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


19 April 1962

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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## DAILY BRIEF

**\*Congo:** Katangan President Tshombé departed Leopoldville for Elisabethville early this morning in a UN aircraft. Although Tshombé left without the formal approval of the central government, Congolese Army forces offered no resistance to Nigerian UN troops who removed fire trucks which had been placed on the runway to prevent his departure.



(Last-ditch efforts by the central government to prevent Tshombé's departure from Leopoldville on 18 April reflect its sensitivity to possible charges by anti-Adoula elements that Adoula is incapable of coping with the problem of Katanga's secession. Adoula himself recessed his talks with Tshombé on 16 April and left for a tour of the provinces on 17 April. There were [redacted] reports that Adoula left instructions that Tshombé was not to be permitted to leave Leopoldville, despite UN assurances concerning his freedom of movement. Tshombé has sought to avoid any suggestion that he himself is breaking off negotiations.)

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(Adoula told the US Ambassador that he and Tshombé had agreed to resume discussions when Adoula returns on Saturday. UN representative Gardiner is informing Tshombé that he expects talks to resume no later than 24 April and that he expects Tshombé's counter propositions to be ready.) [redacted]

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Argentina: A compromise formula for alleviating the political crisis is evolving from secret discussions among elements of the Intransigent Radical Civic Union and the People's Radical Civic Union, despite the two parties' public insistence that all elected Peronistas be installed on 1 May. The formula calls for the Chamber of Deputies to seat the 47 new Peronista deputies and for the Peronistas to agree to the federal government's taking control of the provinces where Peronistas won the governorships. Political jockeying continues, but the formula would afford a solution within constitutional bounds and may gain stronger support.

[Redacted]

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Venezuela: Isolated incidents of violence by extremists are continuing, amid reports of antigovernment plotting by both leftist and rightist groups and public dissatisfaction over recent economic measures. Several National Guardsmen have been killed in Caracas during the past week, and student outbreaks, armed assaults on police stations, and attempted sabotage of gas lines and other utilities have been reported from several cities.

The US Embassy reports that the Venezuelan security forces probably do not have the capability to deter or prevent "either planned or spontaneous acts of extremist violence" but that they can suppress any major revolt.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]


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Netherlands: [The Dutch Government is willing to consider the Bunker proposals as a basis for further negotiations with Indonesia in the dispute over West New Guinea, but is proposing amendments to prevent the automatic transfer of administration to Indonesia before the native Papuans exercise free choice. The Dutch want this plebiscite guaranteed, in effect, by a UN General Assembly resolution spelling out that the future of the territory will be determined by a Papuan plebiscite under UN control by a specified date. They also assert that a UN security force will be required to demonstrate the authority of the UN during the preparatory period.]

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[Indonesia has accepted the Bunker proposals "in principle" but still maintains that New Guinea's administration must be transferred to Djakarta in 1962.]

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[On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board reached the following conclusion concerning Indonesia.]

[Further small-scale clashes are likely, and both sides continue preparations to increase the scale of operations.]

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USSR-Indonesia: [The USSR reportedly has shipped to Indonesia equipment sufficient for a surface-to-air missile (SAM) unit of [ ] launchers. This suggests that the missiles themselves will be supplied in the near future. It will be several months, however, before even this first unit can be operational. Soviet engineers and technicians have been working on the construction of a SAM training center and launching site at Kalijati air base, near Bogor southeast of Djakarta, since November of last year. Under the arms agreement signed with Indonesia since early 1961, the USSR is to provide [ ] similar SAM units for the air force and [ ] for the army.]

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[Moscow apparently has already delivered some air-to-surface missiles for TU-16 jet medium bombers, and the MIG-21 jet fighters scheduled to be supplied this year are to be equipped with air-to-air missiles. Indonesian naval personnel now are being trained in the USSR to operate motor torpedo boats designed to carry surface-to-surface missiles.]

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Laos: [The continuing political deadlock in Laos is causing increasing concern among neutralist Laotian supporters of Souvanna Phouma who fear that, with Souvanna in Europe for an extended stay, the Pathet Lao will broaden their military and political control at his expense. Some Souvanna officials, fearing violence, have sent their families to Phnom Penh.]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] a leftist faction is gaining support within Souvanna's own camp. Despite the difficulties at the headquarters level and a long history of friction in the field between pro-Souvanna forces and the Pathet Lao, common purpose against the Vientiane Government has thus far prevented an open break. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board on 18 April reached the following conclusion concerning Laos)

(Military activity probably will be limited to small-scale attacks by both sides; however, a buildup of materiel for Communist forces continues)

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[Large Redacted Area]

Yugoslavia-Germany: Yugoslavia is considering reduction of its representation in East Germany from the ambassadorial to the consular level, according to a Yugoslav official. Belgrade apparently believes such a step could lead to restoration of diplomatic relations with Bonn without irrevocably alienating the

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[Redacted]

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bloc, and improve its chances of obtaining West German financial assistance to ease an acute foreign exchange shortage. Belgrade, concerned that its foreign trade--one third of which is with EEC nations--may be hurt by the growing integration of the Common Market, may also hope that improved relations with Bonn would facilitate future negotiations with the EEC.

Bonn broke diplomatic relations with Belgrade in 1957 when Yugoslavia became the first nonbloc state to accord East Germany full diplomatic recognition. The West German ambassador in Rome told the Yugoslavian ambassador there in 1959 that before diplomatic relations could be restored, Belgrade must at least reduce its East German representation to the charge level. [redacted]

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**WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS**

[On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that]

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[No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action in the immediate future]

BERLIN: [The Soviets continue to avoid major harassments over access, and we see no indications that they expect early military confrontation over Berlin]

INDONESIA: [Carried on Page iv of Daily Brief]

LAOS: [(Carried on Page iv of Daily Brief)] [redacted]

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Daily Brief

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[redacted] 25X1

### Argentine Proposals to Ease Political Crisis

The compromise formula is intended to resolve the key question of dealing with the Peronista victories. Differences over this question within the Intransigent Radical Civic Union (UCRI) and the minority People's Radical Civic Union (UCRP) have delayed action on the proposed amendments to the law on presidential succession, which would permit Guido to complete Frondizi's term and to postpone elections until late 1963. The Senate, which passed the amendments by a 35-0 vote, could override any Chamber modifications by a two-thirds vote and pass the bill into law, according to UCRI Vice President Lebrero. Chamber approval is expected by Lebrero but not until after Easter.

The formula is a variation of an earlier Peronista suggestion that the federal government take over all provinces where elections were held on 18 March in order to make it appear that the interventions were not directed exclusively at the Peronistas. Under the proposed compromise the Peronistas would lose more face, but the apparent alternative would be to promote the violence which Peronistas have promised if they are banned from office on 1 May. One of the Peronista leaders who was returning from visiting Peron in Madrid reportedly told a Peronista exile in Montevideo on 14 April that Peron was trying to lull his opposition in Argentina into a false sense of security with misleading press statements that he would not order violence.

A high Peronista official has informed a US Embassy officer in Buenos Aires that Peron recently abolished the Peronista Coordinating and Supervisory Council and replaced it with an executive committee headed by Augusto Vandor, secretary general of the powerful metal workers' unions. [REDACTED]

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Possible Shift in Yugoslavia's German Policy

Since 1957 Yugoslavia has supported the USSR's German policies. While a reduction of the rank of the Yugoslav mission in East Germany could be viewed as a departure from Soviet positions on East-West issues, it would not affect Belgrade's basic policy that a continuing division of Germany is desirable.

In recent months, the Yugoslav press has become increasingly critical of East German economic conditions and domestic policies, and little effort has been made to conceal Belgrade's view that the East German leaders are basically "unregenerate Stalinists." In mid-March, Belgrade lodged a "most severe protest" with the East German Foreign Ministry when six Yugoslavs returning from the Leipzig Fair were forcibly removed from trains. The Yugoslavs had given offense by openly criticizing the fair.

Simultaneously, every effort is being made to improve Yugoslav - West German relations, [redacted]

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[redacted] As evidence, the Yugoslav cited the successful visit of Socialist party leader Carlo Schmid to Yugoslavia in mid-March and the likelihood of a visit by Free Democratic party chairman Mende. Yugoslav propaganda attacks on West Germany have eased, and Bonn is reportedly considering an exchange of visits by parliamentary delegations. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Emergency Planning

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

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