss your longer professional future with you? Would any such hopes that you may have for higher Naval command tend to inhibit you in your performance of the DCI's job?

6

Will your Naval background present problems for you in taking an objective position on important matters such as relative US and Soviet Naval strength, the strategic balance of forces, etc., about which you wrote recently in Foreign Affairs? Will your Naval past cause any problems for you in dealing with the other military services, and with civilian agencies, in the coordinator's role of the DCI?

After years in the Navy, responsible primarily to your Naval superiors, do you feel qualified to take over an almost entirely civilian organization, and one that operates under the constant scrutiny of the Congress, the press, and the American people?

Ethics is an important matter, these days and always. Is there anything in your past which could conceivably cause embarrassment to you, to the President, to the Congress and this Committee, or to the CIA, should you be confirmed as DCI and then ~~have~~ the item <sup>be</sup> brought to public attention?

9

After more than 30 years in the Navy, you are no doubt comfortable working with military officers. Do you intend or anticipate bringing more military persons into positions of authority in the CIA or the Intelligence Community staff? Would you engage to advise this Committee before making such appointments?

In your Foreign Affairs article, page 346, you stress the problems of perception and misperception of another country's military strength. In assessing potential adversaries of the U.S., one would extend the matter of perceptions of strength or weakness to political, economic, social and other elements of a potential adversary's life and vitality as well. How would you as DCI make sure that U.S. perceptions of the USSR, Communist China, and other potential adversaries were clear, accurate, honest, and timely, not just for the President but for the Congress and the people as well?

ANSWER: The short answer to the question is: by doing the job of DCI as well as I can. I would apply to the CIA and the Intelligence Community what I recently wrote from my command of NATO's Southern Region: "...the last quarter of the century will make even stiffer demands for superior flexibility, capability and initiative. In an environment where change is the norm, we must learn to adapt more rapidly to evolving political situations and military circumstances. We are seeking greater effectiveness from the assets we have on hand, attempting to use all of our resources more efficiently in combined effect and to simplify even further our command and control functions."

Everything that I would do as DCI would be guided by the objective of providing the best intelligence to the President in a timely manner, while keeping this Committee and the Congress appropriately informed. It would be for the policy-makers to keep the U.S. public advised in most instances, I would think.



In your Foreign Affairs article, you comment as follows on detente: "Detente has been misinterpreted by some as a license to drop national security issues entirely, except when pursuing the transfer of funds from defense to areas of social and economic concern. Does that indicate that you oppose the policy of detente, that you have little faith in the effort to reach a peaceful accommodation with Soviet Union? And are you against trying to meet social and economic needs which cry out for solutions in this country and go the heart of the whole purpose of the United States?"

ANSWER: The answer is no to both questions. Let me emphasize that as DCI I would not be a policy maker, ~~but I believe that there can be no substitute for some kind of peaceful accommodation between the US and the Soviet Union.~~ That can only be achieved when both countries believe it serves their separate fair interests. If the CIA and the Intelligence Community do their work well, they provide the basis for the judgments of our US policy makers on detente and the needs of our defense establishment. And it is from a basis of such informed judgment that the policy makers can then decide how best to meet what, as I noted in my article, I fully agree are "pressing social needs." For the policy makers, it is a question of balance. Good intelligence provides the irreplaceable element in determining that balance. My purpose as DCI would be to help insure the highest quality of that irreplaceable element.

Referring again to your Foreign Affairs article and the matter of US military strength as compared with the Soviets': In response to the question: "Who's ahead, Admiral?", you asked two questions in turn: "What do you mean by 'ahead'", and "How far ahead will suit you, for foreign policy purposes?" How do you answer those questions now?

Answer: I would leave those questions for others to answer, if I may. The matter of what "ahead" may mean and how far ahead will suit the US is clearly for the President and the Congress to answer. As DCI, I would try to insure that the CIA and the Intelligence Community provide the best answers they can to the question of how strong the forces of potential adversaries are, and what trends of research and development and strategy and tactics they may be undertaking or contemplating.

You know, Admiral, that we civilians are traditionally wary of career military men in high government office. Sometimes such officers, used to the order and discipline and perquisites of the military life, seem to show an impatience or insensitivity with the arguments and the confusion and disorder that sometimes accompany<sup>it</sup>s the civilian processes of this society and this government, including those of the Congress and the Intelligence Community. In an editorial signed by you in the January-February 1974 issue of the Naval War College Review, on the first anniversary of the return of our prisoners of war from Vietnam, you note that: "Past fixations on Vietnam and the resultant antimilitary domestic turmoil have abated. The 'public' has proven to have a short attention span. . . ." I'm bothered by what might appear to be a rather cavalier attitude on your part toward the 'public'. Would you give us some clarification? For example, do you think the 'public' has a short attention span relative to the Soviet Union, or the CIA?"

ANSWER: Let me reassure you, Senator, as best I can that I fully respect the problems and values of the civilians of this country and government. In the best traditions of the United States, I am, after all, a civilian in uniform. My comments in the editorial were made out of my deep conviction that the brave POWs of Vietnam, one year after their return to the US, should be accepted and esteemed among us in terms of their future, as they themselves wished. I noted in the editorial that the year that had passed since their release had seen great changes in the

orientation of public attention. Such changes are probably generally true on most issues over time and reflect the useful process in this society of getting on with the future and its promise while remembering, but not dwelling in a disabling way, on the past. I think that the US public has shown a sustained and healthy appreciation of the Soviet Union and its power since the Second World War, and I think that is most appropriate. For the CIA, I would hope that the public, and the Congress, would appreciate that the problems and mistakes of the past are gone but not forgotten, and I pledge that they would not be repeated under my tenure as DCI.

In your Foreign Affairs article on page 346, you make some critical comments about presentations and pronouncements made in connection with the budget process of the Government, suggesting there are distortions of actual Soviet strength and Western strength: "...the formidable qualities of the threat are stressed; the available means to counter it perhaps slighted." You urge care in public discussions of these matters. Does that mean that you think that the military and others appearing before the Congress deliberately distort projections made to the Congress and the people for budgetary purposes, and that you want to solve the problem by eliminating such public discussion?

ANSWER: No, indeed. I support the fullest public disclosure on relative Soviet and US military strength compatible with US security interests. I think this Committee will appreciate that the sensitivity of the information ~~and the ease with which it might be distorted or misperceived~~ suggests some of it must come to the Congress in confidence, at least in its details, rather than be published and disputed generally. My point in the article was that we must exercise care so that the American people and our allies, and most of all our potential adversaries, do not perceive the rhetoric accompanying budget pleas as an actual reflection of US strength and apprehensions. Such misperceptions could lead to very serious distortions of our real and relative strength vis a vis the adversary, and you cannot base policy decisions and public opinion on distortions. There the peril is both obvious and indeed grave and one we would all agree on.

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Do you belong to any organization, clubs etc. which have

restricted membership?

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All CIA employees take a polygraph interview when they enter on duty with the Agency. Would you volunteer to do the same?

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Perhaps the central point and single most disturbing comment in your Foreign Affairs article is that "the Soviets' big advantage is in their option to launch a preemptive strike... An attack could be launched with virtually no warning from point-blank range." (Page 350). Though you were writing about a Soviet ship attack on our ships, the possibility of preemptive Soviet attack could come in other forms as well, most ominously a first missile strike. You then add -- and this is of particular significance for this Committee -- that "The timeliness and quality of intelligence estimates..." will in part determine whether or not the Soviets can successfully carry out such a preemptive strike. What would you, as DCI, insist upon at CIA and in the Intelligence Community to help insure against the possibility of such a preemptive Soviet strike?

Answer: The Committee will appreciate that, as a Naval officer, my whole professional career has been devoted to trying to help this country be prepared for any eventuality. Intelligence -- accurate foreknowledge and careful assessment of a potential adversary's capabilities and intentions -- is the essential first element of such preparation. As DCI, I would endeavor to guarantee to the President, the Congress, and the American people the highest skills in timely acquisition and analysis of information and the highest honesty and integrity of judgment of which the dedicated people in the Intelligence Community and I myself are capable.

If the US intelligence process succeeds, there will be a minimum of misperception for our policy makers and our people. If our misperceptions are at a minimum, the US will project itself in a way to help insure minimum mis-



perception by potential adversaries. And therein lies our best hope to avoid foolish or frightened action by an adversary, including a possible effort to make a preemptive first strike against the US.

For the sake of the security of the United States and the rest of the world, the CIA and the US Intelligence Community may not fail. As DCI, I would do what I could to make sure that they did not fail.

QUESTION: You have been quoted as saying that you would rather make 50 decisions of which 30 were right than make 25 decisions, all of them right. That suggests you would accept a 40 percent rate of failure. Can the CIA, the President, and the country really tolerate a 40 percent rate of failure in the performance of its Director of Central Intelligence? Should it? Why not make fewer, and better, decisions?

ANSWER: Let me assure this Committee that I appreciate the concern that that quote may have evoked. In my years of Naval service, I have always tried to preserve and encourage in making my decisions; when I felt that I had to remove someone or something, I tried to replace it with something better, something fairer. I have tried to make no mistakes in the big decisions. No man is infallible; and as this Committee knows, to make no decision is actually to make a decision. I quite agree that the DCI cannot have a 40 percent rate of failure of decision. I would want to assure you that while I would try to be decisive, I would never ignore the good commander's first imperative: to be prudent.

QUESTION: In your Naval service, you have worn two command hats from time to time. How comfortable will you be wearing the twin command hats of the Director of Central Intelligence, with overall responsibility for the Intelligence Community, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency? Should one man wear both hats?

ANSWER: I appreciate that there are differences of view on this matter. For myself, I would reserve judgment until after I had had an opportunity to see how well the two hats fit, and how well others-- particularly the President--felt that I, or any DCI, look with them on.

22 ✓

QUESTION: What is the proper role of a secret intelligence organization in an open society?

ANSWER: Organizations which must operate in secret contravene the spirit of an open society to a degree, yet it is an inconsistency which nearly all Americans recognize as essential. It is one that is well established in the field of national defense, for example. The remedy to the inconsistency is to insure that intelligence agencies are accountable to the established institutions of Government. The agencies must act strictly within their charters, and cannot operate so as to abridge or in any way infringe on the constitutional rights of Americans.

My pledge as DCI would be to have the CIA and the Intelligence Community adhere faithfully to this charge under my direction.

QUESTION: What relative roles should civilians and the military have in producing intelligence?

ANSWER: Both civilian agencies and military organizations have important roles in the intelligence process.

Generally speaking, the military forces have special intelligence requirements that are related to their operational missions. This means that the Department of Defense must have its own intelligence capability with respect to both collection and analysis of foreign military information relating to national defense.

Coordination mechanisms have evolved over the years to try to avoid unnecessary duplication and to assure full coverage.

Coordination process in the substantive area is probably most important in the production of National Intelligence Estimates. The positions in these estimates are those of the DCI; they are arrived at by a process, managed by his National Intelligence Officers, during which the positions of all civilian and military intelligence agencies are considered fully. When agreement cannot be reached on the position, the DCI judges to be the soundest, either civilian or military agencies may take exception in the estimate itself.

This process allows the policy makers to make their decisions based on national estimates which fully cover all sides of the issues involved. It is the best assurance that estimates are not slanted or biased either in favor of the military or the civilian agencies.

What is your position as to releasing the budget figures of CIA and the Intelligence Community?

Answer: My predecessors, I understand, have been against publishing the budget; and I gather that the weight of opinion in the Intelligence Community and at CIA is still against budget disclosure. I would like time to consider this problem and to assess what impact disclosure might have before responding to this question.

~~30~~ There has been much recent discussion of activities of "friendly" foreign intelligence services in the U.S. Charges have been made that CIA allows these services a free hand in the U.S. in exchange for the privilege of unharassed CIA operations abroad. What is your view of the necessity of liaison arrangements and the propriety of permitting these groups to operate in the U.S., often against U.S. interests?

I have stated that I believe in the necessity of a strong intelligence capability. Significant information can often be obtained through liaison with friendly intelligence services, and I will support the practice of maintaining such liaison arrangements in consonance with American foreign policy aims and U.S. law. With regard to the question of operations of foreign intelligence agents in the U.S., regardless of the country they represent, this is an internal security matter, properly the preserve of the Justice Department and FBI. In my view, there can be no agreements made with any foreign intelligence services which violate U.S. laws.

Are better laws necessary to protect intelligence secrets?

Answer: The National Security Act places on the DCI the responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods. Without such protection, no intelligence service can function. I understand that at the moment, no legal sanctions are provided to the DCI to carry out this responsibility, and that over the years, serious damage has been done to our foreign intelligence effort as a result of unauthorized disclosures of intelligence sources and methods.

I understand that legislation was proposed in the last Congress which would strengthen existing law in this area. I would strongly support such legislation.



What changes need to be made in the National Security Act of 1947?

Answer: I would ask the Committee's understanding that I defer responding to this question until I, if confirmed as DCI, have an opportunity to get better-acquainted with the CIA and the Intelligence Community and to get the advice of the President, the NSC, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and other elements of the Executive Branch.

I understand that questions have been raised about such matters as the clarification of the role of the DCI vis a vis the Intelligence Community, and the broadness and vagueness of some of the language defining the functions and prohibitions placed on the CIA. I understand that this Committee has established a subcommittee to work on the matter of intelligence charters, and I would look forward to working with the subcommittee on any changes that might appropriately be made in the statutory authorities of CIA and the Intelligence Committee.

QUESTION: What are the strengths and weaknesses of E.O. 11905?

ANSWER: Again I would request that the Committee permit me to defer comment to the Congress until, if confirmed, I have an opportunity to immerse myself in the business of the DCI and to consult with others in the Executive Branch.

~~10.~~ What would be your test for when a covert operation should be undertaken?

The test presently embodied in law is "important to the national security." \*

I am not sure whether any hard and fast verbal formula is possible or even desirable in this area. It should be recognized that the President must be guided by the national interest of the United States and has primary responsibility for carefully weighing the relative importance of these interests against the possible risks involved.

\* Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.

Is it really necessary for the United States to conduct covert action?

~~Why? What would be your test to determine if a covert action operations should be undertaken?~~

Answer: I believe it is necessary for the U.S. Government to maintain a covert action capability, to try to accomplish objectives which the policy-makers determine should not be attempted in a public way. But I would encourage the use of covert action only where vital American interests are involved, only where prior determination has shown that an overt program could not appropriately accomplish the same purpose, and only where the covert action operation had an acceptable chance of success and the risks of the consequences of failure were also acceptable.

I would insure that the President was fully knowledgeable of the covert action and supported it.

I would also refer you to the statement of Secretary of State Vance on covert action, made at his confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January. I fully endorse the Secretary's statement.

1 grounds that we must use them because the Russians do. They  
2 have embraced all of the black arts of covert operations --  
3 bribery, false propaganda, physical coercion, abduction, indeed  
4 even attempted assassination of foreign leaders.

5 I don't know how we can be true to our own values as a  
6 country and continue to believe that it is our right to use  
7 such methods; though again, I recognize that in extremity a  
8 nation must do what is needed to assure its own survival.  
9 But we are not discussing cases of extremity, and the habit  
10 of the past has been to intervene in these ways in the affairs  
11 of other lands, even when the objective was purely technical.

12 Now I would like your own view on this. If method is  
13 the essence of whether or not we do adhere to our professed  
14 values as a nation, what are your views and what will be your  
15 policy as Secretary of State when it comes to decisions with  
16 respect to secret interventions in the affairs of other lands?

17 Mr. Vance. I am very happy to give my views on this.

18 Let me say by way of background that these kinds of  
19 covert actions have long been going on in the government. They  
20 were going on when I was in the government, and I was part  
21 of the oversight committee at one point in connection with  
22 these. So I have thought long and carefully about this subject

23 I have come to the conclusion that covert actions -- and  
24 I distinguish between covert collection of intelligence on  
25 the one part and covert actions against other countries, and

1  
2 I am talking about the latter -- I am convinced that covert  
3 action against other countries should be carried out only  
4 in the most extraordinary circumstances and that the procedure  
5 should be set up so that if there is a proposal to carry out  
6 a covert action, that that first has to be passed upon by a  
7 committee of the senior Cabinet officers, to include the  
8 Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the National  
9 Security Advisor, and importantly in my judgment, the  
10 Attorney General of the United States.

11 I feel very strongly that the Attorney General of the  
12 United States should participate in the decision-making process  
13 by which the decision is arrived at which goes to the President  
14 of the United States. I think then that the President of the  
15 United States himself should sign off in writing saying that  
16 he believes this to be vital to the national security and so  
17 endorse the carrying forward of this extraordinary circumstance.

18 I then feel that notice should be given in advance to  
19 the appropriate committee or committees of the Congress so  
20 that they can reflect their views to the President if they  
21 disagree with the proposal.

22 I do not believe that the Congress should have a veto in  
23 that regard because I think that splits the responsibility. But  
24 I think that it is very likely that if the congressional committee

25 said to the President, "We want to come in to see you, as we

have great concern for what is being proposed.

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1 have great weight on any President as to whether he would then  
2 go forward with the operation.

3 Finally, I believe there should be an adequate monitoring  
4 system so that once a covert action is approved, one keeps on  
5 top of it to determine what is happening, how it is proceeding  
6 and whether it should be terminated.

7 Unfortunately experience in the past has shown that these  
8 develop a life of their own and once started are hard to turn  
9 back.

10 Senator Church. I am very much reassured by your  
11 answer, Mr. Vance. I think it reflects conclusions that were  
12 reached by my own committee investigating the intelligence  
13 services. Now that the Senate is possessed of a permanent  
14 Intelligence Committee, I think what you have said is in line  
15 with the prevailing view on that committee, and indeed, in the  
16 Senate itself, where the decision was taken to establish  
17 that prevention.

18 My time is up. Let me just end with this comment.

19 When you establish a test, the one you have suggested,  
20 that covert operations be undertaken only in the most extra-  
21 ordinary circumstances, it is well to keep in mind that in our  
22 kind of society, sooner or later, as long as we are a free  
23 society, the covert operation is going to come into service in  
24 some line. It has not met so exacting a standard. Once it  
25 surfaces it does grave injury to the good reputation of

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29.  
31. The Intelligence Community recently authorized a competitive team approach to preparation of the NIE on Soviet strategic forces, whereby a group of outside experts was assembled to evaluate all available intelligence and reach conclusions independently from those normally tasked with preparing such estimates. I understand the results of the two groups were quite different. What do you think of this competitive evaluation concept and do you think it would be usefully utilized for other estimates?

The competitive team approach was an innovative development in the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates. I hope to encourage innovative approaches in all areas of CIA's performance. The results of this participation of outsiders in the estimating process are to be reviewed by the National Security Council, and I would be reluctant to comment on the efficacy of the concept prior to the results of the full-scale review of this experiment.



Would you explain the procedures that are followed under the provisions of Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, with respect to covert action?

Answer: As I understand it, the Special Coordination Committee of the National Security Council is charged with reviewing proposals for covert action. Upon the recommendation of the Committee, a proposed covert action goes to the President for decision. If the President finds that the proposed activity is important to the national security, he approves it.

When the activity involves a release of funds from the CIA's Reserve, the Office of Management and Budget is notified and a withdrawal approved.

After the President has made his finding, relevant Congressional committees are notified of a new finding; and at the earliest convenience of each committee, the Director of Central Intelligence briefs its members on the nature and scope of the covert action.

As you are aware, this currently involves briefing four Senate committees (Foreign Relations, Appropriations, Armed Services, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence) and three committees of the House of Representatives (Appropriations, Armed Services, and International Relations).

What role do you feel that the Congress should have in covert action?

Answer: I fully support the current requirement under Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the so-called Hughes-Ryan Amendment, that the Congress through certain designated Members be kept advised of covert actions in a timely fashion. There are some elements of such oversight that I understand have been of concern to the CIA and the Intelligence Community in the past, and I would hope to consider these with this Committee if I am confirmed as DCI.

One point is the numbers involved in the Congress: now seven committees, with some 55 Members, are being advised. I do not question the integrity of any individual Member; I would be concerned about wide dissemination of sensitive information on U.S. policy and plans, as a reflection of the intelligence officer's continuing concern that the fewer who know, the more secure is the information.

I would note in passing the suggestions of the Murphy Commission favoring that Section 662 be amended to require reporting of covert actions to a Joint Congressional Committee on National Security.

I would also note the Murphy Commission's recommendation to omit any requirement that the President personally certify to the necessity of a particular covert action activity. I appreciate that there may be problems with associating the Head of State so formally with such activities; I wonder if there is, indeed, no reasonable alternative.

But I know that the Congress has considered these matters, and I would

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What would you do if the President were to ask you to carry out an order which you believed was illegal or wrong?

Answer: I feel confident that the days of improper requests made of CIA are behind us; at least I hope that they are.

If I were asked to order CIA to do something that I considered illegal or wrong, I would point out to the requester that the request was improper in my view, and why. I would attempt to obtain the withdrawal of the order. If unsuccessful, I would decline to follow it and would resign.

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15. What is your concept of the objective of the CIA?

The intent of Congress in creating the Central Intelligence Agency was to establish a focal point in Government whereby intelligence from all producing agencies would be coordinated, correlated, evaluated, and disseminated to the upper echelons of Government for the formulation of national security policies. This centralization would assure that all information vital to the formulation of such policies was provided. Further, under the direction of the President and the National Security Council, the Agency would carry out such other duties as deemed necessary in the national interest.

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The objective of the Agency is to meet national security requirements as fully effectively and efficiently as possible utilizing all intelligence assets and resources of Government. The Agency must be unaffected by any considerations which would in any way result in biased and unobjective intelligence reporting.

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You began your assignment as President of the Naval War College by asking the question: "What is the objective in having a War College?" Many have asked the same question about the CIA in the past few years, with Chile, Watergate, assassinations, poison dart guns, etc., in mind. Will you ask that question?

ANSWER: Every commander knows there is no substitute for good intelligence. As a consumer of intelligence for 30 years, I have a profound respect for its irreplaceable value and essentiality. The CIA is the central instrument for providing intelligence to the United States. There should be no doubt about its objectives: to provide the best intelligence possible to the President, and to carry out to the best of its ability the requirements place upon it by the President.

At the same time, as a newcomer to the CIA and the Intelligence Community, I would look carefully at the way the objectives are met, and suggest and make such changes as seem appropriate to meeting them better.

QUESTION: In an editorial signed by you in the Naval War College Review of July-August 1974, you stated that "a key element in the mutual deterrence that has existed between the United States and the Soviet Union for the past quarter century is the subtle communication of intentions and capabilities to each other." What do you see as the CIA's role in this process? CIA has its spies abroad, it undertakes covert action programs, it puts out various kinds of propaganda, all of which may be taken as signals by the USSR--rightly or wrongly-- of U.S. intentions and capabilities. Aren't the spy business and the strong-arm action that we try not to acknowledge two ways to send confusing, if not false signals? Don't we do better to let the President and the Secretary of State send the signals?

ANSWER: Conveying signals of our intentions and capabilities to a potential adversary is a delicate thing, as this Committee well appreciates. Any activity which the CIA were to take in this area would be done so only at the express direction of the policy-makers, the President and his policy representatives.

The collection of intelligence abroad is essentially an on-going process, whatever a country's policies at the moment may be, and should be done with maximum discretion and minimum reflection of any kind of policy decision. The success of covert action activity, by definition, depends in large measure on the ability to hide its relationship to the sponsoring country; its implications for communicating intentions and capabilities must be carefully thought out and accepted before it is undertaken. That is one good reason why proposed covert action must have the approval of the highest authority in the Executive Branch of this Government, and why I fully support the Hughes-Ryan Amendment

QUESTION: The CIA has taken some hard criticism in the last few years. A recent newspaper article quoted an unnamed friend of yours as saying that you are not very good at "stroking". Does the CIA perhaps need some "stroking", for a change, and will you be able to do that?

ANSWER: I have some understanding of the criticism directed at the CIA in recent years and some appreciation of the impact of such criticism on the efforts of any organization and any group of people. I also have some understanding of the devotion and hard work and array of skills and talents and energy which the CIA's people reflect.

As DCI, I would, of course, look at the CIA in terms of improving ways of doing things, for that is a part of the job of the DCI and I would judge that the Congress and the Committee, like the President would automatically expect that of the DCI.

But I would also try to do it with a full understanding of the human implications of change. Also, I have always welcomed advice and ideas from people at all levels of my organizations. I sought the insights of Naval lieutenants when looking at the War College, and I would seek the insights of GS-07s and GS-09s in any changes I might contemplate at the CIA.

If that is "stroking", then I am ready to do some in the future, as I have tried to do in the past.

QUESTION: You shook the Naval War College from top to bottom during your tenure as its President from 1972 to 1974, and apparently shook up a lot of people in the Navy and outside in the process. You yourself have described your action as a "blitzkrieg". Should we brace ourselves for the same kind of shaking of the CIA?

ANSWER: I would wish this Committee and the CIA to know that I am not in favor of change for its own sake; I am in favor of change for the sake of the mission to be accomplished and the people who serve and are served. I hope that no one would fear the consequences of the deliberate process I would bring to any consideration of change. I would seek and welcome suggestions, from this Committee and the Congress as well as from all other responsible sources.

BACKUP: I would like to commend my activity at the Naval War College to you as an indication of the way I try to work. I wrote about this in the August 1974 Second Annual Report of the College. In the changes I directed, I tried to reflect purpose, progress, and promise. I also acknowledge problems and mistakes. All this is in the article.

I would like to emphasize for this Committee and to reassure the people of the CIA that I know that the CIA is complex as the College was not; that I would have much to learn about the CIA before I would be in a position to fairly recommend changes; and that I would not suggest and institute changes unless I were personally convinced that the new forms and new procedures and new ideas would truly improve upon the work and product of the CIA as it is now.



I would also like to emphasize that although I personally became convinced that a basic reorientation in the Naval War College's program was in the best interest of both the Navy and the individual Naval officer student, the decisions and action taken were graced by the advice of many others and the approval of my Naval superiors. I would insure the same for any changes I might propose at the CIA.

To those who may find evidence of impatience in my work at the College, I would note that I had only a predictable two years or so to initiate change, and I felt I personally had to provide the maximum impetus for it. I made some decisions that seem arbitrary--but that, of course, is always a consequence of making decisions.

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~~24~~ Do you agree with Secretary of State-designate Vance that U.S. Ambassadors abroad should get anything they request from CIA Station Chiefs?

I fully support Presidential directives designating Ambassadors as Chiefs of the Country Team in their Embassies, to be kept as fully informed as possible. Station Chiefs have the duty to afford the most careful protection to their sources and activities. Should there ever be differences over what an Ambassador might be told, I would participate in the decision myself.

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How will you insure that abuses that have occurred in the past will not happen again in the future? How will you make sure that you will know what is going on in the CIA?

Answer: The best way to avoid the possibility of abuses is to have an effective system of command and control. I have always favored and worked for this in the Navy, and would continue to do so as DCI. I would continue the policy of recent DCIs in urging employees to bring to my personal attention activity which they believe is inappropriate or illegal.

Though I am necessarily not well-acquainted with current Agency practices, I understand that the functions of its Inspector General and its General Counsel have been expanded to help guard against abuses. Also, I support the kinds of internal and external oversight mechanisms which were created in Executive Order 11905. & SSC

There is no question that vigorous oversight and supervision are essential in an intelligence organization. But I would also urge upon this Committee that there is a danger of smothering initiative and incentive which must be avoided. As DCI, I would try to help reach the delicate balance necessary to insure the kind of soundly-managed and controlled but imaginative and energetic intelligence system which this country must have.

What is your position on past CIA practices such as assassination plots and drug testing on unsuspecting people?

Answer: It is quite clear that some past activities of the CIA were improper and ill-advised, at best. My understanding is that clear instructions prohibiting most of these activities were issued within the Agency before they came to public attention, and that none is now being practiced.

I would do all within my authority to insure that those programs and activities which were undertaken by the CIA under my direction as DCI were fully within the law of the United States, giving full respect to civil rights and rights of privacy.

Are CIA personnel overseas adequately protected? If not, what can be done to improve this situation? Do you support bills which would provide criminal penalties for disclosure of information leading to the identification of CIA employees under cover, such as have already been introduced?

Answer: This country must afford the best protection it can give to the dedicated men and women it sends abroad to engage in foreign intelligence activities. Since most of them must not be openly identifiable as intelligence personnel if they are to be professionally effective as well as properly protected, I would be most concerned about the nature and protection of the cover arrangements under which they work and live. I would like to defer comment as to how cover might be improved pending my confirmation and study of the problem.

Is the CIA cooperating with the House Select Committee on Assassinations?

Answer: I would say first that as DCI I would pledge full cooperation of the CIA and the Intelligence Community with the inquiries of duly-constituted Congressional Committees, consonant with my responsibilities to the President and for the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

I understand that CIA officials have met with Mr. Sprague and others on the Committee staff at Agency initiative to explain CIA records systems and to prepare for their investigation, and that the CIA is ready to continue cooperating as appropriate to the Committee's purposes.

QUESTION: You are familiar with the public controversy over the recent estimate of Soviet military strength and intentions and the A and B team versions. Are you in favor of such competitive analyses by CIA professionals and outsiders? What is the effect on the morale of CIA analysts to have outside experts looking over their shoulders and perhaps second-guessing them?

ANSWER: I would like to reserve judgment on the matter of inviting outsiders to participate in the estimate process until I have had more opportunity to evaluate the recent experience of the A and B teams. I understand that Mr. Bush felt there was merit in the exercise, both before and after it was conducted and despite the publicity which followed. I do think that the results of such estimates, and any differences which arise, should remain a matter of confidence within the Government pending release by the consumer--the President. Casual or deliberate public revelations of differences by those who disagree with the main thrust of the findings will probably kill the process. As for the attitude of the CIA toward outside participation, I would expect the Agency analysts as good professionals to participate wholeheartedly in what is designed to try to give the policy-makers a better appreciation of the subject at hand, and I have no doubt that they would do so.

Are you in favor of making public the names of journalists, academics, or others who have cooperated with the CIA?

Answer: I believe that every American has the right to voluntarily cooperate with his Government. Therefore, I do not believe it would be proper for the CIA to release such names. I believe that this is a matter of individual privacy.

I understand that the CIA has already adopted a policy of not entering into any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time news correspondent or stringer accredited by a U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station.

I also understand that the Agency has several kinds of relationships with scholars and academic institutions. These include paid and unpaid consultations between scholars and CIA research analysts, and contacts with persons who have travel abroad. They also include contracts for scientific research and development work and for research in the social sciences on matters related to foreign affairs, but these contracts are only made with the approval of a corporate officer of the institution involved.

I believe that such relationships should continue to exist on a completely voluntary basis. I think it is entirely consistent with academic freedom and with the free search for truth for an individual to want to assist an agency of his Government in providing the best possible assessments for the policy-makers. I would be most reluctant for the CIA and the Intelligence Community to give up important links with academic institutions and personalities.



What are your views of the CIA's reported activities in Micronesia?

Answer: I understand that this Committee has held executive session hearings on the press reports of such activity. I don't think it would be appropriate for me to discuss this in open session.

Question: The GAO does not audit the expenditures of the CIA.  
Are you willing to allow GAO to conduct audits of CIA activities?

Answer: That is a question I will certainly look into. I am not thoroughly acquainted with the rules and procedures of the Congress pertaining to the control and distribution of GAO documents and reports, or the extent to which they are available to the membership and staffs. Any worthwhile GAO study would necessarily cover some very sensitive activities which would require careful protection. I have no preconceived ideas about it but, in principle, I should think something could be worked out with both Houses of the Congress whereby GAO documents and reports could be made available to the duly constituted oversight Committees within some mutually agreeable constraints.

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Should Government classification of information be governed by statute or Executive order? Why?

The essential point is that whatever classification system is adopted must afford sufficient protection for sensitive information. Under the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence is made responsible for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. The continued success of our foreign collection programs rests on this protection. Executive orders and court decisions concerning secrecy have recognized this statutory responsibility and have granted the Agency a degree of latitude and flexibility to mold its security programs to assure the protection of intelligence sources and methods. Any statutory classification program must grant an equal degree of protection, and must be administratively workable.

Do you feel that CIA classifies more information than needs to be classified?

If so, what might be done to reduce the amount of information that is classified?

Answer: I think that the point is to try to achieve a proper balance between classified and unclassified information so that the national security is not endangered and that the public is informed. As DCI, I would carefully review Intelligence Community programs to identify those activities which require continued protection and those where a broader disclosure will not be harmful. I understand that with the issuance of Executive Order 11652 regarding classification and declassification, the CIA has been able to reduce by 50 percent the number of materials classified. I would assess classification procedures and strive toward the maximum dissemination possible consistent with national security requirements.

Low morale has been described as a principal problem of the CIA.

If you are confirmed as DCI, what assurances can you give this Committee and the people of the CIA that you will be able to raise their morale?

Answer: None. I can only try. And I shall.

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The Congress had made it clear that it will henceforth take a continuing critical look at the CIA and the Intelligence Community, and this Committee is witness to that determination. Naval officers, like intelligence chiefs, are not always fond of Congressional criticism. How will you get along with us?

ANSWER: I will get along with the Congress as well as I can, and you permit me. I do not anticipate fundamental clashes, though our views as honest and honorable men may differ. As I said in my article in Foreign Affairs: "We live in an open society. The press probes. Congress investigates. Searching questions are good, if not always comfortable, for the soul. Such dialogue works in its abrasive way. Professional opinion is pressed hard on the technical military issues; civilian opinion has to think hard on matters of national policy; and from this interaction arises the consensus essential to the support of whatever level of naval forces is selected." (Page 353). So it is with intelligence.

We are all engaged in the common endeavor of the nation's business, -- indeed, perhaps its survival. As DCI, I would be at all times responsible to the President, but also would try at all times to be responsive to the Congress.

QUESTION: What do you perceive to be your responsibilities to the Congress as Director of Central Intelligence if you are confirmed for that position? 57

ANSWER: It would be my policy to be as responsive as possible to the Congress.

I would respond to the best of my ability within whatever oversight framework the Congress considers suitable and seek to develop a good working relationship between the Congress and both the CIA and the Intelligence Community.

I recognize, for instance, that arrangements for budget authorization and review of Intelligence Community funding needs are still in the process of development, and I would work to assure that the Congress gets the kind of budget information that it requires.

I would also make every effort to meet congressional needs for substantive information, consistent with my responsibilities to the President and to the National Security Council for the provision of intelligence on policy problems currently under consideration.

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QUESTION: What is your opinion as to the effectiveness of congressional oversight of CIA over the years?

ANSWER: The effectiveness of the congressional oversight is ultimately a matter for the Congress itself to judge. However, it appears to me that the Congress is now exercising conscientious and thorough oversight through designated committees.



QUESTION: What is your view of the degree to which Congress should oversee intelligence activities?

ANSWER: Congress has far-reaching legislative oversight and appropriations responsibilities under the Constitution. Appropriate committees of Congress must have knowledge of intelligence activities so that they can exercise these fundamental responsibilities. I would be ready to work wholeheartedly with Congress in this regard.

I think the American people want strong and effective congressional oversight that imposes clear accountability on intelligence organizations, while at the same time preserving the effectiveness of the U.S. foreign intelligence effort.

Because of the sensitivity of much of the information involved, I would hope that the Congress may decide to concentrate its oversight activities to the extent feasible and limit requirements that I provide the same sensitive information to a sizeable number of different committees.

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QUESTION: What policy would you follow in providing information

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to the Congress and in keeping the Congress informed?

ANSWER: I clearly recognize that the Congress must be adequately informed in order to make proper and informed judgments in matters of legislation and oversight. Committees must acquire required information within their jurisdiction to carry out these responsibilities. Information provided by the Executive to the Congress which requires protection under statute or Executive order must, however, be handled accordingly by the Congress. Further, the Congress exercises its prerogative of nondisclosure through executive sessions and other closed meetings. Similarly, the Executive must exercise its prerogatives of nondisclosure in matters of executive privilege and clear statutory mandates.

I trust that an atmosphere of comity and understanding will allow a mutual resolution of this problem and avoid confrontations. The national interest must always be the paramount consideration.

QUESTION: You made the following statement in your article in Foreign Affairs of January 1977 on the U.S.-Soviet Naval balance, p. 339: "Great wasteful wars have broken out in our century partly because of misperceived comparisons of armed forces." You also are on record as an advocate of net assessments of relative force strength. Would you as DCI pledge to give the Congress and the American people candid and continuing information on this vital and difficult matter of relative U.S. and Soviet military strength?

ANSWER: I understand the Committee's and the Congress' concern for net assessments, and would hope to provide them as it is within the charter of the CIA and the Intelligence Community to do so. The Committee will appreciate that CIA's interest is and must be in the strength of foreign military forces, not U.S. military strength, which may limit my opportunity to give you the answers you seek. In many instances, indeed, the only appropriate source may be the President.

**STATINTL**

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