

# INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY Soviet Bloc

REPORT

SUBJECT Summary of Recent Developments:

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
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1. Soviet policy

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[redacted] while Moscow, claiming a "substantial aggravation" of the international situation, lays the blame for this on US policy in Cyprus, the Congo (Leopoldville), and Indo-China, it is aware that the US has not contributed to the developments -- at least in Cyprus and Leopoldville. Thus, while Moscow's position requires polemic attacks against the "unreason of America's ruling circles," it does not come out clearly against US positions here, not wishing its bi-polar foreign policy concept to be burdened by side issues [redacted]

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Nevertheless, [redacted] the Soviet attempts to cultivate the best possible relations with the US for renewal of direct contacts after US presidential elections certainly does not mean the Soviets will renounce the pursuit of their own interests in their sphere of influence. 50X1-HUM

This is exemplified in the case of Cyprus, [redacted]

[redacted] showing Soviet tactics to neutralise the island to weaken the southeastern flank of ~~the~~ NATO thereby. 50X1-HUM

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In regard to the German question, [redacted] <sup>the</sup> Soviet tack in developing bilateral relations with West Germany, while simultaneously playing on French and Belgian anti-German sentiment by claiming West Germany desires revision of its western borders -- for the end result of isolating West Germany as prerequisite for promotion of a Rapallo situation.

[redacted] East Germany is assigned to foster contacts with West Germany to soften the latter's position on recognition of Ulbricht's state. 50X1-HUM

[redacted] on the Berlin ~~pass~~ problem and East German attempts to pressure the Berlin Senate in connection with it, [redacted]

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that the anniversary of the outbreak of World War II provides Ulbricht the opportunity to share in the East's program of defamation of West Germany by charging West German continuation of Hitlerite policy.

2. Concerning present plans in the communist world movement for the Moscow conference

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[Redacted]

the response or non-response of communist

parties invited to the All-Party Congress in Moscow by a Soviet letter of

30 July 1964.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Peiping may possibly hold a conference in the near future, con-

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sidering the brisk flow of visitors from foreign CP circles to Peiping

in recent weeks as positive indication of conference preparations.

[Redacted]

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4. Concerning activity of the World Alliance of Democratic Youth

[Redacted]

the "Second World Forum of Solidarity of Youth

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and Students in the Struggle for National Independence, Liberation, and

Peace," slated for 16 to 23 September 1964 in Moscow, is to assemble youth

of the world to discuss the problems connected with peaceful coexistence.

[Redacted]

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
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3. Hungarian Communists Seek New "Alliance" Partners

Recently, an increased interest of the USAP (Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party) in former Social Democrats living in Hungary, as well as Hungarian emigrants, has been evident.

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 the USAP wishes to win over the Hungarian Social Democrat emigrees in particular to support the pro-Soviet communists in their dispute with Peiping. Indirectly, through the conference of the Socialist International taking place in Brussels in early September, even the former Social Democrats living in Hungary are supposed to be won over to these ideas. ~~In that case~~ <sup>would then be expected</sup> they ~~are supposed~~ <sup>but</sup> to cooperate with the communists, even if not as an independent party, ~~but~~ in the framework of the "Fatherland Front." In this case the communists wish to refrain from all further measures against former Social Democrats.

Three kinds of motives evidently lie behind these Hungarian efforts. One motive may be seen in Moscow's wish to play it safe in the dispute with the Chinese communists. Similar attempts for contact by other satellite states have been aimed at the same goal.

Another, purely foreign policy motive is the continuing desire of the present Hungarian regime for complete rehabilitation abroad. Consequently, specific support by the Socialist International -- if only from pure-

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ly tactical ~~masses~~ <sup>grounds</sup> -- and cooperation with former Social Democrats in Hungary -- is viewed as important in Budapest for improving the international ~~appearance~~ <sup>STANDING</sup> of the regime -- despite all the successes already achieved in this area.

In this connection,  possible per-  
sonnel changes in Budapest in September should be mentioned, according to which, Party Secretary Kadar -- <sup>as</sup> ~~like~~ once before -- again wishes to give up the office of Premier. His successor is supposed to be Kallai, who is less incriminated by the events of 1956.

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Finally, add to this as an internal policy motive the desire of broadening the base of the government. The success to date of the policy of "alliance" between communists and non-party members who are not opposed to the party may encourage Kadar to continue on this path. A large <sup>segment</sup> ~~part~~ of the public regards the Kadar regime as tolerable, if not the only possibility under the existing <sup>realities</sup> ~~facts~~. Many Hungarians see in Kadar the executor of Imre Nagy's program, <sup>in the course of</sup> ~~as~~ which the basic opposition found in the different relationship to Moscow, as well as the betrayal of Nagy and his execution by those interested above all in their personal subsistence, recedes to the background. In <sup>contrast to</sup> ~~distinction from~~ the non-party members sought after up to now, however, the former Social Democrats are politically experienced individuals who know what to make of it when the communists speak of "toleration," and represent the preservation of the "democratic achievements of Destalinization" as the goal.

Nevertheless, the USAP may believe in certain prospects; it is certainly conscious of the difficulties of its plans -- as the indirect approach to the emigres which it follows shows, however, it regards its realization as pressing.

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The abovementioned remark on the safeguarding of the "democratic achievements of Destalinization" should be viewed against the background of the opposition ~~movements~~ within the party. After Stalin prize-holder Sandor Nagy was arrested in March because of his propaganda activity in Komitat (county) Csongrad which was directed against Kadar's course, the Ministry of Interior at the end of July initiated investigative action in Komitat Baranya against a leftist opposition group of former <sup>and active</sup> CP officials working in the educational system and agriculture, who are charged with passive resistance to party instructions and the distribution of opposition agitation materials. Even in Budapest, [ ] the Ministry of Interior was compelled to ascertain similar subversive activity of subordinate CP officials, after charges from Komitat Somogyi about opposition <sup>activities</sup> ~~movements~~ within the party having been heard as early as June. Opposition circles, in their criticism of the party line, allegedly even said that the workers' class is in danger of losing its power. This expression of opinion should be appraised as the ideologically framed argument of officials who are anxious about their personal positions, or are <sup>for</sup> ~~grieving about~~ them, and are therefore susceptible to stalinist, or those held by the Chinese communists, views

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At present, it is impossible to determine the extent of stalinist opposition. However, the more the indications of such movements increase, the more it can be expected that the regime <sup>will be</sup> ~~is~~ seriously interested in broadening its base through cooperation of the former Social Democrats, possibly even in the hope of <sup>being</sup> ~~being able to~~ get them to enter the party some day. The question of success of these efforts is quite another story, however.

[End]

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