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
DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

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\*United Nations: Behind-the-scenes efforts at the General Assembly to construct an alternative to the US and Soviet draft resolutions on the Middle East appear to be making only slow headway.

A committee of nonaligned states, led by India and reportedly encouraged by the Soviets, is said to be moving toward a resolution which would call for withdrawal of armed forces, respect for sovereignty, and appointment of a special UN representative to facilitate discussions on settling other issues. Another report, however, indicates the committee has been able to make virtually no progress. Similar efforts by Western European and Latin American groups have yet to produce anything definitive, and a Chilean official complained that "most friendly delegations do not want to move rapidly."

Mediation efforts are focusing--and foundering--on whether and how withdrawal of Israeli forces can be linked with the other issues at stake. Eastern European diplomats, presumably with Soviet backing, have expressed to U Thant the opinion that a solution could be found based on withdrawal and followed by recognition of Israel as a state and a guarantee of navigation through the Strait of Tiran. Earlier, when queried by a US representative whether the Arabs and Soviets expected Israeli withdrawal to be absolutely unqualified and immediate, a Soviet official replied, "Start with the principle."

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If no agreement can be reached on a substantive proposal, interest will probably turn increasingly toward a procedural proposal which would throw the problem back into the lap of the Security Council. U Thant has indicated his interest in Danish Prime Minister Krag's suggestion that a special UN representative be appointed to work toward a resolution of Arab-Israeli differences. It was not clear, however, whether Thant envisages such a representative as a supplement to, or in lieu of, a substantive General Assembly resolution.

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French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville's speech to the General Assembly yesterday appears to have been an effort to restore an image of French neutrality, which was damaged by De Gaulle's speech two days ago. Couve's theme was that an eventual settlement of the Middle East crisis could be made only within the framework of the major powers, and that France has a preeminent role to play. The four-power emphasis was also implicit in his insistence that the Security Council, not the General Assembly, was the proper sphere for action.

Soviet Premier Kosygin, according to press reports, was "very hard" and "unresponsive" during his two-hour meeting last night with British Foreign Secretary Brown. When the latter urged that all efforts be made to find practical solutions to the Middle East problem, Kosygin reportedly limited himself to reiterating the essence of his General Assembly speech last Monday.

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
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\*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

The Military Situation in South Vietnam: Heavy fighting erupted in the mountainous area of central Kontum Province early on 22 June.

An enemy force, estimated to be at least two companies and probably from the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 24th Regiment, surrounded a US infantry company patrolling southwest of Dak To in Operation GREELEY. Five reinforcing US companies and extensive air and artillery support were necessary to drive the enemy force back. Friendly casualties are seven killed (5 US, 2 SVN) 22 wounded, and 75 missing. The Communists lost 475 killed.

Communist forces in the northern Kontum area probably total more than 3,000, including the NVA 24th Regiment which may have been recently reinforced with infiltrated units from North Vietnam. As early as mid-May these units began to manifest more aggressiveness, launching mortar attacks and exerting increased pressure on isolated outposts and reconnaissance patrols. As the weather continues to deteriorate, enemy offensive activity is expected to increase.

Political Developments in South Vietnam: [Premier Ky is attempting to counter some of the recent criticism of his campaign tactics.]

[The Premier [redacted] was confident of winning the election without pressure tactics and that he intended to phase Police Director Loan out of any campaign role because of Loan's heavy-handed activities. Ky claimed that Loan would be replaced as concurrent head of the Military Security Service (MSS) and restricted to normal police functions.]

[In addition, Ky said he would offer all presidential candidates equal use of communications media and government transportation facilities for their campaigns, as

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well as the right to place a representative in the government's press censorship office. Ky also claims that he will instruct province and district chiefs to keep the elections a "fair and free contest." ]

[ Ky's actions may not completely measure up to these stated intentions. Loan's replacement as MSS chief will not necessarily eliminate his influence in that service, and his retention of the police directorship still gives him control of the largest security apparatus in direct contact with the people. Furthermore, Ky's concern with heavy-handed campaign tactics on his behalf apparently does not extend to his covert political action group. ]


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[ Chief of State Thieu, apparently one of those most disturbed by Ky's current campaigning, [redacted] may resign as Chief of State in a gesture of protest against the unfair tactics of Ky and his supporters. Thieu indicated that he is firmly committed to his own presidential candidacy, not because he believes he can win, but because he hopes to offset Ky's overwhelming advantages over all the other contestants. ]

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
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Thailand: The Thai Government is apparently moving ahead with plans to increase its control over the Vietnamese community in northeast Thailand.

These refugees from the war against the French number some 40,000 and are politically sympathetic toward North Vietnam. They are well organized by a Communist group consisting of an estimated ten percent of their population. Last fall, Bangkok initiated a plan for registration of the Vietnamese and later arrested several suspected of being active Communists.

The Vietnamese, aside from providing limited financial support to the Thai insurgents, have apparently deliberately avoided antagonizing the Thai Government. Nevertheless, Bangkok has become increasingly concerned over their subversive potential and is now seeking a way to remove them from the Laos border area, where the Thais believe Communist infiltration is increasing.

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Over the years, Hanoi accepted about 40,000 repatriates, but since 1964 has refused to take any.

Bangkok now is attempting to have them repatriated to South Vietnam, but Saigon has agreed to accept only those willing to go voluntarily--a very small number in view of the general desire of the refugees to remain where they are. As an alternative Bangkok is considering relocating the Vietnamese on Thailand's offshore islands.

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Bangkok may in the end decide to step up its security efforts against the relatively small Vietnamese Communist organization rather than incur the expense and political hostility that would result from the forced relocation of the whole community.

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NOTES

Aden: [The situation in Aden continues to be explosive following the mutiny in the South Arabian Army three days ago. The rebellious army units and police have gone back to their barracks for the time being, but terrorists still control the heavily populated Crater district. There have also been a few small demonstrations by South Arabian Army soldiers elsewhere in the federation. The army reportedly is split 50-50 in all ranks for and against the federal government, and further army dissidence could break out at any time.]

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India: Public order in volatile West Bengal continues to deteriorate in the wake of a breakdown in the food distribution system and a Communist program to encourage lawlessness. Marauding mobs are said to be looting trucks and trains carrying grain, and the supply of food to famine areas of northern India could be seriously affected. Should the tottering West Bengal coalition government collapse, a period of unpopular but possibly more effective direct rule from New Delhi probably would follow.

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Chile-USSR: Chilean receptivity to Soviet diplomatic overtures is contributing to a steady increase in Soviet influence in various facets of Chilean life. Ambassador Dungan says that the USSR's strong diplomatic drive in Chile has given the Soviets access to a wide assortment of news media, as well as cultural, academic, scientific, and social circles. Dungan also calls attention to a report that Chilean naval officers have been offered free trips to the USSR, indicating that the Soviets are trying to extend their contacts into the Chilean armed forces.

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