




**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

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2 December 1978

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
USSR-Cuba

FEATURE ARTICLE 25

INTERNATIONAL: World Water Problems



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IRAN: Situation Report

Military units in Tehran last night used gunfire to drive off demonstrators who ignored the curfew to observe the first hours of the holy month of Moharram. Exiled Shia leader Khomeini may soon leave France for Suria.

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Hundreds of people who took to the streets to mark the beginning of Moharram marched through several areas of Tehran chanting antigovernment slogans. The military fired rifles and automatic weapons and may have used tanks or artillery to disperse the crowds. According to press accounts, there were some casualties, although the bulk of the reports suggest that most troops fired over the heads of the people.

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Tehran remains very tense. People have hoarded food, cooking oil, and other supplies in the expectation that the general strike will last well into the month. Food was plentiful but expensive yesterday.

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
Antiforeign sentiment is much higher than in previous years during Moharram. Several Iranian friends have warned one US diplomat that his life is in danger and that he should not identify himself to strangers as an American. A homemade bomb was thrown into the home of a US noncommissioned officer but caused no casualties.



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A member of Khomeini's entourage in France said on Thursday that the Shia opposition leader is considering leaving soon--possibly this weekend--for Damascus, and the Syrians have allegedly agreed to accept him.

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


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IRAN: Alert Memorandum

//The Daily prints excerpts from an Alert Memorandum on the situation in Iran, which takes a look at the position the Shah will be in if he survives the civil violence this month--and what Iran is likely to face if he does not. The memorandum was prepared by CIA and coordinated in substance at the working level

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//In the current very difficult political circumstances, there is a good chance that civil unrest will be sufficiently serious to threaten the survival of the monarchy.//

//The likely deterioration of the security situation during Moharram will substantially raise the risk to Americans in Iran. Manifestations of xenophobia have occurred during these religious observances in the past. This year, any antiforeign activity will be especially likely to take on an anti-American cast, given US support of the Shah.//

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//If the Shah remains in power through Moharram, he will have won a temporary political and psychological respite--one that could buy him limited time in which to pursue efforts to form a civilian coalition government. He might be able to elicit the cooperation of "neutral" civilian figures in forming a government of elder statesmen, technocrats, and senior civil servants.//

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//Khomeini's views will not change, however, and the Ayatollah will retain his influence among the masses. In such a situation, it would be very difficult to get leaders of the National Front to participate in a coalition government--and only such a government would have a reasonable chance of reestablishing public trust.//

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//The Shah's outlasting Moharram might also reinforce the military leadership in its view that only the Army can keep order. The military therefore may resist an early return to civilian government and the Shah may decide to extend its involvement in government beyond the period either he or the military leadership initially envisaged.//

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//The powers and prerogatives of the Shah almost certainly will erode in the post-Moharram period. He will be obliged to share power with the military leadership and with the prime minister (whether he is a military officer or a civilian). The monarch's authority will be further reduced by the impact of corruption trials and other exposures of past abuses.// [redacted]

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//Even if he survives the immediate crisis, therefore, the Shah will find it very difficult to implement his planned political program or to negotiate a permanent settlement with his emboldened opposition.// [redacted]

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[redacted]

//If the Shah were to abdicate or be forcibly removed, it is more likely that a military regime would succeed him than that he would be succeeded by either the religious right or the secular left. The military might try to establish its legitimacy by becoming the effective power behind a weak regency council or a facade of civilian politicians.// [redacted]

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//The Shah's abdication at an early stage would probably be coordinated with the military leadership and would result in the accession to power of senior officers with views similar in important respects to those of the Shah. On the other hand, if the military were to mount a successful coup--and we have no sound basis on which to predict the stage at which this might happen--the chances would be greater that younger officers with less traditional views would come to power.// [redacted]

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[redacted]

//A military government would probably attempt initially to play on the Shah's ouster to arrange a detente with the opposition. In the likely event that this failed, we believe that most types of military regime--especially one led by senior officers--would be more disposed than the Shah to use force to quell unrest.//

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[redacted]

//On foreign and defense policies, a military regime would perceive Iran's basic national interests in much the same way as the Shah. It would be more sensitive to xenophobic sentiment, however, and would be more cautious in dealing with the superpowers and in projecting Iran's power in the Persian Gulf.// [redacted]

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[redacted]


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25X1 //We consider it less likely in the near term that a radical nationalist or extreme leftist military regime might come to power or that the government might be taken over by the religious or the leftist opposition. The chance of these eventualities would increase sharply, however, if there were a general collapse of central government authority in the wake of a coup or abdication. A radical regime might well initiate a foreign policy that was initially neutral or xenophobic but that progressively moved away from close ties with the US and the West.// 

//If the Shah perseveres, the USSR would presumably continue the cautious public response it has shown toward developments in Iran during the past several months. At the same time, the Soviets would expand their clandestine contacts with Iranian opposition groups in the belief that the Shah remains highly vulnerable.// 

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//If the Shah does not retain power, the Soviets will move quickly to establish as close a relationship as possible with his successors. Soviet interests might suffer a short-term setback if the Shah were succeeded by a reactionary military or religious government, but such a development would be likely to usher in a period of instability that could offer new opportunities for the expansion of Soviet influence in Iran and in the Persian Gulf region.// 

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[redacted]

ROMANIA: Ceausescu's Speech

In a much-anticipated speech yesterday, Romanian President Ceausescu made no new revelations on relations with the USSR and other Warsaw Pact states. The speech climaxed a successful week-long effort to rally the public around his regime in support of his independent stance at the Warsaw Pact summit in Moscow. The USSR has so far ignored Ceausescu's defiant criticism, but it probably feels it must respond soon. [redacted]

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The only initiatives Ceausescu mentioned in his speech were a vaguely defined renunciation of force and the establishment of a demilitarized zone to separate the two military blocs in Europe. Neither would appear likely to receive much foreign support. [redacted]

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In other public speeches this week, Ceausescu codified, in a more comprehensive way than ever before, the conditions under which Romanian forces may be used in the Warsaw Pact context: only in Europe, only if attacked by the West, only if approved by Romania, and only under Romanian command. The effect of these conditions is to distance Romania still more from its Warsaw Pact partners. [redacted]

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Ceausescu appears anxious to drum up domestic support for his policies at a time when the Romanian economic situation is worsening and the country is experiencing an energy crunch. He has also demonstrated to the rest of the Pact that his countrymen support his position. [redacted]

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The USSR and its allies have thus far largely ignored Ceausescu's disclosures about Soviet efforts at the summit to increase Pact military appropriations and to make changes in its command structure. [redacted]

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Moscow's reaction to Ceausescu's speech will probably be one of relief mixed with consternation. The Soviets will be relieved that Ceausescu refrained from widening his dispute with them and relieved that he seemed to be going out of his way to assuage Soviet fears about Romania's relationship with China. He also spoke more harshly of NATO's defense spending increase than he has in the past. [redacted]

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The Soviets must nonetheless be concerned about Ceausescu's failure to step back from his charges that they exerted pressure at the Warsaw Pact summit for increased Pact defense spending and for centralized control over the armed forces of the Pact countries. The USSR will be loath to let Romania's embarrassing defiance pass unnoticed. Soviet President Brezhnev is scheduled to arrive in Budapest this month, which will provide a forum for responding to Ceausescu's charges and renewing Soviet accusations against the Chinese. 

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Despite the current tensions, Romania is likely to participate in the early December session of Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers in Berlin. The meeting was discussed by Warsaw Pact Supreme Commander Kulikov and the Romanians in Bucharest in mid-November. 

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EC SUMMIT: Economic Cooperation

//The centerpiece of the European summit scheduled for Brussels on Monday and Tuesday will be endorsement of a European Monetary System. Agreement will create new pressures for strengthening economic cooperation and could be a first step toward a pronounced "European identity" in the international monetary arena. The arrangements may start under a political cloud because of Britain's aim of only partial involvement at the outset.//

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[redacted]

//Prime Minister Callaghan will probably seek improvements in the exchange-rate stabilization part of the system, as well as commitments from Britain's partners--especially West Germany--to reallocate Community expenditures. A review of the EC's costly farm policies and a politically significant dispute over regional development expenditures are already on the summit agenda. The monetary arrangements, in any case, mark the beginning, not the end, of a long debate on reapportioning EC economic and financial burdens.//

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[redacted]

//Callaghan will not commit Britain to pegging the pound to the other EC currencies, and most informed observers believe he is unlikely to do so before the national election next year. The key political issue at the summit is the extent to which Britain will be allowed to participate in the system before formally tying the pound to its EC partners' currencies. Resentment of the UK for its standoffish attitude has tempered recently, but there may still be problems when it comes to working out the details of Britain's involvement in credit arrangements, reviewing the monetary system after six months, and harmonizing of economic policies.//

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[redacted]

//On balance, however, we think the others will show reluctant understanding of Callaghan's need to appease the strong anti-EC forces at home by postponing the currency linkage. Otherwise, dramatizing Britain's nonparticipation could be a heavy blow to future EC solidarity.//

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
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//French President Giscard, especially, seems unlikely to want to alienate the UK--an ally against a powerful West Germany within the EC and a potential supporter of French views favoring a "confederal" organization of the Community. The summit will inaugurate a Giscard-proposed study of EC institutions in light of the monetary system, direct elections to the European Parliament, and EC enlargement.//




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//A major uncertainty at the summit is Giscard's position on the multilateral trade negotiations. The French have been quite negative about permitting the EC to continue working toward an early conclusion of the talks.//



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
//Although West German Chancellor Schmidt has a heavy interest in bringing the trade negotiations to a successful conclusion, we doubt he will lobby with much zeal for a more forthcoming French position. Schmidt may hope that, by avoiding any reference to Geneva deadlines, the EC Commission can simply pursue the substantive negotiations and eventually confront the French with a package it would be difficult to refuse.//



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[redacted]

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BAHRAIN: Possible Demonstrations

Bahraini authorities are concerned that the annual religious ceremonies by the island's large Shia community this month might include demonstrations against the Shah of Iran, or even against the Bahrain Government. The government has warned leftists and Shiites to stay in line and has taken other security precautions. We believe security forces will be able to control events. // [redacted]

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[redacted]

//More than half of Bahrain's population is Shia Muslim, more than 100,000 of whom are of Iranian origin and, in the government's view, mildly unsympathetic to the Shah. The government is particularly concerned about observances this year because the Shiites may be inspired by events in Iran or stirred by Iranian clerics who annually enter Bahrain to participate in the ceremonies. Shia ceremonies are likely to culminate on 11 December in street processions of highly emotional believers mourning the death of Shia martyrs. // [redacted]

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//The authorities have called in religious leaders for lectures on the need for restraint. They also have delayed issuing visas to the visiting Iranian clerics, although the government is unlikely to deny them altogether. // [redacted]

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//The authorities are also concerned that antigovernment attitudes might be expressed during observances this year. Local leftists, generally dispirited by strong government countermeasures over the years, have been encouraged by events in Iran. Leftists have traditionally tried to exploit widespread Shia resentment over discrimination at the hands of the ruling family, which belongs to the Sunni Muslim sect. // [redacted]

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//Government authorities should be able to control events because anti-Shah feelings do not seem to run deep in Bahrain, and there is a division between Arab Shias and those of Iranian origin. // [redacted]

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TAIWAN: Fighter Procurement

//Military leaders in Taipei are pressing for a favorable US decision on the F-5G aircraft in the wake of the US rejection of their bid for such advanced fighters as the F-18, F-16, and F-4. The Nationalists are also continuing their efforts in Western Europe to obtain used F-104s, and they are studying the capabilities of the Israeli-built Kfir. Nonetheless, procurement of additional F-5Es will probably meet their fighter defense needs until the mid-1980s.//

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//The Nationalists now have some 310 fighters, including 67 F-100s, 56 F-104s, 66 F-5A/Bs, and about 120 F-5Es. The F-100s and the F-104s were received in the 1960s, are becoming increasingly difficult to maintain, and will soon need to be replaced. As a stopgap measure, the Nationalists are continuing negotiations with West Germany to get used F-104 fighters, but their negotiations have thus far been unsuccessful.//

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//The Nationalists would prefer the all-weather F-5G--which, although not yet in production, will probably be better than anything China can put in the air against Taiwan in the next decade and is relatively inexpensive. Unlike the F-5E, the F-5G could be armed with a radar-directed air-to-air missile system providing an improved attack capability.//

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
//Acquisition of the F-5G would also enable the Nationalists to retain their links to US aircraft technology and logistic support. The first F-5Gs will not be available until the early 1980s, and the Nationalists realize that their request for the aircraft could become a casualty of the Sino-American "normalization" process.//




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//Taipei publicly rejected a purchase of Kfir fighters from Israel in July in the hope of encouraging a favorable decision by the US on a more advanced US fighter. President Chiang, however, recently ordered a comparative study of the Kfir and the F-5G; if the Nationalists fail to get F-5Gs, they may be forced to turn to the Kfir. Political and technical considerations, however, would militate against the purchase of the Kfir except as a last resort.//

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//Despite Taipei's goal of obtaining a more advanced aircraft, its fighter defense needs until the mid-1980s probably can be met by F-5Es. Current agreements will allow the Nationalists to coproduce 200 F-5Es by June 1981. They have also been given the option of coproducing 48 more and of buying an additional 50 F-5Es on a direct purchase basis.//



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[Redacted]

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USSR: Chemical Construction

The Soviet Ministry of the Chemical Industry plans to slash the number of new project starts for 1979 by about 45 percent to expedite ongoing chemical industry projects. A key aspect of Soviet investment strategy for the 10th five-year plan (1976-80) was to halt the growth in unfinished construction, which is reaching serious proportions throughout the economy. [Redacted]

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Increasing chemical capacity has been particularly difficult for the Soviets for many years. Unfinished chemical construction over the last two years increased in terms of value by about 50 percent compared with a 20-percent increase for Soviet construction activity overall. Delays in introducing new chemical capacity result from chronic problems in planning, construction, and manufacture of equipment, and are aggravated by the shortage of skilled workers to man new plants. [Redacted]

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The cutback in new chemical projects next year could alleviate the situation somewhat, especially if investment earmarked for projects now being postponed or canceled is applied to unfinished projects. However, the current emphasis on increasing the share of investment resources for energy and machine-building as well as metallurgy and transportation suggests that planners may be taking funds from the chemical sector. [Redacted]

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SPAIN-USSR: Continued Interest

Spanish Prime Minister Suarez told Senator McGovern last week that the Soviets are continuing to push their request for permission to build extensive facilities in the Andalucian port of Algeciras. Suarez implied that increased US investment in Andalucia--which is particularly hard-hit by unemployment--would make it much easier for Madrid to turn down the Soviet offer. The USSR meanwhile is exploring other areas in which to establish closer relations with Spain. [redacted]

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Suarez said the Soviets have made a "major proposal" to improve commercial port facilities at Algeciras and to establish fish and food processing plants in southern Spain. We do not know whether this is a new offer or the one that the Soviets have been pushing since 1975. Suarez remarked that there has been a significant increase in recent months in Soviet merchant ship visits to Spain's Mediterranean ports. [redacted]

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The Spanish Government is tempted by the Soviet proposals primarily because southern Spain is in dire need of new industries and investment. Madrid has so far limited the Soviet presence in Spain, however, and is clearly concerned by the security threat implicit in the Soviet offers. The Spanish military in particular is strongly anti-Soviet, and Suarez, whose domestic policies have already caused considerable unhappiness in the military, is not likely to invite further discontent by granting the Soviet request. [redacted]

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In the absence of a formal response from Madrid, however, the Soviets will continue to press the matter. The USSR has long sought increased access to ports throughout the Mediterranean and would be likely to attempt to exploit access to facilities in Spain for intelligence purposes. [redacted]

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The USSR clearly wants closer relations with Spain, with which it resumed diplomatic relations early last year. Madrid's mayor told the US Ambassador he has been flooded with Soviet offers of visits by cultural and sports groups, individual lecturers, and other kinds of exchanges. The reception this week of the visiting Spanish Trade Minister by Soviet Premier Kosygin, rather than by the Minister's lower-ranking Soviet counterpart, shows the level of Soviet interest in bettering relations. [redacted]

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UGANDA: US Trade Embargo

The Ugandan economy, weakened by years of government mismanagement and now beset by declining world coffee prices, is being hurt--particularly in the area of oil imports--by the US trade embargo that went into effect early last month. Although the embargo is unlikely to topple the Amin government, economic difficulties are eroding one of Amin's principal underpinnings--his practice of buying off potential opponents in the military. Amin is likely to manufacture more "crises" in an effort to divert public attention from economic hardships.

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The Ugandan economy has declined in most years since Amin seized power in 1971. Early in his tenure, he expelled Uganda's Asian minority--most of the country's managers and skilled workers. The largely illiterate Army officers he installed in management positions have been ineffective.

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//Production of coffee, Uganda's chief export crop, fell steadily until 1976, when high world prices led to a temporary upsurge in production and a surplus in Uganda's current account. This year, the trade surplus is declining because of reduced US demand for Ugandan coffee, a sharp decline in world coffee prices, and Uganda's transportation problems. Uganda's payments for imports are in arrears, and most sellers now require prepayment for goods shipped to Uganda.//

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Uganda will probably find other markets for the coffee it had sold to the US, normally about a third of its coffee exports. In order to sell off supplies as the harvest progresses, however, it will probably have to cut prices.

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The most critical import Uganda has lost is oil. US oil companies are observing the boycott, and the resulting shortage of petroleum may have been one reason President Amin pulled back from his recent invasion of Tanzania. In the event of a complete oil cutoff, Ugandan stocks would suffice at best only for about 14 days.

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The oil shortage will most seriously affect transportation, making it difficult to get crops to the markets.

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Economic problems will hamper Amin's practice of buying off potential opponents in the military, but he will continue to give the military special privileges--including duty-free imports of luxury goods and plentiful supplies of fuel at subsidized prices--increasingly at the expense of the rest of the economy. 

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Economic problems by themselves are not likely to bring Amin down. He will probably resort to even more radical measures to preserve his power and, if he follows his usual pattern, will seek to divert popular attention by fabricating charges of coup attempts, assassination plots, and invasions. 

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
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
A Soviet Spanish-language press bulletin has acknowledged the presence of MIG-23 aircraft in Cuba, apparently in an effort to reassure Havana that the aircraft will remain in Cuba. The commentary strongly defended the aircraft's ground attack role as necessary to Cuba's defense. 

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The article also addresses US concerns in its assertion that the aircraft are not capable of delivering nuclear weapons and that Moscow has never supplied Havana with "nuclear arms carriers." The bulletin makes no mention of the 1962 US-Soviet "understanding" on offensive weapons in Cuba but does reaffirm the Soviet commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Assertions that the aircraft pose a Soviet threat to the US are dismissed as attempts to cast doubt on the Soviet desire to conclude a SALT II agreement. 

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FEATURE ARTICLE

INTERNATIONAL: World Water Problems

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[redacted]

Water problems are becoming increasingly critical in many regions of the world. Because of an essentially fixed supply and growing demand, water will increasingly be treated as an essential raw material, and international conflicts among users of shared water resources are likely to intensify. [redacted]

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At least 20 percent of the world's urban population and 75 percent of its rural population at present do not have reasonably safe supplies of drinking water; increasing industrial and agricultural activity is causing further degradation in water quality. [redacted]

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The global water supply problem is largely one of seasonal availability, distribution, and quality. The global stock of water is sufficient to meet all needs, but the traditional sources--surface runoff and ground water--are inequitably distributed. In more than one-third of the land area of the earth, water is the chief factor limiting human economic pursuits. The developing countries have far more problems than most of the industrialized nations: some of the developing countries do not have enough water, while water supplies in others vary greatly both seasonally and from year to year. [redacted]

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The growing water shortage stems primarily from explosive population growth, improved standards of living, and expanded urbanization. The world's population--now about 4.2 billion--will increase by more than 50 percent by the year 2000. To provide water for these additional people, and for the social and economic development they will expect, the present supply cannot simply be increased proportionately, but must be multiplied several times. Water experts estimate that water use trebles as urban population doubles. [redacted]

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[redacted]

Urbanization brings with it increased demands for water-intensive services such as sanitation and fire protection, in addition to higher levels of individual consumption. The world's urban population, now 40 percent of the total, will grow to more than half the total by the end of the century. [redacted]

Growth in population, industry, and living standards is accompanied by a requirement for increased agricultural production, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Some 80 to 90 percent of all water is used for agriculture, and virtually all of this goes to the 15 percent of the world's cropland that is irrigated. To increase agricultural production, more land will have to be irrigated since nearly all the suitable rain-fed land of the world is already under cultivation. [redacted]

Increases in irrigated crop area--and therefore demand for increased agricultural water--will thus be most pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, the Middle East, and South America, where a large portion of the world's arid and semiarid land is located. Yet many of the countries in these areas are those least able, both financially and technically, to carry out the necessary water augmentation projects. [redacted]

Industries also have a major impact on water supplies, both because of their increased consumption and more important, because of their tendency to pollute. In heavily industrialized countries, the problem is recognized, and some industries and governments are seeking to reduce or eliminate pollution. In most developing countries, however, pollution control is regarded as a luxury that can wait. In addition, waterways in many of these countries are so small that even minimal pollution can cause great damage. [redacted]

Household water use constitutes only a fraction of overall usage, but four-fifths of the world's population have no access to tap water and must often rely on polluted streams and wells. An estimated 10 million people a year die from contaminated water. Although the problem is global, the most acute needs are in the developing countries, where supply systems, if they exist at all, commonly suffer from improper operation or maintenance. [redacted]

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As available supplies of water decline, conflicts among nations that share water resources are likely to intensify. Longstanding quarrels over the Parana River (Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina), the Jordan (Israel and Jordan), the Euphrates (Syria and Iraq), the Indus (Pakistan and India), and the Ganges (Bangladesh and India) could worsen over time. The potential for such conflicts is underscored by the fact that 200 major river basins of the world are shared by two or more countries. [redacted]

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Technology is being put to use to stretch water supplies. New sources are being developed, recycling and other conservation methods emphasized, and more sophisticated transportation and delivery examined in an effort to generate enough water supply to meet future demands. Unconventional sources of supply such as desalination, cloudseeding, and iceberg towing will be further developed, but their overall impact will remain quite small. [redacted]

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Better management could improve the situation in many areas, but it is unlikely that any new water projects will greatly affect the global picture by the end of the century, and the developing countries will carry out only a few major projects. Some of them, notably Egypt and India, will probably be able to make their existing supplies go farther and to institute antipollution programs. At the same time, increased efficiency in water use will characterize consumption in developed countries, where more crops will probably be produced per given inputs of water and further progress will be made in abatement of stream pollution. [redacted]

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