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Attached is an unedited 44 page translation of an interrogation on "North Korean Strategy for Peaceful Unification". The document is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

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State

50X1-HUM

5
4
3
2
1

- 1 -

50X1-HUM

North Korean Strategy for Peaceful Unification with South Korea

1. KLP Principle For Unification:

Ever since the signing of the Armistice in July 1953 the North Korean Communists had advocated "peaceful unification" of the country. According to the platform and statutes of the Korean Labor Party (KLP), the final objective of the KLP was to communize the whole Korean Peninsula and, to this end the Party should fight against imperialism and feudalism. This meant that communization of the whole country was the North Korean principle for unification and, in order to push through this principle to a success, struggles were necessary by employing all available means. Under the present state of bisection, the North Koreans employed two-phase policies, i.e., in North Korea they continued a struggle for socialist construction, while in South Korea they carried on a struggle against imperialism and feudalism chiefly by underground agent operations to create a situation favorable to a Communist revolution, or internal collapse. In setting up this unification principle the KLP adopted the following resolution at its 3rd Congress in the spring of 1956: "The peaceful unification should be accomplished by an independent general elections without intervention of any alien influences, UN or neutral nations." Then, this resolution was reaffirmed at the 4th Party Congress in September 1961 with a declaration that in principle, the unification should be accomplished by peaceful methods, but when necessary, it could be accomplished even by means of war. Accordingly, [redacted] the KLP adopted the 50X1-HUM slogan, "Hammer in one hand and rifle in the other, and march to the unification front!"

2. Unification Strategy:

To push through the unification plans under the abovementioned principles the KLP conceived the strategy of strengthening NK influence to outmatch the ROK. Specifically, this meant to make enthusiastic communists out of the maximum segment of the 12,000,000 NK population and convert at least one half of the 24,000,000 ROK population into supporters of North Korea.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 2 -

The KLP felt it necessary to ferret out for purge or reform all undesirable elements in North Korea and to strengthen the propaganda and political operations in the ROK. [redacted] the KLP made 50X1-HUM preparations for the so-called concentrated guidance activities by its Central Committee to find out anti-Revolutionary elements in North Korea by a general survey and, later in that year it launched the abovementioned activities in full swing. As a result, [redacted] the most 50X1-HUM outstanding nationalists were all executed and more than 3,000,000 people were declared reactionary. In parallel with the concentrated guidance activities, the Communists took a series of measures to strengthen the idolization of KIM Il-song, publishing booklets entitled "Memoirs of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Fighters", newly creating the "Revolutionary Museum", and founding the "Leader (KIM Il-song) Study Center" in all workshops, agricultural cooperatives and schools. On the other hand, for operations against the ROK, the KLP dispatched to the ROK larger numbers of political agents each year, and at the 4th Congress in 1961 the KLP reaffirmed its operational policy against the ROK and passed a resolution to dispatch more agents to expand its agent networks in the ROK. In propaganda activities, it shifted its target of attack from the ROK government to the United States. Formerly, the Communists attacked the ROK government for its incompetence and corruption. But now their main target was Americans. Americans in the ROK were attacked for all kinds of crimes including murderous driving and other outrages. Communists propagandized that more people in South Korea were starved each year because the Americans took out large quantities of rice from South Korea.

3. KLP Tactics For Unification:

In its all-out efforts for unification of Korea under Communist leadership, the KLP viewed its problems in two aspects, namely, external contradictions

C-C-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

3
- 4 -

and internal contradictions. The external contradictions referred to the relations between Korea and foreign countries and the internal contradictions were concerned about relations between North Korea and the ROK.

a. External Contradictions: From the standpoint of North Korea, the external contradictions meant the relations between Korea and the United States, and the formula for its solution was to compel the United States to abandon South Korea and weaken the former's international position so that it could not intervene in the Korean problems. The strategy to weaken the international position of the United States coincided with the line of the International Communism: the world congresses of representatives of communists, held in Moscow in December 1957 and 1960, adopted resolution to concentrate all their efforts on weakening the international influence of the United States. It might be said that the present Soviet-Chinese ideological dispute arose because the Soviet Union, acting against the principle of the above resolution, pursued "peaceful coexistence" policy toward the United States. However, North Korea strengthened its anti-American propaganda to promote its own international position and to lead the world opinion to its favor and, at the same time, adopted an aggressive foreign policy in dealing with neutral countries, newly emerging African countries, and even some capitalist countries. Especially, in its relations with Japan, North Korea made an utmost effort to prevent her from normalizing diplomatic and economic relations with the ROK, since the normalization of the relations, from North Korean viewpoint, would aggravate the external contradictions.

b. Internal Contradictions: As long as North and South Korea remains hostile against each other, a peaceful unification would be impossible. So North Korea insisted upon negotiations between North and South Korea. In this connection, NK asserted that the Korean problem was an internal problem of Korea, and therefore, it should be solved by the Koreans themselves. The North Korean authorities hoped to hold general elections through out all Korea following a negotiation between the North and South, but they insisted upon holding the elections without the supervision or intervention by the U.N. and neutral nations. This insistence was expressed by KIM Il-sŏng at the Liberation Anniversary on 15 August

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 4 -

1960 and was further confirmed at the 4th Party Congress in September 1961. Main points in the North Korean proposal for unification were as follows:

- 1) Hold general elections throughout Korea based on democracy and sovereignty and without the intervention of foreign countries.
- 2) If an immediate general elections were considered not suitable, open negotiations between the representatives of North and South Korea at P'yōngyang, Seoul or P'ammunjōm.
- 3) While maintaining status quo of the two governments in North and South Korea, organize a unified supreme national assembly with representatives from both parties in the form of a confederation to coordinate economy and culture of North and South Korea for a unified development of the country.
- 4) If the formation of a confederation was still not acceptable, constitute an economic council consisting of the industrial representatives from North and South Korea to exchange commodities between the two territories.
- 5) North Korea would give material aid for the economic development of South Korea.
- 6) As a means of cultural intercourse, scientific, cultural, art and athletic missions would be exchanged on reciprocal basis.
- 7) When the exchange of even the above missions was not acceptable, at least exchange correspondence.
- 8) Make the United States withdraw its troops from South Korea and reduce the armed forces of North and South Korea to 100,000 each.

The above proposal was formulated by KIM Il-sōng and the KLP and its propaganda at home and abroad was handled by the KLP through the front organization called the Fatherland Unification Democratic Front, and

propaganda activities for unification were carried on in its ^{50X1-HUM} name. Outwardly, this organization was composed of leaders of all political parties and social organizations in NK so that it would give an impression that the above proposal was not made by the KLP alone, but by the free will of all political parties and social organizations in North Korea.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 5 -

The Fatherland Unification Democratic Front comprised in its membership the Korean Labor Party, the Ch'ongu Religious Party, the North Korean Democratic Party, the Korean Independence Party, the Democratic Independence Party, the Socialist Party, the Christian League, the Buddhist League, the Democratic Youth League, the Democratic Women's League, the General Federation of Trade Unions, the Industrial Technicians League, the Agricultural Technicians League, the Red Cross Association, the Farmers League, the Architects Association, the Confucianists Association and the Scientific Knowledge Dissemination Association. The Fatherland Unification Front published its newspaper entitled "Fatherland Unification" twice a week and distributed it to government agencies, party and social organizations in NK. Some of its ~~xxx~~ copies were even sent to Japan, but the newspaper was not available to ordinary people in NK. [REDACTED] 50X1-HUM

however, the statements regarding the unification question began to be issued by the Supreme People's Assembly, instead of the Fatherland Unification Front. The change was allegedly for the reason that while the Fatherland Unification Front was a mere federation of organizations, the Supreme People's Assembly, as the legislature representing the whole people of North Korea, better expressed the will of the people. Now, supposing the aforementioned proposals are accepted by the ROK, the following subsequent developments could be predicted:

- 1) Confederation of North and South Korea: North Korea proposed creation of a National Council consisting of representatives of the National Assemblies of North and South Korea. This proposal was aimed at facilitating its political operations in the ROK. The so-called Supreme People's Assembly in NK was not composed of the People's representatives in the true sense of word, but it was a group of ~~xxx~~ scarecrows. [REDACTED] the election of the ^erepresentatives involved the use of two ballot boxes, white and black: white for pros and black for cons, for a single candidate for each electorate, but [REDACTED] the black box was eliminated and the ballots were ca50X1-HUM into the white box for a single candidate from each electorate. In the ROK, however, the National Assembly was composed of representatives of various political parties elected by free and secret votes

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 6 -

of the people, and were naturally divided into two groups: the government party and the Opposition. For the proposed national council the ROK would elect its representatives according to the distribution of strengths of the political parties within the National Assembly, and representatives thus elected might not take united position whereas the North Korean representatives would. Despite the fact that the South Korean population was twice as large as the North Korean population, North Korea would insist upon the same number of representatives for both sides, and if this insistence was accepted it is to the disadvantage of the ROK side. In case the national council was composed of an equal number of ~~xxx~~ representatives for both sides North Korea would spare no efforts to recruit the Opposition members in South Korea and, judging from the actual circumstances in South Korea some Opposition members might be recruited by the North Korean side. On the other hand, the North Korean representatives would not dare to join the South Korean side for fear of punishment by the ~~xxx~~ KLP. Should it develop in this way, the distribution of strength within the national council would soon become beneficial to North Korea.

- 2) Economic Intercourse: North Korea~~s~~ proposed exchange of agricultural and industrial commodities with South Korea, along with its overture for economic aid to South Korea. Since NK did not have enough surplus commodities to aid South Korea, the proposal of economic aid was largely for a propaganda value. However, in the field of trade NK would be eager to sell products of its heavy industry which undoubtedly surpassed the ROK level, under any disadvantageous and conditions, /it will most likely be a one-way flow. However, in the trade of heavy-industry products of North Korea for high grade light-industry products of South Korea the situation would be different. First of all, NK would not accept the light industry products from South Korea, in view of the psychological impact they ~~would~~ would certainly have on the North Korean general public since, in general, the clothing of ordinary citizens in Seoul was comparable to the clothing of top ranking officials in NK and the average household goods in Seoul were better and more diversified than

- 7 -

those at the homes of leading Party and government officials in North Korea. When the Korean residents in Japan returned to North Korea, the North Korean natives not only envied the fine articles in their possession but ~~became~~ became to reconsider the situations of the capitalist countries. Therefore, if North Korea should buy anything from South Korea at all, farm products would be the only item acceptable to them. In this case, however, who would handle the trading business for North Korea would be a question. Under the present economic structure in North Korea all economic transactions ~~are~~ are managed by the State and not by private firms. So, in case the economic intercourse should begin between the two ~~ex~~ areas, the North Korean authorities would ~~have to~~ have to create several trading firms in haste to deal with the South Korean commercial companies. Such firms, under the strict supervision and control of the KLP and government, would be ~~given~~ given espionage missions along with trade business.

3) Personnel and Cultural Intercourse: Personnel and cultural intercourse could be divided into travel by private persons and travel in groups across the border and exchange of publications:

a) Travel by Private Persons: NK proposed to permit free travel between the two areas to all persons regardless of their social backgrounds, religions, and political opinion. But, judging from the fact that many outstanding nationalists including CHO Man-sik (2580/2519/2784), CHO So-ang (6392/5685/2491) and OM Hang-sop (0917/1854/3610), were killed in North Korea in the past, such a Communist proposal was another empty propaganda. In short, contrary to their outwardly attitude, the North Korean authorities were not inclined to permit free travel by private persons across the border, because such travels would produce adverse effects to the Communist strategy by exposing North Koreans to anti-Communist ideology. wher^{50X1-HUM} about 20 ROK fishing vessels with about 100 crewmen on board were sent adrift to NK during a storm, the North Korean authorities accommodated the crewmen in one place under the surveillance and took them on a sightseeing tour of only selected places, and at the same time, gave them a brain-washing. Although some of

- 8 -

the fishermen had their relatives in North Korea, they were not permitted to visit them. This was an evidence that North Korea did not want to permit private contact between North Koreans and South Koreans.

- b) Travel in Groups and Exchange of Publications: While disinclined to permit private contact between North Koreans and South Koreans NK would welcome intercourse of group visitors and exchange of publications. For the intercourse, each one in the group to be dispatched from NK would be selected by the KLP and given a perfect ideological training before their departure for South Korea, while NK would certainly restrict the personal movements of the visitors from the ROK, and approach them individually for recruitment. In brief, taking advantage of the liberal regime of the ROK, NK could attain their propaganda and political objectives to a certain extent through its selected groups. But, the South Korean group visiting North Korea, without much political training, would be an easy victim to the manipulation of the KLP. Thus, intercourse of group visitors would be advantageous only to NK. The group visitors to be exchanged would involve all the fields including political, economic, cultural, educational and athletic fields. Probable results of such intercourse could be as follows:

~~(1) Art Troupe:~~

(1) Art Troupe: an Indonesian art troupe 50X1-HUM

visited North Korea to make public performances. Against a prior agreement that the troupe give 20 public performances in NK, the North Korean authorities permitted it to give only two public performances in P'yongyang on the ground that the contents of the performance were not agreeable to the situation in North Korea. Furthermore, the spectators were limited to KLP and government officials, and the general public were not allowed to see the performances. Judging from this fact, any South Korean art troupe visiting NK in the future could not expect any good response from the NK authorities. Moreover, most ROK artists belong to private organizations, while North Korean artists are paid by the NK government and are subjected to

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 9 -

constant political indoctrination by the KLP. For these reasons, when the North Korean art troupe visited the ROK, it could not be expected that it makes any public performances other than those praising the KLP and KIM Il-sŏng.

- (2) Newsman Group: The South Korean newsmen would report exactly what they would have seen and heard in North Korea, but the newsmen from North Korea would be indulged in NK propaganda in South Korea, and after returning to NK, they would report only evil things in the ROK. The North Korean newsmen were members of the KLP without exception; in North Korea no one could become a reporter without the KLP membership, however, distinguished ~~by~~ ability he might possess as a newsman.
- (3) Athletic Group: The North Korean athletic champions were on the government pay roll and devoted about two hours each morning for study of "the Memoirs of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Fighters." So, if they came to the ROK, they would make propaganda on playing Communism while ~~playing~~ games by availing themselves of their free time. On the other hand, the ROK athletic groups visiting North Korea would be restricted in their personal movements and would return home after playing games without opportunities to visit any places as they pleased.
- (4) Education Group: In North Korea, all students for enrollment in technical schools (former senior middle schools) were selected under the supervision of the KLP, and successful students were given scholarships from the government without exception. Because they were on government pay, they were not in a position to complain about the curriculum fixed by the government. Thus, ^{but} all NK students had ~~not~~ to obey the orders of the Party, and were never allowed to develop their own opinion. About one half of the curriculum was concerned about political indoctrination designed to make the students loyal to the Party and KIM Il-sŏng, and their activities in schools were ~~intensively commented~~ also under the control of the KLP and the Democratic Youth League (DYL) and were invariably connected with Communist training.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 10 -

Thus, the student body of NK could not be of academic character but was a mere tool for achievement of the political objectives of the KLP. Therefore, if North Korean student representatives were dispatched to the ROK, they would be indulged in propaganda for the Party, and would never be interested in exchange of scientific information or genuine fraternization with ROK students. On the other hand, the ROK student bodies, being independent entities, would not like to receive any intervention from the ROK government authorities. In North Korea they would be easily manipulated by the KLP. Originally, there were no student associations in North Korea. But, when the South Korean students proposed a negotiation with North Korean students [redacted] (shortly after the 150X1-HUM April Revolution) the KLP ordered the DYI to organize the so-called National Students Committee, and leaders of college DYI committees were appointed its members. However, these staff members were almost professional political agitators. Although it was called the National Student Committee, it had no provincial chapters, and existed only in name.

- (5) Publications: If publications should be exchanged between the two areas, North Korea would be willing to supply maximum quantities of its publications to the ROK, but it would not make ROK publications available to the general public of NK for obvious reasons: first, the ROK standards of publications were far superior to those of North Korea, and second, the contents of the South Korean publications would undermine the Communist ideology in the eyes of the NK people. If the NK publications had great appeal to the reader, they would not need to hold back ROK publications from the general public, but they would be compelled to do so since their publications were poor and less attractive than ROK publications. Indeed, if cultural intercourse should take place between the two areas, what the NK authorities would fear most would be exchange of publications. This fear manifested itself in KIM Il-sŏng's speech delivered at the National Publications and Information Service Worker's Conference held in late October 1961 in P'yŏngyang under the

- 11 -

sponsorship of the Ministry of Culture & Propaganda. According to KIM Pong-kuk (nta) (DOB: Circa 1915), Editor-in-Chief, Chagang-Ilbo (newspaper of the Chagang-do KLP Committee) who attended the conference, KIM Il-song said in his speech that if cultural intercourse with South Korea should take place, it must be seriously considered if NK publications could overwhelm South Korean publications in all respects. It could not be denied, continued KIM Il-song, ~~but~~ that North Korean publications did not have much appeal to the reader. For example, ROK publications had novel designs on the covers and were prepared in very appealing fashions. NK publications were inferior to ROK publications in their outer appearances, numbers of illustrations and photographs used and diversity. In other words, North Korean publications carried crude designs for the covers and stereotyped, poorly appealing articles. Should such publications be exchanged for those published in South Korea, the people in North Korea would only read South Korean publications. Also in the radio broadcasting, North Korean programs were filled with stereotyped propaganda and militant revolutionary songs, thus had poor appeal to the listener. Unless such things were corrected within a short period of time, KIM Il-song said in conclusion, NK would be defeated in the exchange of publications and broadcasting with South Korea. Following the aforementioned conference, the North Korean newspapers and magazines used more photographs and allotted greater spaces to amusement articles such as descriptions of historical remains and places of scenic beauties, stories of traditions of national interest, and in the broadcasting music programs were increased. However, this new trend lasted only a few months, and then, the situation was reversed to the former status. Even though the authors and news reporters wished to produce more interesting publications, they could not do so for fear of Party criticisms against their deterioration in loyalty to the Party and class consciousness.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 12 -

(6) Correspondence: South Korea would desire free exchange of mail without censorship, but North Korea would certainly impose a strict censorship on letters to and from the ROK. Those who would be particularly interested in mail exchange would be, in North Korea, the families of defectors to the ROK, defectors from the ROK, and repatriates of ROK origin from Japan, and, in the ROK, defectors from NK, families of defectors to NK, and families of repatriates of ROK origin from Japan. The KLP estimated the number of North Korean refugees who had fled to the ROK before and during the Korean War at about 2,000,000 people. In NK many people moved their residences before and during the War for various reasons. Following the signing of Armistice of July 1953 the NK government reorganized the administrative districts in NK, abolishing townships and establishing new provinces, thus making it difficult for those desiring to send letters to NK to confirm the addresses in NK. In NK families of defectors to the ROK had been continually oppressed, many having been compulsorily moved to other places, and those families and relatives of defectors to the ROK whose defection had not been revealed to the NK authorities would keep their defection in secret. So, even though they were allowed to exchange correspondence, they would hesitate to write letters for fear of detection and punishments. The correspondence between repatriates from Japan and their families and relatives in Japan was subjected to strict censorship of the Liaison Department of the KLP, and letters from Japan containing messages harmful to the KLP cause were never delivered to their addressees. Similarly, the letters that would be sent from the ROK would not reach the destinations if they contained messages unfavorable to North Korea. Furthermore, such letters would be utilized by the North Korean authorities for locating still undiscovered families and relatives of defectors to the ROK. At any rate, the ROK would be in a disadvantageous position in exchange of correspondence.

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 13, -

4) Disarmament: KIM Il-sŏng proposed to reduce the armed strengths of North Korea and South Korea to 100,000 men each and to effect the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from the ROK. But, it must be understood that the Communist Chinese Army is stationed across the river in Manchuria, and that large portions of the North Korean Army could be evacuated to Manchuria to hide in the Chinese territory till it was ordered back in an emergency. In parallel with the tactics to solve the external and internal contradictions, the KLP placed great emphasis on its political operations in the ROK and strengthening of its armed forces.

c. Political Operations in the ROK: The basic policy of the KLP in its political operations against the ROK was to plant its agents in the ROK on a long range basis and to build up its underground strength in the ROK so that it could take advantage of a critical moment whenever it arrived for a Communist revolution. In accordance with the policy, the KLP since the Korean Armistice in 1953 had dispatched large number of agents to organize and expand underground Party nets in various areas, workshops, and government agencies in the ROK. Following the April Revolution in 1960 the number of KLP agents dispatched to the ROK was greatly increased in order to take advantage of the chaotic political situation in the ROK. In view of the increase in the number of agents and the growing importance of the political operations against the ROK, the KLP in early 1961 promoted its Liaison Department to the status of a bureau, enlarged its structure, and placed YI Hyo-sun (nta), Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee, KLP, in its charge. Then at the 4th Party Congress in September 1961 the KLP reaffirmed to further strengthen the operational activities against the ROK. In this connection, one thing that must be noted was that the KLP deemed it an operational success if even one of its agents safely infiltrated into the ROK, since it meant that there was one more Communist in the ROK. If the agents were not arrested, the results of operations would be that much greater, and even if they were arrested, they would have adequate chances during their prison life to give Communist indoctrination to other prison inmates unless they faced death penalty. In short, the agents themselves and those recruited or influenced by them would be potential supporters

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 14 -

of NK. The only cases detrimental to the interests of NK were where NK agents surrendered to the ROK authorities and cease^d to act as Communists. Along with agent operations, the KLP actively launched propaganda operations against the ROK. The P'yongyang Broadcasting Station was established sometime between 1958 and 1959 exclusively for ~~known~~ broadcast directed to the ROK. Immediately following the students' riots in April 1960 the so-called Broadcast College was created as a standing program of the broadcasting station. This Broadcast College broadcast Communist theories for students in the ROK. The "college" was headed by dean PAEK Nam-un (4101/0589/7189) who was concurrently a member of the KLP Central Committee. The teaching staff of the "college" consisted of about 10 professors and researchers of colleges and research institutes in P'yongyang. The curriculum of the "college" consisted of only three subjects: Marxism-Leninism, the history of the KLP struggles, and philosophy. The college offered a three-year course like the Communist College in NK and promised to its listeners in the ROK a diploma equivalent to those conferred on Communist College graduates after the country's unification. Lectures were broadcast on unknown frequencies on two subjects each morning between 0500 and 0700 hours, and then were repeated from sometime between 2400 hours and 0100 hours the next day.

The KLP boasted that the Broadcast College enjoyed great popularity among ROK college students. The KLP arrived at such evaluation based on reports of student defectors and NK agents returning from their missions to the ROK. In addition to such direct approach, it was expected that smuggling of propaganda leaflets and publications into the ROK through the third countries, particularly, Japan would be gradually increased.

- d. Strengthening of Armed Forces: the KLP told its members that ^{50X1-HUM} peaceful unification of the country could be achieved only when NK's political, economic, and military strength could overwhelm South Korea. Accordingly, residents of NK were urged to "carry hammer and sickle in one hand and a gun in the other." Such two-sided operations, in fact, were initiated immediately following the Korean Armistice in 1953. In order to maintain a balance of power against the ROK military strength, NK expanded its regular armed forces to about 400,000 and armed them with weapons of latest models, while continually developing its

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 16 -

war industry. In their support, the Laborer-Farmer Red Defense Unit was organized in early 1959 at each factory, agricultural cooperative, school, and workshop by inducting into its membership North Koreans in the age bracket between 18 and 45. This organization, however, was limited to individual local units, and was not expanded beyond them. Upon completion of its organization, small arms were issued to its members, and their military training was conducted for two to four hours a week depending on the situation of the workshops or schools involved. Former military personnel were appointed training instructors and leaders of the unit. In addition to the abovementioned training, joint maneuvers with the NKPA troops was conducted two or three times a year for improvements of combat capabilities. Mobility of the unit was also strengthened providing against emergencies. In view of the importance of the Red Defence Unit, the KLP [redacted] established the Military 50X1-HUM Affairs Department at each provincial and county KLP committee and placed them under the command of one of the vice-chairmen of the KLP committees concerned. [redacted] the position of Vice-Chair 50X1-HUM in Charge of Military Affairs was newly created in the KLP Central Committee, and KIM Kwang-hyop was placed in the position. KIM was concurrently the Vice-Premier in Charge of Military Affairs in the NK Cabinet. Thus, the KLP and the NK government pursued a policy quite contrary to the slogan of peaceful unification. At the December Plenary Meeting of the KLP Central Committee in ¹⁹⁶² 1959 measures to strengthen the "people's armed forces" were discussed, envisaging full-scale and stepped-up war preparations. In the wake of the meeting, the following changes took place throughout NK: 1) Air-raid shelters were built at each important place providing against a nuclear war; 2) Each member of the Red Defense Unit was ordered to prepare a knap sack and carry grains and other life necessities in it; 3) At each workshop briefing was made on air-raid signalling system, and posters explaining the system were put up on walls; 4) Pictures, posters, statues, and other public structures featuring pigeons as a symbol of peace were removed. The views of the KLP underlying the creation of such a warlike atmosphere was that for a revolution peaceful methods might be used, but depending on the resistance of the enemy, violent methods must be employed.

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 16 -

4. North Korea's Attitude Toward Unification Through UN:

North Korea's attitude toward the UN was particularly great due to the fact that it was still confronted by the UN Forces. The KLP viewed that the UN was virtually a tool of capitalist countries for their aggression, and objectives of UN-member Communist nations were to foil this tool of aggression by exposing the aggression policies of the capitalist camp through political propaganda and maneuvers within the UN, and to draw neutral nations leaning to capitalist countries into the Communist camp. In other words, their ultimate goal was to undermine the UN, and develop another international organization dominated by Communist nations to supersede the UN. North Korea was dead set against the UN and it was hardly imaginable that NK accept any UN resolutions concerning the Korean question. Nevertheless, NK was anxious to participate in discussions on the Korean question whenever a UN General Assembly was convened. Its purpose was to prevent the UN from adopting any resolution detrimental to the NK interests, and to raise its international status to the level comparable to the ROK. The inference that NK would not accept any UN resolutions concerning the Korean question was deducible from the following facts:

- 1) The UN was still dominated by capitalist countries; 2) The ROK government was founded in accordance with a UN General Assembly resolution and was in favor of the proposition of unification through general elections under the UN supervision, and therefore, NK acceptance of any UN resolution would be viewed as self-acknowledgment of its defeat; 3) Technically, NK was still in hostilities against the UN. NK attitude toward the UN could be expected to change only when the Communist China obtained a seat in the UN, and neutral nations leaning to the Communist camp increased, so that it was in prospect that the Communist camp would command a majority vote on the Korean question at the UN. However, the NK authorities did not expect such things would happen in the foreseeable future. Consequently, NK would continually demand for pull-out of the U.S. Armed Forces from the ROK and unification through general elections without foreign intervention, and if the U.S. Armed Forces were substantially reduced, it would engineer mass riots and demonstrations in the ROK, and, taking advantage of them, would attempt to sweep over the ROK with all its military strength within a shortest period of time.

5. Unification Through Supervision of Neutral Nations:

From North Korea's viewpoint, neutral nations could not exist, because all countries must be either pro-West or pro-East. Realizing that its own international status fell behind the ROK, NK was stepping up its diplomatic efforts to seek more NK supporters among neutral nations and, particularly, newly emerging nations in Africa. In view of its own position defying any foreign intervention in the unification question, NK would not accept general elections under the supervision of neutral nations unless they could place hope on the outcome of the general elections, by pulling out the U.S. Armed Forces from the ROK before the election and designating Communist-side neutral nations for supervision and thus shutting out intervention by the UN.

6. Neutralization of Korea:

Marxism-Leninism views that nothing could be neutral, but that all things are in direct contradictions to one another. Similarly, between South and North Korea all things were in direct contradictions, and nothing could be either way. Such relations were clearly evidenced in the following aspects: totalitarianism in NK vis-a-vis individualism in the ROK; dictatorship in NK vis-a-vis liberalism in the ROK; state ownership of properties in NK vis-a-vis private ownership of properties in the ROK; Communist morals in NK vis-a-vis the traditional morals and ethics in the ROK; and Communism in NK vis-a-vis capitalism in the ROK. Between these direct contradictions reconciliation was impossible. Thus, to NK even unification of the country as a neutral nation meant unification overridden by either NK or the ROK. Since August 1945 two different political, economic and social systems had developed in South and North Korea. The differences between these systems were too deep-rooted to be reconciled by neutralization, and so, in principle, NK would not accept neutralization. However, it could accept it as its transitory tactics for communizing South Korea if the preconditions of removing the U.S. Armed Forces from the ROK and legalizing Communist activities in the ROK were met. NK boasted that the ROK could be easily overridden only if the U.S. Armed Forces were pulled out of the ROK. NK expected that if Korea was neutralized, KLP networks could be expanded to South Korea and one half of the South Korean population ~~might~~ could be changed into Communist sympathizers through political maneuvers.

- 18 -

As it was acceptable if the abovementioned two preconditions were met, NK made considerable efforts to spread neutralism in the ROK. For example, taking advantage of the political chaos following the April Revolution in 1960, NK actively sought to form a united front with middle-of-the-road political parties, social organizations, and individual personalities. Such operations were chiefly done by agents dispatched from NK and, as a result, a few "reformist" political parties were organized in the ROK during the latter half of 1960. These political parties were to advocate neutralization of Korea but were outlawed following the coup in May 1962.

7. Hidden Motives of NK Advocacy of Peaceful Unification:

As was mentioned before, NK advocated immediate holding of peaceful and independent general elections throughout Korea. However, this advocacy not necessarily stemmed from its desire for peace. In this connection, it must be noted that NK's political line had generally coincided with that of the international Communism. After World War II peaceful move was the tactical line of the international Communism. This line was in agreement with the desire of the peoples of the world at that time. The international Communism adopted this line because it needed a peaceful spell for fostering the newborn Communist countries after the War. These newborn Communist countries had just been established and their political feelings were still very weak. The Communist parties in power in these countries had to consolidate their Communist regimes politically, economically, and socially, and the peace tactics was adopted as a means to secure the necessary peaceful spell. In line with this peace tactics, NK, through advocacy of peaceful unification, sought to obtain a peaceful spell for a speedy reconstruction of its industry which had been devastated during the War, to win the support of the people both in South and North Korea and sympathy of the world opinion, to isolate the ROK from peace-loving nations of the world, and thus to deceive the world opinion by picturing the ROK as the provocator of the Korean War. In the mean time, NK intensified its efforts to build large munitions factories and to expand its armaments. With its considerably strengthened military power, NK would continually advocate peaceful unification and wait for political and social confusions to culminate in the ROK for its surprise attack. It was the tactics of Marxism-Leninism to reconcile with a strong enemy but to conquer a weak enemy with force. It would be only when a greater

- 19 -

majority of the people of the ROK became to support NK and thus there was no need to use force that NK would ever abandon its will to invade the ROK with force of arms.

8. Possibility of Unification Under NK Leadership:

Since unification of Korea depended as much on international relations as on the potentials of South and North Korea, possibility of unification under the NK leadership should be considered from both international and domestic standpoints.

a. International Conditions:

- 1) Effect of Sino-Soviet Disputes on NK: NK viewed that the disputes between Communist China and the USSR had originated from Communist China's opposition to the Soviet appeasement policy toward the United States. However, in the early stage of the disputes, NK did not officially declare its position as to the disputes, although unofficially it leaned toward the Communist China. At the ~~XXXX~~ 4th Congress of the KLP in September 1961, nothing was mentioned ~~xxx~~ about the disputes. Even after the congress, North Korea's stand was not officially announced, but was ~~xxxx~~ only obliquely hinted at to the rank and file of the KLP in the form of lectures attacking modern revisionism. Then, at the Plenary Meeting of the KLP Central Committee in December 1962, the KLP officially announced its position in support of Communist China. The plenary meeting also discussed measures to strengthen the people's armed forces. It was the first such time that measures to strengthen the armed forces were even discussed at a plenary meeting of the KLP Central Committee. The sudden declaration of NK's alignment with Communist China and the discussion of measures to strengthen North Korean armed forces were prompted by the Soviet retreat over the Cuban crisis. For its possible decision to unify the country by force, NK had in the past looked forward to military support of the Soviet Union, but after the Cuban crisis NK began to doubt the dependability of the USSR. NK sent a military delegation headed by KIM Kwang-hyŏp (nta) to the USSR in order to obtain a guarantee of its continued military support to NK. However, the delegation was given a cold treatment by the Soviet authorities. KIM's request for an interview with Khrushchev was

50X1-HUM

- 20 -

turned down on the excuse that the latter was having a meeting with Tito. The mission ended in failure. NK regarded this as Soviet denial of its military support. Subsequently, the December Plenary Meeting was convened, where the Soviet retreat over the Cuban crisis and Soviet support of India in the Sino-Indian border disputes were thoroughly reviewed. The meeting reached the conclusion that the USSR might betray NK in future settlement of the Korean question. This conclusion led to the NK alignment with Communist China. NK had to resolve to depend on its own in its military problems. In accordance with the decision of the Plenary Meeting, measures to strengthen the people's armed forces were ~~known~~ taken. The Red Defense Unit was organized and military training was given to its members. The war industry was boosted at the cost of the Seven-Year Economic Plan. The KLP organizations in the North Korean People's Army were expanded and consolidated. In order to create a warlike atmosphere a slogan calling for ~~conversion~~ converting the whole NK into an impregnable fortress was spread among the general public. Anticipating total discontinuation of economic aid from the USSR, another slogan calling for the people to work out their own salvation by their own efforts was also disseminated. With the excuse of shutting out infiltration of international revisionism into NK, import of publications and motion picture films from other Communist countries except Communist China was drastically curtailed. In order to alleviate or control the psychological uneasiness resulting from the situation and to maintain political and social stability in NK the Ministry of Social Security was revived At any rate, as a 50X1-HUM result of the Sino-Soviet disputes NK had to abandon for the time being its dream of forceful unification but, watching closely the U.S. policy toward the ROK, it would concentrate its efforts to bring about an internal collapse by promoting confusions in the ROK through political operations.

- 2) Prospect of U.S. Policy toward ROK as Seen by NK: The NK authorities thought that, due to its own domestic situations, the U.S. military support and economic aid to the ROK would inevitably be reduced

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 21 -

drastically regardless of whether the economic conditions in the ROK improved or not, thus further aggravating the ROK economy and gradually deteriorating the friendly relationship of the ROK people with the U.S. Taking advantage of such a situation, NK hoped to lead the nationalistic sentiment of the people to an anti-American sentiment through propaganda. NK viewed that the situation in the ROK would develop favorably to NK in the future. In case, however, U.S. shifted its responsibility of aid to the ROK to Japan, the situation would be different from what NK expected, and so, NK would promote, through the Federation of Koreans Residing in Japan, public opinion in Japan against rapprochement between Japan and the ROK to frustrate the talks between the two countries.

- b. Domestic Conditions: With a view to gaining the upperhand of the ROK in every respect, the NK authorities demand the people to work hard with ~~their own hands~~ the resolution to achieve unification with their own hands. Meanwhile,

[redacted] the domestic conditions behind NK's potentials for 50X1-HUM unification were as follows:

- 1) Anti-KLP Elements in NK: As a result of the concentrated guidance activities of the KLP about 3,000,000 of the 12,000,000 NK population were discovered as anti-revolutionary elements. As long as this huge number of people remained anti-KLP elements, NK would not be in a position to ask for immediate unification of the country.

Therefore, for a time, the KLP pursued an active policy to appease and reform them. [redacted] the provincial staff school in 50X1-HUM

each province was redesignated as the Communist College and many of those of South Korean origin were enrolled in the schools for their ideological reform. Meanwhile, families of defectors to the ROK began to be called by the new name of "families of the kidnapped to South Korea." [redacted] a program of acquitting 50X1-HUM the anti-revolutionary elements was undertaken. Repatriates from Japan were given better treatment than natives of North Korea.

In spite of the appeasement policy of the KLP, however, the so-called anti-revolutionary elements and their families failed to grow responsive to the KLP policy; they had already lost their

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- 22 -

faith in the KLP because due to strict class discrimination their children were not given the opportunity to receive higher education. On the other hand, hatred against the anti-revolutionary elements was too great in the minds of the rank and file of the KLP to be erased out easily. It was with a view to offsetting these anti-revolutionary elements that the KLP had to step up its political operations in the ROK to win many supporters of NK.

- 2) NK Supporters in the ROK: [] the KLP estimate 50X1-HUM that there were at least about 2,400,000 NK supporters in the ROK. This figure was 10 percent of the South Korean population which was estimated at about 24,000,000. According to the KLP, [] 50X1-HUM there were about 1,000,000 NK supporters in the ROK including about 200,000 members of the now defunct South Korean Labor Party and about 800,000 sympathizers (greater part of them were farmers). Later, they went underground due to the oppression by the South Korean authorities. Following the outbreak of the Korean War they surfaced, and most of the youths among them joined the NKPA as the volunteer force troops. The KLP estimated the strength of the volunteer force at about 500,000 including about 100,000 who were picked up in Ch'ungch'ong-namdo. However, more than a half of them were either killed or were taken prisoners, and the rest went to NK. Besides them, there were many civilians who defected to NK from the ROK during the Korean War. All told, in NK there were about 350,000 persons who had come from the ROK during the Korean War. Assuming that each of the 350,000 persons had an average of four family members in the ROK, their total family members in the ROK would be about 1,400,000. The aforementioned 2,400,000 NK supporters in the ROK consisted of the 1,400,000 of such elements and the number of family members of those who were killed or executed as Communists in the ROK since the Liberation (1945) and family members of Communists serving prison terms in the ROK. Besides them, the KLP viewed that more ROK people become to support NK since the Korean Armistice (1953). From the viewpoint that the ideology of young generation would have a great bearing on the unification problem

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 2B -

in the future, North Korea had directed a great attention to their Communist education. The young generation in the ROK, however, were considered much less hostile to Communism than their seniors. The number of such young generation in the ROK was estimated at about one-fifth of the total population, or nearly 5,000,000. Following the April Revolution in 1960 some of South Korean students advocated political negotiations between South and North Korea. Since even students who were supposed to be receiving anti-Communist education had such an attitude, there would be many more other young people in the ROK who would be in favor of active approach to NK. These young people would become the mainstay of the ROK in the 1970's, and then, the KLP hoped, they would come out in open demand of negotiations with NK. This was why the KLP strived hard to recruit through its agents those in their twenties including students and soldiers in the ROK.

3) Influence of KLP in NK:

a) Condition of KLP:

- (1) Strength of KLP: The total number of KLP members in NK as was revealed at the 4th KLP Congress in September 1961 was about 1,300,000. As expansion of the KLP membership 50X1-HUM was continued after the congress, the total was believed to have increased to about 1,500,000, or one-eighth of the NK population. The percentage of the Party members to the population was said to be the highest among all the Communist countries in the world. If the population under 20 years of age was about one-third of the total population, or about 4,000,000, and the population above 50 years of age was about 10 percent, of the total population, or about 800,000, the population in the age bracket of 20 to 50 was about 7,200,000. If about a half of the population was females who were rarely inducted into the KLP membership, there were about 3,600,000 population who were eligible for the KLP membership. When the 1,500,000 membership was compared against the eligible 3,600,000 population, the ratio was 2.4 to 1. As ^{the} ratio of KLP members to the population was so high, ordinary KLP

- 24 -

members were no longer influential among the local populace. To be merely a KLP member was not a very great honor, and in the eyes of the general public, the KLP members were quite commonplace objects. However, the KLP authorities prized its large membership as a preparation for unification of the country: when the country was unified, KLP members were to be dispatched to South Korea to conduct socialist education of the SK population.

- (2) Party within the Party: Since its membership was so large, the KLP had to have its nucleus members for its effective functioning. Those who were selected as nucleus members were about 30 percent of the total KLP membership. Such nucleus members were all picked from among bereaved family members of deceased revolutionaries and those killed or executed by the enemy during the Korean War, family members of military personnel in active service, enthusiastic workers with favorable family background, and those in responsible positions. Most of former members of the People's Party and the South Korean Labor Party in the ROK were KLP members but they were never made nucleus members. Plain KLP members were subject to surveillance of nucleus members, and hence some discord existed between them.
- (3) Nepotism and Localism: Through repeated purges the KLP eliminated its undesirable factionalists. However, there still remained localism and nepotism in the Party, particularly in Party organizations in Hamgyōng-namdo and Hamgyōng-pukto. These provinces were known as the areas where Communist movements had been most active in Korea during the Japanese occupation. Following the Liberation many Communists from these areas found their way to P'yōngyang and became the ruling class of North Korea. When their influence grew to an ominous proportion, however, KIM Il-sōng took a measure to expel them from P'yongyang. 50X1-HUM KIM Il-sōng adopted a policy of governing localities by cadres native to the localities involved, and many of those from Hamgyōng-namdo and Hamgyōng-pukto were transferred back to their home provinces.

- 25 -

Although allegedly factionalism had been wiped out in the Party, there were discrimination in promotion and job assignment between members of North Korean origin and South Korean origin, and between the domestic faction and those who had worked abroad as Communists during the Japanese occupation. The most influential faction in NK was the so-called Revolutionary Heritage Faction led by KIM Il-sŏng. Shortly after the aforementioned rearrangement, KIM Il-sŏng appointed his younger brother to a responsible position in the Organization Department in the Central Committee of the KLP. Eventually, KIM's brother was promoted to the Chief of the Organization Department.

(4) Professional Standards of KLP Members in Responsible Positions:

In general, the professional standards of KLP members in responsible positions were low. Most of them lacked the ability to manage their duties, but tended to brutally drive subordinates availing themselves of the powerful Party mechanism. The low professional standards of KLP members were attributable to frequent reshuffle of personnel. They were seldom permitted to remain in the same positions long enough to master their jobs. Such frequent ~~reshuffle~~ reshuffle of personnel was necessitated mainly for the following reasons: 1) loss of many responsible personnel during the Korean War and through purges of personnel of South Korean Labor Party origin; 2) increasing demand of personnel resulting from implementation of long-range economic plans and the reorganizations of administrative districts; 3) demotions or dismissals of capable personnel as a result of the concentrated guidance activities during the period from late 1958 to late 1960. Many responsible positions were filled by laborers, and as a result, workers under them looked down on them though outwardly they pretend^{ed} submissiveness. For example, the Agriculture Cooperative Management Committees were organized by provinces and counties, and positions in the committees were filled by personnel enlisted from responsible positions in various

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 26 -

other agencies. As a result, the greater part of the officials of the committees were those unfamiliar with the situation in rural areas. When visiting rural areas for administrative guidance, such officials were more likely to learn from farmers than to give them guidance, thus earning the farmer's contempt.

- (5) Bureaucracy of KLP Officials: The bureaucratic rule of the KLP was feared by the North Korean population. CHO Yon-ch'an (6392/3348/24 6363) (DOB: Circa 1905), former manager of a forestry station in Yanggang-do, died of a heart failure while answering a long-distance telephone call which had come directly from the KLP Central Committee when he was in a conference. The manager had been under criticisms for his incompetency. Such extreme fear gripped the minds of the NK people. In general, a telephone call or a summons from the KLP organization was usually a cause of dread. Particularly, during the concentrated guidance activities, guidance workers frequently resorted to torture while interrogating target persons which caused a dread to everyone who learned about it. Bureaucracy of KLP officials in the process of their ordinary work was notorious. For instance, a drama which had been rehearsed laboriously by a troupe for their public performances might be preemptorily cancelled for the mere reason that it didn't reflect the Party line. Such bureaucracy produced various side-effects. For instance, some girls would sell their chastity to KLP officials to get transferred to better jobs.

- b) Popularity Among Population: When the UN Forces advanced to NK during the Korean War, many KLP members who could not escape in time were killed or given harsh treatment by laborers and farmers whom they had trusted. The total number of Communists slaughtered at that time was unknown, but according to KLP statistics, about 300,000 KLP members and their families were killed in Hwanghae-namdo and Hwanghae-pukto. Such massacres

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 27 -

were touched off by vengeances of laborers and farmers on the KLP, who were supported by the Peace Maintenance Units which were organized following the occupation of localities by the UN Forces. Such vengeances were considered as a testimony to the hidden hatred of the population against the KLP. After the Korean Armistice, the KLP did not fail to revenge itself on its enemies. Even innocent people were accused as anti-revolutionary elements. Children of ~~these~~ those accused as anti-revolutionary were discriminated as potentially rebellious elements in education and other opportunities in life. In the meantime, the supply of consumer goods to the population was inadequate, but the KLP practised ^C bureaucracy to extremity to exploit the people. The people dared not to overtly express their hatred against the KLP, but the hatred found its vents in negligence of work and deliberate damaging of common properties in rural areas, sabotage at workshops, and anti-Communist wall scribblings at schools. Such conditions were believed to have existed as of late 1962.

4.) Economic Potentials of NK: NK believed that it was ahead of the ROK in heavy industry, but that in the standards of consumption goods produced by light industry and agriculture, it fell by far behind the ROK. Therefore, the KLP planned to put emphasis on agricultural production and development of light industry, with a view to overtake and overwhelm the ROK in these fields as well as political advancement by late 1960's or early 1970's when it expected the opportunity for unification of the country would have matured. The economic potentials of NK as of late 1962 and their prospects were as follows:

a) Agriculture: The KLP understood that development of agriculture in NK would have a great significance in accomplishment of the anti-imperialistic and anti-feudalistic revolution in South Korea. If NK was successful in agriculture, it would be a great weapon for winning over about 70 percent of South Korean population that were farmers. So, NK pursued mechanization and electrification of agriculture with a view to increasing the farmer's income through increased production. In reality, however, NK

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

-28-

had many bottlenecks in agriculture including labor shortage and shortage of farm lands.

(1) Labor Shortage: In rural areas of NK there were acute labor shortages. The labor shortages had resulted chiefly from mobilization of manpower from the rural areas for development of heavy industry in urban areas which had been given priority since the Korean Armistice. According to KLP statistics, NK had a total of about 2,050,000 chōngbo (5,022,500 acres) of cultivated lands including 1,450,000 chōngbo (3,552,500 acres) of dry fields and 600,000 chōngbo (1,470,000 acres) of paddy fields. Of the 12,000,000 NK population, about 5,400,000 or 45 percent, were farming populace. If a family was considered as consisting of five members on an average, the farming population comprised 1,080,000 families. If each family had two working members in average, the actual manpower available for agricultural production was about 2,160,000. Of this number, about eight percent were managerial personnel. Therefore, the ratio of the working hands to the total area of cultivated lands was roughly one person for each chōngbo, or 2.45 acres. Moreover, the proportion of male to female population in rural areas was estimated roughly at ^{3 to 7.} ~~3/4~~. Of the only 30 percent male population, the number of able-bodied young men was very limited. Under the circumstances, and with the present limited scope of agricultural mechanization in NK, it was too great a burden for one person to cultivate one chōngbo of lands; the NK authorities regarded that two persons were necessary for each chōngbo. In order to alleviate the acute labor shortages, during busy farming seasons hundreds of thousand persons were mobilized from cities to rural areas for assistance to farmers, and at the same time, expansion of agricultural mechanization was pursued. Meanwhile, farmers were exploited beyond their capacity through various movements such as "morning-star-seeing

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 27 -

movement" (which drove farmers to the fields early in the morning), "no back-stretching movement" (which kept farmers working without rest), "carry one more burden movement" (which forced farmers to work beyond their stints), and "labor star movement" (which kept farmers in the field until stars appeared in the sky). The about eight percent managerial population were also urged by the KLP to participate in manual labor. The managing personnel in each cooperative farm ~~or~~ consisted of a total of about 50 persons including: one managerial chairman, two managerial vice-chairmen, one bookkeeper, 10 statisticians (one in each of usually 10 work teams which comprised a cooperative farm), 10 work team leaders, 10 warehouse keepers, and about 15 agitators, entertainment troupe members, and leaders of the KLP and social organizations; ~~There were about~~ 3,700 agricultural cooperative farms throughout North Korea. However, as they must attend various meetings which were continuously held in preparations for various commemorative events, they ~~it~~ could participate in manual work of agricultural production only for about a week a month, and that, in most cases, for mere form's sake. Throughout North Korea there were about 15,000 tractors, but only 60 percent of them were in operation due to the high rate of breakdown of the machines and delay in their repair for shortages of machine parts and repair technicians. Farmers' discontent grew as the farmers were driven hard and the farm machines failed to meet their operational requirements. The KLP realized it, and so, it sought to receive as many repatriates as possible from Japan and produce more and better farm machines. At the same time, it stepped up propaganada among farmers on the plight of farmers in the ROK with a view to convincing them that even though they were required to work hard, they should think it fortunate that they are not skipping meals which is the common lot for the ROK farmers.

- (2) Actual Production: Each year NK propaganized that it produced more foods than the previous year. The grain

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

-30-

production quota for 1961 was 3,760,000 tons including 1,930,000 tons of rice and 1,830⁰⁰⁰ tons of miscellaneous grains. (The actual production figures [] were unavailable.) The 50X1-HUM production in 1962 was announced as five million tons, which was an increase by 1,240,000 tons over the previous year's quota. This figure was hardly believable in the light of the fact that as of late 1962 there was no government announcement concerning abolition of the food ration system. Rice must be hulled and polished, while the miscellaneous grains which were mostly corn need no hulling or polishing. Assuming that one half of the production [] was rice, and the other 50X1-HUM half miscellaneous grains, from the 2,500,000 tons of unhulled rice about 1,500,000 tons of polished rice should have been produced, since unhulled rice was reduced to about 60 percent through hulling and polishing. Therefore, NK would have four million tons of grains for consumption [] 50X1-HUM

Of this quantity, allegedly, 485,000 tons were for uses other than human consumption for the staple food, including 100,000 tons for animal fodder, 200,000 tons for making soy sauce and soy paste, 100,000 tons for raw materials for food processing industry, 35,000 tons for edible oil, and 50,000 tons for alcoholic beverages. So there should remain 3,515,000 tons for human consumption for the staple food. With this quantity, the 12,000,000 NK population could consume 293kg per capita a year, or about 800 grams a day. In reality, however, the NK population consumed per head in average 500 grams of grains a day, or 182.5kg a year, or 2,190,000 tons in total. When the 485,000 tons for uses other than human consumption for the staple food were added to this, the total consumption of grains in NK was, 2,675,000 tons. Assuming that its one half, or 1,337,500 tons, was polished rice, the polished rice would be equivalent to about 2,230,000 tons of unhulled rice. When miscellaneous grains (1,337,500 tons) were added to this, the total would be 3,567,500 tons. This was more closer to the actual production of grains in NK in 1962.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 31 -

(3) Dividend Distribution at Cooperative Farms and Government

Food Procurement Program: Members of the cooperative farm received their dividends at the year ~~end~~ end in proportion to labor points they earned during the year. Usually, when an average farmer accomplished a day's work stint given him, he received one labor point. Some farmers might earn more than 400 points a year, while others less than 200 points a year, thus yearly points averaged 300 to a farmer. Following the KIM Il-sŏng's "instructions at Ch'ŏngsan-ni" which were disseminated throughout NK as a guide line in rural management on the heels of his on-the-spot guidance at the Ch'ŏngsan-ni Agricultural Cooperative Farm in Kangsŏ-gun, P'yŏngan-namdo, a system of preferential treatment of farmers was put into force. Allegedly, this system set the production quota of the cooperative farm at 10 percent lower than the assessed production capacity of the farm, and levied no tax on the amount produced in excess of the quota. The benefit from this system, however, was not large to grass-roots farmers since it was shared with employees of the pertinent farm machine rental station as well as the managerial staff and the district KLP Committee Chairman concerned. Meanwhile, the products of the cooperative farm were divided among farm members after an average of 35 to 37 percent were set aside from the ^m for tax-in-kind (3.4 to 3.6 percent), farm machine rents, common accumulation funds (three to five percent), social and cultural funds (one percent), aid funds for relief of destitute farmers due to chronic sickness and other calamities, irrigation rates, prices of chemical fertilizers, and seeds. Allegedly, the tax-in-kind was to be abolished within the Seven-Year Economic Plan period (1961-1967), but it was not expected to bring much benefit to the farmers since almost equivalent percentage of farm product could be easily taken away from the cooperative farm ^{or} ~~of~~ one pretext or another. According to an official announcement of the NK government in late 1962, the dividends to average farming family (consisting of two working hands and three

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 32 -

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 depends) in the same year were 2,800kg (including unhulled rice and miscellaneous grains) of grains and 500 won in cash. This announcement, however, was seemed to have been rather exaggerated. In that year, average farming family in Kaep'ung-gun, Kaesong-jigu received 2,800 kg (including unhulled rice and miscellaneous grains) of grains and 300 won in cash, and average farming family in the Chagang-do area received 2,000kg, mostly corn, and 500 won in cash. In 1961, average farming family who were chiefly engaged in vegetable farming in the suburbs of Kanggye-si, Chagang-do received 1,500 won in cash (their dividends in 1962 were unknown). In the meantime, farmers in mountainous areas could hardly produce enough food to feed themselves, and complained about their lot in the unproductive areas. In order to placate them, a farmers' meeting was held in Ch'angsong-gun, P'yongan-pukto, ~~stok~~ where KIM Il-song instructed farmers to raise ginseng, edible mountain herbs, and fruit trees through efficient utilization of mountainous terrains and promised them government subsidies for their new projects. In this new attempt only the Ch'angsong-gun area attained some degree of success, but the other areas failed due to shortages of funds and manpower.

The dividend in cash could be used by the farmer as he wished, but grains in excess of a minimum requirement of the farmer must be sold to the government through the government food procurement program. Due to this program the food situation of the farmers became worse than that of the residents in cities. in enforcement 50X1-HUM of the program the internal affairs station officers frequently torn down roofs and walls of farm houses in search of hidden grains of farmers who were not cooperative to the program. Even after that such violent methods were occasionally used. After the KIM Il-song's "instructions at Ch'ongsan-ni" in February 1962, however, the government switched to a somewhat lenient policy and established the principle to procure grains

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 33 -

in excess of 800 grams in per head daily requirement. In spite of the principle, the government, 50X1-HUM procured from farmers all the grains in excess of 250kg per person for yearly consumption. In most cases, the 250kg consisted of 50 percent rice and 50 percent miscellaneous grains. Moreover, since many farmers must pay back government grains they had loaned from the government due to food shortage, they must repeat loaning grains from the government year after year. Such grain loans were available only to farmers who had completely run out of food, and the loan ceiling ~~ceiling~~ was only about one half or two thirds of the food ration distributed to city residents. Meanwhile, the government termed this procurement program as an inevitable measure to prevent squandering of grains on the part of farmers. In conclusion, it can be said that the farmers can not be liberated from the threat of hunger unless some fundamental changes were effected in the government agricultural policy. While they were always short of food, the farmers' cash income was also very limited. The prices of grains at which the government procured were 60 chōn for one kilogram of rice and about 36 chōn for one kilogram of corn. Farmers sold their rice after hulling and polishing it as the price of unhulled rice was too cheap. As for miscellaneous grains, the major item provided by the farmers to the government procurement program was corn as it was most abundant of all miscellaneous grains and its price was relatively high. If, as the official government announcement said, the annual income of an average farming family consisting of two working hands and three dependents was 500 wōn plus 2,800kg of grains, and the grains consisted of 50 percent rice (unhulled) (1,400kg) and 50 percent corn (1,400kg), the total yearly cash income of the family would be 908.24 wōn, after setting aside for their own yearly consumption 1,250kg of

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 34 -

grain (250kg x 5 = 1,250kg) comprising 625kg of rice and another 625kg of corn. In order to get 625kg of rice, 1,041kg of unhulled rice would be needed. When the 1,041kg of unhulled rice were deducted from the 1,400kg that they were given in yearly dividend, there would remain 359kg. From 359kg of unhulled rice 215.4kg of rice would be produced, which would make 129.24 won when they were sold to the government. When 625kg of corn was deducted from the 1,400kg that they were given in dividend, there would remain 775kg, which would make 279 won through the procurement program. 129.40 won and 279 won made 408.24 won. When the 500 won in cash was added to this, the total would be 908.24 won. So the family would be able to use about 75.69 won a month. This calculation was only based on the official announcement. The actual income was believed to be much less, because, among other things, the government authorities publicly admitted that most farmers' monthly income was lower than that of a laborer making 50 won a month. A 60-kg bag of rice would bring only 36 won if it was sold to the government through the program. This 36 won could buy only three to four pairs of nylon socks which cost in NK eight to ten won a pair.

The NK authorities said that upon completion of the Seven-Year Economic Plan the annual grain production would be increased to 6,600,000 tons, but this was hardly believable. As a matter of fact, due to the limitation in the area of farm lands and shortage of manpower, a rapid progress in agricultural production and income of the farmers in NK would hardly be expected. Judging from the situation free marketing of grains would not be materialized in NK within 1960's. This meant that NK revolutionary operations aimed at ROK farmers would be delayed accordingly due to the tardiness of development of North Korean agriculture.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

-35-

b) Light Industry: The NK authorities realized ~~ak~~ that it would be a long time before NK could catch up with the light industrial development of ROK, particularly, the level of its consumer goods production, and placed a great emphasis on production of consumer goods. In the meantime, their immediate concern was to ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ convince the population that only if they were patient and worked hard enough the supply of consumer goods would be increased year by year, and to make them firmly trust the KLP and the government. The population was exhausted in their destitute life, but it was true that they had some hope for future improvement of consumer goods supply.

c) Living Conditions of Population:

(1) Food Supply: In NK only farmers had grains for their yearly consumption at their disposal within the fixed limit, but all the rest of the population relied on government rations in their grain requirements. According to official government statistics, the population received a daily average of 500 grams of grains per person through the ration system. In the meantime, ration prices and the scale of daily grain rations were as follows:

Ration Prices (the same throughout NK)

Rice: 0.05 won per kilogram

Miscellaneous grains: 0.03 won per kilogram

Scale:

(a) Central Supply Recipients:

Special Grade (Cabinet ministers, department chiefs

of the KLP Central Committee and above): Food grains are supplied as much as are requested.

Grade I (vice-ministers, provincial KLP committee

chairmen, managers of special enterprises, provincial people's committee chairmen, and others in equivalent positions):

Principal: 900 - 1,000g in rice.

Dependent: 500g in rice.

-36-

Grade II (bureau chiefs of the central government,

department chiefs of provincial KLP committees, and
others in equivalent positions):

Principal: 900g in rice

Dependent: 500g in rice

Grade III (county KLP committee chairmen, county people's
committee chairmen, college teachers, medical doctors,
and others in equivalent positions):

Principal: 800g in rice

Dependent: 250g in rice (50g of which were "supplementary
grain" which was rationed for 0.66 won per
kilogram) and 250g in miscellaneous grains
(50g of which were supplementary grains which
were rationed for 0.40 won per kilogram).

Grade IV (KLP and government officials and leaders of

social organizations lower than the abovementioned grades):

Principal: 560g in rice ~~2x~~ and 240g in miscellaneous
grains (ratio: 70 - 30) ~~1/2~~ or 480g in rice
and 320g in miscellaneous grains (ratio:
60 - 40).

Dependent: 200g in rice (including 50g of supplementary
grains) and 200g in miscellaneous grains
(including 50g of supplementary grains).

(b) General Public:

Laborer: 700 - 1,000g

Office worker: 700g

College student: 700g

Technical school student: 600g

Middle school student: 500g

Primary school student: 500g

Dependents: 400g (including 100g of supplementary grains).

Ratio of Rice to Miscellaneous Grains by Localities:

P'yongyang: 60 - 40

Provincial seats excluding Hamgyong-namdo and ~~Hamgyong~~

Hamgyong-pukto: 50 - 50.

Other areas: 40 - 60.

- 37 -

For meat, only pork and rabbit meat were available in limited quantities and they were immediately sold out as soon as they were put on sale, so ordinary people could eat them only very rarely. Everybody could eat meat only on the national holidays of New Year's Day, May Day, and the Liberation Anniversary of August 15. On these national holidays meat was available 500g for each member of the family.

- (2) Clothing: [] NK produced more than 200 million meters of various fabrics, but woolen and cotton stuffs were very scarce. The most common stuffs were staple fiber, blended fabrics of staple fiber and cotton, and pure chemical yarn. In general, pure cotton stuffs fell under the category of high-class fabrics in NK. Pure woolen stuff was totally unavailable to ordinary people. Such situation was quite contrary to the situation in the ROK where cotton and woolen stuffs were generally used both in cities and rural areas. In clothing materials for women, yuttong (a type of silk fabrics) and velvet which were quite common in the ROK were considered as the top class materials in NK. In NK socks were mostly of cotton yarn, and nylon socks were worn only by about three to four percent of the population. Consequently, most NK housewives had to spend much time in mending punctured socks, while the ROK the housewives no longer ^{had} ~~have~~ to toil for sock mending thanks to the wide use of nylon socks. Reportedly, the NK authorities were planning to import nylon yarns from Japan for an increased supply of nylon socks and clothing materials, but this would not be materialized soon due to the tight budgetary situation. Thus, the clothing situation in NK could hardly overtake the ROK standards unless cotton or wool were imported from abroad.

(3) Housing:

- (a) Cities: In NK government-owned apartment buildings for 100,000 families had been built each year since 1960, and as a result, there was almost no housing shortage in cities. Such apartment building construction was

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

-38-

gradually moving from large cities to small ones.^{ix}

[] apartment buildings for 100,000 families^{50X1-HUM} were to be built, and this scale of housing construction would be continued [] Assuming that one fam^{50X1-HUM} consisted of five members in average, 3,500,000 people would be accommodated in new apartment buildings during the Seven-Year Economic Plan period. [] the ^{50X1-HUM} funds for the apartment building construction were financed by local government agencies and only limited subsidies came from the central government, but it was said that the funds were to be financed entirely by the central government [] The average ap^{50X1-HUM} ment of the newly built apartment buildings consisted of two rooms, a kitchen, a bathroom, and a toilet. No key money was required to users of the government-owned apartment buildings, but they paid uniformly about one wān a month to cover the rent, power and service water rates. The power rate was not much since ordinary people were not allowed to use electric heating devices such as iron. As the expenses for housing were small, there was no need for families without their own dwelling houses to borrow tenements in private houses or to buy a private house with a large sum of money.

- (b) Rural Areas: Housing construction in rural areas was undertaken in full scale [] in parallel ^{50X1-HUM} with a campaign to get rid of all thatch roofed houses. Good and strong stucco wall houses with thatch roofs were remodelled by replacing the thatchs with tile roofs, and unshapely mud houses were torn down and houses of better structure were built in their places. During the six years [] 100,000 houses wer^{50X1-HUM} to be built or remodelled each year. The houses to be newly built were of different designs depending on localities, each house accommodating one or two families. Thus, it

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

-37-

was expected that [] there would be 50X1-HUM
 no thatch roofed houses in rural areas of NK. The
 housing construction in most rural areas was carried
 on by rural construction units, but in some areas
 construction trust were also employed. The funds for
 the housing construction in rural areas were entirely
 financed by the agricultural cooperative farms involved.
 The rent of the newly built houses in rural areas was the
 same as that of the apartment in cities.

If the abovementioned housing construction programs were
 carried out smoothly, the housing situation in NK would be
 better than that in the ROK in the future.

- (4) Purchasing Power of Population: In the supply condition of
 consumer goods there was not much difference between rural
 areas and cities. In this connection it must be mentioned
 here that in the past farmers prepared domestically side-dish
 foods they needed, but after the Korean Armistice they had
 to rely on the agricultural cooperative store for supply of
 side-dish foods. In NK commodity prices were the same
 everywhere. The retail prices of major commodities as of
 late 1962 were as follows:

<u>Item:</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Price (in won)</u>
Rice, rationed	1 kg	.05
Miscellaneous grains, rationed	1 kg	.03
Coal, dust	1 ton	6.00
Suit, winter, men, mixed material		
of staple fiber and cotton	1 ea	70.00
Suit, winter, men, mixed material		
of wool and staple fiber	1 ea	280.00
Overcoat, men, wool and staple		
fiber	1 ea	250.00 - 300.00
Suit, summer, mixed material		
of cotton and staple fiber	1 ea	50.00
Suit, summer, flax	1 ea	70.00 - 80.00
Cotton, for quilt	1 kg	10.00

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 40 -

Underwear, winter, knit, men, mixed yarn of cotton and chemical yarn	1 suit	30.00
Underwear, summer, men, mixed yarn of cotton and chemical yar	1 suit	4.00
Haircut charge, men	1 person	.30
Socks, nylon, men	1 pair	8.00 - 10.00
Socks, cotton, men	1 pair	1.20
Shoes, pigskin leather, men, ready-made	1 pair	20.00
Shoes, sport, men	1 pair	4.50
Toothbrush	1 ea	.70
Toothpaste	1 tube	.70
Soap, toilet	1 cake	1.00
Towel	1 ea	1.20

[redacted] an instructor at the county people's committee. 50X1-HUM

made about 40 won a month, and an average skilled worker at factory made about 50 won a month. Therefore, it would be fair to assume that an average NK ~~worker~~ worker made about 45 won a month. The expenses he needed for himself alone a month would be as follows:

- Rice, daily 350g, or 10.5kg a month:
 - (10.5kg x .05 = .53 won) .53 won
- Miscellaneous grains, daily 350g,
or 10.5kg a month: (10.5kg x .03 = .32 won).32 won
- House rent, power rate and service
 - water rate: 1.00 won
 - Side-dish foods: 3.00 won
 - Coal, 0.5 ton ~~xx~~ a month: 3.00 won
- Winter suit of mixed material of staple
fiber and cotton costing 70.00 won
apiece, one in 3 years: (70.00 ÷ 36) 1.94 won
month

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 4/1 -

Summer suit of mixed material of staple fiber and cotton costing 50.00 <u>won</u> apiece, one in 3 years: $(50.00 \div 36 \text{ months})$	1.38 <u>won</u>
Overcoat costing 250.00 <u>won</u> a piece, one in 10 years: $(250.00 \div 120 \text{ months})$	2.08 <u>won</u>
Winter, knit underwear costing 30.00 <u>won</u> a suit, two in 3 years: $(30.00 \times 2 \div 36 \text{ months})$	1.66 <u>won</u>
Summer underwear costing 4.00 <u>won</u> apiece, two in every 12 months: $(4.00 \times 2 \div 12 \text{ months})$.66 <u>won</u>
Hair cut charge, once a month:	.30 <u>won</u>
Cotton socks, a pair a month:	1.20 <u>won</u>
Nylon socks costing 8.00 <u>won</u> a pair, one in every 36 months: $(8.00 \div 36 \text{ months})$.22 <u>won</u>
Toothbrush costing .70 <u>won</u> apiece, one in every 12 months: $(.70 \div 12 \text{ months})$.06 <u>won</u>
Toothpaste costing .70 <u>won</u> a tube, one in every three months: $(.70 \div 3 \text{ months})$.23 <u>won</u>
Toilet soap, a cake a month:	1.00 <u>won</u>
Laundry soap, a cake a month:	1.00 <u>won</u>
Towel costing 1.20 <u>won</u> apiece, one in every 12 months:	.10 <u>won</u>
Pigskin leather shoes costing 20.00 <u>won</u> a pair, one in every 24 months: $(20.00 \div 24 \text{ months})$.83 <u>won</u>
Sport shoes costing 4.50 <u>won</u> a pair, one pair in every three months: $(4.50 \div 3 \text{ months})$	1.50 <u>won</u>
<u>Total</u>	22.01 <u>won</u>

Thus, a single worker would have no difficulty in his livelihood, but a worker with a family to support would be hard pressed even if he made 50 or 60 won a month. This was why in most families both the husband and wife must work.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

-42-

- (5) Social Insurance System: According to the statistics by the KLP, [] about 100,000 people lived under the 50X1-HUM social insurance system in NK. They received daily 600g of grains (in rice and miscellaneous grains) free of charge and 30 percent of his last monthly pay a month. Beneficiaries of the social insurance system were those who lost their working ability due to an injury sustained during execution of their work or illness, and male workers above 50 years of age and female workers above 55 years of age who, due to senility, could not continue their regular work. Among beneficiaries of the social insurance system, those who desired to do light work were provided with such work, and they were compensated for their work in addition to the benefits from the social insurance system.
- d) Prospects: In consumer goods supply NK could never hope to advance ahead of the ROK standard as long as it stuck to its self-sustenance policy in raw materials supply for the light industry and did not import those raw materials in short supply. However, if they drastically changed their policy and realized a large-scale export of NK industrial products and import of large quantities of foods, cotton, and wool, etc. for a massive increase of consumer goods supply, and thus substantially lower their prices, the picture would change: substantially.
- 5) Socialist Education Connected with Unification Tactics: In parallel with the Seven-Year Economic Plan, a campaign was being actively developed to promote young students' participation in productive labor through the "Juvenile Seven-Year Plan." (A similar campaign had been launched during the period of the Five-Year Economic Plan which preceded the Seven-Year Economic Plan.) For example, [] 50X1-HUM the students of the Kanggye Middle School, the Pungmun Middle School, the Kanggye Senior Middle School, and the Sŏsan Middle School, ~~Kanggye Senior Middle School, and the~~ in Kanggye-si, Chagang-do, established seven-year plans for their schools, and in accordance with the plans, they were engaged, after school hours, in rabbit raising, growing of arrowroots and Chinese

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 43 -

balloon flowers (for their edible roots), construction of various production practice facilities, and practice at factories and ranches of cooperative farms. Such production activities of students proved quite successful. With emphasis on students' productive labor, the NK authorities pursued socialist educational policy. According to this policy, even formulae and physical laws were made to serve to inculcate socialist ideology in students. For example, during a lesson on physics the process of water turning into steam was likened to the struggle between laborers and capitalists in the capitalist society. A teacher would tell his pupils that as water turned into steam when it was heated up to 100°C, if the struggle between laborers and capitalists was intensified to a certain degree, capitalism would perish like steam, and laborers who emerged victorious from the struggle would establish a socialist society. In middle and primary school, the lesson on arithmetic or mathematics was frequently referred to the Juvenile Seven-Year Plan. For example, a teacher would tell his pupils that in rabbit raising, if they started with 100 rabbits, they would have 1,000 rabbits in a year, or ten times the original number. If they multiplied at this rate, at the end of the seven-year plan, they would have one billion rabbits. So, upon completion of the seven-year plan, all the NK school children could wear rabbit fur overcoats, and share surplus furs with their brothers and sisters in ragged clothes in the ROK. The NK students were always told to prepare themselves to help South Korean students and thus they became to believe that they enjoyed much better living conditions than their South Korean counterparts, and felt an urge to help them.

9. Prospects of NK Tactics:

As was mentioned in the foregoing, NK was ahead of the ROK in heavy industry, housing construction, and ideological armament of the second generation, but in many other respects, it ~~was~~ fell far behind the ROK. Because of these drawbacks, NK was not in a position to accept immediately the general elections throughout Korea in spite of its continued propaganda for peaceful unification. Under the circumstances, NK was likely to employ the following tactics in connection with the unification problem:

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 44 -

- a. NK would continue its propaganda for peaceful unification through an independent general election throughout Korea without foreign intervention, and would not, for the time being, attempt to resort to force for unification. However, it would carefully weigh the possibility of both methods of peaceful unification and unification by war, and whenever the opportunity ripened, it would not hesitate to choose war.
- b. NK would continually propose its economic aid to the ROK along with the economic, personnel, cultural and correspondence exchange between the ROK and NK. Pursuing this policy, NK would seek to promote anti-government sentiments among the people of the ROK, and direct the public attention in NK to the ROK problem to avert an outburst of discontent among the NK population. If the ROK should accept NK proposal, then, NK would avoid reaching agreement on important issues by presenting various difficult conditions during negotiations.
- c. NK would step up its anti-American propaganda and intelligence operations against the ROK.
- d. NK would step up its anti-Japanese propaganda and political maneuvers.
- e. NK would intensify its efforts to improve its international position as the Communist Chinese influence grew in international affairs.
- f. NK might accept the proposition of unification through general elections under UN supervision if the international climate developed in its favor.
- g. The KLP would stick to its view that as ~~days~~ days passed various conditions would develop in its favor and to the disadvantage of the ROK. It looked forward to the days when the Communist bloc overpowered the camp of free nations in the UN as Communist China and Communist-leaning newly emerging nations were given UN memberships. Domestically, it expected that sympathizers with the ROK regime would be eventually wiped out in NK and it would completely block the infiltration of hostile elements, and on the other hand, it would successfully cause internal confusions in the ROK through infiltration of its political agents.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L