



TOP SECRET

25X1



12 February 1963



Copy No. C

ed

25X1

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



25X1

State Dept. review completed

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800360001-7


Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800360001-7


12 February 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Cuba: Castro may use Bay of Pigs ransom to finance revolution in Latin America. (Page 1)



3. Notes:  Indonesia-Malaya; Britain-USSR; Yemen-UK; Congo; Burma. (Page 3)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

12 February 1963

DAILY BRIEF

Cuba: Castro has promised that the cash proceeds from the ransom of the Bay of Pigs prisoners will be used for the "liberation" of Latin America,

25X1

[redacted] \$100,000 had been allotted to PCE and that half of this amount had already been received. The money was said to have been given on the condition that it be used solely to prepare for a revolt--including the local purchase of arms and supply--and not expended on salaries or trips.

The 1962 budget for the Cuban Institute for Friendship with Peoples (ICAP), one of Castro's chief agencies for spreading subversion, was increased late in the year by more than 1.3 million pesos, according to an official Cuban decree published on 5 December. ICAP channels Cuban financial support to groups in other countries, pays for the travel of individuals and groups to Cuba, and supports them during their stay.

The increase in the agency's funds appears to have coincided with other manifestations of increased Cuban aggressiveness in fomenting revolution observed following the missile crisis. [redacted]

25X1

25X1


25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800360001-7

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800360001-7

25X1

NOTES



25X1

Indonesia-Malaya: Relations between Indonesia and Malaya are continuing to deteriorate. The Indonesian foreign minister warned publicly yesterday that incidents and even war with Malaya might follow the establishment of the Malaysia Federation. On the Malayan side, Prime Minister Rahman said last week that if the Indonesians "ever dare attack us we are ready to accept the challenge." [redacted]

25X1


25X1



Britain-USSR: The government is expected to tell Parliament today that it is willing to consider a Soviet offer to barter crude oil for ships built in British yards. According to a Ministry of Transport official, British interest in such a deal stems from the high rate of unemployment in the shipbuilding industry. The amount of oil involved is small--less than one half of one percent of Britain's domestic consumption. [redacted]

25X1

25X1



25X1



Yemen-UK: British inaction may cause Yemeni President Sallal to carry out his threat to expel British diplomatic personnel unless London recognizes his regime by 15 February. The British cabinet considered the question last week but reached no decision. Colonial Secretary Sandys, who strongly opposes recognition, is scheduled to begin a tour of Africa on 13 February, and this may delay a decision for several weeks more.

Congo: Tshombé, now in Europe for medical attention, evidently intends to return to Katanga and to play a leading role in the Congo. He professed to the US consul in Elisabethville his desire to cooperate with the US in developing the country and his hope that the US would not insist on "paying off old scores." He has made similar overtures to UN officials, and has notified Leopoldville that he is ready to nominate Katangans to serve as ministers in the central government.

Burma: The ouster of Brigadier Aung Gyi, an able moderate who was the second most powerful figure in the military regime, will permit leftist influence in the government to increase. Aung Gyi was dismissed because his criticisms of government operations had irritated Premier Ne Win, and he may eventually become a rallying point for the regime's civilian opponents and for dissatisfied field commanders in the army.

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800360001-7

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800360001-7

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP70T00975A006800360001-7

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP70T00975A006800360001-7

TOP SECRET

STAT

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800360001-7

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800360001-7