

Top Secret

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Friday September 2, 1977

CG NIDC 77-205C



NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Friday, 2 September 1977

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The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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USSR: FB-111 Bomber

25X1 [redacted] Pravda commentator Yuriy Zhukov, citing reported Pentagon intentions to convert the FB-111 bomber into a strategic cruise missile carrier, yesterday accused the US of paying "lip service" to arms control while actually preparing for a new arms race. The prominent journalist's assertion, as reported in a Tass summary, stands in contrast to Soviet President Brezhnev's somewhat hopeful remarks of 16 August and seems to express one view among an apparent number of Soviet views over the prospects for accommodation with the US.

25X1 [redacted] In his speech Brezhnev had commented on certain aspects of President Carter's address on US-Soviet relations in Charleston, and noted that "compared with previous moves by the US administration, these statements sound positive." Zhukov, however, warned that "one must not be lulled by reassuring speeches of those who pay lip service to ending the arms race while preparing on the sly to step it up." Zhukov's statement is the most striking departure from the note Brezhnev struck in August and may well reflect the views of some in Moscow who are especially suspicious of the motives underlying US policy.

25X1 [redacted] Over the last two months Soviet media have been intensely critical of the US, and particularly of the decision on the neutron bomb. At the same time, some authoritative commentators have made occasional references to the "positive" changes taking place in the US administration--a theme which Brezhnev chose to amplify.

25X1 [redacted] The more optimistic Soviet comments have focused on the need for "restraint and patience" and seem to be holding out hope that the US-Soviet relationship can be improved. The more negative assessments, such as Zhukov's, have stressed the influence on US policy of alleged "anti-detente forces" centered in the Pentagon and the "military-industrial complex." [redacted]

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ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA: Situation Report

[redacted] The new Somali attack on Jijiga apparently began Tuesday with artillery fire and air strikes, reportedly followed by Somali ground attacks.

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[redacted] The new attack is the third, and possibly the fourth, Somali thrust in the past three weeks on Ethiopian strongholds in the area. The previous attacks were small-scale probing operations to test Ethiopian defenses at Dire Dawa, Jijiga, and possibly Harar.

[redacted] It is not yet clear whether the latest attack on Jijiga is merely another probing effort or the beginning of a drive to capture the town. Although Jijiga is more heavily defended than Harar or Dire Dawa, it is located on lower ground and is more vulnerable to armored attacks.

[redacted] The Somalis will have to use their IL-28s cautiously. Their air force has not fared well against Ethiopia's F-5 fighters and has already lost several MIGs.

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[redacted] In southern Ethiopia, the government garrison at Filtu, reinforced by part of a militia brigade, apparently drove back the Somali force that had advanced toward the town earlier this week.

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
[redacted] Somali President Siad has warned the Soviets not to strengthen Ethiopia at Somalia's expense. The build-up of Soviet weapons in Ethiopia may be reaching the point at which Siad will feel compelled to take a more explicit stand.

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ISRAEL: Settlement Policy

 //Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan told the US Ambassador on Wednesday that the government will approve establishment of six to eight new settlements in the occupied

territories over the next few months. He said that there would be no new settlement activity before his trip to Washington this month. Dayan did not specify the sites of the proposed settlements.//

25X1 [redacted] //Dayan emphasized that the Begin government had decided to establish the new settlements on its own initiative and was not implementing decisions made in principle by the preceding Labor cabinet.//

25X1 [redacted] //The new settlements would consist of civilian settler groups of 30 to 40 families and would be established within existing army base areas. According to Dayan, no additional land would be involved. [redacted]


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USSR: Human Rights Propaganda

25X1 [redacted] Soviet propaganda assailing the US on human rights-related themes appears to be picking up after a relative lull during the summer; the Soviets possibly have an eye on the coming CSCE conference in Belgrade and the convening of the UN General Assembly.

25X1 [redacted] Tass yesterday strongly challenged charges made at the World Psychiatric Conference in Honolulu regarding Soviet abuse of psychiatry for political purposes. Tass did not mention the resolution passed at the meeting condemning the Soviet practice of incarcerating dissidents in mental hospitals, but alleged that the organizers of the Honolulu conference were in league with "opponents of detente in the US" in furthering an anti-Soviet slander campaign. Tass pointed to recent publicity in the West about reports of CIA-funded experiments "with the aim of manipulating the human mind."

25X1 [redacted] Soviet dissidents and some exiles predictably attempted to focus the conference's attention on Soviet abuses. One appeal sent to Honolulu on behalf of political prisoners held in Soviet psychiatric institutions was signed by 34 dissidents, including Andrey Sakharov.




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In a separate message, the dissident Committee for the Investigation of the Use of Psychiatry for Political Ends, a year-old offshoot of the group that monitors the USSR's implementation of the Helsinki accords, asked the Honolulu meeting to come out in support of Feliks Serebrov, a member of the committee who was arrested last week. Several exiled Soviet dissidents with firsthand knowledge of Soviet psychiatric abuse also reportedly testified at the meeting.


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
The same issue of the weekly *Literary Gazette* that on Wednesday resurrected earlier charges of espionage against *Los Angeles Times* correspondent Robert Toth also attacked the "continued diversionary activity" of the US Congressional CSCE Committee. The weekly complained that the committee was mailing unsolicited, provocative letters to Soviet individuals and institutions, and questioned the international legality of such a method of "distributing propaganda." *Pravda* yesterday published a general commentary questioning US sincerity on the issue of human rights. The daily focused on alleged US reluctance to become party to international agreements on human rights, and cited in particular US failure to sign the UN convention on the abolition of racial discrimination.

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
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


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PAKISTAN: Elections

[Redacted] Pakistani Chief Martial Law Administrator General Zia may be bending to pressures to delay elections, prosecute former Prime Minister Bhutto, and create a constitutional political role for the military.

25X1 [redacted] Zia has not announced any change in plans to hold an election on 18 October and then relinquish power to civilians, but yesterday at a press conference he raised the possibility that the election might be delayed for a few days or even a few weeks if necessary. He also urged that the constitution be changed to give the military a role in political crises because, he said, the politicians alone cannot guarantee the integrity of the country.

25X1 [redacted] Zia has been under pressure for some time from other senior military officers to take such steps, but has so far resisted. He apparently felt that action against Bhutto would be regarded as a sign of partiality and lead to Bhutto's boycotting the election or to his followers taking to the streets.

25X1 [redacted] The Pakistan National Alliance--which expects to defeat Bhutto in the election--had also sought to avoid a situation that could upset election plans. On Tuesday, however, party leaders changed tactics, and demanded Bhutto's prosecution--on charges which could include murder--even if the election had to be delayed. The Alliance may now believe that differences among the leaders of Bhutto's party preclude an effective election boycott, and that Bhutto can no longer push his followers into serious civil disorders.

25X1 [redacted] Zia cracked down on banned political activities--such as demonstrations--last month, and Bhutto has not challenged the campaign ground rules since. He and other party leaders have, however, threatened that serious violence would erupt if "unfair" tactics were used against their party. [redacted]

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GUYANA: More Problems

25X1 [] //A major sugar strike called by Guyanese Prime Minister Burnham's Marxist political archenemy, Cheddi Jagan, has added to an already existing economic crisis and poses the most serious challenge to Burnham in years. Jagan, probably counseled by the Soviets and possibly the Cubans, hopes to force the Prime Minister to accede to his call for a national front government. Unless Burnham can work out a scheme that will assure that he remains the dominant political figure, he is unlikely to bring Jagan into the government and is increasingly likely to use force to try to break the strike.//

25X1 [] The sugar workers have legitimate economic demands, but the strike by the powerful labor arm of Jagan's People's Progressive Party--which has idled almost all the sugar workers--is primarily a well-timed political move. By first calling for a national front government on the eve of the governing party's congress two weeks ago, Jagan sought to encourage the left-wing of the party to bring pressure on the Prime Minister. After Burnham rejected the demand, Jagan called out the sugar workers.

25X1 [] //The face-off, with Jagan's East Indian party and sugar workers on one side, and Burnham's black Peoples National Congress on the other, is an old one. Jagan's challenge now is more formidable, however, because of Guyana's economic crisis has already generated significant problems for Burnham in his labor stronghold among the Afro-Guyanese bauxite workers. The autumn sugar crop is also sorely needed to avoid a tightening foreign exchange squeeze. Burnham's difficulties are further complicated by his continuing health problems and a reduced work schedule stemming from his heart attack in January.//

25X1 [] //Several observers attribute Jagan's more adroit political performance over the past year to good advice from Soviet Embassy officials--the USSR has long backed the orthodox Marxist, a fact that has complicated their attempts to improve relations with Burnham. Foreign Minister Wills believes that the Cubans, following Burnham's meeting with President Castro in July, argued against a strike at this time but were overruled by the Soviets and by Jagan's radical wife.//

25X1 [redacted] //We doubt that the Cubans have played much of a positive role. Rather, they appear to be continuing the shrewd tactics they employed during Burnham's visit--when Castro allowed Vice President for Foreign Affairs Rodriguez to argue the Moscow line while he promised that Cuba would not take sides in Guyanese politics.//

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BRIEFS

South Africa

25X1 [redacted] Black student boycotts are causing problems for the South African government in several areas besides Soweto, where the government is in the process of taking over control of the secondary school system. Soweto currently is quiet, but students in Atteridgeville, a large black township near Pretoria, resumed a well-organized boycott last week.

25X1 [redacted] A student leader told a US Embassy officer that the boycott would continue until students detained in previous disturbances are released. This has been a major issue in Soweto also, and residents of Atteridgeville are worried that the government might move to take over their schools as well.

25X1 [redacted] The boycott spread to East London on the southeastern coast earlier this week, and to Bloemfontein, the provincial capital of Orange Free State, yesterday. Police used force to break up large crowds of stone-throwing students in the black townships around Bloemfontein, which had seen little violence since the student disturbances began over a year ago.

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Ecuador

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[redacted] The Ecuadorean Government announced yesterday that on Wednesday it had smashed a "rebellion" designed to side-track its plan to return the country to civilian rule next year. The "rebellion" actually was merely a meeting of members of several political movements, primarily the National Velasquista Federation, the party of five-time President Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra, who was deposed by the military in 1972.

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[redacted] The government's overreaction may have been intended as a warning to bona fide coup plotters who might plan to take advantage of President Poveda's absence when he attends the Panama Canal treaty signing ceremony in Washington next week. The release yesterday of all those arrested in connection with the meeting is further evidence that the government does not view the Velasquistas as a serious threat.

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[redacted] Although the Velasquistas have opposed some aspects of the military government's normalization program, there is no evidence that they have any significant support among high-ranking military officers, which would be indispensable in any attempt to thwart the government's plans.

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Argentina

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[redacted] Argentina's decision Wednesday to cancel its participation in UNITAS XVIII, a joint naval exercise with the US, reflects official dismay over US security assistance and human rights policies. The Argentines are particularly concerned about the provisions of the Humphrey-Kennedy amendment halting all military cooperation after 30 September 1978 and the conditions imposed on the prospective purchase of helicopters.

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[redacted] Domestic political considerations also affected the decision on UNITAS. Military hardliners have severely criticized President Videla for being too accommodating to recent US official visitors. The hardliners apparently seized on the UNITAS-US arms policy issue to raise the question of the President's prestige. The timing of the announcement probably is deliberately related to Videla's trip to the US next week. Cancellation after the visit would have been viewed as a sign that the trip was a failure.

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Indonesia

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[redacted] Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik has announced his resignation after 11 years in office, and will officially step down after returning from the UN General Assembly. There are reports that he is leaving because of policy disagreements with senior military officials. President Suharto will probably wait at least until the national assembly convenes in October before appointing a permanent successor.

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[redacted] Minister of Defense Pangabbean may take over the Foreign Ministry post in the interim. He has served as acting Foreign Minister in Malik's absence.

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[redacted] Another strong contender is the Ambassador to the US, and former Ambassador to the UK, Rusmin Nurjadin. US and British officials have given him high marks for his frankness and ability, but he lacks political prominence. Nurjadin, however, is a Moslem and is untainted by corruption, and these factors may be important to Suharto as he tries to placate segments of Indonesian society who are calling for greater Moslem representation and less corruption in the government. Suharto would also damage relations with Indonesia's fellow Islamic countries if he does not appoint a Moslem as Foreign Minister. [redacted]

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