

Top Secret




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
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March 11, 1976

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
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
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
LEBANON



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The Israeli government leaders are closely monitoring the situation in southern Lebanon, but they have so far refrained from any comment that would inflame the situation. Israeli press articles suggest that the leadership is unsure of the implications for Israel of recent developments in Lebanon, and has not decided what, if any, action to take.


The Israelis undoubtedly fear that the spread of the mutiny to areas so close to their border may draw additional Palestinian forces into the area. Previously, Israeli leaders have indicated that they would consider the presence of major non-Lebanese forces in southern Lebanon a direct threat to Israel's security.



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
According to unconfirmed press reports, Mamari's forces also attacked a Lebanese air base.

The rebels' successes have sparked concern among Lebanese Christians that Khatib and his sympathizers intend to form a renegade Muslim force encircling the core Christian area of the country.



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
Prime Minister Karami tried yesterday to gloss over the deepening controversy between Christian and Muslim leaders over how to handle the mutineers. He admitted, however, that the problem had forced a temporary interruption in negotiations to form a new cabinet. Leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt—an outspoken supporter of the Muslim rebels—apparently has so alienated Christian leaders on the mutiny issue that they have refused to participate in further political talks until the problem is solved. Jumblatt reportedly has also rejected an alleged Syrian plan simply to announce a new cabinet without further talks with quarreling Muslim and Christian politicians.

Despite Jumblatt's obstinacy, Syrian negotiators apparently still favor the creation of a new cabinet as quickly as possible, and may use the growing security problems as additional leverage against Christian and Muslim leaders.

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CHINA

Peking's most authoritative statement to date on the campaign to criticize Teng Hsiao-ping, while linking Mao Tse-tung directly to this effort, also reflects some differences within the party over how far to pursue the current campaign.

A *People's Daily* editorial of March 10 quotes Mao on the need to "narrow the target" of the attack, implying that Teng alone should be criticized, but, at the same time, leaves the door open to criticism of other officials who are associated with Teng and who, like him, were returned to public office after being ousted a decade ago. While the editorial stops short of calling for Teng to be overthrown, stating only that he should be criticized, Teng is separated from other officials who, the editorial notes, should be "helped" to correct their past mistakes.

The party's left wing will undoubtedly use one of the passages in the editorial that is linked directly to Mao to broaden the attack on Teng to include many of the rehabilitees who once again hold important party, military, and government positions. The editorial nevertheless calls for people to remain "coolheaded" and strictly prohibits the kind of disruptive political activity that characterized the Cultural Revolution.

These prohibitions, which are at the operative heart of the editorial, strongly suggest that more moderate leaning members of the leadership still retain a major voice in defining the scope of the campaign. These leaders almost certainly prefer at the least to limit the attacks to Teng himself and to keep the campaign from gaining enough momentum to encompass large numbers of rehabilitated officials and to undercut major domestic and foreign policies.

The restrictions may be particularly important in view of the greater identification in the editorial of Mao with the leftist cause in general and with the attacks on Teng in particular. The editorial introduces two new "quotations" from the Chairman which tie him closer to the campaign; in the past he had been identified unequivocally only with the leftist effort to preserve Cultural Revolution reforms in the educational field and with a more general injunction to persevere in "class struggle." But even this new invocation of the Chairman's authority is somewhat ambiguous.

The editorial states the campaign is being conducted under the direction of the "central committee headed" by Mao—a power sharing formulation that was conspicuously absent throughout the Cultural Revolution. It was only reintroduced after the Lin Piao incident, when the central authorities were unsure of army loyalty and Mao was somewhat tarnished by his previous relationship with the disgraced defense minister.

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The central authorities also seem to be making other efforts to define the scope of the campaign. In a briefing for foreign diplomats in Peking on March 6, a university official stated that Teng is the only target of the current attack and implied that he could remain in power if he agreed to admit his mistakes. He added, however, that Teng had not yet done so.

The official refused to be drawn out specifically on what Teng's ultimate fate would be or on his current status, but the general low-key tenor of his comments suggests that Peking is making a concerted effort to play down the campaign for foreign audiences—and that important elements in the leadership are concerned about the possible impact that indications of political instability may have abroad. This briefing is unprecedented, and represents a major departure from practice during the Cultural Revolution when far fewer diplomats were in Peking—and during the anti-Confucius campaign of 1974.

In general, the tenor of the briefing accords with the comments of a senior communist official in Hong Kong who gave a relaxed explanation of the campaign to an American diplomat and suggested that more moderate leaders in Peking, who are opposed to the current situation, will eventually be heard from. An indication of what this official had in mind may be contained in recent reports that wall posters appeared in Canton attacking Chiang Ching, Mao's leftist wife.

In the meantime, the party's left wing continues its active pursuit of Teng. The Ministry of Culture, which is closely associated with leftist political leaders, has withdrawn from circulation all films in which Teng appears. Posters have been cited in Shanghai and in Kwangtung Province calling for Teng's ouster. [redacted]

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[redacted] posters attacking rehabilitated provincial officials have begun to appear in several scattered locations. Moreover, some reports of the attacks on Teng in scattered areas carry the implication that the late Chou En-lai is also to blame for his role in returning Teng to power. If this line is pursued, there is likely to be a strong anti-leftist backlash from Chou's many former supporters and adherents.

Equally important, there are signs that civilian leftists are courting the military as allies in the current campaign. The military was conspicuously absent during the campaign's initial stages but some units are now beginning to participate in the criticism of Teng. In what seems to be a direct appeal to China's powerful regional military commanders in the provinces, wall posters reportedly have accused Teng of seeking to undercut their authority by concentrating military power in Peking and more particularly in his own hands. The posters also charge Teng with opposing a system of rapid promotions in the armed forces.

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
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SAUDI ARABIA - SOUTH YEMEN


Saudi Arabia and South Yemen announced in a joint statement yesterday their intention to normalize relations, capping a reconciliation process initiated by Cairo in 1974. The Saudis and the radical National Front regime in Aden have been at loggerheads since South Yemen became independent in 1967.

The communique declared that the two countries would refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs while cooperating in cultural and economic affairs. It also expressed both countries' opposition to "foreign interference" in the Arabian Peninsula. The reference to "foreign interference" is broad enough to encompass both the Saudi objection to the Soviet presence in South Yemen and Aden's opposition to Iran's military role in Oman.




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The late King Faysal's government refused to have anything to do with the ruling group in Aden.



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The Saudis probably also believe that they can widen—to their benefit—the reported differences within the National Front hierarchy. For several years there have been indications that President Salim Rubayi Ali and pro-Soviet party secretary



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
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
general Abd-al-Fattah Ismail have been involved in a power struggle. The Saudis are betting that Ali, with whom they have negotiated the accommodation, can overcome Ismail and be brought into Riyadh's camp.

Our initial assessment is that prospects for remaking South Yemen into a moderate state are not very promising. The party leadership role of Ismail—a hard-line Marxist and key backer of the Dhofar rebellion—has enabled him to place his supporters throughout the party, government, and military apparatus. South Yemen's willingness to negotiate the deal with the Saudis probably was dictated more by economic necessity than an interest in modifying its present political orientation.

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USSR - WESTERN SAHARA

Soviet efforts to straddle the Western Sahara issue are irritating Algiers but pleasing Rabat.

The USSR has handled the proclamation of the "Saharan Democratic Arab Republic" by the Algerian-backed Polisario guerrillas with caution. The Soviets have taken public note of the declaration and reported that Algeria considers the entity a "national liberation movement," but their press coverage has also reported Moroccan opposition to the move.

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Soviet opposition to a war over Western Sahara appears to be registering on Algiers.

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Perhaps to show its pique, Algiers summoned its ambassador to the USSR home before the Soviet party congress last month. Later, the Algerian delegate to the congress made a quick trip home to consult with Boumediene before talking with Soviet leaders.

Soviet overtures have apparently convinced Morocco that the Kremlin is not adopting a blatantly pro-Algerian stand. Moroccan Prime Minister Osman has told US officials that he was pleased by his discussions with Premier Kosygin last month in Moscow. Kosygin evidently told Osman that Boumediene had placed himself on a limb and that a way should be found to get the Algerian President off it without embarrassment.

Early this week, Rabat demonstrated its satisfaction with the Soviet show of evenhandedness by resuming relations with East Germany. The East Germans pledged that they would not interfere in Rabat's "internal affairs"—implying they would not extend diplomatic recognition to the new Polisario "republic." Morocco had broken ties with East Berlin last November as a signal to Moscow that Rabat was disturbed over Soviet meddling in the Western Sahara question.

Despite its show of evenhandedness, Moscow's instinctive sympathies lie with the "progressive" regime in Algeria over the US-supported monarchy in Morocco. Soviet use of Algerian airfields during the Angola conflict and the USSR's desire to curry favor with a regime that has standing in nonaligned circles and at least a part of the Arab world also play a part.

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The Soviets, however, do not want to push strategically located Morocco further into the arms of the US. They also value their commercial dealings with Rabat and want access to Moroccan phosphates, which may prove increasingly important to Soviet agriculture.

In view of these conflicting interests, the Kremlin would probably like to continue to avoid having to choose sides in the conflict. Moscow's bias toward Algiers may nevertheless propel the USSR toward stronger support of the Algerian position, particularly if—against Soviet desires—the Sahara situation deteriorates into a large-scale conflict.



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USSR


Moscow has announced that two naval ships are taking part in an official friendship visit to Port Louis, Mauritius for the island's independence day tomorrow.

Rear Admiral Yasakov, the officer in tactical command of the Soviet Indian Ocean naval squadron, will be in Port Louis until March 17 aboard a Krivak-class destroyer. An Alligator-class tank landing ship is also taking part in the port visit. A supporting Soviet naval oiler is in the Mauritius area but is not expected to participate in the visit.

Although Soviet naval units have made many calls at Port Louis in the past, this is the first by a Soviet naval combatant since last August. The visit emphasizes Moscow's continued interest in pursuing closer ties with Mauritius. Soviet naval auxiliaries called there as recently as last month when a space support ship made a one-day stop.



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PORTUGAL

The campaign for legislative elections in Portugal is swinging into full gear with election day less than two months away.

Fourteen parties have entered slates, but the bulk of the vote will be divided among only four—the Socialists, the centrist Popular Democrats, the conservative Social Democratic Center, and the Communists. Eight of the competing parties are minor groups to the left of the Communists.

The shift to the right since last November is expected to narrow the gap between the Socialists and the Popular Democrats—who received 38 percent and 26 percent respectively in last year's vote—and to bring the Social Democratic Center into contention for a leading role in a post-election government.

To kick off their campaign, the Socialists have arranged a star-studded gathering of West European socialist leaders in the northern Portuguese city of Porto this weekend. Participants will include Brandt from West Germany, Mitterrand from France, Kreisky from Austria, Palme from Sweden, and party leaders from the Netherlands, Norway, Italy, and Spain. The session is intended to give the Socialists a boost in the heavily Popular Democratic north. Popular Democratic leader Sa Carneiro has already labeled the meeting as foreign interference in Portuguese politics and has scheduled a rally in Porto on Saturday in an effort to draw attention away from the Socialists.

The Socialists have also come out a step ahead of the Popular Democrats in the number of nationally recognized figures heading their list of candidates and are benefiting from better media exposure. The Socialists profess to be hopeful of gaining enough votes to control the new national assembly and claim that they will "govern alone or not at all."

The Popular Democrats are concentrating on widening their margin of victory in the densely populated north by courting Angolan returnees and conservative farmers. They are also counting on the vote of Portuguese workers living abroad and have challenged the Socialists, Communists, and far left in the constituent assembly in an effort to ease restrictions on voting by emigrant workers.

The Popular Democrats, however, are caught between the Socialists and the Social Democratic Center. The party's tactical shifts to the left or right in the past have left it without a firm ideological base. In recent months, the party has moved away from the Socialists and adopted views closer to those of the center-right Social Democratic Center. The latter, however, is stressing its role as an opposition and is lumping the Popular Democrats with the left, tarring them with participation in past ineffective governments.

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The Communists appear to be steadily losing ground and are trying—unsuccessfully so far—to promote an alliance with the Socialists to preserve a role in Portuguese politics. The Communists are already preparing their supporters for a bad showing, and one party leader has already said that the Communists will not recognize the results of the election because his party will not be allowed to campaign in "reactionary" areas, such as the north or the Azores.

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SPAIN

Nine Spanish military officers were sentenced yesterday to periods of imprisonment ranging from two to eight years for belonging to the secret officers' society called the Military Democratic Union and for attempting to foment military rebellion. The verdict must still be approved by the commander of the Madrid Military Region.

Two of the nine qualify for immediate release under the terms of the royal pardon issued last November; the other seven must serve their sentences and suffer automatic dismissal from the service if the verdicts are approved.

The sentences seem to indicate that hardliners in the military hierarchy won the upper hand over more moderate generals who favored leniency. The relatively harsh treatment of the nine officers could upset many younger officers who, like the rest of Spanish society, are becoming more politically aware and who already resent the ultra conservative bias of many officers in the upper echelons. The military authorities have apparently decided that they would rather risk this resentment than ease disciplinary control over junior officers.

In the northwestern coal mining region of Asturias, heavily armed security forces yesterday successfully prevented a mass rally by miners to protest the killing of four demonstrators in the Basque country last week. Paramilitary civil guards set up road blocks around the town of Oviedo to prevent miners from gathering there and dispersed a crowd of about 2,000. At least four leaders of the clandestine workers commissions were taken into custody early yesterday morning.

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SINGAPORE

The UK will permit the Singapore armed forces to use British military training facilities in Brunei. The Singapore air force will begin survival training in late March or early April. The UK has tentatively agreed to begin training Singapore instructors at the jungle warfare school in June or July.

The development of Singapore's military establishment has been seriously hampered by a lack of areas suitable for jungle and conventional training. To overcome this obstacle, Singapore has sought the assistance of its neighbors and commonwealth allies. Only Thailand, Taiwan, and the oil-rich protectorate of Brunei, however, have responded favorably to requests for ground force training. Singapore's anti-aircraft artillery units have trained in Brunei for the past two years, and Singapore hopes that a similar agreement can be negotiated to permit its infantry battalions to conduct unit jungle training there.

The UK had been hesitant to approve Singapore's requests for training because of its plans to leave Brunei in 1978. Although British responsibility for the defense of Brunei is currently embodied in a mutual agreement, London is under fire from Malaysia and other Third World countries for hanging on to this "colonial vestige." The limited training and Malaysia's failure to react adversely to past use of Brunei probably induced the British to accede to Singapore's request.

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YUGOSLAVIA

President Tito officially began his Latin American tour yesterday, following a flight the day before from Yugoslavia to Bermuda.

Throughout the trip, Tito will probably preach the principles of nonalignment to his hosts and urge a more active role in the movement by Latin American governments. Belgrade hopes that the trip will strengthen ties between Yugoslavia and Latin America.

While in Mexico from March 10 to 14, Tito will sign agreements for scientific-technical exchanges, trade, and tourism. Tito subsequently will go to Panama for a four-day state visit. He may feel obligated to support publicly Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal Zone. Yugoslavia is aware, however, of Washington's sensitivity over the negotiations. In Caracas, the Yugoslav leader is expected to push nonalignment and may also emphasize Yugoslavia's view that OPEC members like Venezuela have an obligation to help improve economic conditions in the less developed countries.

Originally, Tito was also to have visited Cuba, but arrangements were canceled in favor of meetings from March 6 to 8 with Prime Minister Castro in Yugoslavia.


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