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
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ANNEX: An Assessment of the Khmer Rebel Leadership

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SOUTH VIETNAM


North Vietnamese forces now control virtually all of Military Region 2, including the southern provinces. Since the loss of Qui Nhon and Nha Trang yesterday, the government has apparently abandoned the coastal provinces of Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan. There were no South Vietnamese regulars in Tuyen Duc Province, including the resort city of Da Lat, and much of the population had already fled.

The fate of the civilian refugees recently taken to Cam Ranh is unclear, following the movement on to Vung Tau of the approximately 9,000 marines just evacuated from Da Nang. These marine units are to be reorganized for deployment near Saigon by the end of next week. Efforts to refit and reorganize some 4,000 troops from the South Vietnamese 2nd Division, now heading for Military Region 3, are being slowed by the lack of replacement equipment.

In the delta provinces, the communists are giving new priority to cutting the major highways to block the movement of military supplies south from Saigon and of foodstuffs north to Saigon from the delta. This may have delayed planned attacks against Can Tho and My Tho cities. Nevertheless, elements of the communist 8th Division remain in position to begin attacks against these major urban centers at any time.

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### Cambodia: Lower Mekong



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CAMBODIA

The Khmer communists have overrun the government enclave that included Neak Luong and nearby Banam, the last government holdings on the Mekong River between Phnom Penh and the South Vietnamese border. The two neighboring towns were defended by over 4,000 troops. The loss is a major defeat.

Neak Luong fell yesterday afternoon.


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Banam was overrun sometime last night. The situation there is still confused, but ten Cambodian navy craft from Banam have arrived in Phnom Penh with a small number of survivors.

After the communists have eliminated remaining pockets of resistance in the Neak Luong - Banam area, they will be able to redeploy toward Phnom Penh a substantial number of the 6,000 to 7,000 troops they now have along the lower Mekong.

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In the immediate area of the capital, communist forces yesterday fired over 30 rockets at Pochentong Airport, but they again failed to affect airlift operations. Several rockets fell near the US embassy in the city's southeastern quarter.

Inconclusive fighting continued on the other battlefronts around Phnom Penh, except along the Bassac River to the southeast where government units abandoned positions on an island four miles from the capital's outskirts. Communist reinforcements moved into this area last week, and government units have been gradually losing ground there ever since.

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SAUDI ARABIA

In the first major policy statement of his reign, King Khalid announced on Monday night the regime's intention to "reorganize" its relationship to the people by forming a "consultative council." The statement, broadcast over the Saudi radio, was read by Crown Prince Fahd, who continues to stand forth as the country's pre-eminent political leader now that Faysal is gone.

The statement did not elaborate the plan, but attributed it to King Faysal. Khalid alleged that Faysal would have established such a council had he lived.

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Fahd's support for political change is not new. When he was making his move--between 1970 and 1972--to secure family and public recognition as the number-two man in the country, Fahd publicly endorsed such modernizing changes--

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King Khalid's recommendation in his statement Monday night for changes in provincial government arrangements has also been around a long time. In fact, a thorough revamping of provincial government was drafted in 1963, at the direction of Faysal, who was then crown prince. It was never implemented, however.

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Elsewhere in the statement--which generally stressed continuity with Faysal's policies--Khalid made a point of emphasizing Saudi Arabia's commitment to the liberation of Jerusalem "from the claws of Zionism." By stressing that Jerusalem must be the first step in dealing with the Palestine question--not something to be taken up when everything else is out of the way--the new leaders probably intend to signal their support for a firm Arab position, following the collapse of the step-by-step negotiations. They presumably want to discourage any speculation that their regime will be softer than Faysal on Israel and also to stiffen Egypt's resolve to hold out for an Arab, not just Egyptian, settlement.

Khalid also called for Islamic solidarity, Arab unity, and the recovery of the occupied territories. In a passing reference, he said his government would continue to strengthen the armed forces and provide them with the necessary weapons for defense of Saudi Arabia and the "Arab nation." With respect to the country's oil reserves, Khalid talked about avoiding confrontation and not letting "selfishness" affect world prosperity; he supported the resolutions of the OPEC summit conference in Algiers.

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### IRAN

An upsurge in terrorism and student unrest in Iran since January portends further terrorist acts against Iranian security officials and installations. The Shah's concern over Iraqi support of Iranian dissident groups probably was an important contributing factor behind the rapprochement with Baghdad. The effectiveness of Iranian internal security should now be enhanced by that part of the accord between the two neighbors dealing with border security, prevention of subversive and terrorist infiltration, cessation of propaganda broadcasts, and curtailment of funds to dissident organizations.

The increased terrorist activity has been attributed to successful internal reorganization and possible merging of resources of the following three active terrorist organizations in the country:

--The People's Sacrifice Guerrillas, a large and well-organized communist terrorist group.

--The People's Strugglers, a radical, religious conservative group.

--The People's Democratic Front, the smallest group of the three, but well led.

The Shah's recent decision to revert to a one-party political system reduces the outlets for legitimate political activism, and quiescent liberals may now view the terrorist organizations as an acceptable alternative to the Shah's authoritarianism. The recent restructuring of the political party system has also sparked renewed student unrest

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
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Classes at the nation's universities have been disrupted for the fourth successive month, despite a government crackdown on student protesters. [redacted]

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[redacted] Iranian security officials hope that the current Iranian holiday season will ease the situation.

The majority of terrorist acts committed in recent months has been directed against the Iranian security organization, SAVAK, [redacted]

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[redacted] Terrorism and discontent in Iran in the near term are unlikely to surpass the current capabilities of the security forces. Continued success of terrorist operations, including effective anti-regime propaganda attacks, will likely lead, however, to more repressive police action, resulting in martyrs and possible increased popular support for dissident activities.

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HONDURAS

Honduran military leaders have persuaded Chief of State Lopez to relinquish command of the armed forces, and probably intend to assume wider responsibility for directing the affairs of the country. Lopez will remain as titular chief executive, according to an announcement issued yesterday by the Superior Defense Council.

Lopez' removal from the position that he used since the late 1950s to guarantee his control of government is the latest step in a process under way for several months in which senior military officers have taken over a larger share of decision-making.

Colonel Juan Alberto Melgar, a protege of Lopez, has succeeded him as armed forces commander. Melgar, who previously demonstrated little interest in affairs of state, will probably depend heavily on the advice of a collegium of military officers, including younger ones

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Dissatisfaction with Lopez has grown steadily in the military during the last year or so. Despite strong pressure from fellow officers, deteriorating economic conditions, and deep divisions in his government, Lopez continued to procrastinate. Important decisions--including the need to replace the foreign minister who resigned last October--were put off, and relief efforts for the victims of the hurricane last year have faltered.

Although his power clearly has been circumscribed, at least for the time being, Lopez can still summon powerful support. His extensive web of business interests and the continued loyalty of some top officers--perhaps including Melgar--could enable him to regain a preeminent role. Whatever his role, nonetheless, it seems likely that the military will now provide more dynamic leadership and pay more heed to the advice of younger, reform-minded officers.

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
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YUGOSLAVIA

The Yugoslav army is becoming an open participant in the regime's efforts to achieve political unity before Tito dies. Its role is causing some antagonism between local civilian authorities and their military counterparts.

The military's first move into previously civilian-controlled state activities came last spring with the appointment of military officers to key posts in the internal security network. This resulted in a more organized and determined effort to detect and control dissenters.

As a result of the army's success in the security field, the military has also been entrusted with a wider political role. The Yugoslav leadership, presumably at Tito's urging, is using the army as a means of ensuring the success of a program to organize an orderly transfer of power that has been operating since early 1974.



This increase in military political involvement has already led to friction with some civilians. The most serious occurred early this year in Croatia. The clash involved a dispute between the Croat party leader and the regional army command over a personnel appointment in the Zagreb party organization. Defense Minister Ljubicic and the army political administration intervened to settle the issue before it reached Tito's desk.

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

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Although the actions of the top command indicate that it is wary of the resentment of some civilian authorities, further clashes are inevitable.

A politically active and reliable National Defense Force would be valuable in preparing an orderly succession. Party leaders in Belgrade, however, are also taking precautions against the possibility that the political power of the military might rival their own. Civilian leaders are going along with the political activation of the military, but they are using the strong party administration within the army to ensure that the party line is closely followed.

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## ANNEX

An Assessment of the  
Khmer Rebel Leadership

As the Cambodian conflict approaches what may be its final stages, the Khmer insurgents and their administrative apparatus stand ready to take the reins of power in Phnom Penh. The handful of leading insurgent figures known in the West probably will assume prominent positions in a successor regime, but real power will be in the hands of the covert Khmer Communist Party.

In the five years since their creation, the National United Front of Cambodia and the Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces have formed the overt administrative and military apparatus of the communist-led insurgency. Although Sihanouk's Royal Government of National Union--now dominated by the communists--may eventually be installed in Phnom Penh, to date it has had no significant role inside Cambodia, serving instead merely as the institutional conduit for the insurgents' external relations.

In Cambodia, the insurgent apparatus is controlled and directed by the Khmer Communist Party, which traces its origins to the early 1950s and Ho Chi Minh's Indochina Communist Party. The Khmer party apparently became a formal organization only in 1961. From a handful of Cambodians, it has expanded to a membership of over 10,000, led by a central committee of about 20 members.

Party Leadership

Party members occupy virtually all key positions in the front and its panoply of mass organizations, from the national to the local level, and party cadre form the backbone of the insurgency's military arm.

The precise makeup of the party leadership is a closely guarded secret. Sihanouk's "defense minister" and "deputy prime minister" Khieu Samphan is the best known of the senior leaders, but it is generally believed that Saloth Sar is the top man and is probably

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 Prince Sihanouk poses with Khmer Communist leaders during a meeting in Cambodia in 1973. The photo from China Pictorial is the only known photograph of the leaders together. Front row, left to right: Hou Yuon, Sihanouk, Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim, and Ieng Sary. Back row, left to right: Unknown, Saloth Sar, Unknown, and Koy Thuon.

the secretary general. Widely traveled Ieng Sary, who now handles most direct contacts with Peking and Hanoi, also appears to occupy a top position.

From there on the picture dims. A number of other central committee members have been identified, in varying degrees of certainty. These include better known individuals like Hou Yuon and Hu Nim, as well as lesser knowns like Son Sen, Nuon Chea, Sok Thuok, Chou Chet, Tiv Ol, and Koy Thuon. Top insurgent military commanders and regional party chairmen are probably members of the central committee.

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The relative rankings of the lower echelon of the central committee are open to conjecture. Hou Yuon and Hu Nim, for example, are given broad propaganda exposure, but [redacted] they actually wield little power. Given the party's emphasis on "armed struggle," it would seem only natural that military leaders like Nuon Chea and Son Sen would wield considerable influence.


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All of the individuals whose central committee membership is fairly well established are in their forties. Most qualify as Cambodian intellectuals, having been educated during the 1950s in France--where they got their leftist if not their communist ideology--and having subsequently worked as journalists or teachers. Khieu Samphan and Hou Yuon, in fact, have doctorates in economics. A significant number have had considerable experience in politics: Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon, and Hu Nim held cabinet portfolios under Sihanouk during the 1960s.

Almost all the known or suspected party leaders are remembered as tough nationalists and unyielding ideologues even before their active involvement in the insurgency. Another collective trait appears to be long-standing opposition, and in many cases personal enmity, toward Prince Sihanouk. Saloth Sar, Ieng Sary, and Son Sen, for example, are among a number of today's communist leaders who fled into the bush in 1963 following one of Sihanouk's crackdowns on leftists. Others like Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon, and Hu Nim stayed in Phnom Penh until 1967, when Sihanouk made it impossible for them to remain.



Sihanouk (L) with military strongman Son Sen in 1973.

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These common bonds probably have grown stronger after eight or more years of struggle together and help to explain the cohesion and determination with which party leaders have prosecuted the war. They have had their differences, but have been able to submerge or resolve them and work together once a decision has been reached.

Factionalism

Given the intellectual sophistication of most of the leaders, it is not surprising to find evidence of differences on international communist issues. Reports speak of heated ideological debate among Khmer communists who previously were part of Sihanouk's entourage in Peking and of "Soviet" and "Maoist" factions. A party history prepared for a party anniversary last September hinted about such debate. It referred to a "state of disunity still existing in the party" and to "partisan factions."

The party's ties with Hanoi are a related cause of friction. The relationship has always been ambivalent. Hanoi nurtured the Cambodian party when Sihanouk was in power, and ties became even closer when the North Vietnamese increased their support during the initial years of the conflict. From the beginning, however, Hanoi has had to buck an undercurrent of distrust rooted in Cambodia's historical experience with Vietnamese expansionism. As the Khmer party expanded and gradually assumed greater responsibility for its own military and political affairs, its Vietnamese connection appears to have become even more contentious.

Lines of division on this issue are murky, but a number of reports have identified Ieng Sary--who, along with several other top leaders, is supposed to have received training in North Vietnam--as the leading proponent of close ties with Hanoi. Khieu Samphan has frequently been reported as heading a more nationalistic faction, which apparently had some success in strengthening the party's ties with Peking as a balance to Hanoi's influence. The Chinese, for their part, have appeared eager to cultivate ties with the insurgents, both to prevent Vietnamese dominance over the Cambodians and to foreclose a Soviet intrusion.

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The discernible drift toward a middle ground between Peking and Hanoi may involve practical considerations. North Vietnam's ability to extend post-war reconstruction aid to a communist-controlled Cambodia is limited, while Peking will be in a position to help rebuild the country's war-torn economy. The party, in fact, has been careful to keep open all potential sources of foreign aid. A policy statement issued by a recent "congress" of party front organizations, for example, juxtaposed a promise of an "independent and nonaligned foreign policy" with a statement that it would accept all "unconditional aid."

Sihanouk's Role

The party line toward Sihanouk also appears to have been developed with an eye to the future. There is now some evidence that the party plans to retain Sihanouk as nominal leader, if and when the insurgents win a military victory or the current government in Phnom Penh capitulates. Party leaders have long recognized that the Prince has given their movement a legitimacy that it would not otherwise have had. During a period of post-war consolidation, Sihanouk's value as a domestic rallying point and his ability to attract international recognition and aid would help. The Prince's close relationship with Chinese leaders was probably an important consideration in this regard, and the party may, in fact, have been under some pressure from Peking to retain Sihanouk.

For many in the party, any role at all for Sihanouk is a bitter pill. The Prince symbolizes the old order, at whose hands many party chiefs suffered. The party leaders know first hand that Sihanouk is an unscrupulous and adroit political operator and are probably more than a little suspicious of his intentions and concerned about his ability to make mischief for them.

Sihanouk, for his part, appears painfully aware of the party's attitude toward him. His statements that he will not involve himself in post-war domestic affairs, limiting his activities to foreign relations, may in fact reflect the arrangement he has been forced to accept as the price for any role at all. Similarly, his frequent

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references to the possibility of early retirement probably grew out of a recognition that his usefulness will decline, and the pressures to jettison him will increase, as the party gains confidence in its ability to rule.

Party Aims

The party aims to impose its own brand of Marxism on Cambodia. Essentially, this would mean the implementation on a country-wide basis of programs long under way in the communist zone. These include:

--Destruction of the traditional administrative system and its replacement by a centralized government controlled by the party.



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*Listening to party officials.*

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--Confiscation of privately owned land and the tools of agriculture, followed by the establishment of government-run communes.

--Nationalization of all industry and means of commerce.

--Gradual replacement of Buddhism with communist-controlled mass organizations.

So far, in the communist zone such measures have not gone down well with the land-proud and independent Cambodian peasants. Over the years, the program has caused large numbers of villagers to flee the communist zone. Smoldering resentment among those who have remained behind has on occasion flared into small-scale uprisings, which the communists have put down ruthlessly.

Even if the communists win control of the country, they can expect to meet similar resistance to their programs. The Khmer party leadership lacks a large pool of well-trained cadre, but it can be expected to push its program relentlessly, using force when necessary.

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