


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
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
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
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
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USSR-PORTUGAL

On August 8, *Pravda* reprinted an article by K. I. Zarodov concerning Lenin's analysis of the abortive revolution in Russia in 1905. The article has attracted considerable attention, particularly in Western Europe, for its implications for the West European communist parties, for the Soviet Union, and even for Brezhnev himself.

Zarodov begins: "It is the summer of 1905. Russia is engulfed in the flames of revolution. All classes and parties are on the move." He goes on: "Seventy years have passed, but Lenin's work reads today as if it referred to events developing before our very eyes." Clearly, Zarodov is referring to Portugal.

Zarodov's line is tough, orthodox Leninism. He emphasizes that a communist party must maintain its hegemony, its separateness from other parties, and its commitment to lead the revolution. It is precisely this hegemony, he says, that makes it possible for a communist party to apply the "specific levers" that turn a "democratic revolution" into a "socialist revolution."

He is scornful of "modern conciliators" who believe that gaining control of the "levers of power" is the final act of the revolutionary process, which comes after some kind of "referendum" that expresses the will of the majority. Leninists, Zarodov says, know that the popular majority is a political, not an arithmetic, concept; i.e., the communist party expresses the will of the majority, whatever the results at the ballot box may be.

Zarodov is providing an ideological rationale for Cunhal's tactics in Portugal. He is justifying the Portuguese Communist Party's infiltration of the state machinery and the military establishment. Zarodov's article sanctions the assertion of Communist control over the unions, the shutdown of *Republica*, and the use of violence against opponents. At the same time, the article is not an unqualified endorsement of Cunhal's tactics. Some of Zarodov's observations can be interpreted as guarded criticism of the Portuguese Communist Party.

Open to different interpretations is Zarodov's wider purpose. The article first appeared in the July issue of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, of which Zarodov is senior editor. It was written at a time when the Portuguese Communist Party was in reasonably good shape, when it appeared to have an excellent chance of achieving power in Portugal, and when its heavy-handed tactics were being openly criticized by the Italian and other West European parties. It is possible that Zarodov's purpose was to tell the Italians and others that they, not Cunhal, are the apostates and that Portugal might serve as a model for how a West European party comes to power.

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Zarodov may also have had the Soviet audience in mind. His article can be interpreted as part of the debate on the appropriate strategy and tactics for nonruling communist parties during the current "crisis of capitalism." In placing his emphasis on the hegemony of communist parties, Zarodov is trying to refute theorists who give heavier weight to unity of action between the communist and other parties.

In reprinting the Zarodov article, *Pravda* seems to be intervening on the side of the hard-liners. This raises a question of whether there has been a fundamental switch in Moscow away from countenancing the quasi-constitutional approach to achieving power, as exemplified by the Italian Communists, toward the approach exemplified by the Portuguese.

We have problems with this hypothesis. When Zarodov was writing his article, the Portuguese Communists were riding high; when *Pravda* reprinted it, the Portuguese party was under violent attack and in danger. It is hard to believe that the Soviets would commend to the West European parties and the world communist movement the old orthodoxy at exactly the time when the leading exemplar of that orthodoxy was tottering on the brink of disaster.

It would take some fast, and probably unconvincing, footwork for Moscow to argue that the reaction against Cunhal is an example of what would happen to the Italian and French communists if they were on the brink of gaining power. Cunhal has clearly been playing a different game than Berlinguer or Marchais.

Another hypothesis is that *Pravda's* message was more modest: the West Europeans and others should not interpret a defeat for Cunhal as vindication of their own approach to achieving power. It is also possible that Moscow reprinted Zarodov's article in *Pravda* as a token of its "solidarity" with the beleaguered Portuguese comrades. The Soviets always feel themselves under some obligation to protect their revolutionary credentials.

The Zarodov article may have been the instrument for a militant note after the European security conference and before a meeting of European communist parties. The Soviets are making a valiant effort to have it both ways. Thus, their line on Portugal has consistently supported Cunhal's grab to power even though they supported the unity of action by the Communists and other parties.

Zarodov's boss, Politburo candidate-member Ponomarev, last year wrote a widely discussed article on the lessons of Chile that emphasized the importance of controlling the levers of power. Last month, Ponomarev was extolling the

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
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appropriateness and importance of maintaining relations between communists and social democrats. Indeed, Ponomarev, along with his superior, senior ideologist Suslov, was speaking at a conference commemorating the 40th anniversary of the popular front.

This is not to say that Zarodov's article and the situation in Portugal do not raise questions about the relationship between detente and revolutionary change. The supporters of the current Soviet detente policy have cited Portugal as a case where revolutionary progress has been possible as a consequence of detente. If the Portuguese Communists come to a bad end, those who are less enamored of detente will have another string for their bow. [redacted]

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PORTUGAL-AZORES-MADEIRAS

Portuguese Popular Democratic Party leaders in the Azores foresee eventual independence for the islands regardless of the outcome of the political turmoil in Lisbon. Should a nonradical government emerge, the timetable for independence will be deferred rather than abandoned.

Two Popular Democratic Party leaders, one recently named to the new governing board of the islands, have admitted their membership in the Azores Liberation Front to the US consul. They claim the Popular Democrats control the Front in the Horta and Angra districts, but factionalism within the Front has kept the party from taking control of Ponta Delgada district. The Front's contingent in Horta district is purportedly well-organized and has the support of the police and the army battalion except for the commander.

On the mainland, the Armed Forces Movement apparently is divided over policy toward the Azores. *Movimento*, the Movement's official bulletin, has been critical of members who have on the one hand underestimated the intensity of sentiment for independence or who on the other have accepted it as accomplished fact. The "correct" view, according to the bulletin, is to recognize the plight of the Azorean worker and take revolutionary measures to solve his problems. The publication underscores the lack of consensus in the Armed Forces Movement over what to do about the Azorean problem.

The continuing crisis in Lisbon is also contributing to increased support for independence in the Madeira Islands. Failure to redress the grievances of the islanders apparently is generating support for the recently formed Front for the Liberation of the Madeiran Archipelago. It reportedly has formed a government in exile and demands total independence rather than increased autonomy. Although this organization is said to believe independence will be achieved peacefully, its members apparently are armed. They probably are responsible for blowing up the state radio transmitter on August 22. [REDACTED]

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JORDAN-SYRIA

Jordan and Syria have taken further steps to increase cooperation in a number of fields.

In a communique capping King Husayn's five-day visit to Syria, the two countries announced the formation of a "Supreme Syrian-Jordanian Command Council" composed of Husayn and Syrian President Asad. The council is supposed to meet at least once every three months to act on recommendations of the ministerial committee formed at the time of Asad's visit to Jordan last month.

The communique avoided any mention of a joint military command, and its specific labeling of the new council as "political" seems designed to relieve Israeli and US apprehension that Jordan and Syria have established a military command. The command council will, however, review plans for "coordination and integration" between the two armed forces.

The prerogatives of the command council appear to be sufficiently broad to permit Husayn to keep his options open and move toward closer military cooperation at his own pace. Although the King sees benefits in closer cooperation with Syria, he will be careful not to alienate the Jordanian army, his major power base. For its part, the army remains skeptical of Syrian motives, fearing that Asad will prevail on the King to allow the fedayeen to re-establish a presence in Jordan. The pro forma treatment of Palestinian aspirations in the communique may reassure the army for the time being.

The communique lists several other areas in which the two governments are to work together. In addition to planning for a "unified foreign policy," particularly with respect to Arab issues, the command council will discuss coordination of economic and social development plans, the formation of joint economic companies, unification of markets, and establishment of a unified customs policy.

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MOROCCO

In a speech on Wednesday, King Hassan again vowed to "recover" Spanish Sahara by the end of the year, by force if necessary.

At the same time, Hassan repeated his desire to acquire Spanish Sahara by peaceful and legal means. He promised to limit his efforts to the diplomatic level until October or November so as not to interfere with the forthcoming advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice or the UN General Assembly's response to that opinion.

Hassan first set a deadline for resolution of the dispute a year ago, when he characterized 1975 as the year of mobilization to liberate Spanish Sahara. He is a clever tactician, however, and will find a way around his own deadline if that suits his purposes.

In a clear reference to Algeria, the King expressed disappointment with the attitudes of those who go back on their commitments each time they see that their interests lie elsewhere. He declared Morocco must be willing to take "decisive action" with regard to other countries if they do not give the support Morocco has the right to expect.

Hassan's thinly veiled criticism of Algeria reflects his disappointment that Algeria has not actively supported the communique of July 4 in which Algeria publicly accepted a Moroccan-Mauritanian understanding that would partition the disputed territory. Algiers is trying to keep its options open for as long as possible by continued public support for the principle of self-determination for Spanish Saharans and for a pro-independence Saharan political group.

The King's sabre rattling was, in part, a response to continuing Spanish efforts to put together a coalition of various political groups in the Sahara looking toward a settlement by self-determination and to Madrid's unwillingness to negotiate a bilateral deal with Morocco before the Court's opinion is rendered. He is also worried that the opinion may be either neutral or unfavorable to Morocco's claim.

The speech, prepared for a major holiday that traditionally inspires strong rhetoric, also was meant for domestic consumption. The King wants to keep Moroccan attention focused on his Saharan campaign to reap as much internal support as possible. He may also be responding to reports of restiveness among army units who are bivouacked with little to do in the desert heat near the Saharan border.

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RHODESIA

Prime Minister Smith and black Rhodesian nationalists are to begin settlement talks Monday, but an early break-off is threatened by disagreements over further procedural arrangements.

Both sides have confirmed that they will meet in a railroad car on the bridge spanning the Zambezi River at Victoria Falls. Smith will be accompanied by four cabinet ministers and a few aides. The Rhodesian African National Council has named a 28-man delegation, including all leaders of its rival factions.

The Council's leaders, however, have repudiated an earlier agreement that the specific settlement terms will be drawn up by joint committees working inside Rhodesia.

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Smith has said publicly that the initial session will be merely a brief formality, and he may welcome the Council's partial repudiation of the earlier agreement as an excuse for scrapping settlement talks. The Prime Minister appeared to be preparing for a crackdown on the Council until two weeks ago, when he acceded to the latest plan for salvaging settlement talks under heavy pressure from South African Prime Minister Vorster.

Since the Council's leaders decided to reject negotiations inside Rhodesia, British envoys in Zambia and Zambian officials have urged them to consider some new procedural compromises.

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ARGENTINA

Recurrent rumors of an impending military coup, which have now reached the press, may be emanating from officers upset by the presence of a fellow officer—army Colonel Vicente Damasco—in a government they consider without merit. The rumors seem designed to make his position untenable.


The appointment of Damasco as interior minister has given these long-time critics something to zero in on. They feel his participation will be construed as military support for the government and that, as an institution, the army will be made to look foolish should the administration continue to falter. Resentment of Damasco's rapid rise to prominence and his failure to consult with these officers in the process of selecting the new cabinet, a process he directed, also play a part in the current problem.

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In the current climate of political uncertainty, heightened by sharply escalating leftist violence, speculation that the army will intervene openly has risen again but with increased prominence. The obstacles to a take-over, however, are many and formidable.


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In addition, there is very genuine, widespread sentiment in favor of a constitutional solution to the leadership vacuum. This stems from the realization by most officers that there is no current problem—whether it is terrorism, economic chaos, or inept leadership—that the officers have not already sought vainly to remedy under three successive military regimes from 1966 to 1973.

If the army as a whole is to be goaded into seizing full control of the government, it will require an event of unprecedented magnitude, such as a nationwide halt to all economic activity or a guerrilla take-over of an entire city. An attempt by a minority faction would likely fail.

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FOR THE RECORD

TURKEY: The Turkish general staff yesterday set up new procedures that prohibit US air force flights to and through Incirlik air base, unless on a NATO-related mission. Flights to third countries must now be routed through civilian airports at Istanbul and Ankara, thus entailing landing, parking, and service fees. The move does not appear to be a new effort to step up pressure on the US Congress to lift the arms embargo, but rather the implementation of the Turkish government's earlier decision to restrict operations at Incirlik to NATO-related activities. Ankara appears willing to await the result of a new vote by the US Congress on the arms embargo before taking further action against the bases. A new vote is expected during the second week in September.

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ANNEX


Soviet Support for Angola's Popular Movement


Moscow is giving strong support to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. It is not only training Popular Movement troops, but more important, it is delivering military equipment. These deliveries do not cost the Soviets much, but they have considerable impact in Angola. Moscow has sharply increased shipments during the past year, almost certainly because it calculated that the revolution in Portugal would foster change in Angola, which the Soviets wanted to be in a position to exploit.

Even before the increased shipments began, the Popular Movement had amassed an impressive array of Soviet equipment. The Movement's arsenal was well-stocked with a variety of small arms, including machine guns and grenade launchers, and some heavier items, such as 82-mm. mortars, B-10 82-mm. recoilless rifles, and 122-mm. rockets.

The new deliveries have continued the flow of some of this equipment and have added several other types of materiel, including armored cars, trucks, armored personnel carriers, antitank weapons, and rocket launchers. The Popular Movement is far and away the best equipped of the contending groups in Angola.



Moscow conducts training programs for the Popular Movement both in the USSR and in the Congo. Thousands of Popular Movement troops have received training in the USSR since the early 1960s; hundreds are now in the Soviet Union. 

 Popular Movement troops are thus better organized and better led than those of its major rival, the National Front.



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
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The Soviets presumably see the pro-Soviet Marxist Neto as the kind of liberation movement leader they prefer to work with. Their relative generosity to the Popular Movement may be intended to exemplify the rewards that await those who associate themselves with Moscow. Over the longer term, the Soviets may hope that with an amenable government in Luanda, they will be able to exert a major influence on events in southern Africa and to limit Chinese advances in the region.

The Soviets probably have not lost sight of the strategic or economic opportunities that might flow from an Angola under the control of Neto's Popular Movement. But it is hard to see how much, if anything, Moscow would gain from bases in Angola. With the opening of the Suez Canal, the South Atlantic seafaring lanes are even less important to the Soviet navy than they have been. Bases in Angola could not add significantly to any current Soviet military activity, and Angola would be strategically important to Moscow only if the Soviets contemplated a major new increase of their activities in the South Atlantic. There is no evidence they have any such plans.

The Soviets themselves have no need for Angolan or Cabindan resources, but they might want to use Cabindan oil to supply some of their East European clients. The Soviets may also want to hinder Western access to the minerals in the area.

The Soviets probably do not expect any immediate return on their investment. While Soviet arms and equipment have helped the Popular Movement to assert control over Luanda, Cabinda, and some other areas, they have not—and probably cannot—overcome the Popular Movement's inherent weaknesses. The Popular Movement's essentially urban character, its relatively limited personnel resources, and Neto's doctrinaire and unappealing personality make significant inroads into the countryside strongholds of the National Front or National Union unlikely, no matter how much equipment the Soviets send.

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On the other hand, neither of the other two groups—or both in concert for that matter—appears able to defeat the Popular Movement decisively on its own territory. Since there is no support whatsoever for a partition agreement, a protracted war of attrition seems in the offing, and Moscow wants to make sure the Popular Movement is well-provisioned for the ordeal.

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
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