

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Summary	1
I. History of the Boundary	4
A. Changes in the International Character of the Boundary	4
B. Establishment of the Boundary	6
1. Tsarist Period (1826-World War I)	6
2. Finnish Period (World War I - World War II)	8
3. The Soviet Period (Post-World War II)	15
II. The Course of the Boundary	21
III. Description of the Boundary Area	23
A. General Characteristics	23
B. Terrain	25
C. Distribution of Population	26
D. Industries and Resources	28
E. Transportation and Border Crossing	35
1. Routes	35
2. Border-Crossing Points	38
IV. Boundary Administration and Potential Disputes	39
A. Boundary Regime Agreement and Boundary Administration	40
B. Potential Disputes	44

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


CONFIDENTIAL

	<u>Page</u>
V. Maps Showing the Norway-USSR Boundary	49
A. Evaluation of Map Coverage	49
B. Evaluation of Individual Map Series	51

Maps

- CIA 11738 USSR-Norway Frontier Area
- CIA 12104 Norway-USSR Boundary in the Mouth of the Jakobselv

25X1A2g	<u>Appendixes</u>	<u>Page</u>
---------	-------------------	-------------



C. Gaps in Intelligence	73
D. Sources and Evaluation of Sources	75

List of Illustrations

- Figure 1. -- Boris Gleb church, Kolttakengyas, USSR (probably pre-1940).
- Figure 2. -- View of marker posts along land boundary.
- Figure 3. -- View of boundary cairn.
- Figure 4. -- Norwegian boundary marker No. 120, Skogfoss (1947).

CONFIDENTIAL

Security Information
CONFIDENTIAL

BOUNDARY BETWEEN NORWAY AND THE USSR

Summary

The following report on the Norway-USSR boundary and border area is one of a series dealing with the international boundaries of the USSR. The reports are designed to give information on the history of the boundary; to describe the terrain, transportation, economy, and population of the boundary area; to discuss boundary disputes or potential disputes; and to evaluate the more important large-scale maps of the area.

The two countries are not new neighbors. The present boundary, as a line between Norwegian and Russian territories, was first established in 1826. Most of the 122-mile boundary from the point where Finland, Norway, and the USSR meet to the Varangerfjord (an inlet of Barents Sea) follows the courses of two rivers, the Pasvikelv (Russian: Pats-Yoki) and Jakobselv (Russian: Vor'yema). In the period between the two World Wars, Finland and Norway were neighbors along this same boundary. In 1947, after the final transfer of the Pechenga area to the Soviet Union, a detailed survey and demarcation of the boundary was carried out by a joint Norwegian-Soviet commission. The very detailed maps resulting from the demarcation survey are by far the best source for the exact position of the line.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Throughout most of its length the boundary passes through barren, undulating terrain that is swampy in places. In the lower Pasvikelv Valley, however, the terrain is level to gently rolling and is sheltered enough to support mixed forests of pine and birch.

The zones of greatest economic and strategic importance and densest population are near (1) the Norwegian A/S Sydvaranger iron ore mines and the Soviet nickel mines at Nikel' (formerly Kolosjoki), both of which lie only a few miles from the boundary, and (2) the ice-free posts of Kirkenes, Norway, and Linakhamari, the port town of Pechenga, USSR. Because of the rigorous climate, other activities and concentrations of population are limited almost exclusively to the lower Pasvikelv Valley and to a few sheltered fjords near the Barents Sea, where the climate is moderated by the warm North Atlantic Drift. Most of the population not employed in mining, ore processing, or shipping is engaged in a seasonal combination of agriculture, fishing, lumbering, and reindeer breeding. The area is accessible by land from Norway, Finland, and the USSR, respectively, by (1) the Norwegian trunk road (Oslo-Kirkenes) No. 50, which was completed during World War II, (2) the Arctic Highway from Rovaniemi to the port of Pechenga, which was originally constructed by the Finns but is now closed to Finnish traffic at Virtaniemi on the Finnish-Soviet border, and (3) the improved dirt road running west from Murmansk and connecting with the Arctic Highway at Pechenga. The main roads and border-crossing points lie in the Pasvikelv Valley, but travel

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

across the boundary is prohibited (unless officially approved), and all of the bridges that had not been destroyed during the German retreat of 1944 have been dismantled. All of the main roads have improved dirt or gravel surfaces, are difficult to maintain, and often become completely impassable during the spring thaws.

The administration of the boundary is subject to detailed regulations established by a regime agreement that went into effect in October 1950. This agreement restricts activities on the boundary rivers and along the land boundary and describes the method of handling all border violations. The agreement does not deal with the use or flow of the waters of the boundary rivers but merely states that future agreements will be reached between Norway and the Soviet Union on matters involving the building of installations or other structures on the rivers. The lack of an adequate agreement is particularly significant for Norway because Soviet control of the water flow in connection with the Yaniskoski power plant (just southwest of the boundary in Pasvikely) has created serious fluctuations between flood and low water, the first destroying crops and the second preventing the floating of timber downstream.

The only potential problem related to the actual position of the line is that of the extension of the line into the Barents Sea for purposes of bounding the territorial sea of the two states. Norway claims 4 nautical miles as the width of its territorial sea, whereas the Soviet Union claims 12 nautical miles. It was probably

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

because of this difference that the Joint Commission for the Demarcation of the Boundary decided to have this issue resolved in future diplomatic negotiations between the two countries.

I. History of the Boundary

A. Changes in the International Character of the Boundary

The boundary between Norway and the USSR has existed in its present position, with only minor changes, since 1826.¹/_{*} (See map CIA 11738.) Before 1826 the area traversed by the boundary was open to free travel by inhabitants of areas which are now parts of Norway, Finland, and the USSR, and taxes were paid to both the Norwegian and Russian crowns by the villages in the Lapland districts. In 1809 Finland, which had been a part of Sweden, was transferred to Russia. From 1814 to 1905 the Norwegians and Swedes were united under a single monarch, though their territories were distinct. In an effort to prevent difficulties in the Foelleds Districter (Districts in Common), the King of Sweden and Norway and the Emperor of "All the Russias" agreed to a demarcation of the line of sovereignty in the boundary area. The agreement was included in the "Convention of Limits between Russia and Sweden," 2-14 May 1826, signed at St. Petersburg.² The division of the area by Norway and Russia precluded Finnish access to the Arctic Ocean. This introduced a problem which was to exert great

* Footnote references in arabic numerals refer to sources listed in Appendix D.

SECRET

SECRET

influence and to result in several changes in Norway's neighbors along the boundary.

From 1826 to 1917, when the Soviet Government came into existence, the line was the boundary between Norway and Russia. Although Finland became an independent nation in 1917, it did not receive the Petsamo district from the USSR until the treaty of peace signed at Dorpat on 14 October 1920.^{3/} From 1920 to 1940 the line was common to Norway and Finland. By the peace treaty of 12 March 1940, between the Soviet Union and Finland (following the Soviet Winter War invasion), Finnish sovereignty over the Petsamo district was again confirmed. At this time the USSR was accorded the special privilege of free access to the Norwegian border.^{4/} In 1941, however, the treaty was nullified by the renewal of hostilities between Finland and the USSR. The armistice agreement of September 1944 between the two countries proposed the cession of Petsamo (Russian: Pechenga) district to the USSR.^{5/} The signing (in February 1947) and the ratification (in September 1947) of the Finnish Peace Treaty completed the transfer of the area to the Soviet Union and again gave Norway and the Soviet Union a common boundary.^{6/}

The juxtaposition of Norway and the USSR is of considerable significance at present, since Norway is the only member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that borders the USSR in Europe and is one of the few non-satellite neighbors of the Soviet Union. Norway also occupies a strategic position near the western terminus

SECRET

SECRET

of the northern sea route at Murmansk and virtually lies astride polar air routes. Prior to the association of Norway with the NATO, relations between Norway and the USSR were not unusually bad and problems regarding their common boundary were mostly of a minor and local nature. In recent months, however, Soviet-Norwegian relations have become strained as a result of the membership of Norway in NATO. Norway has rejected the recent Soviet protests that Norway is ignoring the 1920 treaty prohibiting the establishment of naval and military bases on the island of Spitsbergen. A recent corollary to the Spitsbergen issue has been the Soviet protest regarding visits of persons of NATO countries to the Norwegian-Soviet boundary.

B. Establishment of the Boundary

1. Tsarist Period (1826 - World War I)

In 1826, when the boundary between Norway and Russia was first established, it was described generally along the Pasvikelv and Jakobselv rivers and on the ground by several long straight-line sectors. A map at 1:168,000, prepared in 1825 for purposes of delimiting the boundary in the agreement, was attached to the agreement. Another map (at 1:8,400), prepared after the marking of the line in the summer of 1826, showed more detail for some parts of the line than the 1825 map. Both maps, however, contained errors in directions and distances. The actual 1826 marking of the present line consisted of only 10 markers or stone cairns, generally at the main break points. The location of

SECRET

SECRET

Krokfjell (Muotkavaara), the meeting point of the present territories of the USSR, Norway, and Finland, was established in 1833 by representatives of Russia proper and the Grand Duchy of Finland, but the marker was not erected until after the 1846 Norwegian-Russian survey of the boundary. At that time a map was prepared to show the location on Russian territory of marker No. 363, near the mouth of the river Jakobselv. In 1847 an agreement was reached providing for a resurvey of the boundary every 25 years. This agreement applied not only to the present Norwegian-USSR boundary but also to portions of the present Finnish-Norwegian boundary.

The periodic survey of 1896 resulted in the first relatively accurate, correlated map series covering the boundary.^{7/} The 1896 maps were prepared at the scale of 1:42,000 and covered a strip one verst (3,500 feet) wide along the entire boundary. These maps are enlargements of the Norwegian topographic maps at 1:100,000.^{8/} Detailed maps at 1:8,400 were also made of the terrain around each cairn. The courses of the rivers also were more closely investigated. At the time of publication, the maps were considered to be very good and particularly valuable for clarifying problems resulting from inaccuracies in the 1825 map. During the 1946 negotiations, however, the maps were found to be unsatisfactory in view of modern surveying techniques and the current need for accuracy.

As a part of the 1896 survey, additional markers were placed on the line near the old cairns to indicate the direction of the line to

SECRET

the next marker. The boundary clearing was also widened to 8 meters (26.24 feet) so that the line could be identified at a distance. Another marker was placed at the mouth of the Jakobselv on the Norwegian side of the river so that there would be no future misunderstanding of the line. According to a special notation in the 1896 protocol, the new marker did not "in any way alter the provisions of the Agreement of 1826." The protocol also specifically stated that the line in the Pasvikelv River did not follow the thalweg at the two islands -- Ostrov Chevessuolo (Norwegian: Skolte-kholmen; formerly Nakholmen) and Ostrov Niva-saari (Nivansaari). Although the line was to the disadvantage of Norway at these islands, it was in conformity with the 1826 documents, and no attempt was made to change the boundary.

Norway never approved the 1896 protocol but did approve maps in 1904. Russia approved both the maps and protocol and, in 1907, requested Norway to recognize the protocol. Even though Norway had never approved the document, its value as a supplement to the maps was not ignored in the 1946 negotiations.

2. Finnish Period (World War I - World War II)

Before the next scheduled Norwegian-Russian survey in 1921, Finland had become a neighbor of Norway along the boundary. In 1920, Norway began investigations on problems created by the new boundary situation, and in 1921 Finland decided to open boundary negotiations with Norway. On 5 April 1922 the Norwegian Storting agreed to the opening of talks concerning the boundary in the Finnmark-Petsamo area.

SECRET

Discussions were held from May 1922 to February 1924. An agreement was reached on 28 April 1924 concerning the boundary between Finnmark Province (fylke) of Norway and Petsamo District (herred) of Finland.^{9/}

Although the agreement signed in 1924 superseded the 1826 agreement, it contained no basic changes in the description of the course of the boundary, with the exception of a clause calling for the establishment of the line in the territorial sea north of the mouth of the Jakobselv. During the negotiations, however, the Norwegians had proposed two modifications of the 1826 line, both to no avail. First, they wished to apply the thalweg principle to the Pasvikelv River near Ostrov Chevessuolo and Ostrov Niva-saari; and, second, they proposed that the line leave the Pasvikelv in an easterly direction in the vicinity of Ozero Kuets-yarvi and continue to the Jakobselv, rather than follow the river to the point north of the Kolttakengyas (formerly Boris Gleb) area, whence it takes a south-easterly and easterly direction to the Jakobselv. The second proposal had been rejected in the negotiations prior to the 1826 agreement, which not only extended the boundary farther north but also provided for the Norwegian cession to Russia of a small area around the Russian church of Boris Gleb on the west bank of the Pasvikelv (see Figure 1).*

* The name Kolttakengyas is the present Russian version of Kolttaköngäs, the name given to the town by the Lapps who settled in the area. In the 16th century a Russian Orthodox Church was built at the site of the present town of Kolttakengyas and dedicated to two eighth-century Russian princes, Boris and Gleb.

SECRET

In the 1922-24 Finnish-Norwegian negotiations, the Finns rejected the proposal for a change, since Norway could offer no territorial compensation.

In 1925, Norway and Finland conducted a survey of the boundary, which resulted in several differences of opinion and interpretation.^{10/v} According to the 1924 agreement the land boundary was to be in accord with that of previous Norwegian-Russian agreements and should therefore run in straight-line sectors from one marker to another. During the investigations this procedure was found to be agreeable generally, but in the Boris Gleb area, particularly, a problem was encountered. Here terrain characteristics and the absence of a referenced boundary road made it impossible for the resident Norwegians to know where the line ran, and some were found to be cultivating Finnish soil. So that there would be no doubt as to the course of the boundary in the area, a boundary road was built and additional markers were established.

The Pasvikelv Sector of the boundary was to follow the line in the river that had been established previously by the Norwegians and Russians. The 1896-97 maps were to be used as sources, and where they were not clear the middle of the deep channel was to be followed (Article I). The Norwegian representative stated that the maps could be followed satisfactorily, despite the fact that they were old and enlargements of the Norwegian topographic maps at the scale of 1:100,000.

* The points of view of the two countries are treated in two articles which were written by members of the boundary commissions. The Norwegian article, cited as Source 8, came as an answer to Source 10.

Although the Finns raised some objections to the use of the maps and to the means of marking the boundary, the Norwegians felt that resulting gains would not justify the expense of a new survey and of the careful marking of the boundary, as advocated by the Finns. Consequently, it was decided that the only new mapping in the Pasvikelv Sector was to be sketches of individual areas that were considered significant or that were poorly shown on the 1896 maps. The Norwegians also considered it unnecessary to mark the boundary line along the rivers by pillars on the river banks, as had been proposed by the Finns. The Norwegians argued that, although the scheme called for a large number of new markers, it still left the line in doubt. The main problem was to clarify the possession of the islands in the river. In 1925, special signs were placed on the islands to designate the country to which they belonged.

For the Jakobselv Sector of the boundary a new series of maps at the scale of 1:10,000 was to be made and held valid until the next scheduled 25-year boundary survey. As a result of the relatively frequent minor changes in the river bed, the 1896 maps were out of date by 1925, when the thalweg was redetermined and indicated on the 1:10,000 maps. In addition, each country had made a single-sheet map of the outlet of the Jakobselv at the scale of 1:20,000.*

* Neither the 1:10,000 nor 1:20,000 maps is available. However, attention is called to Finnish 1:20,000 maps which are discussed briefly on pp. 50-51.

SECRET

In the Jakobselv area some questions arose in regard to the location of the line at places where an island divided the stream and it was difficult or impossible to determine the main channel. Article II of the 1924 agreement provided that the line in the Jakobselv should follow the middle of the deep channel of the river and the middle of the lakes formed by the river. Apparently there were two outstanding areas in which it was impossible to determine the main channel. Consequently, the line was placed to favor Norway in one case and Finland in the other.

The island and channel problems were minor in comparison with the issue raised over the mouth of the Jakobselv (see map CIA 12104). At the time of the 1925 settlement the Finns maintained that the tidal estuary of the river was actually a part of the sea and that the line should run equidistant from the two banks. In 1924, the Finns had refused to discuss the question on the spot. This stand was regarded by the writer of the Norwegian rebuttal as a device for leaving the issue open. The Norwegian Government, on the other hand, contended that the line should follow the channel of the river at low tide, which would have put the boundary close to the eastern bank of the open mouth of the river.

The course of the line in the lower portion of the Jakobselv, as well as in the territorial waters to the north, was not resolved in 1925. Both problems were again opened for negotiations in 1931, following the publication in 1927 and 1930 of articles written by

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

principal members of the Finnish and Norwegian commission of 1925 for the investigation and marking of the boundary.

For the section south of the narrows, the view of the Finnish representative in the 1927-30 battle of words was virtually the same as the Norwegian view -- that the line should follow the channel at low tide. This view differed from that expressed by the Finnish Government in negotiations in 1924-25. For the area north of the narrows, however, the two writers again raised the issue concerning the course of the line in their territorial seas. This dispute involved many legal definitions and interpretations of tide levels, skerries (rocky isles or reefs), sand banks, etc. Article III in the 1924 agreement merely stated that the line should be established according to principles of international law.

The 1931 negotiations resulted in a supplementary protocol, which was signed on 12 September 1931. This protocol established 11 points through which the line was to be drawn and also provided that vessels of both countries could freely lie and anchor on either side of the boundary. The line provided for in the protocol of 1931 was finally marked in 1939, using a series of 20 sight markers placed on the land in such a manner that the sight lines intersected at the 11 points along the boundary line. The 1939 work resulted in a special protocol and description, in addition to a revised copy of the 1925 map.

~~SECRET~~

From available information the course of the line is not clear, nor can it be determined whether the line agreed more closely with the Norwegian or the Finnish claims. Neither is it clear whether any provision was made for an extension of the line through the territorial sea. The official Norwegian topographic map at a scale of 1:100,000, dated 1949 (Sheet 05, Jarfjorden), differs from the 1895 original in the portrayal of the line in the mouth of the Jakobselv south of the narrows.* On the 1895 map the line extends down the middle of the estuary. On the 1949 map the symbol is omitted from the estuary but leads up to the estuary from the south and is resumed again in the narrows to the north. On the Finnish map at the scale of 1:20,000, dated 1941 (Vuoremi Sheet), the boundary symbol stops completely at the southern end of the estuary. Therefore, neither the 1941 nor the 1949 map sheds any light on the exact course of the boundary as it was marked in 1939. The 1939 edition of the Finnish 1:400,000 series carried a line lying to the east of center in the estuary, thus resembling somewhat the Norwegian claim. The map also extends the boundary symbol in a north-northeasterly direction about 3.45 nautical miles into the Varangerfjord. Since the Norwegians show no line in the territorial sea, the Finnish representation does not necessarily indicate a definitely established line.

* The maps discussed in this paragraph are evaluated in Appendix D.

SECRET

According to the Norwegian-Finnish agreement that the boundary was to be resurveyed every 25 years, a survey was to be made in 1950. This requirement, however, was nullified by the transfer of the Petsamo (Pechenga) area to the USSR.

3. The Soviet Period (Post-World War II)

In August 1946, representatives of Norway and the Soviet Union met and established the Joint Soviet-Norwegian Commission for the Marking of the International Boundary between the USSR and Norway. Its basic task was to establish the international boundary in accordance with the old Norwegian-Russian boundary. The 1826 boundary agreement and the 1896 Norwegian-Russian maps were to be used.^{11/} Under the Joint Commission there were two mixed Norwegian-Soviet subcommissions, one supervised by the Soviet members and the other supervised by the Norwegian members. The Joint Commission agreed that the two subcommissions appointed to check and mark the line might deviate slightly from the old boundary course where local conditions justified the change. It was also realized that the specific measurement of the boundary by modern instruments might result in radical changes. To keep the line in accord with the 1826 agreement in such cases, the line on the 1896 maps would have to be used. The two subcommissions were required to report all problems and deviations to the Joint Commission for approval.*

* A detailed discussion of the negotiations is found in the proposal which was submitted to the Norwegian Storting for ratification of the boundary (see Source 1), which provided most of the information dealing with the activities preceding the actual demarcation of the line.

SECRET

Pursuant to the permission granted by the Joint Commission to make minor changes on the basis of local conditions, the Soviet Union proposed the two following changes in the boundary as related to the waters of the Pasvikelv: (1) that the position of the boundary in the Graensefoss (falls) area, where Norway controls both banks of the river in two small areas northwest of marker No. 11, be changed to follow the thalweg, and (2) that the Norwegian part of the Pasvikelv some distance south of the main falls at Skoltefoss (totalling about 103,000 square meters) be given to the USSR in exchange for a part of the Pasvikelv (totaling about 113,000 square meters) that lies near the northern limit of the Soviet-held Kolttakengyas (Boris Gleb) area. Both of these changes would have been to the advantage of the Soviet Union in the development of water power and in the control of the flow of the river. Norway rejected both proposals on the basis of the consequent technical problems arising from the control and use of the river for power sites, which would have to be solved in negotiations regarding the combined water-power potential and planned use of the river.

The thalweg measurements in the Pasvikelv gave rise to further questions along this portion of the boundary. First, the Norwegians proposed that the Soviet islands, Ostrov Chevessuolo (see map CIA 11738, marker No. 71) and Ostrov Niva-saari (marker No. 85), which had been situated on the "wrong side" of the thalweg since 1826 and had been the sources of differences in 1896 and 1925, be turned over

SECRET

to them. Second, the Soviets demanded that the three small islands of Ostrov Kiste-kholmen (marker No. 50), Ostrov Brenn-kholmen (marker No. 82), and an unnamed island (marker No. 81) just to the south and west of the latter be transferred to them on the basis of the new thalweg measurements of the Pasvikelv. The three markers mentioned are double markers, with those of the USSR lying on the islands and those of Norway on the left bank of the river. Ostrov Kiste-kholmen is located about one mile north of the town of Nyrud, and the latter two are located at the northeastern end of Lake Vaggatemjavrrre (Ozero Bukhtles-vandet). Since an agreement could not be reached on these two issues, involving five islands, the Commission reverted to the line as shown on the 1896 map for what proved to be only a temporary solution.

The placement of the line in the mouth of the Jakobselv also proved to be a source of difficulty in the establishment of the new boundary. The Soviets held that the 1896 boundary should be retained, but the Norwegians contended that the 1947 position of the thalweg of the river at low tide should determine the position of the line. The Norwegian view was based on the change in the course of the thalweg since 1896, as a result of which the placement of the 1947 line to correspond with the 1896 line would have precluded Norwegian use of the harbor inside the river mouth and entrance into the river mouth at low tide. The Norwegian delegation was anxious to insure to residents of the area the free use of the harbor and access to the mouth of the Jakobselv from the sea.

SECRET

SECRET

At this point in the negotiations the Soviet delegation contended that if the thalweg principle were followed in the Jakobselv, as advocated by the Norwegians, the boundary would also have to be changed in the Pasvikelv at Græensefoss. The results of the discussions of the Joint Commission were: (1) the line in the mouth of the Jakobselv was to follow the thalweg as determined at low tide, as recommended by the Norwegians; (2) the USSR was to give up the demands for the change at Græensefoss; and (3) Norway consented to transfer the three small islands in the Pasvikelv to the USSR. Ostrov-Chevessuolo and Ostrov Niva-saari are still shown on the boundary maps as on the eastern or Soviet side of the line, which indicates that the 1896 line was followed in this area.

Only preliminary discussions were held on the problem of the territorial sea north of the mouth of the Jakobselv. Since the viewpoints and claims of the two countries to territorial waters differed so radically, the Norwegians claiming 4 nautical miles and the Soviets 12, the Joint Commission decided to keep this question open for future diplomatic negotiations.

At the conclusion of the marking of the Soviet-Finnish boundary in 1945, it was agreed to place a three-nation boundary marker at Krokfjell. A Norwegian representative was present to approve the position of the marker and a tri-state protocol was signed on 26 October 1945. After the Yaniskoski-Niskakoski area was ceded to the Soviet Union by Finland in 1947, a new demarcation of the northernmost

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

sector of the Finnish-Soviet boundary, just south of Krokfjell, was undertaken. In the summer of 1947 a Norwegian representative inspected the marker, and on 3 December 1947 a new tri-state protocol was signed, replacing the 1945 protocol, regarding the marker on Krokfjell.

During the summer of 1947 the two mixed Norwegian-Soviet sub-commissions (under the Joint Commission) marked the boundary. The Soviet-supervised subcommission marked the first section of the boundary, from the junction of the Norwegian, Finnish, and Soviet boundaries at Krokfjell northward 61.1 miles to $69^{\circ}32'N$, north of Holmfossen. The Norwegian-supervised subcommission marked the second section, from $69^{\circ}32'N$ northward 60.5 miles to marker No. 415, a buoy stake north of the mouth of the Jakobselv. Each subcommission was responsible for the placing, painting, and numbering of the boundary markers. A topographic survey of a strip at least 0.5 kilometer wide along each side of the boundary was made at the scale of 1:25,000, and a polygon system was laid on which the rectangular coordinates of the boundary markers were computed.

On 18 December 1947, with the final drafting and reviewing of the boundary documents, the boundary agreement along with the maps and protocols was signed in Moscow. 12/13/14/ The Norwegian Storting ratified the agreement unanimously on 3 December 1948, and the instruments of ratification were exchanged on 23 May 1949 in Moscow. 15/*

* The descriptive protocol includes: (1) a table of coordinates and elevations of the boundary markers and the points in the geodetic network along the boundary, and (2) a list of the boundary markers.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Before ratifying the agreement, however, the Norwegian Storting questioned the cession to the USSR of the three small islands in the Pasvikelv. The issue was dismissed because the islands were regarded as being of no strategic or economic value, and it was agreed that under the terms of the 1826 convention the islands fall on the Soviet side of the line. The course of the boundary as marked in the mouth of the Jakobselv proved satisfactory to the Norwegians, since their fishing vessels could enter and leave the river mouth without crossing the line.16/17/ The demarcation maps show the boundary line along the channel of the river at low tide, which was the line held by the Norwegians during the dispute with the Finns over the issue following the 1925 investigation of the boundary.

The 1947 agreement dealt only with the detailed description and demarcation of the boundary. Issues relative to the administration of the boundary (such as water, navigation, fishing, and logging rights, and the maintenance of markers) were left to be settled by subsequent agreements. These issues and agreements are discussed in the section on Boundary Administration and Potential Disputes.

The Norwegians agreed to the Russian proposal for the actual demarcation of the boundary, which differed notably from the former simple demarcation. The line on the land is marked by pairs of wooden posts or by single stone cairns (see Figures 2 and 3). Each marker is visible from the next, and in no case are the markers more than 1 kilometer apart. Double markers on land are placed at a distance of

SECRET

SECRET

2 meters (6.56 feet) on either side of the line, and the line itself is indicated by a small wooden post or by the center of a 25-centimeter (9.84-inch) circle carved in the rock. A cleared strip along the entire land boundary measures 8 meters (26.24 feet) in width, which, in the case of the double markers, includes the 4 meters (13.12 feet) between the posts and 2 meters (6.56 feet) behind each post. Markers Nos. 11, 208, 211, 222, and 279, shown on map CIA 11738, are old stone cairns at the main break-points (changes of direction) in the boundary, which were restored in 1947.

The boundary along the Pasvikelv and Jakobselv is marked by double posts, one on either side of the river or lake, or one on a bank (see Figure 4) and one on an island. North of the mouth of the Jakobselv is the northernmost marker of the 1947 boundary, marker No. 415. This is a buoy stake anchored at a depth of 17 meters, or 55.55 feet.

Most of the boundary posts are 2 meters (6.56 feet) high and 22 centimeters (8.66 inches) square. The Norwegian posts are painted yellow with black tips, and the Soviet posts are painted in alternating red and green stripes with red tips. Attached to each marker is a signed protocol describing its position and a map of the immediate area.

SECRET

II. The Course of the Boundary

Of the 121.6-mile Norway-USSR boundary, only about one-fifth is on land. The course of the remainder of the line is determined mainly by the deepest channels of the rivers Pasvikelv and Jakobselv and their associated lakes.

The westernmost point of the Norwegian-USSR boundary is at Krokfjell Mountain (Muotkavarra), where the boundaries of Norway, Finland, and the USSR meet (see map CIA 11738). From Krokfjell Mountain the boundary follows a southeasterly direction in a series of short straight-line sectors to the Pasvikelv, which it crosses to marker No. 11 near Graensefoss. At that marker the entire river lies within Norway. From marker No. 11, which is a main breakpoint in the boundary, the line takes a northeasterly direction to the Pasvikelv, which it follows to marker No. 196 (a breakpoint) at Skoltefoss. The boundary in the Pasvikelv follows the deep channel and, for the most part, it also follows the middle of the lakes. Except for Ostrov Chevessuolo and Ostrov Niva-saari, islands in the river and lakes are allocated to the country on whose side of the channel they lie. Only a few islands or sandbanks are crossed by the boundary, and the only one of significant size is Store Grenseholmen (Russian: Ostrov Sture Grense-kholmen), on which markers Nos. 169-171 are located.

At Skoltefoss the boundary leaves the Pasvikelv to the west and proceeds in a straight line to marker No. 208 (a breakpoint). From No. 208 the line turns to the north-northwest to No. 211 (a breakpoint),

SECRET

then to the east-northeast and across the Pasvikelv to No. 219 on the right bank of the Pasvikelv. This sector of the boundary encircles the town of Kolttakengyas and leaves an area of more than 1.5 square miles on the west bank of the river under Soviet control (see Appendix A). The Soviet Union also has complete control of the river for approximately 2 miles. This projection of Soviet territory on the Norwegian side of the river was created by the 1826 convention that ceded the territory to Russia. From marker No. 219 the boundary continues in a straight line in an east-northeasterly direction to No. 222 (a breakpoint), where it turns to the southeast, crossing fairly rugged land, barren mountains, moors, marshes, and numerous small lakes and ponds to marker No. 279 just southwest of Hundvann (lake). From No. 279 (a breakpoint) the boundary takes an east-southeasterly direction to marker No. 302, where it joins the Jakobselv. Thence the line follows the deep channel of the river and in general the middle of the lakes. Islands are allocated to the country on whose side of the channel they lie.

At low tide numerous sandbanks are exposed in the wide section of the Jakobselv River south of its mouth. The boundary in this area follows the channel of the river at low tide, which places it close to the Soviet side of the estuary (see map CIA 12104). The boundary continues near the Soviet bank through the narrows to marker No. 412, which is the last marker at the mouth of the river. From marker No. 412 to No. 415 (2,214 feet or 675 meters in a straight line;

SECRET

SECRET

north-northwesterly in direction) the boundary is marked by a series of sight lines from boundary markers and by special sight markers. From marker No. 412 the boundary goes north-northwest in a straight line for 47.8 meters (156.78) feet, north for 214 (701.9 feet), and north-northwest for 429 meters (1,410.1 feet) to the final marker, No. 415.

III. Description of the Boundary Area

A. General Characteristics

All of the area traversed by the Norway-USSR boundary lies north of the Arctic Circle and therefore experiences continuous darkness from the end of November to mid-January and the midnight sun from mid-May to the end of July. Another characteristic of the area is the evidence of severe glaciation in the past -- the large number of lakes and swamps at lower elevations, the glacial drift on the slopes, and the thin soil cover or bare rock surface on the exposed uplands (see Figure 5). Stunted birch and tundra moor growth predominate on those upper slopes which have any vegetation at all. On the lower slopes and in the sheltered valleys near the Pasvikelv and its tributary lakes and rivers, there are mixed forests, which give way to swamp pine growth or treeless bogs in the low swampy areas.

Physically the area along the boundary differs little from other high-latitude areas of Europe, except that it includes the ports of Kirkenes and Linakhamari, which are ice-free as a result of the North

SECRET

SECRET

Atlantic Drift. Although the ports are important locally in the exportation of ores from the Norwegian iron mines and the Soviet nickel mines, they are of minor national value in time of peace. In the field of strategic planning for northern air and sea routes, however, the ports are of major significance.

B. Terrain

The area traversed by the boundary is generally undulating, with higher elevations ranging from approximately 500 to 1,400 feet above sea level (see Figure 6). Terrain on the Norwegian side of the boundary is less rugged than that farther east on the Soviet side.

The southern section of the boundary area along the Pasvikelv is characterized by many lakes connected by short turbulent stretches of river and by swamps. Elevations in this area rarely exceed 750 feet. From marker No. 222 on the Pasvikelv to marker No. 302 on the Jakobselv, the boundary crosses undulating terrain, with hills of higher elevations than those near the Pasvikelv. Elevations range from 700 to 1,000 feet above sea level, and slopes are more precipitous than farther south and west. The most precipitous terrain in the immediate boundary area is found farther north along the Jakobselv. Here the hills rise steeply, and scarps with elevations of 900 to over 1,300 feet are not uncommon on either side of the narrow valley. Near the mouth of the Jakobselv the land becomes flat to gently

SECRET

SECRET

rolling. No single source describes the border area as a whole, and pertinent information was selected from a variety of sources. 18/19/20/21/

C. Distribution of Population

Over most of this relatively isolated and cold border area, access to routes of communication, by both land and sea, and the shelter provided by the terrain are important factors in determining the overall distribution of population and the pattern of settlement. Mining activities in the border area, however, have caused the main concentrations of population.

Population on the Norwegian side of the boundary is concentrated chiefly in the vicinity of Kirkenes, the port and processing town for the A/S Sydvaranger iron ore mines near Bjørnevatn. The present population of these two towns and small nearby villages is probably at least as high as it was before World War II, when the area had about 4,500 inhabitants.

Although information on population and settlement patterns on the Soviet side of the border is lacking, it can be assumed that two areas are by far the most densely populated: (1) near the nickel-copper mines at Nikel' and (2) near the head of Guba Pechenga, where the port town of Linakhamari is located. On the basis of the increased activity at the nickel mines and in the nearby town of Salmiyarvi as observed from the Norwegian side of the boundary, the population of the mining area is estimated at over 20,000, as compared with a probable maximum

SECRET

SECRET

of 1,500 or 2,000 in 1939. Presumably the port facilities and population at Linskhamari have increased in proportion to the needs of the nickel mines. In 1941, however, the population of the port was probably about 500 and that of the Guba Pechenga area probably from 1,000 to 1,500.

Most of the smaller settlements of both countries are found in the sheltered valley of the Pasvikelv or at the heads of the more sheltered fjords, where roads are relatively well developed and lumbering, shipping, fishing, and limited agricultural activities are possible.22/23/ In the more rugged areas, away from the rivers and fjords, the population is negligible. On the Norwegian side of the boundary, numerous small villages, usually numbering about 25 persons each, are strung out as far south as Svanvik and east to Karpbukt, each of which has about 100 inhabitants. On the Soviet side of the boundary the general settlement pattern probably resembles that on the Norwegian side, but with some modifications resulting from the Soviet policy of moving residents away from the boundary.

The Norway-USSR border area lies in the northern part of Lapland. The Lapps, however, do not predominate in any of the four countries into which Lapland extends. It is difficult to make an estimate of their numbers, but about a decade ago the total number of "more or less full-blood Lapps" in Lapland was said to be about 32,000, of whom about 21,000 resided in Norway, 7,000 in Sweden, and 4,000 in Finland and the USSR.24/ There are indications that at least some

SECRET

of the Lapps on the Soviet side of the line were moved from the Pasvikelv Valley to Finland after the USSR acquired the Pechenga area.^{25/} It is likely that they were moved out of the Kolttakengyas area.

The seasonal migrations of the Lapps, a reindeer-herding and fishing people, caused international difficulties in the past. In addition, the Lapps objected to the loss of pasturelands to newcomers within individual countries. Most of these problems, however, have been resolved by national legislation which assures the Lapps of certain rights. Since these people have never formed a cohesive political unit, the possibility of their being used as a tool for political dissension in the area seems relatively remote and would probably be based primarily on cases of abuse or negligence on the part of the individual governments under whose jurisdiction they come.

D. Industries and Resources

The economic importance of the boundary area is based primarily on the iron ore deposits near Bjørnevattn in Norway and the nickel-copper deposits at Nikel' in the USSR and secondarily on the installed and potential hydroelectric developments available to serve the mining and processing activities. Free access to a source of power for the Soviet nickel mines and processing plant was an influential factor in determining the present location of the Finland-USSR boundary near the point where it joins the Norway-USSR boundary.

SECRET

Less than two miles west of the Soviet Kolttakengyas (Boris Gleb) area, east of Bjørnevåtn (lake), are the A/S Sydvaranger Norwegian State iron ore mines (see Figure 7). These mines produced an average of 800,000 tons of ore concentrates in the years immediately before World War II, and provided almost two-thirds of the concentrates exported from Norway. Most of the extracting, processing, and shipping facilities of the mines were destroyed in the German retreat of 1944.^{26/} The 12-kilometer railway that connects the mines with the port town of Kirkenes is in operation again, but not all of the postwar reconstruction and modernization of the mines and processing facilities has been completed.^{27/} (See Figure 8.) It is estimated that the program, as planned, will be completed by late 1952 or 1953, when production should reach the prewar level or possibly full production, amounting to 1 million tons of concentrate (66 percent iron content) annually.^{28/29/30/31/} All of the A/S Sydvaranger production of iron concentrate is to be exported to increase the Norwegian supply of foreign currency.^{32/}

The power for the A/S Sydvaranger mines and associated facilities, including the processing plants, port facilities, and the town of Kirkenes, is furnished by the A/S Sydvaranger Grid System. This system is fed by the thermal-electric plants at Kirkenes (9,000 kilowatts) and by the hydroelectric plants at Tårnet (1,000 kilowatts) and Kobholm (2,000 kilowatts). Although these three plants are not located on the boundary rivers, they are important to the area as

SECRET

the source of all power on the Norwegian side of the boundary.33/34/
35/

The Soviet nickel-copper deposits, often referred to as the Petsamo or Pechenga nickel mines, are located at the foot of the mountain Kaulatunturi near the town of Nikel' (formerly Kolosjoki), about 5 miles east of the boundary. These mines and the town of Nikel' are connected with the port of Linakhamari, about 40 miles to the northeast, by a branch of the Arctic Highway that serves the mines and by a short stretch of the Highway itself (see Appendix B).

The mines, which were discovered in 1921 and were barely ready to produce in 1941, were bought in 1944 by the USSR from the Mond Nickel Company and the International Nickel Company of Canada.36/ From 1942 to 1944 the estimated annual production of nickel was about 9,000 tons and of copper between 3,000 and 4,000 tons. The mining and processing equipment was destroyed during the German retreat, but the Russians began reconstruction almost immediately. By 1947 the smelter was reported to have been rebuilt.37/

The present production figures are not known, but observers from the Norwegian side of the boundary report an increase in activity that indicates intense Soviet interest in the mines and processing plant (see Figure 9). Vigorous building activities have been noted near Nikel' and there has been evidence that the mines were being expanded rapidly (see Appendix A).38/ Current production is estimated at 9,000 to 12,000 tons a year. The International Nickel Company reported in

SECRET

1942 that production of nickel "could conceivably be stepped up to 20,000 tons in the future." 39/40/41/ It is estimated that there were about 3,000 workers in the mine fields and 20,000 residents in the area in 1939.42/

According to a recent report, the Germans, during World War II, planned to construct an underground concentration and smelting plant at Nikel'. An open cut was to house the installations, which were to be covered by reinforced concrete. Such construction may explain the violent explosions that occurred in the area during the summer of 1950.43/ During the German occupation, a similar concrete cover was put over the Yaniskoski dam to insure an uninterrupted power supply.

The main source of power for the nickel mines is the Yaniskoski power plant on the Pasvikelv (Russian: Pats-Yoki) about 8 miles southwest of the boundary. The Yaniskoski dam and power plant, including the concrete cover, were destroyed by the Germans in their September 1944 retreat, and the Niskakoski dam that regulates the level of Lake Inari and which is generally reported as lying above Vitaniyemi on the Pasvikelv was partially destroyed.44/ Under the terms of the German Assets Agreement of 3 February 1947, the Yaniskoski-Niskakoski area was ceded to the USSR by Finland, and the Finns agreed to reconstruct the dams and the power plant as part of their reparations.45/
46/ Reconstruction of the Yaniskoski dam was begun in 1947, and by July 1951 the two turbines and one turbogenerator had been installed. The Soviets were in the process of installing the other turbogenerator.47/

SECRET

The planned capacity of the plant is about 28,000 kilowatts, all of which is used by the nickel mines.^{48/} The Yaniskoski plant was reported by a Helsinki broadcast of 27 July 1951 to have been transferred to the Soviet Pechenga Nickel Company on 25 May 1951.^{49/} Apparently it was not until about 1 July 1951, however, that the power plant was run solely by Soviet citizens.

Apparently another power dam is projected at Rajakoski (Norwegian: Ragjeguoiikka) near the Norway-USSR boundary. It will have a slightly lower output (about 25,000 kilowatts) than the Yaniskoski plant since the falls are only 18-20 meters high as compared with 21.5 meters at Yaniskoski. Preliminary investigations on the Rajakoski project were expected to be completed by the end of July 1951, but actual building activities probably would not begin until the spring of 1952.^{50/} The output of the installation could be higher if the dam were built about a kilometer farther downstream where there are additional rapids. The construction of a dam at this point, however, would require Norwegian approval since part of the dam would be located in Norway, as is also some of the land that would have to be flooded. Another potential power plant has also been mentioned. If a dam were built in the Kolttakengyas (Boris Gleb) area, no agreement would be required and the power plant could produce 12,500 kilowatts. If the falls and rapids at Yaniskoski (Norwegian: Narefossen) were utilized, 17,500 kilowatts could be produced, but

SECRET

this would require an agreement to flood some Norwegian territory.*

Economic activities other than those associated with the iron and nickel mines are carried on primarily to serve local needs and include fishing, lumbering, limited crop production, livestock raising, reindeer breeding, and hunting.^{51/52/53/54/} Although these activities seem of slight importance compared with mining activities, their part in the early development of the area was significant, and currently they are the primary source of potential dispute concerning the administration of the boundary.

Fishing, primarily for cod, is carried on in both of the boundary rivers but mainly in Varangerfjord and Barents Sea. When the Pechenga (Petsamo) area was under Finnish control, settlements on the western shores of Guba Pechenga (fjord) and Poluostrov Rybachiy (peninsula) were established primarily on the basis of cod fishing in the fjords and Barents Sea. Finmark Fylke (province) in Norway, which dominates the Norwegian portion of Varangerfjord and Barents Sea and lies adjacent to the Soviet Union, is one of the most important cod-fishing areas of Norway.^{55/} The towns of Vardo and Vadso, which lie outside of the boundary area, are the most important centers of this industry, but fishing activities are

* The Yaniskoski referred to here is about 7 miles south of the Kolttakengyas area and about 40 miles northeast of the site of the existing Yaniskoski power plant.

SECRET

SECRET

also operating out of the port of Kirkenes, the settlements at the southern end of Jarfjord, and the mouth of the Jakobselv, where bait also is caught.

The Pasvikelv Valley is the principal source of lumber in the area, with pine and birch forests furnishing most of the wood for the few sawmills. In general, the timber cut is for local use, though timber has been listed as an export from Kirkenes. Although the course of the Pasvikelv is an asset to the Norwegians in floating timber to the main consuming area near Kirkenes, Soviet control of the flow of the waters of the Pasvikelv and some of its tributaries has restricted such activities in recent years. Rather than risk losing timber in dry parts of the river, the Norwegians saw much of their timber in movable sawmills and then transport it by truck. The Soviets have no transportation problems with regard to the timber supply for the nickel mines and nearby towns in the Pasvikelv Valley and vicinity. Timber for the port of Linakhamari, however, must be transported via the Arctic Highway by truck from the Pasvikelv Valley.

. In most of the settled sheltered areas potatoes and a few other vegetables can be raised. A small amount of grain is sown, chiefly for fodder. The reindeer feed almost exclusively on tundra moss.

Many of the people, particularly the Norwegians, have several seasonal occupations. In the off seasons, farmers may support themselves by lumbering or fishing, and many of the Lapps who live near the coasts combine fishing with reindeer herding.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~E. Transportation and Border Crossing1. Routes

The principal contact of the remote Norway-USSR border area with the outside world is by boat from the north. Only two roads lead into the area: (1) Norwegian Highway 50, from Oslo to Kirkenes, and (2) the Arctic Highway from Rovaniemi to Pechenga (formerly Petsamo), which was originally constructed by the Finns.^{56/} (See map CIA 11738.) Both routes are difficult to maintain because of harsh winters, spring thaws, and relatively rugged terrain. Most of Highway 50 was constructed by the Norwegians, but the far northern portion was completed under German military pressure in 1941.^{57/58/} The Arctic Highway, formerly entirely Finnish, now lies within Soviet territory from Virtaniemi northward.^{59/*} It provides only limited access to the border area from the south since it is closed to all regular traffic at the Finnish-Soviet border. The Soviets do have land access to the border area, however, by the northern section of the Arctic Highway, via an improved dirt road that connects the port of Linakhamari with Murmansk to the east (see Appendix B).

* Plans to connect the Finnish section of the Arctic Highway with the Norwegian road system in the border area have been reported. This road presumably would run from a point southwest of Virtaniemi, near Lake Inari, across the Finnish-Norwegian border near Krokfjell (Muotkavaara), west of Øydevann (lake), to Norwegian Highway 955 at Nyrud. The Finns probably have begun construction of their portion of the road in order to obtain access to the Arctic port of Kirkenes and to compensate in part for the loss of Pechenga to the USSR (see also Appendix B).

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Several main routes serve local needs within the border area. On the Norwegian side are the north-south boundary route No. 955 and the east-west route No. 960. The latter is practically an extension of Route 50 from Kirkenes to Storbugten. On the Soviet side is the Arctic Highway, which parallels the boundary as far north as Salmijarvi, and two branches, one to Kolttakengyas (Boris Gleb) and the other to the mines at Nikel'.

Norwegian Route 955, from Kirkenes to Graensefoss, was constructed to facilitate settlement in the Pasvikelv Valley. (See Figure 6.) At present it serves no particular economic function but greatly facilitates boundary inspection. It is a good gravel road as far south as Nyrud, where it connects with an unfinished section leading to Graensefoss.60/

Route 960, from Kirkenes to Storbugten, which passes north of Kolttakengyas, is of importance because it connects with a "track" that provides access to the Jakobselv portion of the boundary and to the hydroelectric plants at Tarnet and Kobholm. The extension of Route 960 from Storbugten to the Jakobselv in the vicinity of Heimdalen would furnish better access to an area which can now be reached only by track from the west or by boat from the north.61/*

* Several maps published during World War II show a route following the alignment of the track to the Jakobselv north of Heimdalen as under construction. Possibly it had not been completed by December 1948, when interest was evidenced in building a road from a settlement at the mouth of the Jakobselv to Kirkenes, implying that the extension of Route 960 had not been completed.

SECRET

A third route in the area is a military road southeast from Tarnet, to the Arctic Highway and Pechenga, which was built during World War II. The road was destroyed by the retreating German army and, since little reconstruction is in progress, it apparently is regarded as only a military road.62/

The present condition of the Arctic Highway and its main branch roads to Kolttakengyas and Nikel' is doubtful. Soviet accessibility to the boundary southeast of Kolttakengyas and along the Jakobselv is by way of tracks, except for the military road from Tarnet to Pechenga, which crosses the boundary near the lake Jakobselvvann (Russian: Ozero Vuoremi-yarvi).

Winter roads are not uncommon in the border area, especially on the Soviet side. These routes follow the solidly frozen surfaces of lakes and swamps, maintaining the same general alignment from year to year. They reduce travel distances and are in many cases safer than the narrow, snow-covered roads of standard construction.

Roads in the entire boundary area are typical of the Arctic. They are gravel-surfaced to withstand the rigors of seasonal temperature changes. In winter the roads are difficult to maintain and traverse because of snow and in spring because of the deep ruts and frequent crumbling of the shoulders caused by thaws. Traffic is forced to stay on the roads because of swampy terrain on both sides in the Pasvikelv portion of the boundary area and relatively rugged terrain in the eastern portion. The narrowness of the roads and the scarcity of passing places further complicates transportation.

SECRET

Transportation on the Pasvikelv above Kolttakengyas is by means of Lapp boat only. Portages are necessary at the falls.

There is only one known railroad within the border area, a 12-kilometer line that connects the A/S Sydvaranger mines with the port of Kirkenes. Another narrow-gauge line may connect the nickel mines and the smelter on the Soviet side of the boundary, but the existence of such a line has not been confirmed.

2. Border-Crossing Points

All of the border-crossing points, except the Jakobselv crossing near Jakobselvvann (lake), lie in the Pasvikelv Valley, and the majority are river crossings. (See map CIA 11738.)

At present, communication and travel across the border are severely restricted, and the former Finnish-Norwegian customs posts are closed. Along the Pasvikelv, bridges that were not destroyed during the German retreat have been dismantled wherever possible and ferry services have been discontinued. The boundary can be approached, however, at several points. Spurs of Route 955 to Nordmo and Hyrud are the most important approaches (see map CIA 11738). Bridges were built at these towns to connect the Norwegian road system with the Arctic Highway. A third approach is provided by the road to Svanvik, which continues south of the town for a short distance to Utnes, where there is a ferry landing. The ferry, which traveled between Utnes and Salmiyarvi, formerly was a fairly important crossing point. The ferry was large enough to carry heavy vehicles, and in the winter the vehicles could cross on the ice.

SECRET

Two other boundary approaches are at Skogfoss and Grænsfoss. At both places, bridges were probably built during the war, but available information regarding the completion and use of the bridges is vague, as is also information concerning road connections between the bridges and the main roads (particularly on the Soviet side of the boundary). Another bridge, at Grænsfoss, was designed to replace a ferry service and connect Route 955 with the Arctic Highway near Nautsi.

The remaining two points in the Pasvikelv Valley at which the boundary can be crossed by road are near Kolttakengyas. Two roads that run south from Route 960 -- one west of the river and one east of the river -- connect, via the Kolttakengyas-Akhmalkhti road, with the Arctic Highway. 63/64/65/

IV. Boundary Administration and Potential Disputes

It is not expected that disputes on the administration of the boundary or the position of the line as demarcated in 1947 will seriously affect Norwegian-Soviet relations in the near future. The extreme detail of the boundary regime agreement, dated 29 December 1949, and of the method of demarcation used precludes many disputes, provided the procedures set for dealing with disagreements are respected. Furthermore, the people in the border area appear anxious to avoid trouble, especially the Norwegians, who have relative freedom of movement. Certain problems may arise, however, in relation to the boundary rivers and territorial sea north of the mouth of Jakobselv.

SECRET

A. Boundary Regime Agreement and Boundary Administration

The severe attitude of the Soviet Union toward border security, coupled with the desire of Norway to protect its own interests while still maintaining good relations with the USSR, necessitated a very detailed agreement regarding border activities and providing means for the settlement of conflicts and incidents. Negotiations for such an agreement began in Oslo on 30 November 1949. The resulting agreement was signed on 29 December 1949. Norway ratified the agreement on 30 June 1950 and the Soviet Union on 23 October 1950. The agreement went into effect on 30 October 1950, after exchange of instruments of ratification in Moscow.^{66/}

The agreement provides regulations for the following: (1) the inspection and maintenance of markers and a cleared strip (vista) along the boundary; (2) the use of boundary streams and lakes, including shipping, log floating, and fishing; (3) land use along the land boundary, including hunting, agriculture, and mining; (4) the avoidance of incidents; and (5) the solution of disputes and the enforcement of the provisions of the agreement. Article I states specifically that the boundary extends under the ground and into the air. Points 2 and 3 are of particular interest, since their effectiveness in guaranteeing to residents of the border areas the right to pursue their means of livelihood will determine whether the course of the boundary will be subject to dispute in the future (see Appendix A).

SECRET

SECRET

The provisions for the movement of vessels and for fishing apply to both the Pasvikelv and Jakobselv, but the regulations on timber floating apply only to the Pasvikelv, probably because the Jakobselv area is almost barren. Vessels may use the main channel, even if they must cross the line to do so, in the narrow portions of the rivers between markers Nos. 9 and 10 and marker No. 196 on the Pasvikelv and along the entire Jakobselv boundary. This permits Soviet travel through the part of the Pasvikelv that lies wholly within Norway. Limitations at marker No. 196, on the other hand, prohibit Norwegian transport through the Soviet Kolttakengyas area, thus preventing Norwegian use of the river as a route to and from the sea. It should be noted, however, that the river would not be a main waterway above this area even if it were open, since only shallow Lapp boats can navigate above the Soviet-held portion of the river and portages are necessary at the falls and rapids. In the larger lakes the only vessels allowed to cross the boundary are those used in log floating, which may cross the line under certain conditions.

Fishing is allowed up to the boundary, but fishing zones are not defined by marker numbers. Presumably fishing by nationals of the USSR is not permitted in the part of the Pasvikelv between boundary markers Nos. 9 and 11, which belongs to Norway, or by Norwegians in the Kolttakengyas regions, which belongs to the USSR. Both travel along and fishing on the rivers at night is prohibited

SECRET

SECRET

except on the larger lakes, where vessels must stay at least 200 meters (656 feet) from the line and be adequately lighted. All vessels must be marked clearly, and landing on the bank of the other country is allowed only in case of distress.

Limitations of the floating of timber are not so strict. Normally, logs may be floated freely through the two sectors of the Pasvikelv that lie entirely on either the Norwegian or Soviet side of the line (see map CIA 11738). This is a distinct advantage to the Norwegians, since it gives them access to the mouth of the Pasvikelv, which lies in their territory. Until special agreements have been reached on control of the water level of the Pasvikelv, however, the Norwegians will probably avoid the risk of having the timber lie dry in the riverbed. Soviet use of the river below the Kolttakengyas area is not mentioned in the agreement, probably because the Soviets are not interested in floating timber beyond that area. Presumably a special agreement would be necessary to permit them to use the Norwegian-controlled mouth of the river. The boundary administrators are to decide by 1 April of each year when timber may be floated in the area. Foremen and crews are allowed to cross the river and work on the opposite bank by daylight to set up installations essential to the floating activities. At least five days' notice of such a boundary crossing must be given to authorities of the other country, and the workers must have special certificates from their boundary commissioner. Timber floated down the river is not subject to customs or other duties.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Two clauses on the use of waters of the boundary rivers that deal with the construction of installations and with water flow are discussed under Potential Disputes.

Agriculture, lumbering, and mining are to be carried on without violating or damaging territory or property of the other country or crossing the boundary for any reason. Wild animals and birds are not to be shot or pursued across the boundary. The other party must be notified of dangerous forest fires across the boundary, or of trees that have fallen across the line, which will then be cut and returned. Mineral deposits may not be explored or exploited in a manner that might damage territory on the other side of the boundary. These activities are prohibited within a 20-meter (65.6-foot) strip along the boundary unless the two parties agree to an exception and make adequate provisions to "insure the preservation of the boundary line."

Conflicts and incidents resulting from lack of conformance with the regulations or from such issues as injury of persons living on the other side of the boundary, unapproved crossings and communications, animals straying across the boundary, photographing of parts of the other country, and damaging of markers are to be handled by the boundary commissioners. Serious issues may be negotiated through diplomatic channels, but provision is made for returning such issues to local authorities for discussion. In March 1950 discussions between the Norwegian and Soviet boundary authorities regarding

~~SECRET~~

disputes and incidents were held at the border box near Storskog.^{67/}
(See Figure 10.)

The great number of restrictions on the boundary necessitates an almost constant patrol system, particularly in the settled Pasvikelv Valley. The Norwegians, as a result of the December 1949 agreement, planned to expand their frontier police force and, in response to Soviet protest of Norwegian boundary crossings, to have a permanent police force in the frontier areas where settlement is comparatively dense. According to a report of May 1951, the USSR has placed wooden watchtowers at points averaging one-half kilometer (1,640 feet) apart along the Pasvikelv portion of the boundary, about 200 yards behind the line.^{68/} (See Figure 11.) Although the border is watched closely by Soviet guards, it is apparently possible to cross undetected during the summer. The Soviets can "organize a very effective pursuit," however, if an illegal crossing is suspected.^{69/}

B. Potential Disputes

Although no serious disagreement over the course of the Norway-USSR boundary is now apparent, several issues may lead to disputes unless special agreements are concluded. The Soviet projection of territory on the Norwegian side of the river around Kolttakengyas might at first seem to be the main cause of difficulty, but actually, during peacetime, that area has been the source of only relatively minor issues. The Norwegians are apprehensive about this Soviet

SECRET

foothold on their side of the river, which connects directly with their road system and is only a few miles from vital iron mines, but they have become resigned to the situation, which has existed since 1826. A minor incident of a type that might recur developed in 1926, when Norwegians were found to be cultivating Finnish territory inadvertently because the boundary was inadequately marked.

A more critical potential difficulty in the area is the problem of Soviet control of the water level of the Pasvikelv. By the 1949 regime agreement, Norway was granted the right to float timber to the mouth of the river, but Soviet regulation has disturbed the water level in some areas to such a degree that Norwegian log floating has been restricted.

The 1949 agreement provided for the concluding of special agreements regarding the construction of any installation on the boundary rivers that might affect the flow or level of water. Before the regime agreement was drawn up, some Norwegian farm land in the valley had been flooded during the summer and suffered from drought in the fall because the USSR had dammed the river and regulated the water level, probably in connection with the Yaniskoski power plant. The problem of water flow seems likely to become increasingly significant since construction of the Yaniskoski dam has been completed and plans have been made for the construction of a dam at the Rajakoski (Ragjeguoiikka) falls and possibly another on the Pasvikelv near Kolttakengyas. (See map CIA 11738.) These projects are discussed in greater detail under Industries and Resources.

SECRET

SECRET

The USSR refused to include in the regime agreement any provision for the regulation and use of waters of the boundary rivers on the ground that any such clauses, no matter how general, might hinder negotiations for specific agreements in the future. The two falls near the southernmost point of the boundary lie entirely on the Soviet side of the line and installations at both of these points could have a very serious effect on the water level of the river. In June 1950, in agreeing to ratify the 1949 agreement, a Norwegian Storting committee commented "that as soon as conditions permit, the agreement on waterways along the border areas should be concluded."70/ Apparently, no such agreement has been drawn up, but in view of the final transfer of the Yaniskoski plant and dam by Finland to the USSR in May 1951 and the initiation of negotiations for the Rajakoski dam in about June of that year, the Norwegians and Soviets may have been discussing an agreement on the waterways.71/ In the meantime, Norwegian rights are protected only by a clause in the 1949 agreement that requires the regular exchange, "if possible," of information on water level and flow and on ice conditions that might result in damage or in danger to territory of the other country. Flood warnings, issued in accordance with this provision, might reduce flood damage but no corresponding safeguard covers water shortage.

Claims to territorial waters in the Barents Sea may become another source of dispute. Norway claims territorial seas extending 4 nautical

SECRET

SECRET

miles offshore and the USSR claims 12 nautical miles offshore.* Because of this situation, Norwegians might inadvertently fish in waters claimed by the USSR, especially since fishermen in these northern waters had been accustomed to sailing about relatively freely. Finnish and Soviet fishermen had even been allowed to catch bait on the Norwegian side of the line in the vicinity of the mouth of the Jakobselv, provided they did not sell the bait or in any way endanger the livelihood of the Norwegian fishermen. In the past, Norwegians fished in the fjords of the White Sea, but since the marking of the international boundary in 1947 the Soviet Union has been enforcing the 12-mile limit. The result has been the loss of rich fishing areas to the Norwegians. Although the Soviets have considered the 12-mile limit as applying in the vicinity of the Norway-USSR boundary 72/ the 1947 demarcation protocol makes no specific mention of the territorial sea in terms of extent of claims or with reference to the east-west limit of claims if the marked boundary were mathematically extended beyond marker No. 415. In fact, the Joint Commission, after preliminary discussions, decided that this problem should be settled in separate negotiations.

Marker No. 415 lies approximately 2,200 feet in a straight line north-northwest of what was considered in 1947 to be the mouth of the Jakobselv (marker No. 412). (Note three separate straight-line

* There is no indication of a special agreement between Norway and the USSR that would bind the Soviet Union to a claim of less than 12 miles in extent.

SECRET

SECRET

sectors between markers Nos. 412 and 415 shown on map CIA 12104.) The demarcation protocol describes the location of the final marker by relation to the other markers and sight lines, but it gives no indication of how the course of the line and the locations of markers Nos. 413, 414, and 415 were originally determined. Apparently the delimiting of the line in the sea followed the principle of placing it equidistant from the Soviet and Norwegian shores, sandbanks, skerries, and similar features that are not constantly inundated. This approach is traditional for both Norway and the Soviet Union and was cited in the discussions following the 1925 Finnish-Norwegian investigation of the boundary.

If the territories of two nations meet at a sea the terminus of the international boundary, in most cases, is at the shoreline. Ideally, however, the boundary should terminate at the seaward limit of the marginal, or territorial, sea.^{73/} According to the 1947 demarcation protocol and maps, the northern terminus of the Norway-USSR boundary, marker No. 415, is neither at the shoreline nor at the seaward limit of the marginal seas. The reason for the extension of the boundary to marker No. 415 is not clearly indicated in available references, but the boundary probably was extended to assure to both nations equal access to the mouth of the Jakobselv. The Joint Commission probably decided to end the boundary at marker No. 415 and thus avoid the question of claims to the territorial sea, which might have delayed the reestablishment and marking of the land and river boundary.

SECRET

The distance to which a mathematical line would have to be extended to meet the requirements of the Soviet claim of 12 nautical miles would definitely be unsatisfactory to the Norwegians, who claim 4 nautical miles. The difference in the extent of the claims would have great bearing on the determination of the course of the mathematical extension of the boundary.

Although the Soviets are applying the 12-mile limit north of the mouth of the Jakobselv, details on the exact limit of Soviet enforcement are lacking. It seems possible that the Norwegians have cautioned their people to maintain safe distances from any possible extension that the Soviets may have in mind. Few reports of Norwegian ships apprehended by the Soviets have been received, but this does not necessarily indicate that no incidents have occurred. The Norwegians probably have found that such incidents differ little from those that occur along the land and river boundary and that repatriation of the people who violate the boundary is much easier and quicker if there is no publicity on the issues.^{74/} Without publicity the individuals could be returned within two or three days, but if the cases were publicized it might take up to three or more weeks.

V. Maps Showing the Norway-USSR Boundary

A. Evaluation of Map Coverage

The exact location of the present Norway-USSR boundary is best shown on the official 1947 demarcation map. Ranking second is

SECRET

the Norwegian topographic map series at 1:100,000, which also shows the Norwegian version of the line. No large-scale Soviet maps produced since the USSR acquired Pechenga are available.* Consequently, the present Soviet area is covered only by Finnish map series, which are very old.

Maps at a scale smaller than 1:100,000 do not show adequately such detailed features as islands and sandbanks in the boundary rivers, which have been the main subjects of dispute. For the Jakobslev area even the scale of 1:100,000 is much too small, and only the 1947 demarcation map and the Finnish maps at 1:20,000 give sufficient detail. Usefulness of the Finnish maps is limited because of the early date (1928-33) of the surveys on which they are based. Changes in the thalweg and islands of the rivers since the 1:20,000 surveys were made have altered the position of the boundary considerably. Furthermore, the map does not show the boundary symbol in the estuary of the Jakobselv and the waters to the north, and the available sheets cover the boundary only as far south as approximately 69°20'N.**

* Two sheets of the Soviet map at 1:500,000 (1951) show the boundary, but this is neither an official presentation of the line (the Pechenga area was still a part of Finland) nor of much value in tracing the actual detailed course of the boundary, since the scale is too small. [General Staff of the Red Army Topographic Map]; 1:500,000; General Staff of the Red Army; 1941; Sheets Ozero Inari and Murmansk (Army Map Service Library Call No. N-3-30-57049-500, Sheets Nos. R-36-C and D and R-35-C and D).

** Topografinen Kartta (Topographic Map); 1:20,000; [Finnish] Maanmittaushallitus (General Survey Office); 1941 reprints; Sheets Vuoremi, Pasaritunturi, Kivitunturi, Vuoremijarvi, Maajarvi, Kuvernöörinkoski, Vohtajarvi, Jäniskoski-Kolttakongas, Valasjarvi, Salmijarvi, Menikka, Pitkajarvi (Army Map Service Library Call No. 21M-23-30-37509-20).

SECRET

SECRET

Finnish coverage of the boundary area at scales of 1:100,000 and 1:200,000 is spotty, the former covering approximately the same area as the 1:20,000 series and the latter covering only the southernmost part of the boundary. Finnish map coverage of the boundary over a period of years is provided by the 1:400,000 general maps of Finland, but the scale is too small to show boundary detail.* German maps and [REDACTED] of the border area are based on the Norwegian and Finnish series, with the boundary line apparently taken from the Norwegian 1:100,000 series.

B. Evaluation of Individual Map Series

Karta gosudarstvennoy granitsy mezhdu Soyuzem Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i Norvegiy (Map of the state boundary between the USSR and Norway); 1:25,000; Smeshannaya Soyuzu SSR i Norvegii Komissiya po demarkatsii gosudarstvennoy granitsi mezhdu SSR i Norvegiy (Mixed USSR and Norwegian Commission for the demarcation of the state boundary between the USSR and Norway); 1947; 18 ozalid sheets, each in both Norwegian and Russian (CIA Map Library Call No. 74710).

These sheets may be consolidated with the new Finnish series, Peruskartta, which has replaced the Topografinen Kartta.

* The most recent date of this series is 1946, but a supplementary sheet has been issued showing later boundary revision, including the delineation of the new Finnish-Soviet boundary in the Yaniskoski-Niskakoski area. Suomen Yleiskartta (General Map of Finland); 1:400,000; Finnish/ Maanmittaushallitus (General Survey Office); Sheet A 4, dated 1946 (Army Map Service Library Call No. 21M3-29-37505-400).

The boundary demarcation maps are more useful than the descriptive protocol because they show the exact position of the line, whereas the protocol merely supplements the information shown on the map. The markers are located on the map with an error of not more than 0.2 millimeters, and topographic detail within the boundary strip is plotted with almost equal precision.

The demarcation map locates the boundary line and its 415 markers and carries topographic detail for strips 0.5 kilometer (1,640 feet) wide on both sides of the line, including the areas along the banks and shores of boundary rivers and of all but the largest boundary lakes. Structures (differentiated by type), transportation features, details of drainage (swamps, falls, rapids, and sand banks), contours at 10-meter intervals, spot heights, vegetation, and trigonometric points are shown. The task of surveying, mapping, and marking the boundary was divided into two sections, one supervised by Norwegians and the other by Russians. As a result, differences between Soviet and Norwegian methods in choice, classification, and symbolization of the physical and cultural features are apparent. Sheets 1 through 9, which cover the southern portion of the boundary from Krokfjell to Holmfossen, are characteristic of Soviet mapping; and Sheets 10 through 18, which cover the northern and eastern portion of the boundary from Holmfossen to the Varangerfjord, are characteristic of Norwegian mapping. These differences, however, do not affect the usefulness of the map with respect to boundary portrayal. The

SECRET

boundary is shown by the same symbol throughout its length, except in the narrowest parts of the Jakobselv, where a fine dashed line was found to be more practical. The boundary markers are indicated uniformly on all sheets.

Another copy of the demarcation map is available in album form at the CIA Map Library (Call No. aF122.la .S6). The materials in this album are all photostatic copies, and the sheets of the demarcation map are at a reduced scale of approximately 1:50,000. Although the sheets are at a scale large enough for tracing the boundary, they are neither as clear nor as easy to use as the 1:25,000 sheets. The album also includes (1) an index map of the boundary sheets, (2) another series of 18 sheets showing the geodetic network established to provide boundary-marker coordinates and serve as the basis for the topographic surveying of the boundary strip, and (3) four pages of sketches and working drawings of certain markers and geodetic points along the boundary. The local triangulation was based on points determined in the Pulkova system of 1932 on the Bessel ellipsoid.

Topografisk kart over kongeriget Norge (Topographic map of the kingdom of Norway); 1:100,000; Norges geografiske opmåling (Norwegian Geographic Surveying Department); Sheets Z 7 (Krokvjeld), AE 7 (Vaggatem), AE 6 (Svanvik), AE 5 (Neiden), Ö 6 (Karpelven), and Ö 5 (Jarfjorden); originals 1893-95, revised sheets 1939-50 (Army Map Service Library Call No. 31M/3-30-38000-100).

SECRET

Except for the 1947 demarcation maps, these six sheets give the best official representation of the boundary that is available in this country. The land boundary is still correct, although the position of the boundary along the rivers is out of date on most sheets. Only one of the six available sheets has been revised since the 1947 demarcation of the boundary. Sheet Z 7, Krokfjeld, dated 1950, covers the southernmost portion of the boundary and clearly shows the Norwegian possession of both banks of the Pasvikelv in the Graensefoss area. The new marker numbers have been substituted at the locations of the old cairns, new markers Nos. 8 and 11 replacing old markers Nos. 354 and 355, respectively. The detail of the river and the relation of the boundary to the river are shown much more precisely on the 1950 sheet than on the 1894 original, which gives the erroneous impression that the thalweg of the Pasvikelv is followed between old markers Nos. 354 and 355. The remainder of the boundary is basically the same on both editions, but it is obvious that the later edition incorporates the results of the 1947 surveys, since the location of the banks and islands of the Pasvikelv corresponds, as well as scale permits, with that on the demarcation maps.

Of the sheets covering the Pasvikelv portion of the boundary, the Svanvik (Æ 7) Sheet, dated 1939, is the most obviously out of date since it covers the portions of the Pasvikelv in which Norway ceded islands to the USSR in 1947 on the basis of thalweg measurements made that year. On the Svanvik sheet the three islands -- Ostrov

Kiste-kholmen (Kisteholmen), Ostrov Brennkholmen (Brenneholmen), and an unnamed island near the latter -- are still shown as Norwegian, in accord with the line as determined or reaffirmed in 1826, 1896, and 1925. Although neither of the two larger islands is named, they can be identified from the demarcation map. On the Svanvik sheet of the 1:100,000 series, Ostrov Kiste-kholmen can be identified as the largest island crossed by the parallel of $69^{\circ}10'40''N$, Ostrov Brennkholmen is crossed by the parallel of $69^{\circ}18'20''N$, and the small unnamed island lies slightly more than 500 meters to the southwest of Ostrov Brennkholmen.

Other sheets for the Pasvikelv boundary are correct in showing the possession of the larger islands, but some of the details on islands, rivers, and lakes are not in full agreement with the demarcation map. These discrepancies are in part a result of differences in scale and in part of changes in the thalweg and banks of the river.

The 1:100,000 sheets are of little use for the entire Jakobselv boundary. South of the estuary the river is so narrow that it appears as a single line. The 1949 printing of the Jarfjorden sheet omits the boundary symbol in the estuary of the Jakobselv, and the extension of the symbol beyond the narrows does not conform to the position of the boundary as established in 1947.

On the whole the most recent sheets of the Norwegian 1:100,000 series are fairly accurate for this scale, but it is still desirable to use the demarcation maps as a supplementary source since they


~~SECRET~~

incorporate the most recent surveying and thalweg measurements and show the exact course of the boundary. One disadvantage of the 1:100,000 Norwegian map is the lack of detail on the Soviet side of the boundary. Only main drainage, transportation, and settlement information is shown outside the limits of Norway, and this is often in generalized form. Topographic information within the limits of Norway is quite detailed on these sheets.

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL


Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T01018A000100040001-6



Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T01018A000100040001-6

RESTRICTED
SECURITY INFORMATION

Norway – U S S R Boundary in the Mouth of the Jakobselv



25X1A2g00010004000

1-6

Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T01018A000100040001-6

Next 14 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T01018A000100040001-6

SECRET

APPENDIX C

Gaps in Intelligence

The most serious gap in information on the Norway-USSR boundary area concerns activities on the Soviet side of the line. Such information is available for only a few areas where observations have been made from the Norwegian side. Although no large-scale Soviet maps of the territory are available, it is probable that the Soviets have either mapped the area or revised earlier Finnish maps.

Comprehensive reports including information on the area are available, but they are old, most of them having been published in the early 1940's. To some extent these reports have been brought up to date by more recent spot information on settlements, roads, mines, and power plants, but the current picture is not complete. Further information is needed, particularly concerning some of the less-used roads and recent population changes.

It is not known whether the Norwegians and Soviets have begun negotiations concerning the use of the waters of the Pasvikelv or of the extension of the international boundary into the territorial sea. It seems, however, that negotiations concerning the use of the Pasvikelv would be imperative in view of the completion of the Yaniskoski hydroelectric power plant and Soviet plans for the development of other power sites along the river. Indications concerning negotiations for the seaward extension of the international boundary north of the mouth of the Jakobselv are even more vague. It is not known whether Norwegian ships have been detained by the Soviets or whether Norway has

SECRET

adopted precautionary measures to prevent such incidents. The fact that few have been reported could indicate either that such incidents are rare or that the Norwegians are observing a policy of curbing publicity regarding them in order to facilitate the return of Norwegian nationals.

SECRET

APPENDIX D

Sources and Evaluation of Sources

1. Evaluation of Sources

The 1947 Norway-USSR demarcation maps, protocol, and boundary regime agreement are highly detailed and official and are the basic sources for the entire report. Official sources available also give a complete history of the boundary, texts of all treaties, and details of all major boundary surveys.

Descriptions of the boundary area are drawn from comprehensive reports published in the early 1940's. They have been brought up to date, insofar as possible, by spot intelligence information, which is believed to be accurate since practically every report cited was confirmed by at least one other.

25X1A2gDP

25X1A2gDP 79T01018

In cases where two reports merely substantiated each other, only one was cited as a source.

A large number of maps were examined. The few listed as sources were selected because they were official as of the date of publication and because they served as the basis for all other maps of the boundary and the boundary area. The most important map sources are discussed in detail under Maps Showing the Norway-USSR Boundary (see p. 49).

2. Sources



1. Norway, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Storting Proposal 119 (1948). Procurement of the consent of the Storting for Norway's approval of the Norwegian-Soviet boundary survey of 1947; translated in part as Central Intelligence Agency, FDD Report U-1524, 24 October 1951.

SECRET

2. Hertslet, Edward, Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. I, 1814-1827, London, 1875, pp. 744-46.
3. League of Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. III, No. 1, 1921, p. 6.
4. Department of State Bulletin, 27 April 1940, pp. 453-56, Peace Treaty of 12 March 1944.
5. Department of State Bulletin, 18 February 1945, pp. 261-68. September 1944 Armistice for Finland.
6. Treaty of Peace with Finland, 1947.
7. Norway, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Storting Proposal No. 119 (1948), Appendix 4.
8. Klingenberg, K. S., "Practical and Legal Questions which Arose During the Boundary Agreement Between Norway and Finland in 1925," Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift, Vol. IV, 1930, pp. 197-240. In Norwegian; translated as Central Intelligence Agency, FDD Report U-1325, 30 April 1951.
9. League of Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. XXX, 1924-25, p. 49. Treaty No. 758.
10. Haataja, Kyösti, "Questions Juridiques Surgies Lors de la Revision de la Frontiere Finlandaise entre le Golfe de Bothnie et l'Ocean Glacial," Fennia, Vol. 49, No. 1, 1927, pp. 1-46, maps.
11. Department of State, Despatch No. 53, Oslo, 22 August 1946.

SECRET

SECRET

12. Department of State, Despatch No. 1345, Oslo, 16 September 1947.
13. Department of State, Despatch No. 1554, Oslo, 24 November 1947.
14. Department of State, Airgram No. 1410, Moscow, 29 December 1947.
15. Norway, Overenskometer med Fremmede Stater, No. 4, 10 May 1950, pp. 151-273. Exchange of notes with documents concerning the Norway-USSR boundary survey of 1947; translated in part as Central Intelligence Agency, FDD Report U-1351, 11 June 1951.
16. Military Attache, Oslo, R-527-48, 11 December 1948.
17. Department of State, Airgram No. 764, Oslo, 27 December 1948.
18. 
19. 
20. Central Intelligence Agency, Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study of European U.S.S.R., Janis 40, Chapter II - Military Geography, 1948, p. 4.
21. Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Erik R. v., "The Petsamo Region," Geographical Review, Vol. 34, No. 3, July 1944, pp. 405-418.


25X1X7

SECRET

22. Folkefordelingskart-1946 (Population Distribution Map-1946); [1:1,075,000]; Finnmark, Regionanalyser for B.S.R., Oslo, 1948.

23. Jutikkala, Eino, Atlas of Finnish History, Helsinki, 1949, p. 22.

24.



25X1X7

25.

26. Department of State, Despatch No. 277, Oslo, 22 August 1949.

27. Department of State, Despatch No. 432, Oslo, 1 September 1950, "Semi-Annual Economic Report -- Norway, 1950."

28. Department of State, Despatch No. 277, Oslo, 22 August 1949.

29. Department of State, Despatch No. 432, Oslo, 1 September 1950.

30. Department of State, Despatch No. 507, Oslo, 28 March 1950, "Annual Economic Report -- Norway, 1949."

25X1A2g

31.




32. New York Herald Tribune, 8 October 1950.

SECRET

SECRET

33. Norway: Zone Handbook No. 1 (Fylke Series) -- Finnmark,
pp. 18-19.

34.



25X1A2g

35.

36. Canada, Treaty Series, No. 29, 1944.

37. Central Intelligence Agency, FDD Report No. U-38249.
No. 340262, 17 August 1949.

38. Army Attache, Finland, R-297-51, 26 July 1951, "New
Industries and Settlements in Petsamo Area."

39.



25X1A2g

40. Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis
Branch, R and A No. 730, Survey of Finland, 25 April
1942, (2d edition, October 1942), p. 30.

41. Office of Economic Warfare, Enemy Branch, Individual
Industrial Plants in German Europe: Janiskoski Power
Plant and Petsamo Nickel Mines. No date.

42. Department of State, Despatch No. 277, Oslo, 22 August
1949.

25X1A2g

43.



44. Department of State, Despatch No. 503, Helsinki, 13
June 1950.

45. Department of State, Despatch No. 1075, Helsinki,
7 February 1947.

SECRET

SECRET

46. Department of State, Despatch No. 188, Helsinki, 15
September 1950.

47.

48.

49. FBID, Europe and the Near East, 28 June 1951, p. YY-2.

50. Army Attache Finland, R-297-51, 26 July 1951.

51. Geographical Handbook Series: Norway, Vol. I, B.R.

501, January 1942.

52. Geographical Handbook Series: Norway, Vol. II, B.R.

501a, January 1943.

53. Kuehnel-Leddihn, Geographical Review, Vol. 34, 1944,

p. 405-418.

54. I.S.I.S. Report on Northern Norway and Arctic Finland,

C.B. 04096Q, Vol. II, pp. 11-12.

55. Department of State, Despatch No. 2, Bergen, 12 July

1950, "Cod-Liver Oil Industry in Norway."

56. I.S.I.S. Report on Northern Norway and Arctic Finland,

C.B. 04096Q, Vol. II, p. 12.

57. I.S.I.S. Report on Northern Norway and Arctic Finland,

C.B. 04096Q, Vol. II, p. 52.

58. Norway: Zone Handbook No. 1 (Fylke Series) - Finnmark,

pp. 33 and 69.

25X1A2g

SECRET

SECRET

25X1A2g

59.

60.

61. Department of State, Airgram No. 764, Oslo, 27 December 1948.

62. Naval Attache, Oslo, Series C-35-49, 5 March 1949.

63. I.S.I.S. Report on Northern Norway and Arctic Finland,

64096Q, Vol. II, pp. 102-103.

25X1A2g

64.

65. Naval Attache, Oslo, Serial C-35-49, 5 March 1949.

66. Norway, Overenskomster med Fremmede Stater, No. 1, 20 March 1951. Boundary regime agreement between Norway and the USSR; translated by Department of State, Division of Foreign Language Services as TC No. 37871, T-38/R-XII, Norwegian.

67. Department of State, Despatch No. 287, Oslo, 2 March 1950.

68. Naval Attache, Oslo, 55-C-51, 28 May 1951.

69. Army Attache, Finland, R-294-51, 25 July 1951.

25X1A8a


70.

SECRET

SECRET

25X1A8a

71.



72. Naval Attache, Stockholm, 19-49, 8 February 1949.

73. U. S. Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,

Submerged Lands, Hearings on S. J. Res. 20, U. S.

Senate, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., February 1951, p. 551.

74.



25X1A2g

SECRET

SECRET

Security Information




Figure 1. Boris Gilev Church, Kattikhengras, USSR (probably pre-1940).

SECRET

SECRET

Security Information




Figure 2. View of marker posts along land boundary.



Figure 3. View of boundary cairn.

SECRET

SECRET

Security Information




Figure 4. Norwegian boundary marker No. 120, Skogfoss (1947).

SECRET

SECRET

Security Information



Figure 5. Terrain along Norway-Soviet boundary, Soviet Union on far side of river (1948).

SECRET



Figure 6. View of Largetjord, Norway; highway No. 975 on right (date unknown).

SECRET

Security Information




Figure 7. Electric drills at Norwegian iron ore mine, Bjørnevatn (1951).

SECRET


SECRET
Security Information



SECRET

Security Information

PETSAMON NIKKELI O.Y.



Surface Plant at Kotosjoki

Panorama from Roof of Shear Building

Sept 30, 1939

Figure 9. Petsamo nickel-processing plant.

SECRET

SECRET

Security Information



Figure 10. Border-crossing point at Storskog; Norwegian and Soviet commandants hoist their respective national flags on the tall poles when they wish to confer with each other (1947).




Figure 11. View across the Pasvikelv from Norwegian guard post at Skogfoss; Soviet observation tower on summit opposite (1947).

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN D/R
DEC 22 4 42 PM '52

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T01018A000100040001-6

Copy No. 130

GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

D/R

THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN
NORWAY AND THE USSR

G-4



CIA/RR-G-4
31 October 1952

DOCUMENT NO. 1
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1989
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE 26 Nov 79 REVIEWER: 008514

U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

RETURN TO RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
JOB 56-526 BOX 2

33284

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

W A R N I N G

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T01018A000100040001-6
~~SECRET~~
Security Information

GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN NORWAY AND THE USSR

CIA/RR-G-4

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports

Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T01018A000100040001-6