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


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


National Intelligence Bulletin

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National Intelligence Bulletin

March 4, 1976

CONTENTS

MOZAMBIQUE-RHODESIA: Border closure
will cause economic problems 1

UK-RHODESIA: Concern over
situation in Rhodesia 2

MOROCCO: King Hassan's speech 3

USSR-ASIA: Attendance
at party congress 5

NORWAY: Probable
restriction on aid to Cuba 6



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National Intelligence Bulletin

March 4, 1976

MOZAMBIQUE-RHODESIA

President Machel's decision yesterday to impose sanctions against the Rhodesian white minority regime by closing Mozambique's borders with Rhodesia will have serious economic consequences for both countries.

Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith will now be under intense pressure to negotiate a settlement with his country's black nationalists because of the economic dislocation caused by the border closure. Up to half of Rhodesia's foreign trade had been passing through Mozambique. The Rhodesians will try to make up as much as they can of the loss by increasing traffic through South Africa's transport links with Salisbury. Although Pretoria will accommodate some of this extra burden, the South Africans are not likely to disrupt their own commerce significantly to accommodate the Smith government.

Closing the border will also entail risks for Machel. Economic problems and tribal tensions have been troublesome for Machel, and the loss of revenue and the resulting unemployment which will follow the end of trade with Rhodesia will be a further blow to Mozambique's economy. Severe food shortages will pose the most serious problem, since Mozambique had been dependent on Rhodesian wheat, corn, and meat shipments.

The Mozambique government probably is counting on commonwealth leaders to make good their pledges of last year to make up the revenue that would be lost by imposing sanctions. British officials say that they are expecting a request for assistance in the next few days.



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National Intelligence Bulletin

March 4, 1976

UK-RHODESIA

The Wilson government has only recently faced up to the fact that events in Angola could directly affect other parts of southern Africa, which in turn could have serious political repercussions in Britain.

Lord Greenhill found no significant changes in Prime Minister Smith's hard-line position during his special mission to Rhodesia last week. A Foreign Office official told the US embassy in London that, while Greenhill detected some apprehension about the future among white Rhodesians, he found no willingness to do anything to avert the gathering storm.

The Labor government, for its part, does not seem to know how it can influence the situation in Rhodesia. The British, however, can hardly remain unconcerned because:

- many white Rhodesians are recent emigrants from Britain and retain strong family ties to the homeland;
- London still has a "legal" responsibility for its breakaway colony;
- British economic interests in South Africa would be threatened by a calamity in Rhodesia; and
- vocal right-wing elements in the media and parliamentary opposition would criticize Labor's passivity in the face of a struggle between "kith and kin" and an externally aided guerrilla movement.

Although the time for a peaceful settlement may have passed, Britain might be willing to subsidize the costs of transition to majority rule should an unexpected breakthrough occur in the talks between Smith and black nationalists led by Joshua Nkomo. Prime Minister Wilson and his senior foreign policy advisers have publicly said that Britain will not give the Smith regime military support.

Most Britons would be unwilling to support military aid, and the government believes that in the long run it has more to gain by protecting its trading position with black African states than with Rhodesia and South Africa.

If internal security deteriorates in Rhodesia, London would probably help evacuate refugees. Most refugees probably could escape by land to South Africa, but some airlift capability would be needed. The British probably would also help Rhodesian refugees to resettle in the UK.

25X1

National Intelligence Bulletin

March 4, 1976

MOROCCO

King Hassan, in his annual Throne Day speech yesterday, shed no new light on his plans for consolidating Morocco's position in Western Sahara.

He did not describe how the territory is to be partitioned between Morocco and Mauritania, suggesting that the demarcation line is an unresolved issue with Nouakchott.

The 24th parallel is the rumored dividing line. Morocco would acquire the phosphate reserves in the northern sector and Mauritania would gain one of the world's most lucrative fishing areas and an established fishing industry at Dakhla.

Hassan asserted that Western Sahara will be transformed into a paradise, but he glossed over the economic, administrative, and security problems that would need to be surmounted. He emphasized the legitimacy of Morocco's Sahara policy and his determination to remain in the territory at all costs.

Predictably, the King blamed Algeria for the present tensions in the region, but his criticism was low key and he deliberately avoided adding to the friction with Algiers.

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Asian Parties Attending 25th Soviet Party Congress

Ruling Communist Parties	Non-Ruling Communist Parties	Progressive Movements
Laos	India	National Liberation Front (South Vietnam)
Mongolia	Indonesia	
North Korea	New Zealand	
North Vietnam	Philippines	
Sri Lanka (one port- folio in coalition dominated by Freedom Party)	Australian So- cialist Party (pro-Moscow)	

Asian Parties Not Attending

Cambodia	Australian Communist Party (pro-Peking)	Socialist Program Party (Burma)
China	Burma	Socialist Party (Japan)
	Bangladesh	
	Japan	
	Malaysia	
	Thailand	



National Intelligence Bulletin

March 4, 1976

USSR-ASIA


Asian absenteeism at the Soviet 25th party congress underscores how little Moscow has accomplished in the past five years in its efforts to improve Soviet relations with Asian communist and "progressive" parties. The most important absentee is the Cambodian Communist Party, but also missing are four other parties that sent representatives in 1971.

The reasons for the absences vary. The Cambodians are still angry because the Soviets refused to take the Cambodian Communist movement seriously almost until the fall of Phnom Penh. The independent Japanese Communist Party is not represented because Moscow persists in interfering in its internal affairs. The Communist Party of Bangladesh is not present because the party is operating underground as a result of a ban on all political activity last August. The Japanese Socialists planned to go but were not invited, apparently because of Soviet pique over Socialist endorsements of some Chinese foreign policy positions.

Of the ruling Asian communist parties at the congress, only one—Mongolia—is fully pro-Moscow, and the non-ruling parties in all cases represent only one faction of the communist movement in their countries—and generally the least important one. None has any real prospect of achieving power at any time in the foreseeable future.

Moscow has no ties with the communist parties of Burma, Malaysia, and Thailand—all of which have connections with Peking.

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National Intelligence Bulletin

March 4, 1976

NORWAY

Strong domestic opposition to Cuban involvement in Angola has sparked calls for immediate cessation of aid to Havana. At issue is a \$2.5 million construction project in Havana harbor scheduled to be completed in 1978. Parliamentary debates are expected to result in a decision to grant no new aid but to honor existing commitments.

The three major nonsocialist opposition parties—Conservative, Center, and Christian People's—have in the past argued against aid to Cuba on ideological grounds and as being economically unjustifiable. Their position has been strengthened by Bonn's recent decision to halt Cuban aid because of Castro's military intervention in Angola.

Norwegian labor government leaders have tried to respond to growing public sentiment against Cuba without compromising their control of foreign aid projects or losing support of leftists who are still sympathetic to Havana and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. Prime Minister Nordli said recently that Oslo would not use its foreign aid programs as political weapons and maintained that existing commitments should be honored.

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