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FINAL REPORT ON
MIGRATION FROM WEST TO EAST GERMANY

Reference is made to the reports of 25 May, 2 September, and 7 September 1954, 12 January, 17 January, 26 January, and 11 June 1955.

1. Estimated Magnitude and Characteristics.

It is estimated that from the beginning of 1951 to mid-1955 nearly 300,000 persons -- around 170,000 males and 130,000 females -- migrated from West Germany and West Berlin to East Germany and East Berlin.
*

No information is available which could be used to present a breakdown of this 1951-55 migration apart from sex. Such data,

* Based on Table I. As explained in note 5 to this table, it was assumed that 75 percent of the persons migrating from West Berlin with unknown destination went to East Germany, including East Berlin. This assumption may be too high by about 25 percent. If this is taken into consideration, only 286,859 persons -- 163,962 males and 122,897 females -- would have migrated from the West to East Germany and East Berlin. These figures and those in the above table, however, are somewhat too low because a substantial number of post-war refugees slipped back to East Germany clandestinely and, thus, are not included. Taking all these factors into consideration, the above estimates appear to be reasonable. The computations in subsequent tables include only the migrants with known destination.

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however, are available for the years 1952 and 1953. In these years, 47,400 persons migrated from West Germany and West Berlin to East Germany and East Berlin. The number of females (24,200) exceeded that of males (23,200) slightly. (Table 2) Nearly 44 percent of the migrants were economically inactive. Although only about 42 percent of the female migrants were members of the labor force, roughly 71 percent of the male migrants belonged to it. (Table 4) Table 6, however, indicates that the percentage of the total female outmigrants 14 years old or over who were economically active (52.6 percent) was, apparently, considerably higher than the percentage of all women 14 years old and over who were in the West German labor force. The percentage for the latter group was not higher than 40 percent. Similarly, about 90 percent of the total male outmigrants 14 years old and over were economically active, although the percentage of all men in this age group which was in the West German labor force was only roughly 83 percent.

The largest group among the migrating members of the labor force -- nearly 37 percent -- were industrial workers. About 28 percent of these industrial workers were metal workers, 19 percent construction workers, and 13 percent textile workers.

The next group, according to size, included persons engaged in commerce and transportation (18 percent of the migrating members of the labor force) and domestic, hygiene, and social workers (17 percent). Only around 11 percent were farmers and agricultural workers. Relatively

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few office and public employees (nearly 7 percent) and scientists or artists (not quite 6 percent) migrated to the East. The share of members of technical occupations, such as engineers and technicians, was less than 5 percent.

A relatively high percentage of the 47,400 persons migrating from West Germany and West Berlin to East Germany and East Berlin in 1952 and 1953, namely 18.5 percent, were younger than 14 years. (Table 5) About the same applied to the migrants from East Germany and East Berlin to West Germany and West Berlin. The medium-age was also about the same, and the occupational distribution was not very dissimilar, either. The percentage of juveniles among the migrants to the East, furthermore, was about the same as the percentage of juveniles in the West German population.

No data are available to break down the 47,000 migrants from West Germany and West Berlin to East Germany and East Berlin in 1952 and 1953 into expelled, returning refugees, and others. This can be done, however, with respect to a portion of them, namely, the 13,300 men and 12,700 women -- together 26,000 persons -- who during the same period migrated to Soviet Berlin and Soviet Germany from the Federal Republic proper (not including West Berlin). (Table 3)

Approximately 58 percent of these 26,000 migrants were members of the labor force. (Tables 7 and 8) Forty percent of these economically active migrants were industrial workers, 25 percent of whom

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were metal workers, 22 percent construction workers, and 12 percent textile workers. Nearly 19 percent of all migrants belonging to the labor force were domestic, hygiene, and social workers, 14 percent were farmers and agricultural workers, 13.5 percent were engaged in commerce and transportation, 6.5 percent were office workers or public servants, and 4 percent scientists or artists. Technicians, machinists, and related occupations accounted for only roughly 3 percent. These percentages do not differ much from the occupational distribution of all economically active migrants from West Germany and West Berlin to East Germany and East Berlin, which was discussed above.

About 20 percent of the 26,000 persons who migrated from the Federal Republic of Germany proper to East Germany and East Berlin were expellees*, nearly 50 percent were returning refugees**, and

* According to German definition, expellees (Vertriebene) are German nationals or ethnic Germans who, as a direct or indirect consequence of World War II, were expelled from formerly German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line or from territories outside the borders of the former Reich as they existed on 31 December 1937.

** Refugees (Zugewanderte), according to German definition, are those Germans who on 1 September 1939 had their residence in East Berlin, East Germany, or the Saar and subsequently moved to West Germany or West Berlin. No separate statistics exist which would be limited to post-war refugees or returning refugees. It may, however, be estimated that about 45 percent of the 12,600 refugees who, according to Table 7, returned, in 1952 and 1953, _____

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the remaining approximately 30 Percent were almost entirely indigenous West Germans. (Table 3) This may be regarded as a representative sample of the migration from both West Germany and West Berlin to East Germany and East Berlin.

Of the 12,600 refugees returning from the Federal Republic proper, 4,100, or roughly 32 percent, were 20 years old or younger. Approximately 15 percent were 14 years old or younger (Tables 16, 17).

Around 73 percent of the returning refugees 14 years and over were in the labor force (Table 6). The highest percentages were represented by age groups between 18 and 29 years. The same percentages, by and large, apply also to the indigenous West Germans migrating from the Federal Republic proper to East Germany and East Berlin.

II. Reasons for Migration

Appraisal of the reasons for migration from West to East Germany is even more difficult than ascertainment of the reasons for migration from East to West Germany. With respect to the latter, at least from the Federal Republic proper to the East, were returning post-war refugees. This rough estimate is based on CIA/RR 30, 15 March 1954, "The Effects of Migrations Into and Out of East Germany on the Labor Situations in East and West Germany." SECRET, US OFFICIALS ONLY.

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the migrants' own statements at their screening in the reception centers are available. The possible motives for West-East movements, however, are, more or less, a matter of conjecture.

Information obtained through the refugee screening process indicates that the mass movements from East to West Germany have been primarily because of economic or personal reasons and that opposition to the Soviet system as such or belief in West-European democracy have played a relatively minor role. * There can hardly be any doubt that movements from West to East Germany have been due preponderably to the same reasons. The statement of a disappointed refugee, about to return to East Germany, that "my home is where I can find work and make a good living, never mind politics" ** is probably symptomatic of the way of thinking of many West-East migrants. Such attitude can be easier understood if German experience of the last four decades is taken into account. During that period three seemingly strong systems -- an imperial, a democratic, and a totalitarian-nationalist -- collapsed with great economic and other losses

* See CIA/RR 30, 15 March 1954, "The Effects of Migrations Into and Out of East Germany on the Labor Situations in East and West Germany."

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for many citizens, especially those who trusted or even actively supported the one or the other of them. Now, Germany is half communist-totalitarian, half democratic-liberal. These rapid changes have seriously affected faith in political (and economic) stability and have produced a marked trend to play along with any regime in power for the sake of personal advancement, irrespective of political convictions. The "man in the street" feels, more than ever, that he could not influence the course of basic political developments, even if he tried.

The fact that almost 50 percent of all West-East migrants in 1952 and 1953 were not economically active may indicate the extent to which movements to Soviet Germany were motivated by non-economic considerations. Though a number of these migrants may have gone East hoping to improve their economic situation in one way or another, the bulk probably moved for other reasons.

Once the relatively minor role of ideological considerations in decisions to migrate or return to the East is recognized, it is not too difficult to see why people should have moved for personal reasons. The wish to marry a person on the other side of the line of demarcation, to return to one's former community, to rejoin friends or a family split up during the war, to enjoy again the use of one's property, or even mere nostalgia, apparently, have often been stronger

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than awareness of the potential political, social, and, perhaps, economic consequences of migration into the Soviet area. Changes in the prospects of German reunification have not necessarily deterred would-be migrants from going East. Hopes that reunification is imminent have induced people to move east in order to get the start of many others who, in their opinion, would migrate or return to the East after the re-establishment of a single all-German government. Loss of the hope that Germany would be reunited in the near future, likewise, has caused people to move because they saw no advantage in waiting longer for more favorable political conditions.

Most of the relatively numerous West-East migrants in 1952 and 1953 who were under 14 years of age, obviously, accompanied their families. The majority, however, of the roughly 28 percent of the migrants who were between 14 and 24 years probably left West Germany for other reasons. There is rather general agreement that they were chiefly returning refugees, many of whom came to West Germany unaccompanied by older family members, and some of whom had already completed their occupational training. In general, they could and did find suitable jobs rather easily. The large return movement among the juveniles, thus, was not due to economic difficulties. According to many West German social workers, including directors

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of the special federal camps and private institutions engaged in taking care of them, it rather resulted from the inadequacy of efforts to adjust them to the living conditions in a free country, to which they were not accustomed, as well as to unsuitable housing conditions after release from the camps. The Bonn Refugee Ministry cited as important causes: inadequate attention and supervision, and lack of contact with the native population in general and the native youth in particular.

Although it is not too difficult to point out personal motives of migrants to the East, it is not easy to surmise what economic factors may have caused people to leave the West for Soviet Germany. By any yardstick, economic conditions in both parts of the country improved substantially before and during the period under discussion. However, the rate and scope of over-all improvement, obviously, was greater in the West than in the East. Yet migration to the East, apparently, was not considered economically unwise in specific situations or by specific types of people.

Though living costs, at the end of the period under discussion, still tended to be generally higher in the East than in the West, the

* See "Die Zonenjugend kommt und geht," Sozialer Fortschritt, December 1955, p.269

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expenditures for goods and services of people with very small income, living near or at the subsistence level had become about the same in West and East Germany. In this respect, therefore such people had nothing to lose by migrating to the Soviet area. The fact that many essentials of life were (and still are) rationed in the East and sold at relatively low prices may have been an incentive to move. The situation was similar with respect to those specialists and highly skilled workers for whom jobs were waiting in East German industry with compensation high enough to take care of the West-East living cost differential or even to exceed it.

In view of great improvements in the employment situation in the West German industry as a whole, the large demand for many types of labor in the Soviet area can no longer have attracted as many West German people in 1952 and subsequent years as in the earlier post-war period. The number of unemployed per 100 vacancies in the Federal Republic proper decreased from 815 in 1952 to 672 in 1953, 494 in 1954, and 207 in 1955. In view of differences in the

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* See, for example, Report [REDACTED] 14 June 1955, "Information on Standard of Living in the GDR." CONFIDENTIAL

** "Die Andrangsziffer als Indikator der Arbeitsmarktlage in Westdeutschland," Vierteljahrshäfte zur Wirtschaftsforschung, Number 4, 1955, pp. 360 ff.

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development of the various industrial sectors, the tempo of the decrease, however, was not the same in all occupational groups. It was fastest in the occupational groups employed in the capital goods area (for example, electricians, and building construction, metalworkers, wood processors, and mine workers) and was more limited in other occupational groups such as agriculture, commerce, textile and leather, food products and stimulants (Nahrungs-und Genussmittel), and domestic workers. Job seekers, especially refugees, belonging to occupational groups with a less favorable employment situation may, therefore, under the influence of East German recruiters or on their own motion, have decided to try their luck in the East. In this connection, it must also be taken into account that scarcity of housing has prevented many unemployed refugees of any occupational type from moving to the chief industrial areas of West Germany where they might have found jobs.

If, according to all available sources -- West German, East German, and the attached tables of US origin -- about half of those leaving the West for the East have, in each recent year, been former East German refugees returning home, this appears to have been due largely to bad living conditions, inability to find, because of higher West German Standards, a position comparable to the one they had before or to impossibility to get any job. Under such circumstances, promises of jobs by East German recruiters together with

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other inducements such as small cash payments, defrayment of living expenses for an initial period, free transportation, interest-free loans, return of property, obviously, have frequently prompted persons dissatisfied with unpleasant aspects of a refugee's life to re-migrate to the East.

The smaller percentage of females among the total migrating members of the labor force may signify reluctance of women workers to submit to the unhealthy and untraditional working conditions of women in East Germany. This is, in particular, indicated by the relatively low number of females among the migrating industrial workers. In other occupational groups, in which the working conditions of women are better, as, for example, domestic and office workers, the number of female emigrants even exceed^{ed} that of men. Accordingly, it can be concluded that female, as male, workers have moved to the East largely in the expectation that this would improve their economic conditions.

A brief examination of the participation in the West-East movement of specific occupational groups mentioned before appears to bear out the above general statements. In September 1952, 1,035 West German metal production and processing workers were unemployed per 100 vacant jobs. The figure for September 1953 was still 1,001.*

* All data on unemployment in West Germany are quoted from "Die Andrangsziffer als Indikator der Arbeitsmarktlage in Westdeutschland," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung, Number 4, 1955, pp. 360 ff.

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If compared with the corresponding figures for West German industry as a whole (815 and 672), this shows that the employment situation of this occupation was not favorable in the West. In the East, however, workers of this type were needed. The confused character of the migration within Germany becomes particularly clear if notice is taken of the fact that the scarcity in East Germany was, at least in part, caused by defections to the West. At any rate, there can hardly be any doubt that the relative employment situation in this field has had something to do with the fact that 25 percent of the industrial workers migrating to the East in 1952 and 1953 were metal workers. In 1954, unemployment in West Germany per 100 vacancies declined to 382 and in 1955 to 38. Accordingly, it would not be surprising if West-East migration of metal workers would be much smaller now.

Similarly, 377 West German building construction workers were unemployed per 100 vacancies in September 1952 and 423 in the same month in 1953, while, apparently, difficulties were encountered in East Germany in recruiting such workers. This may explain, at least in part, why 22 percent of the industrial workers migrating from the West to the East during that period belonged to this occupational group. *

* Unemployment of construction workers per 100 vacant jobs in West Germany decreased to 178 in September 1954 and to 38 in September 1955.

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migration of industrial workers to East Germany amounted to 12 percent, unemployment per 100 vacant jobs was 1,128 in September 1952 and 866 in September 1953.
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The employment situation in West Germany of commercial occupations, to which nearly 9 percent of the outmigrating members of the labor force belonged, was very bad: 1,607 per 100 vacancies in September 1952 and 1,160 in September 1953. Unemployment did not go down to less than 1,098 and 655 in the same month in 1954 and 1955, respectively. It is not likely that their prospects in East Germany were particularly encouraging. Yet, the 1,300 migrants to the East in 1953 and 1953, apparently, believed that they had nothing to lose but, on the contrary, might get some job due to the great general demand for labor and, perhaps, the lower standards in the Soviet area.

The professional people among the West-East migrants were probably attracted by the shortage of people of their kind which existed (and still exists) in Soviet Germany. As to physicians, in particular, supply has been ample in the West, while the ratio of population to practicing doctors in the East has probably not been better than around 1:2,000. Some artists have moved to the East for ideological

* 990 in September 1954 and still 347 in September 1955.

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reasons. Many, however, were drawn there by offers that were attractive financially and otherwise.

With 201 unemployed per 100 vacancies in September 1952 and 163 in September 1953, the situation in the agricultural labor force was not at all rosy in West Germany. The mass exodus of farmers and agricultural workers from East Germany starting in 1953, naturally, further limited the chances of finding a place in West German agriculture. * This lack of opportunity applied particularly to refugees. According to a statement by Chancellor Adenauer to Secretary of State Dulles, 250,000 refugee farmers had not been integrated into the West German economy even before the great increase in their influx in 1953. ** In East Germany, on the other hand, the outmigration of so many farmers resulted in the abandonment of probably more than 5 percent of the total cultivated land, and the

* The number of defecting East German agriculturists rose sharply between January 1952 and June 1953 and reached a total of nearly 26,000 during this period.

** STATE, "Current Foreign Relations," No. 7, 18 February 1953.

SECRET. Though the Chancellor's statement, probably, was exaggerated, about 130,000 settlement applications for farm families were indeed still unsatisfied in March 1953 and unemployment among agricultural immigrants was widespread.

East German government was, therefore, forced to make very attractive promises to all members of the agricultural labor force who would return. Yet, only 2,100 farmers and farm workers -- probably almost exclusively returnees -- left the Federal Republic for East Germany in 1952 and 1953. The bulk of the agriculturists in West Germany, obviously, held that, unfavorable as their situation was, they would, in the long run, be better off in the West than in the East.

Similarly, the small number of scientists, engineers, technicians, and members of related occupations in the West-East migration indicates, among other things, that the opportunities which have existed in Soviet Germany as a result of a shortage of trained people of this kind have not been attractive enough to cause much migration to the East. The few who did leave West Germany, probably, were lured to the East by especially tempting offers, such as good housing facilities, compensation high enough to guarantee an improved living standard despite higher living costs, higher rations which, due to lower prices, decrease living expenses, and other privileges. Such promises, which have usually been kept, may have attracted both very highly and very poorly paid members of the occupational groups here discussed. A tendency to leave them alone politically to a certain extent and the

* Unemployment per 100 vacancies in West German agriculture declined to 125 in September 1954 and to only 66 in September 1955.

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fact that wage increases in the East after mid-1953 have been especially high for technicians and foremen, may have been contributing factors.

Migration from West to East Germany has in each year been much smaller than migration in the reverse direction. The loss suffered by outmigration, unquestionably, has been much greater for Soviet Germany than for the Federal Republic. This applies not only to the number of people lost but also to the loss of needed skills and knowledge. Nevertheless, the immigration of a sizable number of workers and professionals has meant a valuable asset for East Germany and has given her an opportunity to make up for at least a part of the losses suffered by the numerous defections and other causes.

Migration to East Germany dropped considerably in 1952, probably, because of the economic improvement in West Germany. It reached its lowest point, thus far, in 1953 -- politically and economically a particularly bad year in the East. It increased, however, in 1954 and, apparently, remained at the same level in 1955 -- two years of relative stability and economic progress in Soviet Germany. It can be assumed that the relative volume of movements to the West and East will continue to be influenced greatly by the relative economic developments in the two parts of the country, including cost of living, earnings, employment, and supply of consumers goods.

The above statements may explain some of the motives of migrants

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to the East. In addition, it should, however, not be overlooked that both the movements to the East as well as the movements to the West have been parts of a large, completely unorganized post-war adjustment taking place in a haphazard manner. A considerable portion of those who migrated into West or East Germany subsequently went back to where they came from. According to experience of West Berlin officials, many of the numerous people who had registered as refugees did not even apply for asylum but returned immediately to East Germany, preferring continuation of life under Soviet rule to the uncertainties of life as refugees, of which they apparently had not been aware previously. Not a few migrants, especially young people, have moved back and forth even more than twice. This may not necessarily, have been due to bad experience at the new place of residence or merely to indecision. In any attempt to interpret these migrations it should, above all, be taken into account that, despite the development of different economic systems and forms of government in the East and West, Germany is still one country or, at least, is considered by most Germans to be one country which is only temporarily divided owing to external pressure. Accordingly, people have probably not hesitated to move from one part of their country to the other any more than have people, say in the United States.

* As to motives of migrants to the West, see CIA/RM 30, "The Effects of Migrations into and out of East Germany on the Labor Situations in East and West Germany," 15 March 1954. SECRET, US Officials ONLY.

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
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
This report is, in a way, a companion study to CIA/RR 30, "The Effects of Migrations into and out of East Germany on the Labor Situations in East and West Germany," 15 March 1954. The earlier report included a discussion of post-war migration from West to East Germany up to and including the year 1953. That discussion, however, was by no means exhaustive because of lack of statistical information that could have been used, among other things, to undertake the breakdowns and refine interpretations of the causes of the movements, as contained in the present report.

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The 20 tables below, however, were prepared not only from the data furnished by the West German Statistical Office but also from data which have been published here and/or in Germany. The arrangement of the tables is indicated by the table of contents preceding them. Their figures must be considered to be rough and occasionally very rough estimates. Owing to the uncontrolled and haphazard manner in which people have been moving inside Germany since the final phase of World War II, it will, probably, never be possible to compute them accurately. The tables include data on migration ^{to} of the West as well as migration to the East. Both types of data were included, first, because a number of estimates regarding moves to the East were based on data concerning moves to the West and, second, because comparing of the two sets of figures with each other appears useful in any attempt to appraise the relative significance of the two movements and to formulate a policy toward them.

It is believed that the footnotes to the 20 tables point out the

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necessary qualifications to the data with sufficient clarity. The following problems and assumptions, however, should be emphasized at this juncture:

1. The number of migrants to the West whose origin was indicated in the source materials as having been Soviet Germany, (see tables 1 and 2), should be considered as estimates only because of problems both of under-counting and double-counting of migrants.
2. Because no data are available on the proportion of migrants of unknown origin which was from Soviet Germany or on the proportion of migrants of unknown destination which goes to Soviet Germany, estimates of these proportions are based on rather arbitrary assumptions. These assumptions are given in footnote 5 to table 1. Except for tables 14 and 19, which present characteristics of persons migrating from West Berlin to unknown destination, the data presented are for migrants whose origin or destination is indicated in the sources as Soviet Germany.
3. The data received from the Statistical Office of the Federal Republic of Germany were adjusted as follows:
 - a. Migrants to East Berlin from the Federal Republic in 1952, not shown separately in the tabulations, were assumed to have the same distribution by age and by

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labor force status and occupation as migrants to East Berlin from the Federal Republic in 1953. Another reasonable assumption might be that these migrants were like those going to the Soviet Zone in 1952. The former assumption was employed, however, because migrants to the Soviet Zone in 1953 had characteristics more similar to those of migrants to the Soviet Zone in 1952 than to those of migrants to East Berlin in 1953.

- b. Migrants to the Soviet Zone from Hesse in 1952, not shown in the tabulations, were assumed to have the same characteristics as had migrants from the other States of the Federal Republic in 1952.
- c. Migrants in the labor force whose occupations were not specified were assumed to have the same distribution by occupation as had those migrants of the same group whose occupations were specified.
- 4. The characteristics of migrants to the West during 1952 and 1953 were assumed to be the same as for migrants to the Federal Republic from the Soviet Zone and Berlin during these years. The validity of this assumption is largely dependent on (1) the extent to which migration from West Berlin to the Federal Republic consists of persons who moved to West Berlin from Soviet Germany during the same time periods, and (2) the

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extent to which the characteristics of those migrants from Soviet Germany to West Berlin who remain in West Berlin differ from those who later move to the Federal Republic.

5. Except for migrants from the Federal Republic to Soviet Germany during 1953, data are available only for selected occupations within the major occupational groups. For other groups of migrants, therefore, the sum of the numbers shown for specific occupations does not equal the number shown for the major occupational group.

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TABLES PERTAINING TO THE CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANTS BETWEEN THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND WEST BERLIN, ON THE ONE HAND,
AND THE SOVIET ZONE OF GERMANY AND EAST BERLIN, ON THE OTHER,
DURING 1952 AND 1953

ESTIMATES OF TOTAL MIGRATION

Table

1. Migrants Between the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin, on the One Hand, and the Soviet Zone of Germany and East Berlin, on the Other, by Sex, and Time Period: January 1, 1951 to June 30, 1955.
2. Migrants Between the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin, on the One Hand, and the Soviet Zone of Germany and East Berlin, on the Other, by Area of Origin and Destination; Migrants to the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin With Unknown Origin, and Migrants From These Areas With Unknown Destination, by Sex: 1952 and 1953.
3. Migrants From the Federal Republic of Germany to the Soviet Zone of Germany and East Berlin, by Sex and Population Group: 1952 and 1953.

SUMMARY TABLES

4. Labor Force Status and Occupation of Migrants Between the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin, on the One Hand, and the Soviet Zone of Germany and East Berlin, on the Other, by Sex: 1952 and 1953.
5. Migrants Between the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin, on the One Hand, and the Soviet Zone of Germany and East Berlin, on the Other, by Age and Sex: 1952 and 1953.

LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES

Table

6. Percent of Migrants From the Federal Republic of Germany to the Soviet Zone of Germany and East Berlin, 14 Years Old and Over, Which Was in the Labor Force, by Age, Sex, and Population Group: 1952 and 1953.

LABOR FORCE STATUS AND OCCUPATION

7. Labor Force Status and Occupation of All Migrants From the Federal Republic of Germany to the Soviet Zone of Germany and East Berlin, by Population Group: 1952 and 1953.
8. Percent Distribution by Labor Force Status and Occupation of All Migrants From the Federal Republic of Germany to the Soviet Zone of Germany and East Berlin, by Population Group: 1952 and 1953.
9. Labor Force Status and Occupation of Male Migrants From the Federal Republic of Germany to the Soviet Zone of Germany and East Berlin, by Population Group: 1952 and 1953.
10. Percent Distribution by Labor Force Status and Occupation of Male Migrants From the Federal Republic of Germany to the Soviet Zone of Germany and East Berlin, by Population Group: 1952 and 1953.
11. Labor Force Status and Occupation of Female Migrants From the Federal Republic of Germany to the Soviet Zone of Germany and East Berlin, by Population Group: 1952 and 1953.
12. Percent Distribution by Labor Force Status and Occupation of Female Migrants From the Federal Republic of Germany to the Soviet Zone of Germany and East Berlin, by Population Group: 1952 and 1953.
13. Labor Force Status and Occupation of Migrants From West Berlin to the Soviet Zone of Germany and East Berlin, by Sex: 1952 and 1953.

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LABOR FORCE STATUS AND OCCUPATION—Con.

Table

14. Labor Force Status and Occupation of Migrants From West Berlin With Unknown Destination, by Sex: 1952 and 1953.
15. Labor Force Status and Occupation of Migrants to the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin From the Soviet Zone of Germany and East Berlin, by Sex: 1952 and 1953.

AGE AND SEX

16. Migrants From the Federal Republic of Germany to the Soviet Zone of Germany and East Berlin, by Age and Sex and Population Groups: 1952 and 1953.
17. Percent Distribution of Migrants From the Federal Republic of Germany to the Soviet Zone of Germany and East Berlin, by Age and Sex and Population Groups: 1952 and 1953.
18. Migrants From West Berlin to the Soviet Zone of Germany and East Berlin, by Age and Sex: 1952 and 1953.
19. Migrants From West Berlin With Unknown Destination, by Age and Sex: 1952 and 1953.
20. Migrants to the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin From the Soviet Zone of Germany and East Berlin, by Age and Sex: 1952 and 1953.

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