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24 March 1966

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Communist China: Peking's refusal to attend the 23rd CPSU Congress is a further indication that China's aging leaders are determined to steer a dogmatic, isolationist course.

The Chinese sent a top-level delegation to the last CPSU Congress in 1961 and have since regularly attended the congresses of pro-Soviet bloc Communist parties. Such gatherings were generally used by the Chinese as forums for self-righteous anti-Soviet polemics.

The sarcastic letter of refusal, made public on 23 March, suggests that the Chinese leaders' decision to boycott was prompted in part by the widely circulated Soviet "secret" letters. Citing Soviet attempts to "whip up hysteria" against China, the Chinese refusal concludes, "in these circumstances, how can the Chinese Communist party, which you look upon as an enemy, be expected to attend your Congress?"

China's leaders apparently feel compelled to demonstrate by their absence their scornful and total rejection of "revisionism" and in so doing have taken another step toward a de facto break in party relations with Moscow.

Of those parties aligned with the Chinese only Albania has thus far indicated its refusal to attend. North Vietnam publicly accepted the Soviet invitation during Shelepin's visit to Hanoi last January. The Chinese boycott will add to the difficulties of the Vietnamese by putting them in a position where it will appear they are making a choice between Moscow and Peking, a situation which Hanoi has consistently sought to avoid in the past few years.

The Soviets can probably be expected to feign sorrow rather than anger at the Chinese action.

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Secretary Brezhnev, during his opening speech to the Congress, is likely to point with regret to China's empty seat as evidence of Peking's unwillingness to work within a united Communist movement. Moscow probably takes private satisfaction that the Chinese, by their absence, will further strengthen the Soviet position in the dispute.

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Pakistan - Communist China: [There is now visual evidence to confirm previous reports that Communist China has supplied some military equipment to Pakistan.]

[Five Communist-built tanks participated in yesterday's National Day parade in Rawalpindi. Recent study of a photograph taken near Karachi has identified 41 T-34 and T-54 tanks. Only Communist China is likely to have supplied these vehicles.]

[The National Day flyover included four MIG-19 Farmer aircraft, but these were probably obtained from Indonesia last fall.]

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Egypt - Saudi Arabia - Yemen: Nasir's speech
on 22 March, pointedly criticizing King Faysal, will probably further complicate negotiations on Yemen. Nasir said that since his agreement with Faysal last August, events had not taken the course he had expected, implying that Faysal was not living up to its terms. He indicated he might renounce an Arab summit agreement not to engage in propaganda warfare. Nasir said Egypt is developing a new long-term strategy in Yemen which would involve fewer troops and lower costs. He claimed that Cairo is prepared to remain in Yemen for "twenty years," if necessary. /

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
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