

13 May 1966

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


# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

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
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Rhodesia: [Most Rhodesian whites welcome the exploratory talks for settling the Rhodesian problem, but they are counting on Prime Minister Smith to make no major concessions in London.]

[According to the US consul in Salisbury, larger numbers of whites have recently come to the view that sanctions are producing long-range dangers to Rhodesia. The consul believes, therefore, that Smith could probably survive a challenge by extremists in his cabinet and party over minor concessions--perhaps in education and land apportionment fields.]

[Rhodesian whites, however, are in no mood to capitulate. The consul believes that Smith could not get away with any agreement that would significantly alter Rhodesia's "future internal organization"--presumably its white-dominated political structure.]

[Should the London talks fail, the consul believes that the hope they raised in Rhodesia might degenerate into bitterness and increased determination to resist. He does not share Britain's view that the Rhodesians will soften after three or four more months of sanctions.]

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Common Market: [The EEC Council appears to have made significant progress in its meetings in Brussels this week although the firmness of some of the agreements remains to be seen.]

[The agreement in principle on financing the community's agricultural policy calls for freeing internal movement of agricultural goods by stages between November 1966 and July 1968. This will be accompanied by community fund financing of marketing and surplus disposal expenditures as regulations for individual products become effective.]

[Industrial goods will move freely within the EEC as of 1 July 1968, 18 months earlier than foreseen in the Rome Treaty. The council reportedly agreed that "legal steps" should be taken to implement treaty provisions for making customs receipts community property after 1969--an important issue in last year's crisis. The council also agreed on dates for decisions on common tax and social measures.]

[The council took no specific decisions on the Kennedy Round, but early meetings are apparently foreseen to work out community positions on both the agricultural and industrial sides of the trade and tariff negotiations. The Germans and Dutch maintain that this week's agreements are conditional on progress on EEC preparation for the Kennedy Round. The Germans presumably count for leverage on the fact that the agreements have yet to be approved by the council as an actual regulation.]

[The decisions on agricultural financing as well as the impetus apparently provided for progress in other fields reflects again the continuing pressures in the EEC to proceed with economic integration. In addition, this week's negotiations reaffirmed the importance of the EEC Commission in Brussels in defining and then conciliating an agreement on common policies.]

Laos: [A new period of heightened tension within the Laotian military establishment appears to have begun.]

[The current uneasiness was precipitated on 11 May by an effort on the part of the general staff in Vientiane to replace General Ma as commander of the air force. Members of the general staff have long resented Ma's independence and growing power, and his removal has been under active consideration since late April.]

[A compromise "solution" now has apparently been reached under which Ma will continue to command the air force, although with reduced powers. Ma's headquarters will be moved from Savannakhet to Vientiane where presumably his activities will come under closer supervision of the general staff. Certain details remain to be worked out, however, and it is not clear whether the current compromise is intended only as a temporary arrangement.]

[Although this face-saving formula may hold the contending factions in check for the immediate future, the attempt to undercut Ma may impair the effectiveness of the air force at least over the short term. In addition, the general staff's heavy-handed tactics will almost certainly rouse the long-standing animosities and apprehensions of other field commanders.]

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NOTES

Chile: [Public protests against the scheduled French nuclear tests in the Pacific may take a violent turn. [redacted] labor leaders of the opposition Socialist Party propose to make the tests one theme of a strike of students and teachers planned to start today under the auspices of Chile's largest labor federation. If the strikes go well the party may call for demonstrations against the French Embassy, and also that of the US to protest US failure to exert greater pressure on the French to call off the tests.

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[redacted]

Congo (Brazzaville): Premier Ambroise Noumazalay's first official speech since taking office last week bears out earlier indications of his hard-line pro-Soviet orientation and his anti-US outlook, particularly regarding US-Vietnam policy. Noumazalay, nonetheless, left the door open to closer ties with "old friends" like France. Other comments by the premier may indicate that recent infighting within the regime has resulted in the strengthening of forces which want tighter control by the single political party over the government.

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Finland: The prospects for Communist participation in a new government appear to have been somewhat enhanced with the appointment of representatives from the three major political parties, including the Communist-front SKDL, to consider a government program proposed by Social Democratic chairman Paasio. According to press reports, the chief points at issue are economic policy and the distribution of cabinet posts which remain important obstacles to an agreement. If a coalition of the three major parties is formed, Communists would be in the cabinet for the first time since they were expelled in 1948.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The United States Intelligence Board on 12 May 1966 approved the following national intelligence estimate:

NIE 20-66, "Western Europe: Problems and Prospects"

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THE PRESIDENT  
The Vice President  
Executive Offices of the White House  
    Special Assistants to the President  
    The Scientific Adviser to the President  
    The Director of the Budget  
The Department of State  
    The Secretary of State  
    The Under Secretary of State  
    The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
    The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
    The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council  
    The Director of Intelligence and Research  
The Treasury Department  
    The Secretary of the Treasury  
    The Under Secretary of the Treasury  
The Department of Defense  
    The Secretary of Defense  
    The Deputy Secretary of Defense  
    The Secretary of the Army  
    The Secretary of the Navy  
    The Secretary of the Air Force  
    The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)  
    The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff  
    Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy  
    Chief of Staff, United States Air Force  
    Chief of Staff, United States Army  
    Commandant, United States Marine Corps  
    U. S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO  
    Supreme Allied Commander, Europe  
    Commander in Chief, Pacific  
    Commander in Chief, Atlantic  
    The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency  
    The Director, The Joint Staff  
    The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army  
    The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy  
    The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force  
The Department of Justice  
    The Attorney General  
    The Federal Bureau of Investigation  
    The Director  
National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
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The Atomic Energy Commission  
    The Chairman  
The National Security Agency  
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