

MEMORANDUM/SUBJECT: Sino-Soviet Bloc Aid and the Belgrade Conference/CIA/RR EP 61-72/26 September 61/SECRET NOFORN

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
26 September 1961

CIA/RR EP 61-72

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33

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Sino-Soviet Bloc Aid and the Belgrade Conference

The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of Bloc aid, if any, on the positions adopted at Belgrade by each of the participating countries. An attempt is made to determine if there is any correlation between the stands taken at the conference and the nature and magnitude of the aid being provided by the Bloc. A general discussion of Bloc aid to the conference countries, as well as a survey of the main issues and alignments at Belgrade, precedes the country-by-country analyses.

Conclusions

The Belgrade conference of nonaligned countries, which took place from 1 to 6 September, brought together heads of state and other representatives from some 28 countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, including most of the underdeveloped countries which have received Bloc economic aid and all of those which have received Bloc military assistance. With few, but significant, exceptions, there is little or no indication in the activities at Belgrade that Bloc aid had more than an indirect influence on the positions taken at the conference. Political considerations peculiar to the individual countries appear to have been the determining factor behind the positions and alignments among the conferees. If the Bloc aid program in its entirety had any significant impact on these positions it probably was in reinforcing the particular form of "neutrality" pursued by the individual countries--the paths usually having been chosen prior to receiving Bloc aid. In most cases the impact of aid--whether from the Bloc or the West--is imperceptible and sometimes a country's position was the reverse of what might be expected if only aid is considered. The clear-cut Communist line of Cuba, where the Bloc's

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economic and military support is essential to the maintenance of the regime, can obviously be linked to the impact of Bloc aid. Negotiations for the supply of advanced Bloc military equipment, such as those being conducted by Iraq and which have been completed by Indonesia, may have had an impact on the extreme positions adopted by these countries. However, the UAR, with similar negotiations under way, showed no inclinations toward accepting a pro-Soviet position on East-West issues, and its anti-colonial stance is not the result of Bloc aid.

For its part, the Soviet Union probably considers whatever support for the Communist cause it has aroused through its aid programs as a desirable but not essential by-product of the Bloc's efforts in the aid field. While Moscow considers the aid program a vital feature in the advancement of Communism, it has not demanded specific political guid pro quo's in its policy of expanding economic relations with even the most Western-oriented neutrals. For the time being the cultivation of such neutralism serves Soviet purposes. At times the USSR has even restrained the enthusiasm for Communist programs in certain countries in order to calm the fears of potential aid and trade customers in neighboring areas.

Thus, while it cannot be categorically stated that Bloc economic and military aid has promoted either a pro-Communist or anti-Western atmosphere in the nonaligned nations, it is apparent that such assistance has tended to foster the strong sense of "neutralism" already present in these countries. We feel, therefore, that Bloc aid is a reflection of Moscow's willingness to ride along with and to strengthen this wave of neutralism rather than being the immediate cause of an anti-Western or pro-Soviet attitude on the part of these countries.

General Discussion

Twenty of the 28 participating countries at Belgrade have received pledges totaling more than \$4 billion in Bloc economic credits and grants, or more than 96 percent of all Bloc economic aid extended to the underdeveloped countries since the program began in 1955. Eleven of the countries have received all of the more than \$2 billion in military aid extended by the Bloc. During the same period (since 1955), the US has extended more than \$5 billion in economic and military aid to the Belgrade countries, and since 1945 US aid to these countries totals more than \$9 billion for economic and \$1 billion for the military.

- 2 -

N-O-F-O-R-N

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With few exceptions, there is little direct correlation between positions taken at the Belgrade conference by the participating countries and the degree to which they have become involved in Bloc economic or military assistance programs. Political considerations appear to have been the controlling factor behind these positions; these considerations include concepts--however ill-defined or misguided--of national interest, personal and national prestige, and other problems or principles peculiar to individual nations. Each leader interpreted issues and adopted positions in the light of these considerations and tailored his own variation of nonalignment to suit these concepts.

If aid--either Western or Communist--had any impact on the views expressed and the positions taken, it was in reinforcing the peculiar forms of political "middle-ism," which generally have been chosen by the nonaligned countries prior to receipt of Bloc aid. The more moderate of them--such as India and Burma--are accustomed to taking positions which they feel support neither side in the cold war, hence should offend neither or both equally. The more rabid among them--usually those recently freed from some form of European domination, such as Guinea and Ghana--are accustomed to taking anti-Western positions and to greeting each East-West issue with an almost automatic bias, or at least suspicion, against the Western position. This they would do regardless of aid programs; even the more moderate Afro-Asians have only recently overcome their traditional bias against the West.

In some cases, particularly among the "giants" of the conference, the impact of aid was negligible or even contradictory. Yugoslavia, with little bitter experience from Bloc aid and a prime recipient of US aid, adopted an extremely anti-Western, generally pro-Soviet position. On the other hand, Nehru and Nasir, the former backed by both Western and Bloc aid and the latter heavily dependent in both the economic and military spheres on continued large-scale Bloc aid, adopted moderate stands, urging the US and USSR to resolve their differences, but not siding with either.

The West African states receiving significant amounts of aid from the Bloc tended to be more extreme on colonialism and more pro-Soviet on East-West issues, while older Asian neutrals like Nepal, Burma, and Ceylon, which have had mixed experiences with Bloc aid, leaned toward moderation. It is doubtful that Bloc aid was more than one of many factors in arriving at these positions. Indonesia's President Sukarno, usually billed as one of the foremost

- 3 -

N-O-F-O-R-N

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spokesmen for the nonaligneds, drifted far to the left at Belgrade--a course which was probably reinforced, if not prompted, by the extensive Bloc aid he has received, particularly the commitments for modern weapons which are desired for the campaign to "recover" West New Guinea from the Dutch.

With regard to the conference itself, there were two schools of thought on where its attention should be focused. Those countries like India, Burma, Afghanistan, Nepal, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Lebanon, and Sudan sought to draw the full strength of the conference to urging the great powers to solve their problems without recourse to war and to impressing them that the nonaligned countries have a vital interest in the preservation of peace. Others, like Indonesia, Iraq, Ghana, Guinea, Cuba, and to a lesser extent the UAR, Morocco, Mali and the Algerians, sought to focus the attention of the conference on the traditional Afro-Asian grievances summed up in the usual Leninist phraseology of anti-imperialism and colonialism. Nehru's pre-emption of moderate leadership appears to have led Tito to attempt to take over leadership of the extremists by acting as their spokesman.

Some countries among the extreme group worked to have their pet anti-colonial arguments included in the conference documents. The final documents reflect a compromise in which the general appeal for peace, addressed to Moscow and Washington, was offset by a longer document carrying most of the anti-imperialist line, but which acknowledged that classic colonialism is a dying issue. It took note of only a few specific anti-colonial issues, such as the Algerian and Angolan wars, and the question of foreign bases in Tunisia and Cuba.

At the same time as this battle raged, another was under way between those who felt the conference documents should take strong substantive stands on major East-West issues--stands which usually reflected pro-Soviet or at least anti-Western views--and those who believed the conference would lose its moral force and flavor if it expressed judgements on substantive issues such as the German question.

The final conference documents also reflected this split, with a victory indicated for those led by Nehru who sought flexibility and not firm positions on East-West questions. All nuclear testing was opposed--the Soviet unilateral resumption of tests was not cited--and the great powers were urged to resume the moratorium and disarmament negotiations. Attention was called to the German problem, but only in the context of an appeal to avoid the use of force, and in a general statement endorsing "unity", self-determination,

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and independence for all nations. Nearly all members agreed on the need for reorganization of the UN, but few could accept--and some specifically condemned--the Soviet "troika" concept for the Secretary General's office. Those who pressed for flexibility at the conference were India, Burma, the UAR, Saudi Arabia, the Algerian Provisional Government, Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Cyprus, Lebanon, Sudan, Cambodia, Ceylon, Nepal, and Afghanistan. Those pressing for substantive--and usually pro-Soviet stands--were Iraq, Cuba, Indonesia, Ghana, Guinea and Yugoslavia.

In judging the performance of the individual countries it should be noted that the conference had two public images: that conveyed by the unfettered, flamboyant speeches of the participants as they basked in the limelight of world attention, and that conveyed by the formal conference documents, which reflected the results of hard bargaining and the requirement for unanimity. The speeches were much more specific than the documents and many were anti-Western in a sense transcending even the usual anti-colonialist theme. In discussing the positions of the individual countries, comment is first devoted to the public image and then to the country's tactics in the bargaining behind the scenes

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The following statements on each participant at the Belgrade conference include summaries of aid received from the Bloc and from the United States. The figures are somewhat noncomparable for the following reasons:

- Bloc aid is compared only with US aid. In several cases, particularly for those countries formerly subject to the United Kingdom, considerable additional Western aid has been granted.

- US aid includes grants, loans, and credits; Bloc aid consists almost exclusively of credits.

- US aid for the most part has been delivered or is in the process of being delivered; the US figures, consequently, contain relatively little in the way of future obligations. The Bloc figures, on the other hand in several important cases represent largely obligations for future assistance and in most cases future obligations are a significant portion of the total.

- Bloc figures represent the total of economic development resources available to the recipient country from the Bloc. In several cases, non-governmental assistance from the US and other Western sources of private capital is (or has been) of major significance to the recipient country.

- 5 -

Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002300150001-9

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AFGHANISTAN

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>Bloc since 1954</u>	<u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	217	180
Military	110	3
TOTAL	<u>327</u>	<u>183</u>

Afghanistan has accepted aid from both East and West, but the Bloc's more than \$300 million in economic and military aid is acknowledged to be of decisive importance to Kabul's development and defense, and has won a firm foothold for the Communist Bloc in the country. Moreover, the Afghans are currently in process of seeking more aid for their Second Five-Year Plan and probably are to receive additional military aid, including MIG-19 aircraft. Bloc aid, along with Soviet propaganda support for Afghanistan in the Pushtunistan dispute with Pakistan, could be used to argue for Afghanistan's pressing an extremist position favorable to the USSR. Prime Minister Daud, however, fell in with the moderates of the conference. He hit colonialism, advocated Peiping's admission to the UN, pressed for UN reorganization and extended recognition to the Algerian Provisional Government. On Germany, he deplored the division of the country and the use of "policies of force" but avoided strong stands on East-West issues. Privately, he generally sided with Nehru, agreeing to forego mention of Pushtunistan in the conference documents or specific formulas for Germany. The Afghans did, however, support Cuban insistence on a reference to the Guantanamo naval base. Bloc aid had no demonstrable effects on Afghanistan's position at Belgrade.

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ALGERIA

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>Bloc since 1954</u>	<u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	--	--
Military	12+	--
TOTAL	<u>12+</u>	

Although strongly supported by Soviet propaganda and with limited amounts of Bloc military and financial assistance, the Algerians have no particular cause for championing a pro-Soviet line on East-West matters. Prime Minister Ben Khedda concentrated on his own struggle for Algerian independence, reaping support for his fight from all, including specific reference to the issue in the conference documents. He laid strong emphasis on colonialism, banning of nuclear tests, and condemned military pacts. Privately, not much is known, although the extent of support for Algeria in the documents suggests strong politicking on the colonialism issue. The limited assistance received from the Bloc does not appear to have significantly affected the Algerian position.

BURMA

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>Bloc since 1954</u>	<u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	96	95
Military	--	--
TOTAL	<u>96</u>	<u>95</u>

Burma has received little Soviet aid so far, but this year accepted an \$84 million credit from Communist China which boosted it into one of the more important recipients of Bloc aid; Rangoon has also been flirting with Bloc overtures for military assistance. So far, though, Bloc aid has played a relatively minor role in the country and probably exerts little or no influence on the government's international posture. U Nu delivered the most statesmanlike address of the whole Belgrade conference, out-doing even Nehru on the importance of the peace issue and criticizing anticolonialism based on revenge and racialism. Behind the scenes, U Nu appears to have been Nehru's strongest aid in pressing for flexibility and moderation. Bloc aid had no apparent effect on the Burmese stand.

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CAMBODIA

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>Bloc since 1954</u>	<u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	56	
Military	--	220
TOTAL	<u>56</u>	<u>78</u>
		<u>298</u>

An important recipient of US aid, Cambodia also accepts economic assistance from the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The magnitude of Bloc aid at this stage should preclude it from being more than a minor factor in influencing Cambodian foreign policy; in fact its function at times has been to pressure the US into new aid commitments. Sihanouk stressed the colonial issue, but also hit hard on the division of Germany, Vietnam, Korea, and Laos. He criticized the two "blocs" for their roles in Laos and pressed for plebiscites in divided countries. He also argued for disarmament under the supervision of neutral governments. Privately, he appears to have been in the Nehru camp, favoring flexibility in positions on East-West issues.

CEYLON

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>Bloc since 1954</u>	<u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	58	
Military	--	75
TOTAL	<u>58</u>	<u>--</u>
		<u>75</u>

Ceylon has accepted aid from both East and West but at no time has been so deeply involved with the Bloc economically as to jeopardize its neutral position. Bloc aid and trade are important to Ceylon, but certainly not decisive. Mrs. Bandaranaike called for an end to the war threat in her speech at Belgrade, suggesting the demilitarization of Germany and the need for negotiations between the major powers. She specifically criticized the Soviet decision to resume nuclear testing and Moscow's "troika" proposals for the UN. She called for increased aid to the underdeveloped world--from both East and West--and for Chinese Communist admission to the UN. Privately she appears to have carried little weight, but was definitely in the moderate camp. Bloc aid probably had little or no influence on this position.

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SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002300150001-9

N-O-F-O-R-N

CONGO

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>Bloc since 1954</u>	<u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	some	78
Military	--	--
TOTAL		<u>78</u>

Late arrivals at the conference, Congo leaders Adoula and Gizenga created mixed impressions, as would be expected from their well-known positions prior to the gathering in Belgrade. Adoula's well-balanced, moderate speech and his support for the UN earned kudos from the moderate camp, while Gizenga's pre-occupation with Lumumba's ghost brought forth some short-lived emotion. Although Gizenga has received some financial assistance from the Bloc, as well as massive propaganda support, he focused on Congolese problems and avoided pronouncements on other issues. Both Congo leaders arrived too late for most of the backstage activity, but Adoula earned special praise from Nehru for his balanced performance, while presumably Gizenga lined up with the extremists.

N-O-F-O-R-N

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SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002300150001-9

N-O-F-O-R-N

CUBA

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>Bloc since 1954</u>	<u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	357	41
Military	100+	11
TOTAL	<u>457+</u>	<u>52</u>

Dependent on the Sino-Soviet Bloc for both its present and future development plans, for the economic well-being of the country as measured in terms of sugar sales, and for large-scale military assistance necessary for its survival, the Castro regime has ample reasons for adopting a strong pro-Soviet position. Since early 1960, as the magnitude of the Bloc aid effort has grown, so has grown Cuba's sycophantic echoing of the Bloc propaganda line on every world issue. Dorticos gave a straight Communist-line speech on all major issues, urging special treatment, not of general principles, but of specific issues such as colonialism, "troika", disarmament, testing, foreign bases. Privately, the Cubans pressed the same anti-Western, anti-US sentiments, and maintained a staunchly pro-Soviet posture throughout the conference. Dorticos appears to have alienated most of the other conferees, but gained mention of Guantanamo in the final documents, apparently on the grounds that a Latin American issue rated some specific mention. While it is not possible to demonstrate that Cuba's position is the direct result of Bloc aid, it can be argued that without such aid the Castro regime would not be able to assume the stance taken at Belgrade by Dorticos.

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SECRET

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N-O-F-O-R-N

CYPRUS

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>Bloc since 1954</u>	<u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	--	
Military	--	10
TOTAL		<u>--</u> 10

Cyprus was one of the five participants at the conference that has not received Bloc aid--although offers have been made--and has no reason for feeling beholden to the USSR. Makarios publicly condemned colonialism, Soviet tests, and the erection of barriers in Berlin. He called for self-determination to be applied to Germany as elsewhere. Privately, Makarios appears to have been among those counseling moderation, although he probably carried little weight.

ETHIOPIA

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>Bloc since 1954</u>	<u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	114	
Military	--	124
TOTAL	<u>114</u>	<u>57</u> 181

Ethiopia has accepted about \$114 million in Bloc economic aid but relatively little has been accomplished under the agreements and the degree of Bloc influence is rather slight. Haile Selassie expressed strong support for the UN and for nonalignment, for a unified Germany, and for free access to Berlin. He said classic colonialism is a dead issue in Asia and Africa, but touched on such issues as West Irian and Bizerte. Privately, he appears to have thrown his weight with the Nehru group in favor of flexibility in East-West negotiations, and of the conference focusing on peace issues.

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SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002300150001-9

N-O-F-O-R-N

GHANA

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>Bloc since 1954</u>	<u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	108	7
Military	some	--
TOTAL	<u>108+</u>	<u>7</u>

If there is a direct correlation between foreign aid and the positions taken by a country in international affairs, it would seem prudent for Ghana to have followed a moderate course at the conference, as it has negotiations under way for additional aid from both Bloc and Western sources. Ghana has been a primary target of the Bloc's economic offensive in Africa. While currently cultivating its existing ties with Accra, Moscow stands ready to extend further aid if requested. Although no military aid agreements are known to have been concluded as yet, recent developments strongly suggest the Bloc may soon be active in that field also. It is doubtful, however, that this aid has been decisive in determining Ghana's position in world affairs, although it probably has had some influence. Nkrumah at Belgrade gave a strongly anti-colonial speech, and on East-West issues generally favored the Soviet line, especially on Berlin. He stressed the need for a demilitarized Germany, for general disarmament, and for a summit meeting between the US and USSR. He supported a "troika" system for officials immediately under the UN Secretary General. Privately, he pushed for substantive--and pro-Soviet--stands on Germany, and for heavy emphasis on the colonialism issue, but split with Nasir on criticism of Israel. Bloc aid seems to be only one of many factors in Nkrumah's anti-Western position.

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SECRET

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Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002300150001-9

N-O-F-O-R-N

GUINEA

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>Bloc since 1954</u>	<u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	113	4
Military	some	--
TOTAL	<u>113+</u>	<u>4</u>

Guinea, strongly bound up with the Bloc through economic and military aid programs, was cast with Ghana, Indonesia, Yugoslavia, and a few others as one of the extremist, generally pro-Soviet participants at Belgrade. Foreign Minister Bevogui spoke most vigorously on colonialism, and on other questions fell in with the Nkrumah line, both publicly and privately. Guinea's support for the Soviet Bloc has been evident for sometime and may well be derived in part from its growing dependence on Bloc aid and trade. It would be difficult to argue, however, that the aid program is the reason for Guinea's present stance in East-West relations.

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N-O-F-O-R-N

INDIA

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>Bloc since 1954</u>	<u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	1,000	
Military	--	3,072
TOTAL	<u>1,000</u>	<u>3,072</u>

Although India is the third largest recipient of Bloc aid, and the largest recipient of economic aid--nearly \$1 billion is committed--it has received even larger amounts from the West, primarily the US. While continuing to seek and accept Bloc aid offers, Nehru's performance at Belgrade underscores his policy of nonalignment. A reluctant participant almost to the end, Nehru addressed his remarks to the peace issue, stressing the need for the nonaligned states to urge the great powers to negotiate their differences, but without committing the conference to specific stands on the German question. He said the present crisis in East-West relations overshadows the issue of colonialism and therefore sought to temper the violently anticolonial line favored by many others. He expressed regret at the Soviet decision to resume nuclear testing. On Germany, he asked for recognition of the "fact" of two German states, but stressed the need for free access to Berlin. Privately, he led the moderates and was the principal architect of the conference documents. Foreign aid appears to have, at most, only an indirect effect on Nehru's attitude; his desire to have both East and West continue to support India may contribute to his unwillingness to be sharply critical of either.

- 14 -

N-O-F-O-R-N

Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002300150001-9

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002300150001-9

N-O-F-O-R-N

INDONESIA

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>Bloc since 1954</u>	<u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	600+	583
Military	830	?
TOTAL	<u>1,430</u>	<u>583+</u>

The second largest recipient of Bloc economic and military aid, Indonesia in all probability has been influenced by this support in adopting more favorable positions to the USSR, not only at Belgrade, but at other times as well. With more than \$600 million in economic aid extended by the Bloc, for use in key areas of the country's Eight-Year development plan, and with the three military services in process of receiving some \$600 million in military equipment and training from the Bloc, the Indonesians are in a poor position to incur the wrath of Moscow. They may feel a need to balance Soviet largess with pro-Soviet gestures, but often these appear to be little more than manifestations of President Sukarno's peculiar brand of neutralism. Moscow has shown an unusual willingness to meet Indonesian requests for military equipment on favorable terms--including guided missiles and military aircraft, such as MIG-19s, MIG-21s and TU-16 bombers, all of which are still of prime importance in the Soviet arsenal. The Indonesians are also grateful for the Bloc's all-out support for their claims to Dutch New Guinea. A conference sponsor at Belgrade, Sukarno naively declared in his major speech that the most important source of world tensions is not the ideological clash between two great power groups, but rather the continuation of colonialism; thereafter he hammered away on a similar theme. On Germany, he urged a solution on the basis of "realities," and said that if a "temporary" division of Germany is necessary, then so be it. On the UN, he stressed the need for reorganization to take account of the increasing influence of the neutrals. He omitted all reference to the Soviet test resumption, and merely voiced support for general disarmament. Privately, he appears to have been with the violent anticolonialists, especially the Africans, but was persuaded to omit mention of West New Guinea from the documents. While the cause-and-effect relationship is more subtle than elaborated here, Bloc aid and the Communist support of Indonesian national goals probably have had significant effects on Indonesia's position between East and West.

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IRAQ

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>Bloc since 1954</u>	<u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	216	21
Military	240+	46
TOTAL	<u>456+</u>	<u>67</u>

Iraq has received more than \$450 million in Bloc economic and military aid since the revolution in the summer of 1958 brought Qasim to power. Prior to the revolt, Iraq received aid exclusively from the West, but the Bloc has taken over almost completely and is carrying out a wide range of projects in all key sectors of the economy. Moreover, the Iraqis are currently engaged in seeking additional military aid from the Bloc, probably including guided missiles, more aircraft, and probably more land armaments. These delicate negotiations may have exerted some influence on Iraq's position at the conference, although Baghdad's leftist approach was manifest long before Belgrade. Iraqi Foreign Minister Jawad, however, appears to have outdone himself, turning in what Ambassador Kennan termed an "amazing performance." Both publicly and privately he followed the Communist line, played heavily on anti-colonialism, and repeatedly denounced Western positions while apologizing for those of the Communist Bloc. He called for the recognition of two Germanies and for general and complete disarmament, without mentioning the Soviet resumption of testing. He denounced Western economic assistance as a cover for "neo-colonialism," and generally favored a strong acceptance of Soviet positions on East-West issues. Although not one of the leading lights, Iraq strongly supported the extremist group, both publicly and privately. Bloc aid has probably exerted a significant influence on Iraqi policies.

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LEBANON

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>Bloc since 1954</u>	<u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	--	81
Military	--	9
TOTAL		<u>90</u>

Lebanon has received no aid from the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Prime Minister Salam took a moderate position at Belgrade, stressing the survival of the remnants of colonialism and citing Israel as a "center of imperialist infection" spreading throughout Asia and Africa. He called for UN reorganization to take account of the new members. On East-West issues, he expressed dismay at the Soviet test announcement on the eve of the conference. Salam appears to have been in the Nehru camp behind the scenes, with some regard for Nasir's views as well.

- 17 -

N-O-F-O-R-N

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MALI

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>Bloc since 1954</u>	<u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	57	3
Military	--	--
TOTAL	<u>57</u>	<u>3</u>

Mali has accepted substantial Bloc aid this year and at the time of the conference was engaged in working out an aid agreement with Communist China. Bloc military equipment has begun to appear in significant quantities and it is likely that the Communist foothold in West Africa will include a substantial program for Mali, even though the country welcomes Western assistance as well. At Belgrade, however, President Keita played a more moderate role than his two African neighbors--Ghana and Guinea. He urged unification and neutralization for all divided countries, including Germany, but said the conference should not side with either East or West. He urged reorganization of the UN and a seat for Peiping. Privately, he appears to have carried little weight, although there are indications his relative mildness in public spilled over in his work behind the scenes. Bloc aid may have had some influence on Mali's position, but less than might have been expected. Keita's position at Belgrade, however, contrasts sharply with the Mali delegation's more extremist performance at the preparatory sessions in Cairo.

- 18 -

N-O-F-O-R-N

Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002300150001-9

SECRET

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Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002300150001-9

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MOROCCO

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>Bloc since 1954</u>	<u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	--	308
Military	<u>5</u>	--
TOTAL	5	<u>308</u>

A recipient of some Soviet military aid, Morocco's position at the conference reflected no significant pro-Soviet leanings. King Hassan hit hard at colonialism, especially on Mauritania, but was more moderate on East-West issues. He vigorously condemned French nuclear tests in the Sahara, and noted that the Soviet test announcement "unfortunately" occurred just at the time when first steps toward disarmament were expected. On Germany, he spoke of the need for the nonaligned nations to mediate between the two great powers. Privately, Hassan's activity is subject to conflicting reporting, but he appears to have vacillated between supporting the extremists on colonialism and the moderates on East-West issues. No perceptible influence of Bloc aid is indicated by the Moroccan stand at Belgrade.

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NEPAL

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>Bloc since 1954</u>	<u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	41	44
Military	--	--
TOTAL	<u>41</u>	<u>44</u>

A recipient of roughly equal amounts of aid from the US and the Bloc--chiefly Communist China--Nepal's King Mahendra both privately and publicly supported flexibility in stands on East-West relations and moderation on other issues. He decried attempts to change the status quo except through negotiation, and urged the conference to work for a relaxation of tensions rather than substantive stands on cold war issues. While deploring the remnants of colonialism, he pointed out the British example of accommodating to new situations and regretted France's inability to learn from the British. On the UN, Mahendra denounced the Soviet "troika" principle, but suggested strengthening the body by fairer representation and by the admission of Communist China. The influence of Bloc aid on Nepal's stand apparently was negligible.

SAUDI ARABIA

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>Bloc since 1954</u>	<u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	--	47
Military	--	some
TOTAL		<u>47+</u>

Saudi Arabia has accepted no economic or military assistance from the Bloc. Foreign Minister Suwajil denounced colonialism in general terms, except for strong attacks on the French and Israelis, and on East-West issues urged the conference to contribute something helpful to easing tensions, warning against a bias toward either bloc. Privately he voted with the moderates, except on the reference to Israel.

- 20 -

N-O-F-O-R-N

Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002300150001-9

SECRET

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Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002300150001-9

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SOMALI REPUBLIC

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>Bloc since 1954</u>	<u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	58	13
Military	--	--
TOTAL	<u>58</u>	<u>13</u>

The Bloc has made considerable progress in developing its economic relations with the Somali Republic, having extended nearly \$60,000,000 in long-term credits this year; additional aid probably will be forthcoming. President Aden, however, generally sided with the conference moderates and rejected taking substantive stands for one side or the other. He spoke in general terms on the German question, urging a peaceful settlement. He supported a strong UN executive, praised the UN operations in the Congo, and asked those who wish to alter the present structure of the UN organization to reconsider. He attacked Portuguese and French colonialism and declared the principle of self-determination should be applied to all colonial territories, as well as to Germany. Privately, he appears to have been with the moderates on most issues and showed no inclinations toward favoring Soviet positions in East-West issues. Bloc aid probably played no appreciable role in deciding the Somali Republic's positions at Belgrade.

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SUDAN

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>Bloc since 1954</u>	<u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	22	54
Military	--	--
TOTAL	<u>22</u>	<u>54</u>

Sudan, which recently accepted a \$22 million Soviet credit, avoided positions either pro-Soviet or violently anti-Western and generally held to the views of the Nehru moderates. Abboud's speech was temperate and reasonable, stressed the need for UN reorganization, for a test ban, and for Peiping's admission to the UN; he omitted all reference to Berlin or the German question. Privately, Abboud appears to have worked well with the moderates on both the "flexibility" and peace issues. Sudan's position probably was not affected by foreign aid.

TUNISIA

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>Bloc since 1954</u>	<u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	35	255
Military	--	--
TOTAL	<u>35</u>	<u>255</u>

Tunisia only recently entered into its first important aid agreement with the Bloc--a \$27 million offer from the USSR in August--but has received well over a quarter of a billion dollars in US economic aid. As expected, Bourguiba hit French colonial policies hardest, and omitted mention of Germany or Berlin. Privately, Bourguiba appears to have been with the conference moderates on most questions, but was said to be out of his element among the nonaligneds. He successfully pressed for mention of Bizerte in the conference documents. While Bourguiba publicly stated his willingness to accept Bloc aid during the Bizerte crisis, he is not involved in any significant economic or military commitments with the Bloc and showed no sign of favoring pro-Soviet positions. The limited aid extended to the Bloc does not appear to have affected the Tunisian position.

- 22 -

N-O-F-O-R-N

Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002300150001-9

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002300150001-9

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UAR

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>Bloc since 1954</u>	<u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	800	
Military	700+	439
TOTAL	1,500+	<u>439</u>

A sponsor of the gathering and one of its "big five" personalities, Nasir generally focused on the anti-colonial issue; he was anti-French, anti-Portuguese, of course anti-Israeli, and to a degree anti-American. He deplored blocs in general, as well as the artificial division of Germany, and he specifically condemned the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing. Behind the scenes, Nasir supported Nehru on the need for the conference to avoid substantive stands on East-West issues. He worked for a strong anti-colonial statement, while giving way to only a mild reference to Palestine. While the UAR is the largest single recipient of Bloc aid--more than \$1.5 billion--and is currently in process of acquiring such advanced military items as guided missiles and high-performance aircraft from the USSR under new military aid pacts, its positions at Belgrade, while strongly anti-Western on colonial issues, were not pro-Soviet in the manner of several other participants. While Bloc aid may cause Cairo to be circumspect on East-West issues, particularly the Berlin problem, Nasir has consistently disavowed those who argue he must temper his anti-Communism because of the economic and military support he receives from the Bloc. His stature among the neutrals appears to have been enhanced by his conduct at the conference. Nasir, along with Nehru, is a prime example of a nonaligned leader who continues to receive extensive aid from the Bloc, but who continues to steer his own course between East and West. His support of the Bloc was significantly less than his dependence on Bloc military supplies, including modern weapons systems. His position appears, at most, to be but indirectly affected by Bloc aid.

- 23 -

N-O-F-O-R-N

Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002300150001-9

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Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002300150001-9

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YEMEN

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	Bloc since 1954	US since 1945
Economic	44+	
Military	30	17
TOTAL	<u>74+</u>	<u>--</u> <u>17</u>

Yemen is almost totally dependent on the Bloc for economic and military assistance and has tightly bound up its modest development efforts with Soviet and Chinese aid programs. A lightweight at the conference, Yemeni ambassador to the UN Prince Hassan, spoke primarily on colonialism, hitting hard at both the French and British. He called for reorganization of the UN and for an end to the arms race, but avoided involvement in East-West issues. Privately, he appears to have followed Nasir's lead. Yemeni support for the Soviet position was less complete than is Yemeni dependence on Bloc economic support, which did not have a demonstrable effect on the Yemeni attitude at Belgrade.

- 24 -

N-O-F-O-R-N

Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01049A002300150001-9

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YUGOSLAVIA

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>Bloc since 1954</u>	<u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	111	1587
Military	--	694
TOTAL	<u>111</u>	<u>2281</u>

A recipient of more than \$2 billion in US economic and military aid, Yugoslavia has received only \$111 million from the Soviet Bloc and has had some \$350 million in aid extended by the Bloc only to be cancelled or allowed to expire. Despite the disparity in aid from East and West, and its disillusioning experiences with the Bloc, Yugoslavia sided with, and in fact led, the conference extremists in favoring generally pro-Soviet positions on the key issues of East-West relations. As conference host, Tito spoke twice, once in statesmanlike tones on the peace issue, and a second time in an anti-colonial, anti-Western, and pro-Soviet mood. His views on most questions were well known before the conference, but the intensity with which he pressed them surprised many. Privately, he appears to have sought leadership of the conference extremists as a counter to Nehru, pressing for a pro-Soviet line on nuclear testing and the German issue, but in the end being forced to give in to the moderates. Yugoslavia is perhaps the best illustration of large-scale economic and military aid playing no discernible role in influencing positions adopted at Belgrade.

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BRAZIL/ECUADOR/BOLIVIA

Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:

	<u>BRAZIL</u> <u>US since 1945</u>	<u>ECUADOR</u> <u>US since 1945</u>	<u>BOLIVIA</u> <u>US since 1945</u>
Economic	1,519	73	220
Military	180	24	2
TOTAL	<u>1,699</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>222</u>

Although all three of these countries have received Bloc aid overtures, particularly during the past year, none have yet accepted any long-term Bloc economic aid. Restricted by their observer status, and in the case of Brazil undercut by the recent departure of Quadros, these countries appear to have worked behind the scenes on the side of moderation, but their impact was negligible by all indications. However, the Bloc's attempt to curry favor in Latin America appears to have strengthened their sentiments for joining the nonaligned nations.

- 26 -

N-O-F-O-R-N

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NONALIGNED NATIONS' SUMMIT MEETING

(BELGRADE 1-6 SEPTEMBER 1961)

Original 20 Countries:

*Afghanistan
*Burma
*Cambodia
*Ceylon
Cuba
*Ethiopia
*Ghana
Guinea
*India
*Indonesia
*Iraq
Mali
Morocco
*Nepal
*Saudi Arabia
Somali Republic
*Sudan
*UAR
Yemen
Yugoslavia

Participants:

Prime Minister Daud
Prime Minister U Nu
Chief of State Sihanouk
Prime Minister Bandaranaike
Pres. Dorticos
Emperor Haile Selassie
Pres. Nkrumah
Foreign Minister Beavogui
Prime Minister Nehru
Pres. Sukarno
Foreign Minister Jawad
Pres. Keita
King Hassan II
King Mahendra
Foreign Minister Suwwayil
Pres. Aden
Pres. Abboud
Pres. Nasir
UN Ambassador Hassan
Pres. Tito

Additional Countries:

Bolivia
Brazil
Congo
Cyprus
Ecuador
*Lebanon
Provisional Algerian Govt.
Tunisia
Observer**
Observer**
Adoula and Gizenga
Pres. Makarios
Observer**
Prime Minister Salam
Prime Minister Ben Khedda
Pres. Bourguiba

* Attended Bandung Conference in 1955;
Ghana was then Gold Coast and the UAR
was then Egypt and Syria.

** Bolivian, Brazilian, and Ecuadorean
observer status is official, based on
invitation. Unofficial observers have
apparently arrived from several other
countries as well as foreign political
parties.

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- 27 -


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