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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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DAILY DIGEST

JUN 22 1951

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- NOTE:
1. This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence.
 2. Comments represent the preliminary views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
 3. Marginal letter indications are defined as follows:
 - "A" - items indicating Soviet-Communist intentions or capabilities.
 - "B" - important regional developments not necessarily related to Soviet/Communist intentions or capabilities
 - "C" - other information indicating trends and potential developments

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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)

"B" USSR. Builders Reprimanded for Shortcomings. According to a Pravda editorial of 19 June, many building organizations are not taking advantage of available opportunities allowing for speedier building, increased quality of construction, and further reduction of costs. The editorial warns that the "tremendous program of capital works in 1951 demands a fundamental improvement in the organizing of construction works and an ever-increasing development of Socialist competition from economic heads of construction sites and Party and trade union organizations." Delays at many construction projects are attributed to the fact that building organizations have not taken the necessary steps to insure that sufficient builders and "engineer-technical staffs" be made available, nor have they secured the requisite material and technical resources for the sites. Chelyabinsk, Yaroslavl, and Sverdlovsk are specifically mentioned as localities where building is proceeding at a very slow pace. Local Party organizations are called upon "to head the struggle for the fulfillment and overfulfillment of building plans." Party organizations at the sites are advised to improve their efforts, broaden mass political work among the builders, and draw the workers more thoroughly into Socialist competition. (R-FBIS, 21 June 51). COMMENT: Evidently difficulties are already being encountered by Soviet builders in meeting the goals of the State plans for 1951 which decreed that the cost of construction work be reduced by 3 percent, and that productivity of workers engaged in construction be increased by 11 percent.

"C" EASTERN EUROPE: POLAND. Hilary Minc Reported to have been Ousted. [REDACTED] 25X1C
 25X1C [REDACTED] Hilary Minc, Deputy Prime Minister in Charge of Polish Economic Planning, has just been ousted. [REDACTED] 25X1C
 is of the opinion that this move will initiate a wholesale change in the structure of the present Government. [REDACTED] 25X1A
COMMENT: Minc has long been the subject of such reports, primarily because of a middle-class bourgeois background which logically would render him suspect. By virtue of his training and ability, Minc holds the most important economic posts in Poland, i.e. Chairman of the State Economic Planning Commission, and Chairman of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers. His continuance in office depended upon his indispensability to the Government and the lack of a qualified replacement. During the past year there have been indications of his gradual eclipse. His removal would undoubtedly bring about personnel changes within the office which he headed, but not necessarily extending throughout the Government.

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"B" YUGOSLAVIA. Tito Bids for "Peace" Leadership Against Soviet Bloc. The Yugoslav National Committee for Defense and Peace has announced 23-26 October as the date for the anti-Cominform international peace congress at Zagreb, which marks the most ambitious Yugoslav step in Tito's political warfare campaign against Moscow. Although the conference is purportedly unofficial, the proposed agenda indicates that it is intended to expose the Soviet-sponsored Peace Appeal and the World Peace Congress. The suggested agenda includes: (1) the tendency toward domination and lack of respect for the equality of nations as one of the fundamental reasons behind the danger of war; (2) the condemnation of all aggressive acts and pressures; (3) the reduction of armaments; (4) the struggle for the principles of the Charter; (5) assistance to underdeveloped countries and the free development of economic cooperation and; (6) cultural cooperation among nations based on mutual respect. The Yugoslav peace committee apparently intends to enlist the support of prominent anti-Soviet liberals, in order that the conference will be an imposing rally against the pseudo-pacific aims of the Soviets. (U-New York Times, 22 June 51). COMMENT: The Yugoslav-sponsored international peace meeting was originally scheduled to open on 1 September, but was postponed after Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt reportedly agreed to attend the meeting if it were held in October. A previous report revealed that the Yugoslav Government intended to invite prominent US organizations and individuals to attend the meeting and thus afford it a maximum of prestige.

"C" CURRENT COMMUNISM. Malik Intends to Receive World Peace Council Delegation. Following a request from Joliot-Curie, President of the World Peace Council (WPC), Soviet delegate Malik, in his capacity as President of the UN Security Council for the month of June, has agreed to receive a WPC delegation in New York on 25-27 June. The US delegation to the UN believes that this and other developments may indicate a Soviet intention to use the 25th June anniversary of the Korean invasion as a sounding board for the "peace campaign." Among other possible steps, Malik may call a SC meeting for 25 June with the intention of making a propaganda speech. Malik is presently scheduled to make a radio speech on the "Price of Peace" radio series 23 June. He might in such a speech, in addition to general remarks along the "peace campaign" line, indicate whether he plans to call a SC meeting.

COMMENT: The delegation mentioned in the Curie-Malik interchange is presumably the group which the WPC previously sought to dispatch to Secretary General Lie with demands for a revision of UN policies, particularly with respect to Korea. Lie has refused to see the delegation in New York, although he had at one time agreed to meet it in Europe which, however, was declined by the WPC. Malik's reception of the delegation could be prevented by a US State Department refusal to grant entrance visas.

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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)

"C" LEBANON. Yafi Government Receives Vote of Confidence on Presentation Of Its Program. Following six hours of heated but orderly debate, Prime Minister Yafi on 19 June received a vote of confidence of 52 to 23 on a program which includes cooperation with the Arab League and the UN, an economic agreement with Syria, electoral and agricultural reform, and improvements in health, education, law enforcement, and finance. US Charge Bruins comments that the program sounds encouraging although most observers are adopting a "wait and see" attitude as to the general effectiveness of the government. He considers it significant that for the first time Lebanon has parliamentary opposition, regardless of the fact that it is currently split between the Reform Front Liberals and reactionary land-owners and professional politicians. (R Beirut 878, 20 Jun 51). COMMENT: Prime Minister Yafi, who took office on 6 June, has been a Parliamentary Deputy since 1937 and was Prime Minister in 1939. He is well-balanced and moderate; and although a known friend of France, he is also friendly toward the US. The combination of the Prime Minister's liberal program plus a parliament which does not contain merely the same old faces makes it hopeful that the country will have a more stable and effective government.

"B" INDIA. Prime Minister Nehru Reported to be Open-Minded On Kashmir. On 16 June, the UK High Commissioner in India delivered a "blast" at Nehru regarding the latter's 11 June speech accusing the UK and US of aiding and abetting Pakistan in ~~distorting~~ the Kashmir crisis. Nehru took the "blast" reasonably and calmly and left the High Commissioner with the impression that he might not, after all, have a completely closed mind on the subject. (C New Delhi 3710, 20 Jun 51). COMMENT: For the past three years, Nehru has alternately appeared first adamant, then malleable on the question of Kashmir. The problem is still unsolved.

"C" Politics in the Indian Air Force. The US Air Attache in New Delhi reports that the problem of naming a successor to the present Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Air Force, who is rumored to be retiring next December, is a hot one politically. Air Vice Marshal Mukherjee, now second in command, is allegedly lacking in financial support and tends to be too pro-Western. Air Commodore Engineer, a rich Parsi with less pro-Western feeling, apparently has the best chance of becoming Commander-in-Chief. According to the US Air Attache, Air Vice Marshal Mukherjee's morale is low and he is considering retirement.

COMMENT: Heretofore the Indian armed services have been relatively free from political control. This evidence that views on the East-West question may be affecting promotions is a further disturbing indication of deterioration in the calibre of the armed forces. (See OCI Daily Digest, 12 Jun 51.)

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"B" INDOCHINA. Political Reliability of Some Vietnamese Officials is Questionable. In discussing, with US Consul Blanke in Hanoi, a security problem connected with the ECA mission, the North Vietnam security director asserted that he never took up security matters at the level of department heads. The security director states these officials were completely passive on the subject and never investigated their own personnel, in an attempt completely to avoid assuming any political hue. Blanke observes, generally, that the view is interesting that officials at the level of Department heads can consider themselves uncommitted fence-sitters; and, in particular, that the chief of the Vietnamese American Aid Department and his immediate assistant have sometimes been suspected of at least passive sabotage of the ECA program. (C Hanoi 754, 21 June 51).

"A" CHINA. Chinese Communist Threat to Hong Kong Increasing. The threat to Hong Kong is gradually increasing, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] for the following reasons: (1) trade restrictions are reducing the city's value as an entrepot to the Chinese Communists, (2) unemployment is increasing the internal security risk, and (3) the Chinese Communists are replacing detached units and formations in South Kwangtung with complete armies. (S AMCONGEN, Singapore, 23 May 51).
COMMENT: The Chinese Communist potential to mount a successful attack on Hong Kong with little or no notice has been generally conceded. While the indications in the above report certainly enhance the threat of an assault, there is no other information available which suggests any aggressive intentions at this time. Communist troop strength in the general area of South-Central Kwangtung is estimated at 85,000, of which 30,000 are in relative proximity to Hong Kong, with 1,000 actually deployed on the border of the colony.

"B" More Mass Executions Belie Purge Softening. A reported May directive from Peiping (O/CI Daily Digest, 20 June 1951), authorizing commutation of death sentences, though being implemented, is apparently not interfering with the continuance of mass executions, according to a recent Hong Kong press release telling of the execution of 284 in Shanghai and 122 in Sian on 15 June. The 284 executed falls but nine short of the Shanghai record. Meanwhile, in the same city, a newly established "Committee for the Examination of Counter-Revolutionary Cases" granted a two-year stay of execution to 19 individuals (during which time, by "showing sufficient evidence of repentance", they may win reprieves), sentenced 23 to life imprisonment, 92 to undisclosed jail terms, paroled 12 (involving indoctrination courses) and released two individuals "on bond". In Sian 21 received a two-year stay of execution, 11 life sentences, 166 indefinite jail terms and 144 were placed under surveillance.

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(U Hong Kong AP, 21 June 51). COMMENT: A Communist report of a public trial of counter-revolutionaries in Lanchow states that of the 203 people tried, 30 were sentenced to death, 17 given a two-year stay of execution, 19 paroled, and 52 released in view of their minor offenses. Nothing is known of the selective standards employed by the Communist review boards reportedly handling counter-revolutionary cases, but evidently there are still enough irremediable cases to warrant a continuance of mass executions.

"B" KOREA. Enemy Capability to Continue Night Air Attacks Estimated. Noting the relative ease with which the enemy in the past several days has been able to conduct small night air attacks against forward UN airfields and ground positions, Far East Air Force Intelligence estimates that 25-40 conventional fighter sorties could be mounted by the enemy per night without major relocation of his air forces. Fighter types available for this type of mission would be the LA-7, the LA-9 and the Yak-9, all of which can reach UN lines from present bases in the Antung-Sinuiju area. (S, FEAF AX 8878, 19 June 51). COMMENT: Since 14 June, the enemy has conducted one and two plane night air attacks on UN fields at Suwon (where one F-86 was destroyed and major damage was inflicted on four others) and Kimpo. Other sporadic attacks have been launched against Inchon and several forward ground positions.

"C" Chinese Civilian Labor Being Employed in North Korea. Radio Peiping on 18 June announced that despite the hazards of "working directly under enemy fire, Korean and Chinese civilian workers are still maintaining a constant flow of goods to the front by quickly repairing damaged bridges." (R FBIS 21 June). COMMENT: The reference to Chinese civilian labor in North Korea indicates both the relative shortage of North Korean manpower and the necessity for utilizing large amounts of coolie labor to maintain supply lines in the face of UN air operations.

"C" North Koreans Called on to be More Friendly to Chinese. On both 19 and 20 June, Radio Pyongyang carried speeches exhorting the North Koreans to "consolidate the good will between the Korean and Chinese people" and to give "warmer aid to the Chinese volunteers." (R FBIS 21 June 51). COMMENT: While the existence of tensions between the Chinese Communist troops on the one hand and the North Korean civilians and troops on the other has been previously noted, the heavy Radio Pyongyang emphasis on this topic suggests both the seriousness of the problem and its continuing nature. The Communist military practice of living off the land has aggravated the problem.

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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)

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GERMANY. Personnel Difficulties Cited in GDR Foreign Ministry. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the GDR Foreign Ministry is having trouble in personnel matters. Jonny Loehr and Friedrich Wolff were removed from the top posts in Bucharest and Warsaw recently and have not been replaced. It is also reported that Stefan Heyman, the Minister in Budapest, is about to be replaced as a result of a recent inspection of his post by a Foreign Ministry official. Albania is also anxious to exchange diplomatic missions. The GDR Foreign Ministry is allegedly unable to find trustworthy representatives of enough stature for the various satellite posts. Meanwhile, the deputy Foreign Minister, Anton Ackermann, is said to be intriguing against his chief, Foreign Minister Georg Dertinger, and it is believed that the Communists wish to name Ackermann Foreign Minister. [REDACTED]

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COMMENT: Indications have been received previously that the GDR was having difficulties in finding competent personnel for top foreign posts; particularly in Poland, where the task of selling German-Polish friendship is not an easy one. Dertinger, a former Christian Democrat, has always been considered as a front man for Ackermann, who is a strong Communist.

"C"
25X1C.Decision Reported to "Seal Off" West Berlin Shortly. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Heinrich Rau, East German Minister of Planning, presided over a meeting in East Berlin on 6 June at which he let it be understood that a decision had been made to seal off West Germany and West Berlin "shortly". The meeting, which was attended by several Cabinet ministers, their deputies, and directors of certain key industries, was concerned with a study of measures for improving the administration of the East German economy and making it independent of the West. Among the measures discussed were the sealing off of Berlin. Informal statements by some participants at the meeting indicated that new provocations will be used, designed to result in a blockade of Berlin. [REDACTED]

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25X1A

COMMENT: Events of the past week suggest that the USSR and the East Germans are anxious to acquire imports from West Germany, in return for which West Berlin will be able to conduct trade with the West. The East German economy has lately been deteriorating, but it is more likely to be improved by closer East-West German trade relations than by the "sealing off" of West Germany from East Germany.

"B"

ITALY/SPAIN. Italians Refuse Urgent Spanish Request for Wheat Loan. The Italian Government has informed the US Embassy Rome that it has refused urgent Spanish requests for a loan of 20,000 tons of wheat. The Italians are willing to furnish the wheat, which they can loan without difficulty, provided either a US or British agency guarantees the loan. The Italians refuse to accept the guarantee of Spanish banks because they feel economic conditions in Spain make doubtful the repayment of the loan. (C Rome 633,

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
20 June 51) COMMENT: The Spanish wheat crop should meet minimum requirements; the US has granted the Spanish a \$5 million credit for wheat, and the Spaniards are procuring wheat on their own account—all of which indicate that wheat supplies will be adequate. The efforts of the Spanish Government to obtain Italian wheat may be caused by temporary shortages in local stocks before the wheat crop is harvested and further foreign purchases are received. It is evident that the Spanish regime is apprehensive over the disaffection of the populace and fears even temporary reduction of the bread ration. A wheat loan to Spain might cause the Italian Government some embarrassment in Parliament at this time, and the Italian Communists would probably point to the loan as another example of Italian subservience to US strategic interests.

"C" DENMARK. Economic Stability and Defense Program Threatened by Foreign Trade Difficulties. Three years of ECA aid have helped Denmark achieve a high level of internal prosperity—with agricultural and industrial production exceeding pre-war levels—but the nation still suffers from a basically unsound foreign trade imbalance which may require a major reorientation of the Danish economy. The extent to which Denmark can solve this problem will materially influence the success of its defense effort; for, lacking oil, coal, iron or any other metals, Denmark must obtain from abroad industrial raw materials as well as finished military equipment. Otherwise, Danish defense efforts will largely depend upon US largesse. Essentially, the country lives by importing feedstuffs which it converts into animal products and then exports. However, inflation as a result of the Korean war and the currency devaluation of September 1949 have accelerated the rising costs of these imports, while the price of major Danish exports— notably such things as bacon and butter to the UK— have increased only slightly. There is accordingly not a sufficient margin between agricultural import and export prices to finance the import of raw materials and finished goods for other segments of the economy, and Denmark is confronted with a chronic dollar-sterling deficit which ECA aid has served to cushion but not really to correct. ECA officials have therefore been urging the Danish Government to consider seriously a reorientation of the entire economy so as to utilize domestic feedstuffs to a much greater extent than at present, to depend less on British markets, and to be more diversified in agricultural and industrial production as well as in marketing. Such a re-orientation, however, poses major political and economic problems (such as changes in the basic pattern of land use) which any Danish government is reluctant to tackle.

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"B"

Government Pressed by Conservatives to take Firm Stand on Iranian Oil Crisis. Anthony Eden, deputy leader of the Conservative Party, in opening the 22 June Parliamentary debate on the oil crisis, stated that a British evacuation of Iran would be disastrous. He felt that it was the duty of the government to protect British personnel and promised opposition support for any such action. There was a large degree of support throughout Parliament for the use of military force to protect British lives, with Conservative backbenchers favoring strong action and Labor backbenchers fearful of the implications of a show of strength. A group of the latter, including Richard Crossman, suggested that US oil interests were largely responsible for the present crisis in Iran. These allegations were rebutted in some detail by the Foreign Secretary. Mr. Morrison admitted that the loss of Iranian oil would dislocate the current supply situation, but said that rationing in the UK was exceedingly unlikely. He said that the US had in general supported the actions the UK had taken, was anxious that there should be no precipitate manifestation of military force, but accepted the UK's right to protect British lives. (R London 6731, 22 June 51) COMMENT: The Government is clearly under considerable domestic pressure to take a forceful stand in the oil crisis. Present indications are that it will resist this course unless necessary to implement plans to evacuate British nationals. The care with which Morrison rebutted the charges against the US oil companies indicates his concern over the possible development of anti-US sentiment.

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- "B" FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA. Election Trend Toward Right. Brazzaville authorities are reported to consider the French National Assembly elections in French Equatorial Africa (FEA) to be a sharp defeat for Communists and the native Communist-oriented African Democratic Rally (RDA) and to show a strong movement toward the right. Of the seven seats allotted to FEA, three and probably four were won by pro-Gaullists. (S Leopoldville 83, 20 June 51) COMMENT: Native voting was closely controlled to eliminate the RDA candidates, and thus the vote is not indicative of local political thinking. The high percentage of pro-Gaullist seats is consistent with the extremely conservative and authoritarian sympathies predominating among officials in colonial areas.
- "B" CUBA. Seized Communist Newspaper Released. The newspaper Hoy, organ of Cuba's Communist Partido Socialista Popular, has been returned to the party in accordance with the ruling of a lower court. In rendering its decision, the court stated that the government acted illegally in seizing and closing down the newspaper plant, and that such action could be taken only by "judicial order" and not by a Labor Ministry order as was done on 24 August 1950. (U NY Herald Tribune, 20 June 51; U NY La Prensa, 20 June 51) COMMENT: The closing of Hoy last August, in response to demands from the non-Communist Cuban Confederation of Labor, forced the Communist press "underground" and resulted in the sporadic and ineffectual publication of several small clandestine newspapers and pamphlets. The subsequent establishment of La Ultima Hora, which has carried no advertising and has had limited circulation, has not nearly compensated for the loss of Hoy. The restoration of the latter will enable the Communists to recover the propaganda effectiveness which they formerly enjoyed. The government is sure to appeal the case to a higher court in view of the widespread opposition which the court's ruling has met from various groups and organizations throughout the country.

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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT S/S CABLES22 June 1951

SECTION 2 (EASTERN)

"A" UNITED KINGDOM/IRAN. UK Foreign Office Indicates Policy on Iran. The UK Foreign Office has told the US Embassy in London that measures are being taken to evacuate Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) personnel from outlying oil fields into the Abadan area. They will be kept there as long as possible in the faint hope that a more realistic attitude will prevail among the Iranians. Permanent Under Secretary Strang thinks almost all AIOC personnel would choose to leave rather than to place themselves at the mercy of the National Oil Company. The UK has no present plan to use force beyond that required to evacuate personnel, and even then only in the event of necessity. It does not plan to use force to protect AIOC property. In the event of a Communist coup following evacuation, the UK might wish to re-examine the situation in consultation with the US. The UK estimates the possibility of the USSR attempting to take control of the oil industry as small. Although no final decision has yet been made, the UK might ask the US to support an embargo on Iran, and might further ask the US to stop economic and military assistance to the Iranian government. (S, S/S London 6701, 20 June 51). COMMENT: There is indeed little hope that a "more realistic attitude" will be adopted by Iran towards the AIOC. On 21 June, Prime Minister Mossadeq won a confidence vote from both the Majlis (Lower House) and the Senate which eliminates any possibility that he might waiver at this late date. It appears now to be only a matter of time before the recent course of events in Iran will be reflected in a progressive decrease in oil production in that country.

"B" PHILIPPINES. Romulo Adamant on Reparations. Foreign Secretary Romulo has informed US Minister Harrington in Manila, that the Philippines cannot and will not recede from the position that Japan must pay reparations. He added that failure to establish Japanese liability would be regarded in the Philippines as evidence of the Government's lack of an independent foreign policy. (S, S/S Manila 4133, 21 June 51). COMMENT: Any recession from the position universally held in the Philippines, that Japan both should and can pay reparations will open the Government to very severe political attack. Romulo has, himself, been considering entering the senatorial race next fall and is undoubtedly especially sensitive to the domestic political aspects of the reparations problem.

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"C" JAPAN. US to Delay Announcement on Chinese Participation Problem. Ambassador Dulles has advised British Foreign Secretary Morrison that the US is disposed not to issue a formal public statement at this time on the arrangement for Chinese accession and the disposition of Taiwan as now envisaged in the Japanese peace treaty. The Department of State believes that it would be more useful quietly to consolidate support for that position before issuing a statement which under present circumstances would surely attract counter statements and perhaps political controversy in both the US and the UK. (S, S/S State 6007, 20 June 51). COMMENT: The Nationalist Government on Taiwan is already taking violent exception to the proposed clause which would permit Japan to choose with which China it prefers to deal subsequent to the multilateral treaty. (See OCI S/S Supplement 21 June 51). The Japanese press likewise is expressing some concern over the reported arrangement, pointing out that the Communist regime is not likely to accept a settlement of the type now contemplated, while a decision in favor of the Nationalist regime would rule out any possibility of future trade with the mainland.

SECTION 3 (WESTERN)

"B" DENMARK. US Position on Communist China Recognition in UN Receiving Support. A Foreign Office official has informed the US Embassy that the Danish delegation to UNESCO has been instructed to vote for postponing the question of Chinese representation on grounds that such a decision should be made by the General Assembly itself according to its resolution of 14 December 1951. The official said that a similar attitude would be adopted in all other cases of Chinese representation in UN organs or specialized agencies, but that Denmark would not qualify its recognition of the Peiping government nor allow the decision on UNESCO to "prejudice" Denmark's vote in the GA on the issue. He revealed informally, however, that the previous Danish attitude of supporting Chinese Communist representation in the UN as a consequence of Danish recognition of Communist China was actually in the process of modification. The Embassy attributes the changed Danish attitude to Britain's recently adopting a similar position in the Trusteeship Council, and comments that it reveals Danish diplomatic dependence upon the UK. (C, S/S Copenhagen, 1092, 18 June 51). COMMENT: Denmark, together with Norway and Sweden, followed Britain's example in recognizing the Peiping regime in early 1950. Disillusioned with the meager results of such a conciliatory attitude, the Danish Government now is willing to cooperate in preventing the Chinese Communist regime from gaining any standing in the UN so long as its present aggressive policies continue. As suggested by the Embassy, Danish policy on this question will probably continue to be closely patterned on that of the UK.

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