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
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# National Intelligence Bulletin

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December 3, 1975



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## SPAIN

King Juan Carlos appears to have won his first battle to put his own men in the government.

Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda, his former tutor, will be sworn in today as president of the Cortes—the Spanish parliament. Fernandez-Miranda will also become president of the Council of the Realm, the powerful advisory body that would play a major role in any other major government changes.

the Council followed the expressed wish of Juan Carlos in selecting Fernandez-Miranda as one of the three nominees for the post. A press service quotes government sources as saying that the choice of the three nominees was hotly disputed in the council; militant right-wing members wanted to renominate outgoing conservative president Rodriguez de Valcarcel, whose term expired last week.

Fernandez-Miranda can be expected to do the King's bidding. A former professor of law and a political theorist, he served as minister secretary-general of the National Movement, Spain's only legal political party, and deputy prime minister under the late Carrero Blanco. Although Fernandez-Miranda showed some signs of supporting moves to open the Movement to broader participation, he finally followed Carrero's lead in opposing liberalization. According to a close colleague, he will be more liberal now than when he was in the cabinet in 1973.

Fernandez-Miranda will play an important role in promoting the King's choice for prime minister, should Juan Carlos decide to replace Carlos Arias. As president of the Cortes and the Council of the Realm, it will also be Fernandez-Miranda's duty to countersign a number of executive decisions, which would give the King more freedom to act.

Meanwhile, the government faces its first confrontation with labor since Juan Carlos became King. A two-day strike in Madrid has been called by the clandestine Workers' Commissions to start today in the building industry. The strike is being called ostensibly to protest the government's recently announced decision to limit wage increases to no more than 3 percent above the annual increase in the official cost-of-living index. The leaders of the Workers' Commissions—which are dominated by the Communists—reportedly want to see how much support the Madrid strike receives before deciding whether to call a general strike later.

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## USSR

Economic speeches at yesterday's session of the USSR Supreme Soviet projected an increase in industrial production during 1976 of only 4.3 percent, the lowest planned rate since 1961.

Moscow radio reported that Nikolay Baybakov, chief of the State Planning Committee, ascribed this unusually low forecast to anticipated shortages of agricultural raw materials resulting from this year's harvest failure and to delays in completing new production facilities. Baybakov failed to provide an official estimate of the size of the 1975 harvest, which has been described by other Soviets as "terrible" and "disastrous."

The magnitude of Moscow's economic problems next year is indicated by the fact that growth of industrial production has averaged more than 6 percent for the period 1971-75. As in previous downturns, it is likely that consumer goods and services will bear the brunt of next year's reduced industrial growth, although heavy industry clearly will experience cutbacks as well.

Baybakov said the USSR's national income this year will increase by 4 percent—versus a planned increment of 6.5 percent. In 1976, however, Baybakov foresees national income growing by 5.4 percent, a goal that is probably based in large part on hopes that the agricultural sector will recover from the shortfall in 1975.

Available excerpts of Baybakov's speech preclude a more detailed analysis at this time. The accompanying report on the state budget for 1976 by Minister of Finance Garbuzov was unremarkable, according to the available selections. In keeping with current practice, Garbuzov gave a figure for projected defense spending—17.4 billion rubles—that is virtually unchanged from those in recent years. The domestic radio broadcast reporting on his speech, however, failed to include a figure for the large and growing "science" category, which is believed to contain a substantial share of the actual defense budget.

The announced figure for defense spending has little meaning in terms of the size of Soviet defense programs, and the trend of the announced spending figure does not match the path of observed Soviet defense activities. For example, from 1970 to 1973 the announced figure remained at 17.9 billion rubles and was cut in both 1974 and 1975. During this period, however, there have been major increases in military procurement programs, growth in military manpower, and two large raises in military pay. Published plans to keep defense outlays at the same level this year help buttress the detente image the Soviets are attempting to project at home and abroad. [REDACTED]

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### USSR

The visit to Moscow last week of a PLO delegation headed by Yasir Arafat appears to have broken little new ground.

The communique marking the end of the visit indicates that Arafat gave little more than lip-service to Moscow's initiative of November 9 to reconvene the Geneva conference. The Palestinians seem to be looking to the UN to generate momentum for their cause, but Moscow is cool to pursuing Middle East issues in a forum where its influence will be diluted.

The Soviets apparently again pressed Arafat to make some gesture toward affirming Israel's right to exist. The communique, however, only said a Middle East settlement should be achieved on the basis of UN resolutions and the UN charter. Although the Soviets can take this as implicit acknowledgment of Israel's existence, the wording is sufficiently ambiguous to leave Arafat considerable room for maneuver. Although the communique attacked the second Egyptian-Israeli agreement and castigated "certain quarters" for undermining Arab unity, it did not criticize either Sadat or the US by name.

The Soviets continue to withhold formal endorsement of the PLO as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. As a result, Moscow is able to maneuver among different fedayeen factions and exercise some leverage over Arafat.

The situation in Lebanon and Soviet arms supplies to the fedayeen were undoubtedly discussed, but were not mentioned in the communique. Three fedayeen leaders with military responsibilities went to Moscow with Arafat, suggesting that the Palestinians intended to press for additional arms supplies to replace weapons given to Lebanese leftists.

Arafat's reception in Moscow was similar to that accorded him during his visit last spring. He had no conversations with any official higher than Foreign Minister Gromyko and party secretary Ponomarev. Last spring, Arafat had a brief, ceremonial encounter with Brezhnev; this time he was accorded somewhat greater media coverage. [redacted]

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**NATO**

NATO today will consider the implications of a somewhat forthcoming French response to recent arms standardization initiatives by the Western allies. Arms standardization will be an important discussion topic at next week's NATO ministerial meetings.

The standardization of military weapons and equipment is part of a complex attempt by the NATO allies to ensure that the West retains an effective conventional defense capability in an era of strategic parity and super-power detente. As part of the standardization effort, the caucus of most European NATO members—the Eurogroup—has proposed, and the US has tentatively agreed, to purchase more arms from European sources. This proposal anticipates the development and consolidation of a European arms industry that would lay the foundation for an enhanced indigenous European defense capability.

French cooperation is important to any effort to standardize armaments and upgrade NATO's military capability. The recent initiatives in both the NATO forum and the Eurogroup have thus been drawn in such a way as to accommodate Paris' desire for independence while slowly and pragmatically increasing French cooperation with the allies.

France has now reaffirmed its intention to cooperate on arms standardization with NATO, and especially with its European allies. The French have said, however, that they will not sanction institutionalization of their participation either in a permanent NATO steering committee or in a European defense procurement secretariat as proposed by the Eurogroup.

The French are insisting that any meetings with their European allies on standardization must be informal. They also insist that the NATO committee must be a temporary body and be clearly subordinate to the North Atlantic Council and avoid a comprehensive discussion of standardization principles. The French remain opposed to any transatlantic dialogue until the Europeans sort out problems related to standardization and cooperative European defense production. The French proposals would in effect transfer the initiative for NATO-wide standardization to the Europeans in general and France is particular. Paris' cautious response appears to confirm European expectations about present French attitudes. It may also confirm indications that Paris' consideration of its alternatives in this area is at a preliminary stage and that any change in traditional French attitudes will come slowly.

Attention will now focus on European reactions—especially those of the British and the Germans—to France's announced position. A major issue will be how far the allies are prepared to take a united stand on the need for an even more forthcoming French attitude.



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The recommended ministerial position on standardization proposed by Secretary General Luns would establish the ad hoc steering group in NATO, but it would delay approval of a particular policy until next May. In view of the French position, the allies appear likely to approve this course.

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## CANADA

Defense Minister Richardson, in a recent report to Parliament on the defense review, reassured the members that a creditable defense establishment would be maintained.

According to Richardson, the year-long review has brought about no changes in the four basic roles of the military—national defense, cooperation with the US in the defense of North America, participation in NATO, and support of international peace-keeping under the auspices of the UN. The defense review establishes fiscal guidelines for the defense budget that will permit a 1.5- to 2-percent increase per year in real terms, beginning in 1977, as well as a minimum level of 20 percent of the budget for capital expenditures by 1982. In order to meet government economic restraints, however, initial funds for the new long-range maritime patrol aircraft and tank modernization would be taken out of next year's already approved budget. This will probably require some offsetting belt-tightening in support functions.

An earlier proposal to replace temporarily Canadian F-104s in Europe with F-5s already in the inventory has been dropped, and there will be no replacement for these aircraft until the early 1980s. Richardson's report affirmed the need for maintaining the current air capability in Europe, but was equivocal on North American air defense, saying only that it would meet "sovereignty requirements for identification and control of intrusions." Richardson also told Parliament that for the first time forces will be specifically earmarked for UN peace-keeping duties. The 2,000 men tabbed for this assignment will presumably include those already in UN contingents in the Middle East and on Cyprus.

Ottawa will not seek consultations with NATO on the review because no reductions in its alliance commitments are to be made. While Richardson's report holds the line on defense policy, the long-term nature of major weapons system programs and the delay in implementing new fiscal guidelines will make later slippage possible.

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### ICELAND-UK-NATO

The tensions generated by the fisheries dispute between Iceland and Britain continue to strengthen the hand of Icelandic opponents of NATO and the US-manned base at Keflavik. At a news conference on November 28, Foreign Minister Agustsson declared that Iceland will withdraw from the alliance and dismantle the Keflavik base unless the UK removes its frigates from Iceland's 200-mile fishing zone.

Agustsson also intimated at his news conference that he would not attend this month's NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels. He suggested there was a strong possibility that Iceland's permanent delegation would be withdrawn before the scheduled meeting. Agustsson also threatened to take the fisheries dispute to NATO or to the UN Security Council. The foreign minister said his remarks reflected his private opinion and not necessarily the position of the Icelandic government.

Prime Minister Hallgrimsson suggested in a recent newspaper interview that Iceland might recall its ambassador to London, or break off diplomatic relations with Britain. Reykjavik issued similar threats, including withdrawal from NATO, during a similar outbreak of the "cod war" in 1972-73. The statements are intended to force the US and other NATO members to put pressure on London. Norway and West Germany have already offered their good offices. Several Icelandic politicians admit privately that their government, in fact, has taken no official position on the NATO issue.

The coalition is not under overwhelming public pressure at this time to withdraw from NATO. Last week, it easily got parliament to ratify its controversial fishing pact with West Germany. An anti-British demonstration, furthermore, attracted only a small crowd, and its mood was more festive than angry.

Icelandic politicians are prone to engage in hard rhetoric, and the greatest danger now is that they could become its captive. If prospects for settling the dispute remain dim and there are incidents at sea in the coming weeks, the politicians will face growing public pressure to follow through on their threats.

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### FRANCE

The US defense attache in Paris reports that France is cutting back on its Pluton tactical nuclear missile program because of budgetary considerations.

General Bigeard, French state secretary for defense, recently told the defense attache that Paris now plans to deploy four Pluton regiments instead of six and to reduce the number of nuclear warheads to be procured from 120 to 70. It is not clear whether the French decision is final or whether the Pluton deployment program will merely be held in abeyance, in the hope that economic conditions become more favorable and the prospects for reaching an agreement on stationing Pluton units in West Germany improve.

The French currently have two operational Pluton regiments. The third regiment will begin forming this month, while the fourth is scheduled to be operational late next year. The army, which is in the process of reorganizing, will undoubtedly assign all four regiments at the army corps level in France, leaving the one corps that will remain in West Germany without its own nuclear support.

The Pluton is a highly mobile missile system designed to provide battlefield support to ground forces at the army and corps level. The missile can carry either a 10- or 25-kiloton nuclear warhead from 6 to 65 nautical miles. [redacted]

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TURKEY


The Turks appear to be willing to back off somewhat from their hard-line position in the negotiations with the US for a new defense cooperation agreement, although major differences remain between the two sides on key issues.

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The General Staff's decision appears to have grown out of Turkey's ill-fated attempts in recent months to find an alternative to the US for arms. The US approach to the negotiations, which Turkish military leaders believe has been reasonable and fair so far, also helped persuade the generals to be more flexible,



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Perhaps in response to the General Staff's decision, Turkish negotiators at recent working-level sessions of the negotiations have given indications that compromise may be possible on a number of issues. There have been no signs, however, that the Turks are prepared to back down from their demand for some sort of guaranteed annual compensation for US use of the bases.

The General Staff reportedly is urging the Turkish negotiators to press for a minimum payment of \$150 million annually. This would represent a significant drop from the \$1.5 billion originally mentioned, but with the arms embargo still fresh in their memory, the Turks have been adamant on the principle of a guaranteed payment.

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EC

The UK won significant concessions at the EC summit in Rome yesterday in return for abandoning its demand for a separate seat at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation. That conference can now presumably get under way in Paris as scheduled on December 16, as the question of developing-country representation was settled late last week.

London's insistence on separate representation was aimed largely at potential domestic charges of "giving away" British North Sea oil resources if the UK could not defend its special interests as a producer at the international conference. Now Prime Minister Wilson will be able to show that all his EC partners have accepted the concept of a minimum price for energy, in effect guaranteeing a profit for North Sea oil against a theoretical future collapse of world oil prices.

France, moreover—in addition to accepting the minimum-price mechanism for the first time—agreed to share oil among the Nine in a supply emergency. Paris will presumably still remain aloof from the consumer countries' International Energy Agency, but the French concession on oil sharing will no longer be a potential obstacle to the other EC members' participation in the agency's emergency sharing scheme.

The UK will still be able to present its own statements at the international conference "as the major EC oil producer," but the Community will clearly be represented by a single delegation. The EC's initial positions on energy and the other conference topics are, in fact, composed mostly of generalities and, now that agreement has been achieved on a minimum price concept, may not give rise to many differences among the Nine.

The dispute in Rome over the energy issue led to one of the more heated rows in the Community's history and brought to the fore explicit arguments based on national power: Wilson's threat to join OPEC, for example, and German Chancellor Schmidt's reminder that Bonn might not be available to bail Britain out financially in the future.

This debate may leave its mark on the Community, but the fact of the ultimate accord is likely to be more significant. At the least, the Rome European Council session will probably confirm the importance of the summit as a device for forcing agreement among the Nine on difficult questions.

Apart from the energy question, the major achievement of the Rome meeting is the commitment to go ahead with direct elections in 1978 for the European Parliament without waiting for the UK and Denmark, if they have not ironed out by

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that date their own problems with electoral procedures. Most observers believe that popular elections, replacing the present appointing of parliamentary delegations, will inaugurate a determined drive for a stronger parliamentary role. Although details remain to be worked out regarding the common passport, which the Community leaders agreed will come into use in 1978, it is intended to be a symbol that will revive flagging popular interest in the EC.

The larger EC countries that participated in the Rambouillet summit with the US and Japan got a reminder in Rome that the interests of the smaller countries must also be given expression. In response to Belgian, Dutch, Danish, and Irish criticism of the lack of proper EC preparation for the Rambouillet meeting, it was agreed that no similar summit would take place again without prior Community coordination. [redacted]

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## JAPAN

Tokyo has expressed its concern that the major industrial nations are moving to a more protectionist trade policy, violating the free-trade principle outlined at last month's economic summit.

In a low-key note to Washington, Tokyo cited the growing number of actions filed by US companies charging their Japanese competitors with dumping. So far this year, 16 investigations have been undertaken involving a total of \$2.5 billion in Japanese shipments to the US market, of which about \$1.8 billion are in the car export category.

Tokyo is particularly concerned about the effect of these actions on Japanese auto exports. Retail sales of Japanese cars did exceptionally well in the US market this year, up 23 percent in volume compared with 1974. During the model year ending in September, Japanese car sales accounted for 11 percent of total car sales in the US, up from 7 percent in 1974. [redacted]

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Tokyo is also concerned about the possible imposition of import controls by the UK. Japan probably will be the hardest hit of the industrial countries because the controls will be directed at cars, machinery, and textiles, which account for 60 percent of Japanese sales to the UK.

Japanese exporters have already been severely hurt by barriers erected by other industrial nations. Australia adopted controls in December 1974 that cover 25 percent of Japanese shipments to the Australian market. Canada is also closely monitoring imports from Japan. [redacted]

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## NIGERIA

The military government has announced that its purge of the armed forces and civil service is over. The announcement, which exhorted all concerned to settle down and resume normal activities, clearly came in response to signs of growing discontent over the purge among junior- and middle-grade military officers and some senior government officials.

The decision to end the purge reportedly was made at a recent meeting of the ruling 22-man Supreme Military Council

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Last Thursday, the regime announced that 244 officers, including a state military governor, had been dismissed or retired as a result of the military purge that began last month. In the three-month-long purge of the civil service, more than 9,000 civil servants and university officials were removed. While the announcement ending the purge made no reference to the regime's previously stated plan to demobilize an unspecified number of servicemen, including ex-soldiers recalled to duty during the civil war, this may be undertaken at a later date.

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## PANAMA

The purported message from the Panamanian leader, General Torrijos, to US Ambassador Bunker, telling him not to return to Panama without serious treaty proposals, was never passed, but was manufactured and publicized locally for domestic political purposes.

Shortly after the ambassador's departure from Panama last week, the pro-government media publicized an "ultimatum" implying that unless the ambassador could commit the US to further concessions he need not return for additional talks. The story alleged that contrary to Panamanian expectations, the ambassador had brought no concrete US commitments or favorable proposals and that the "ultimatum" was in response to a no-longer positive US attitude toward the treaty talks.

US embassy officials in Panama believe that Torrijos' action was designed to offset expected leftist and ultranationalist accusations that the government was deliberately stalling the negotiations to accommodate the US elections and to minimize pressure on General Torrijos to reveal negotiating details. A need to placate the left while making cabinet changes favorable to conservatives and business elements, the declining economy, rumors of scandal in the national bank, and residual frustration over the lack of progress in the talks have also been credited as motivating the government's move.

Despite official denial by the US that any such message was received, the publication of the "ultimatum" is probably viewed by General Torrijos as accomplishing several objectives. It will allow him to appear to retain the initiative in the talks, temporarily offset leftist claims of a sellout, and justify an extended lull in the negotiations. Recurring official frustration and insecurity throughout the negotiating process make further such Panamanian ploys possible, particularly since top officials continue to believe they retain a psychological advantage over the US and appear unwilling to make further concessions.

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### PORTUGAL

The military's dominant political role in Portugal could become a source of increasing friction between civilian and military leaders.

The popularly elected constituent assembly took up the issue yesterday when it met for the first time since the failure of the leftist military rebellion last week. The assembly meeting coincided with the lifting of the state of emergency in the Lisbon area.

Military participation in the government was formalized before the constituent assembly elections last spring, when the leftist military leadership dominated by pro-Communist former prime minister Vasco Goncalves forced the political parties to agree to a continuing role for the military for a period of three to five years. Under the terms of the agreement, the military has the power to override an elected government, in addition to having veto power over presidential candidates and the selection of key cabinet ministers.

At the assembly session yesterday, the Socialist Party announced that it was prepared to participate in talks to renegotiate the pact. The party emphasized, however, that it was not prepared to call the agreement with the military into question on its own.

The Socialists' reluctance to challenge the military at this juncture is understandable. They have cooperated closely with the anti-Communist Antunes faction since the overthrow of the Goncalves government and hope to use their present favored position in the government as a springboard to power in the general election promised for next year.

The other democratic parties, however, have shown no such reluctance and may be expected to press the Socialists now that the latter have opened the door. Francisco Sa Carneiro—head of the Popular Democratic Party, which also belongs to the present government partnership—on several occasions has called on the military to return to the barracks, and, more recently, urged the popular election of a civilian successor to General Costa Gomes as president. The Social Democratic Center, a center-right party that is not represented in the government but which does sit in the constituent assembly, can also be expected to throw its weight behind the proposal.

Popular sentiment for an end to military rule has been on the increase in Portugal, and there is support for such a move within the military as well. Although the present military leaders have promised at various times to respect the results of the election planned for next spring, they have given no indication that they intend to withdraw from politics completely. [redacted]

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**LEBANON**

French mediator Couve de Murville, who completed preliminary talks with Lebanese leaders this week, is optimistic that the government's effort to expand the cabinet will lead to real progress in easing Lebanon's turmoil. In discussions with US Ambassador Godley, Couve said he thought a cabinet including representatives of the major factions could be put together within the week, if the current cease-fire holds.

The French envoy apparently is encouraged by the hints of moderation recently shown by Christian Phalangists and the Maronite clergy, who apparently are now responding to pressure from him and from the Vatican. The French emissary also believes leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt may be prepared to back away from his previously rigid refusal to be represented in a cabinet including the Phalanges Party.

The unusual show of unity between President Franjyah and Prime Minister Karami last weekend—which was encouraged by Couve—will make the task of expanding the cabinet easier. Karami has been trying to broaden his government since his appointment as Prime Minister in July, but until now has not had the backing of the President. As expected, however, Karami is apparently having some difficulty with Jumblatt and other leftists who rightly perceive advantages for the Christians in an enlarged government.

Expansion of the cabinet would benefit the Christians by reducing the importance of the national dialogue committee, in which Lebanese leftists are over-represented. By moving the focus of political debate from the committee to the cabinet, the Christians would also have a better chance to delay or influence the terms of any agreement on fundamental political changes that would erode their dominant position.

On the other hand, Karami's ability to control and direct a reform program would be improved if he succeeded in eclipsing the national dialogue committee with a broad-based cabinet. The Prime Minister has not been able to exert effective control over the committee, which is chaired by a former prime minister.

Karami apparently is moving as quickly as possible to put together an acceptable cabinet slate; his difficulties with leftist leaders may drag on well beyond this week, however. In addition, renewed tensions in the north around Tripoli and Zagharta and fighting in the eastern city of Zahlah may increase the reluctance of the leaders of warring factions to cooperate with the government. A flare-up in Zahlah triggered nation-wide fighting last August; all roads into the city reportedly were blocked by Lebanese security forces yesterday in an effort to contain the fighting.

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The parliament passed an army conscription bill yesterday, which is expected to be quickly approved by President Franjijah. Long advocated by the military high command, the conscription law will over the long run substantially improve the army's effectiveness, particularly against private militias. For the present, however, the security forces are carrying the burden of enforcing the tenuous cease-fire.

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
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
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*Soviet-built 8,500 ton drydock enroute to Somalia*



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## FOR THE RECORD

USSR-SOMALIA: A Soviet-built floating drydock with a capacity of 8,500 tons arrived at Berbera, Somalia, on December 1 after being towed from the Black Sea by three merchant tugs. A drydock of this size can accommodate Soviet ships as large as a Kresta II class guided-missile cruiser. If it remains at Berbera, the drydock will facilitate the maintenance of Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean.

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
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