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THE PATTERN OF SOVIET BLOC-FREE WORLD TRADE  
SINCE 1948

CIA/RR MP-115

8 September 1954

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FOREWORD

This paper has been prepared to reflect the effects of Soviet Bloc-Free World trade on the Bloc rather than on the Free World. The presentation of data has been oriented to reflect this viewpoint. Thus Bloc exports data which is reported in C.I.F. Western ports values have been adjusted to F.O.B. Bloc port values, similarly Bloc imports normally reported F.O.B. Western ports have been converted to C.I.F. Bloc ports.

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(ORR Project 42.585)~~SECRET~~I. Summary of Postwar Trade and Observations on Prewar Trade.\*

The Communist Bloc has shown an apparent desire to increase trade with the Free World. Following the propaganda line of the USSR, the Bloc has attempted to convince non-Bloc areas that increased trade with the Communist World will serve as the solution to their economic problems. The Bloc appears to be using this tactic, at least in part, as a means of encouraging dissension between the US and other nations of the Free World. Aside from political advantages which may accrue to the Bloc through the use of this tactic, it has also helped to break down the control system imposed on trade in strategic items. It is unlikely, however, that the traditional trade objectives of the Soviet Bloc, which have been directed towards achieving economic self-sufficiency, have been substantially changed. Although the current Communist propaganda line portrays Bloc nations as desiring to increase imports of consumer goods from the Free World, any increase in trade over the next few years will probably include significant quantities of specialized types of capital goods. With the exception of China, the Bloc may be expected to increase to some extent imports of foodstuffs and capital goods used for the production of consumer goods.

The postwar pattern of Bloc exports, and especially those of the USSR, may because of increased domestic requirements for foodstuffs be expected to change in composition. The capacity for export of foodstuffs will be reduced and expansion of other exports and development of new exports will be needed. As an indication of this in the latter half of 1953, larger quantities of petroleum, manganese, precious metals, and manufactured goods were exported to the Free World.

Recorded trade totals for the period 1948 through 1953 are shown in the table. Commodity composition of this trade is shown in accompanying graphs.

Soviet Bloc Trade with the Free World <sup>a/</sup>

Millions of Constant 1948 US Dollars

Year	Bloc Imports	Bloc Exports	Total
1948	2,096	1,880	3,976
1949	1,904	1,758	3,662
1950	1,765	1,629	3,394
1951	1,700	1,623	3,323
1952	1,463	1,468	2,931
1953	1,508	1,556	3,064

a. See Addendum for explanation of estimates.

Despite the existence of a system of trade controls maintained by various nations of the Free World, substantial shipments of controlled materials and equipment have reached the Soviet Bloc through the medium of clandestine trade. Although good coverage of officially recorded Soviet Bloc - Free World trade is available, the very nature of clandestine trade precludes the compilation of firm aggregates. Reports from various free ports of Western Europe, as well as from Gdynia, Hong Kong, and Macao, indicate substantial shipments of controlled goods moving to the Bloc. Reports also indicate movement of such goods overland to Bloc areas. In view of various limitations, which seriously prevent the gathering of clandestine trade data into firm aggregates, no attempt has been made in this paper to quantify the sum total of illegal trade flowing to the Bloc from the Free World.

In the prewar period, 1936-38, total Soviet Bloc\*\* trade with the Free World was in the order of US \$4.5 billion, in terms of 1948 prices. Bloc exports to

\* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent the best judgment of the responsible analyst as of 1 September 1954.

\*\* Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, USSR, and China.

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and imports from the Free World practically balanced. On the import side, manufactured goods and industrial raw materials accounted for close to 75 percent of total Bloc imports from the Free World. Food products, approximating one-third of total exports, coupled with industrial raw materials accounted for about 60 percent of total Bloc exports to the Free World. Thirty percent of Bloc exports consisted of manufactured goods.

A more complete comparison of prewar and postwar trade is not particularly meaningful because of boundary adjustments and changes in the economic and political climate of the area.

## II. USSR Trade with the Free World.

It appears unlikely at this time, that the USSR is prepared to alter substantially its trade policy one of the major aims of which has been the achievement of a maximum degree of economic independence. Although it is apparent that Soviet trade tactics, particularly since the ascendance of Malenkov, have emphasized a strong desire to expand trade with the Free World, the basic trade policy appears to remain firm. A major aim of current Soviet trade tactics appears to be an attempt to create dissension between the US and the rest of the Free World. Aside from political advantages which may accrue to the USSR, such dissension is breaking down the trade-control system of the Free World and thus offers the USSR access to additional goods.

An analysis of recent available trade data shows that manufactured goods constitute the most important segment of Soviet imports. If the USSR actually takes steps to increase East-West trade, it is probable that a substantial fraction of Soviet imports will continue to be in ships, machines, and other capital goods. The import of food and machinery used for the production of consumers goods, will continue to be subordinated to the import of capital goods.

Traditional exports of the USSR have included timber, grains, furs, fish, gold and other precious metals. Increasing demographic pressures, coupled with a higher consumption level, has reduced to some extent, the capability of the USSR to export agricultural products. Consequently current Soviet exports show increased sales of petroleum, precious metals, and metallic ores such as chrome and manganese.

Soviet trade with the Free World for 1953 amounted to US \$824 million. Soviet imports totaled US \$462 million and exports totaled US \$362 million. A geographical breakdown of current Soviet trade with the Free World shows that the greatest share of this trade is with Western Europe. Of all 1953 Soviet exports to the Free World, 88 percent reached Western Europe and 79 percent of the 1953 exports from the Free World to the USSR came from this region. The Near East and Africa imported 9 percent of all Soviet exports to the Free World and exported 7 percent of all Free World trade to the USSR. Australia and New Zealand shared 7 percent of 1953 Soviet exports to the Free World and accounted for only 1 percent of Soviet imports from the Free World. Soviet trade with other non-Communist geographical areas accounted for a very small percentage of total trade.

Available statistical data, including known firm orders and probable deliveries under trade agreements, indicate that Soviet trade with the Free World has shown a substantial increase over 1953 during the first half of 1954. If the USSR maintains this level of imports, 1954 will probably become one of the USSR's best postwar trading years.

## III. European Satellite Trade with the Free World.

The European Satellites showed a renewed interest in reestablishing and expanding trade relations with the Free World in late 1953 and early 1954, reversing the trend of decreasing trade between the two areas. Special efforts were directed towards the expansion of such trade with the Middle East and Latin America, but overtures were also made to Western European nations.

Current trade agreements reflect this policy. Bulgaria, East Germany, and Rumania have not only concluded trade agreements with Free World nations with

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which they formerly had no agreements,\* but they have also renegotiated agreements with other Free World countries superseding the largely ineffective agreements signed in 1947 or 1948. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland have made an effort to revive old agreements but they have not concluded any new agreements. Some attempts by these countries to improve commercial relations with Asiatic nations have also been reported.

In an evaluation of trade agreements as indications of future levels of trade it should be pointed out that actual trade in the past has frequently been only 60 percent to 65 percent of that provided for in the annual trade agreements. In a few cases there have been downward revisions in export quotas under Satellite trade agreements.

Recent Satellite propaganda has professed a desire to increase trade with the Free World. The reason for this may be that the European Satellites now require increased imports of food and consumer goods to help implement the "new course" (current Satellite program for increased emphasis on consumer goods). Relaxation of international security controls may also produce a limited expansion of trade. On balance, however, it is improbable that European Satellite-Free World trade will show more than a modest increase. The requirements of the Satellite industrialization program, the heavy economic commitments with the USSR, and the economic needs under the "new course" will tend to limit Satellite export capabilities.

An analysis of the trade pattern since 1948 indicates that Western Europe has been the European Satellite's largest trading partner in trade with the Free World. The percentage of trade with this area remained quite stable between 1948-53, averaging approximately 75 percent.

The Western Hemisphere has experienced a large decrease in trade with the European Satellites. Imports from this area representing about 21 percent of total European Satellite imports in 1948, fell to about 2 percent of such trade in 1953. Exports to the Western Hemisphere, however, remained relatively stable at about 7 percent. Trade with the Far East, Australia, and New Zealand rose during 1948-53 while trade with the Near East remained stable.

Trade between the European Satellites and the Free World in the first quarter of 1954 showed a turnover increase of approximately US \$41,000,000. Western Europe absorbed only US \$6 million of this increase. The remainder of the increase apparently can be attributed to an increase in trade with the Near East, Far East, and Latin America.

The largest category of commodities imported by the European Satellites from the Free World was that of crude materials. Approximately one-third of total imports consisted of this group of commodities. Manufactured goods, machinery, and foodstuffs were the other major commodity groups imported by the European Satellites during the period 1948-53.

The two largest categories of exports from the European Satellites to the Free World were foodstuffs and mineral fuels and lubricants. Together they comprised approximately 40 percent of the European Satellite exports in 1953. Manufactured goods are the third largest in the Satellite group of exports.

#### IV. China's Trade with the Free World.

Communist China's recorded trade in constant 1948 US dollars with the West declined from US \$1,100 million in 1950 to a low of US \$610 million in 1952.

\* The number of 1954 trade agreements of these countries with Free World countries compared with the number of agreements made in 1953 are as follows: Bulgaria, 7-3, East Germany, 10-7, Rumania, 13-5.

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In 1953 trade increased to US \$728 million. The level of trade of the first quarter of 1953 has not, however, been maintained during the first quarter of 1954.

Communist China's foreign trade reflects the predominantly agricultural and extractive character of the economy. Raw materials and foodstuffs have been sent abroad in exchange for raw materials such as cotton, rubber, and chemicals, as well as metals, machinery, and transportation equipment. Foodstuffs and consumer goods imports are kept at a minimum.

Communist China's trade with the West has been primarily with Asia and Oceania. Western Europe has become the second ranking trading partner of Communist China.

Because of the shortage of foreign exchange to pay for the import of materials for reconstruction and industrialization, Communist China has begun to concentrate on the expansion of exports. There are reports that Communist China is selling many products cheaply in Southeast Asia in an effort to gain new markets.

The need for industrial items from the West is apparently one factor behind the present trade promotion campaign of Communist China. Such a campaign is also well-suited for splitting the West politically.

V. Terms of Reference for Soviet Bloc-Free World Trade Potentials and Alternatives.

A. Summary and Conclusions.

B. Potential Trade between the Soviet Bloc and the Free World.

1. Historic Trade.

(Trade trends in commodity detail with specific trading partners. These data should be carefully deflated and adjusted in order to arrive at estimates of volume which are independent of the influence of changing prices, terms, or geographical structure.)

2. Internal Economic Trends in the Soviet Bloc and Their Implications in Trade Potential.

(This section would include an analysis of the internal production and consumption of Soviet Bloc commodities and services with foreign trade potential in order to determine the short, medium, and long-run needs and abilities of the Soviet Bloc to procure and pay for foreign goods.)

a. Soviet Bloc Export Possibilities.

(This section would be devoted to major potential exports, concluding with short and long-run estimates of the ability of the USSR to export the following items:)

- (1) Food Commodities
- (2) POL
- (3) Industrial Raw Materials
- (4) Manufactured Goods
- (5) Gold

b. Soviet Bloc Import Needs.

(This section would deal with Soviet Bloc import needs as determined from an analysis of the Soviet internal economy. Projections should be made in population, investment and standard of living along with an analysis of the ability of the internal Soviet economy to meet these changes at acceptable prices as compared to potential Free World prices.)

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- (1) Food Commodities
- (2) Industrial Raw Materials
- (3) Capital Goods
- (4) Manufactured Consumer Goods

- c. The Potential Role of Credit in East-West Trade.
- d. The Role of Intra-Bloc Trade in Potential East-West Trade.

(To a large extent this subject would be covered in sections 2a and 2b. However it will be necessary to discuss, stand back, and examine the political and economic relationships between the Bloc countries as well as their individual internal economic affairs in order to determine the potential role of East-West trade.)

3. Ramification of Potential East-West Trade to the Economies of the Free World.

(The current level and composition of East-West trade is such that it does not have an important bearing on Western economies. However, a sudden cessation or large increase in such trade might benefit or harm certain Free World countries.)

- a. Ramifications on Free World Price Structures.
  - b. Supply Ramifications (Change in Bloc and Free World Vulnerabilities).
  - c. Investment in and Control by the USSR of Foreign Sources of Supply.
  - d. Political Ramifications (Changing Political Relationships Conditioned by Economic Relationships).
  - e. Military Ramification (Protection of Sources and Supply Lines).
  - f. Changes in Potential Economic Warfare Capabilities.
4. Potential Changes in Terms of Trade between the Soviet Bloc and the Free World.

(This will be done in the light of 2 and 3 above, that is, with trends of specific commodity needs and surpluses and prices of both in mind.)

C. Alternatives to East-West Trade Available to the Free World.

1. Present Level of East-West Trade in Comparison to Total Trade!

(Should be analyzed in terms of important Soviet Bloc trading partners and key potential commodities.)

2. Methods of Increasing Level of Free World Trade with Special Emphasis on Potential Soviet Bloc Trading Partners.

(This section should draw heavily on the conclusions of Part B -- determining first the Soviet needs and surpluses and secondly the Free World ability to supplant the Soviet influence.)

- a. Investments.
- b. Tariff Changes.
- c. Technical Assistance.
- d. Other (Student Exchange, Union Leader and Executive Exchanges, etc.)

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3. Ramifications of Free World Policy Changes.

a. Reaction of the USSR.

(The effort here should be to analyze the reaction of the USSR to the denial or supplanting of her potential sources of supply or markets. What would be her competitive reaction - price, quality, military, political.)

b. Effect on Free World Suppliers and Markets.

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VI. Bibliography.

Some General References That May Be of Assistance in the Study of Soviet Trade Activities with the West.

1. Vulnerability of Western Europe to a Soviet Embargo on East-West Trade. (Secret) State, OIR, 5477, 10 August 1951.

Western Europe as a whole, depends only slightly on Eastern Europe for imports -- 3 to 4 percent of total imports, representing less than 1 percent of total national income of Western European nations. Only 5 percent of this volume of West European imports is made up of "strategic items." About 50 percent of these imports from Eastern Europe is made up of grains, coal, wood, and wood products.

For certain nations, the imports from Eastern Europe are more important than the over-all aggregates indicate. For example, in 1950, Norway received 36 percent of its bread grain consumption from Eastern Europe; the UK received 18 percent of its sawn soft wood and 10 percent of its coarse grain supplies from Eastern Europe; East European coal met 25 to 33 percent of Scandinavian requirements.

In most cases, the US could supply the items "without serious difficulty." Soft wood would be the most difficult problem.

Loss of the export market in Eastern Europe would not prove a major problem for Western Europe.

2. Vulnerability of the Soviet Bloc to Existing and Tightened Western Economic Controls. (Revised) (Secret) State, OIR, 5447R, 26 January 1951.

This study includes: (1) The Soviet Bloc as a whole (including Soviet Bloc dependence on imports from the outside world, Soviet Bloc vulnerability to a ban on its exports, and limitations on Soviet Bloc vulnerability; (2) Deficit commodities (including fuel and power, metals and metallurgical equipment, non-metallic minerals and selected manufactures, chemicals, rubber and rubber products, and industrial machinery and equipment.

The study states that Satellite dependence on the Western world has been greatly reduced as compared with prewar periods, but it remains substantially greater than that of the USSR itself. Although the USSR and its Satellites have made strenuous efforts to develop self-sufficiency, the fact remains that the orbit is still dependent to an important degree on Western imports.

The study appraises Soviet vulnerability with respect to broad categories such as "high quality machines and instruments" as well as with respect to general commodities.

3. Trade of the Free World with the Soviet Bloc. (Secret) E.C.A. February 1951.

This report includes (1) The nature of the Soviet Bloc economy and its foreign trade; (2) Soviet Bloc imports from the rest of the world (including, the import needs of the Soviet Bloc, the relative dependence of Soviet Bloc nations on imports, imports as related to military potential, sources of Soviet Bloc imports, dependence of the Free World on the Soviet Bloc markets, and present controls over exports); (3) Soviet Bloc exports (including, the need of the Soviet Bloc to export, participating country imports from the Soviet Bloc, and the commodity composition of imports); (4) the Balance of Advantage (including, the Economic Balance, the Balance of Initiative, and the Balance of Political Objectives); (5) the vulnerability of the Soviet Bloc; (6) a general program of economic sanctions; and (7) a program of selective controls.

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The study states, under the heading of "A Warning," "In casting up a balance of advantage it might be recalled that neither side can injure the other decisively through economic action. The most that we can do is to slow down the rate of Soviet development. The most that the East can do is to force the Free World into a program of developing costly resources and of allocating limited supplies of commodities which need not be scarce so long as there is trade between the Free World and the Soviet Bloc" ... "serious as these problems would be, however, production and the economic program of the Free World would be less seriously upset than programs of the Soviet Bloc."

4. Soviet Bloc Maneuvering to Obtain More Essential Equipment from Western Europe. (Secret) Weekly Intelligence Report, No. 132; Department of the Army, Office, Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, 31 August 1951.

This article states, "The Soviets apparently intend to exploit their position as suppliers of these 3 commodities (grain, timber, coal) to obtain more of what they urgently need from the West. ... Recent developments indicate that the Soviets may succeed in their designs."

The article then briefly analyzes the East-West trade situation in the following countries; the UK, France, Belgium-Luxembourg, and Austria.

5. Vulnerability of the Soviet Bloc to Economic Warfare. (Secret) CIA; NIE 22, 19 February 1951.

This estimate includes: (1) General conclusions (including, Military Capabilities, Conduct of Foreign Policy, Economic and Political Stability, Economic Development, Ability to Reduce the Effects of Controls, Chinese Military Capabilities, and the Chinese Economy; (2) Discussion (including, Vulnerabilities of the USSR and its Eastern Satellites, and Soviet Bloc Capabilities to Minimize the Effects of Controls).

The estimate states, "Although, because of the advanced state of Soviet preparedness for war, such a program (economic warfare) would not significantly affect the present capability of the USSR to wage initial campaigns, it would nevertheless, seriously affect the ability of the USSR to conduct a general war of long duration and might correspondingly influence a decision concerning such a venture."

The estimate discusses specific commodity and equipment vulnerabilities of the USSR and its Eastern European Satellites.

6. Soviet Trade with Free World Shows Decline in 1953. Intelligence Report OIR - No. 6347 Date: October 9 (Secret).

This study deals with the various aspects of Soviet trade with the Western world and is divided into five parts -- (1) Trade Agreements, (2) Contracts and Barter Agreements, (3) Trade Negotiations, (4) Composition of Soviet Imports, and (5) Composition of Soviet Exports.

It is pointed out that trade of the USSR with the countries of the Free World during the period January-May 1953 was about 45 percent less in value than for a similar period in 1952. The report estimates that total East-West trade will be substantially under the 1952 figures. Although the USSR has concluded more Trade Agreements than in 1952, the bulk of them are concerned with deliveries to be made in 1954 and therefore those trade figures cannot be included in the 1953 totals. The composition and shift of Soviet imports and exports is also discussed.

7. Soviet External Trade and Finance -- A Basic Study. (Secret) Intelligence Report, OIR, IR-6301.3 Date: August 17, 1953.

This basic study is concerned with the policies of the USSR as regards foreign trade and finance. The study notes two characteristics

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of USSR trade that are most peculiar. ... one characteristic is the form, namely, state monopoly of foreign trade; the second is a policy feature, defined as the continued and persistent drive to achieve the greatest degree of self-sufficiency.

Section B entitled "International Finance and Trade" contains one part dealing with Soviet foreign trade policy. Under this particular portion of the study can be found material on Postwar Soviet trading tactics with the West, the Moscow Economic Conference, and the Soviet attitude towards the Economic Council of Europe. Another part of Section B deals with the various mechanisms that are employed by the Soviets in their trade relations with non-orbit areas.

8. Analysis of Communist Propaganda. (Confidential), OIR Intelligence Report No. 57141, 30 May 1952.

This report is concerned with an analysis of Communist propaganda in various areas of the world. It contains references to specific types of propaganda pertaining to economic matters, that is employed by Communists to proselytize their cause in various regions of the world.

9. The Economic Importance of Current Trade with the Communist Bloc to the Non-Communist Far East. (Confidential), OIR Intelligence Report No. 5896, 28 April 1952.

This study was prepared as a contribution to NIE 59 which dealt with the relative strategic importance of East-West trade to the Soviet Bloc and to the rest of the world. It is concerned with two basic questions: "What is the current level of trade between the non-Communist Far East and the Soviet Bloc?" and "What would be the cost to the non-Communist Far East of a complete cessation of this trade?"

10. Generalized Assessment of Economic Damage to the Soviet Bloc in the Event of a Complete Severance of East-West Trade. (Secret), EIC-R-3, 31 August 1953. Prepared jointly by US Intelligence Agencies, Economic Intelligence Committee.

This study is designed to assess the effects of a total severance of Western trade with the Soviet Bloc. It concerns itself with the question: "How would the total cessation of trade affect Soviet-Satellite capabilities to wage war?" The purpose of the report, is "to aid long-range planning, with little attention directed to providing information needed for the day-to-day operations of a trade restriction program."

11. Probable Economic Effects of a Severance of East-West Trade. (Secret), NIE 59, 16 April 1953.

This estimate deals with an analysis of economic consequences that would result from a total stoppage of trade between East and West.

12. An Analytical Framework for Study of Economic Warfare with Special Reference to East-West Trade Problems. (Confidential), CIA/RR 22, 30 April 1953.

This project provides the analyst with a basic framework for the development and analysis of the various problems arising from East-West trade. This study is divided into four component parts: (a) Problems and definitions; (b) General analysis of strategic damage from trade restrictions; (c) Methods of measuring strategic costs; and (d) Special factors in the analysis of East-West trade.

13. Economic Conditions in the European Satellites. (Secret, US Officials Only), CIA/RR IP-364, 15 May 1954.

This study contains a section dealing with the Foreign Trade of the European Satellites. It contains information pertaining to (a) Inter-Satellite

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
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trade and the radical shift of this trade in the postwar period, (b) information concerning Satellite trade with the West and a table showing the value of each Satellite's trade with the West from 1948 through 1953, (c) a limited amount of information on the commodity composition of Satellite trade and a table listing the major exports and imports of the Satellites to the Soviet Union, other Bloc nations, and the West, (d) Satellite trade as it is conditioned by their economic policies, (e) Trade agreements and Negotiations, (f) Foreign trade planning in the European Satellites, (g) Price differentials in Soviet-Satellite trade, and (h) Satellite reparations to the USSR.

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16. The Significance of Recent Soviet Gold Sales. CIA/RR IM-384, 14 January 1954. (Secret, US Officials Only).

This study contains information concerning (a) Soviet capabilities to export gold, (b) the purpose of recent Soviet gold shipments, and (c) certain effects of these sales.

17. Changes in the Pattern of Soviet Trade with the Free World 1953-54. (Secret), CIA/RR IM-388, 16 July 1954.

This report is concerned with the shifting pattern of Soviet trade and an analysis of the various factors that have been responsible for this change.

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ADDENDUM-EXPLANATION OF CHARTS

These charts represent an attempt to portray East-West trade from the point of view of the Soviet-Bloc countries. As such, very rough adjustments for shipping and insurance costs were incorporated in the data. Soviet Bloc exports are presented, therefore, on an FOB basis and imports on a CIF basis. Moreover, the yearly values of total exports and imports were adjusted for price changes from U.N. statistical data on the basis of 1948 world prices.

The charts, which are based on official trade statistics of the Free World nations, are subject to many limitations inherent in such data. Because of this, information in the charts should be construed as rough orders of magnitude only. This is especially true in the charts concerning the commodity composition of trade. Particularly in the earlier years, large portions of recorded trade were reported by Free World countries in "miscellaneous" and "other" categories. Because of these residual categories, the commodity patterns in earlier years are probably distorted. In the case of China, 1948 and 1949 data reflect Chinese Nationalist trade. Furthermore, reported Chinese trade for all the years is probably overstated because of the inclusion of Taiwan, Korea, and Hong Kong, in certain reports of Free World countries under the title of "trade with China."

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
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GENERAL COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF THE SOVIET BLOC'S TRADE WITH THE FREE WORLD 1948 - 1953 \*

1948

(millions of constant 1953 US dollars)




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GENERAL COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF EUROPEAN SATELLITES' TRADE WITH THE FREE WORLD 1948 - 1953 \*

(millions of constant 1948 US dollars)




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GENERAL COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF THE U.S.'S TRADE WITH THE FREE WORLD 1948 - 1953 \*

(millions of constant 1948 US dollars)




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GENERAL COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA'S TRADE WITH THE FREE WORLD 1948 - 1953 \*




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PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SOVIET BLOC'S TRADE WITH THE FREE WORLD 1948 - 1953 \*




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PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN SATELLITES' TRADE WITH THE FREE WORLD 1948 - 1953\*




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PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE USSR'S TRADE WITH THE FREE WORLD 1948 - 1953 \*



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
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PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CHINA'S TRADE WITH THE FREE WORLD 1948 - 1953\*

CHINA'S EXPORTS

CHINA'S IMPORTS



KEY:

Western Europe

North and South America

Near East and Africa

Far East and Oceania

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