


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16 March 1962

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


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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16 March 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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DAILY BRIEF

✓ *USSR-Berlin: The latest Soviet moves in the corridors are intended to demonstrate further that present procedures are inadequate to guarantee air safety. Moscow is gradually trying to build a case to demand changes which would increase Communist control over Western flights in the corridors. In addition, the gradual increasing pressure against Western air access is designed to maintain a sense of urgency for negotiating a Berlin settlement. Shortly after the six Soviet transport flights in the southern corridor were completed on 15 March as scheduled, the USSR protested that Western aircraft had "deliberately violated established flight procedures" and "endangered air safety in the corridors." The Soviet controllers in BASC charged that one commercial and two US military transports overtook Soviet transports in the same flight levels and "approached inadmissibly close."

Four Soviet transport flights--two outbound and two inbound--are scheduled in the northern corridor for 16 March during the hours of darkness (1400-1500 EST) at altitudes from 6,500 to 9,500 feet. [redacted]

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*Guatemala: The security situation in Guatemala City has deteriorated further as Communist-led students, with growing support from other elements of the population, continued rioting for the third successive day. Several deaths have been reported, and the number of injured is estimated above 150. Police ineptness and brutality have led, as the Communist instigators had hoped, to growing public sympathy for the students and the Communist-influenced labor unions which launched a sympathy strike on 14 March.

If the disturbances continue and if there are indications that popular hostility toward the President is becoming widespread, a military coup may result. President Ydigoras has expressed determination to use whatever force may be required to end the disturbances, but the army reportedly is apprehensive lest it be called in to restore order. Some officers have said that if called upon, the army will not use force against the students but will, instead, force Ydigoras from office and install a military junta.

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Guerrilla activity which broke out east of the capital on 12 March is apparently led by the same group of non-Communist ex-army officers that launched an initial attack in mid-February. These guerrillas have obtained Communist support, and [redacted] the Cuban Government has provided financial assistance of \$10,000 for a second guerrilla operation inside Guatemala.

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
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DAILY BRIEF

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Netherlands-Indonesia: The Netherlands' announced intention to send two destroyers and two submarines through the Panama Canal for a tour of American Pacific coast ports may destroy prospects for preliminary secret talks with Indonesia on West New Guinea and could provoke some form of Indonesian military action. The Netherlands and Indonesia had agreed on 12 and 14 March respectively to proceed with the talks in the presence of an American mediator. The Dutch decision to send the ships to Pacific coast ports apparently is a compromise to meet the demands of elements in the cabinet which favored dispatch of the vessels to West New Guinea to allay growing concern in the Netherlands for the safety of Dutch nationals there. Indonesia will probably regard the transfer of Dutch naval units

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to the Pacific during the period immediately preceding the
projected conversations as evidence of a Dutch intention to
exert unaccentable pressure

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]


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[Redacted]



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Portuguese Guinea: Portuguese Guinean nationalist elements based in the Republic of Guinea and supported by Sekou Touré's regime as well as by the Communist bloc may be preparing to launch early guerrilla operations in Portuguese Guinea.

[redacted] these elements were the intended recipients of at least part of 600-700 tons of arms and ammunition which, [redacted] were included in the shipments of military materiel known to have arrived in Guinea from the USSR last month. [redacted]

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[redacted] emigré Portuguese Guinean adherents of the African Independence Party for Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC) were receiving training in guerrilla tactics under Touré's auspices. A Radio Conakry broadcast of 10 March protested alleged repeated violations of the Republic's frontiers by Portuguese aircraft. [redacted]

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
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v




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
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[REDACTED]

✓ North Korea - Sino-Soviet Bloc: Pyongyang has made clearer its sympathy for Peiping and Tirana in the Sino-Soviet-Albanian dispute. In Pyongyang's most outspoken recent assertion of sympathy for Peiping's position toward the West, a North Korean party newspaper on 12 March published a compilation of Lenin quotations to support the proposition that peace propaganda not accompanied by the call for revolutionary action of the masses can only sow illusion and corrupt the proletariat. The paper included quotations from Lenin often used by Peiping in its rebuttal of Soviet positions. In a statement made at the North Korean party plenum last fall, Kim Il-sung implied that the denigration of Stalin was strictly an internal affair of the Soviet party and that attacks on the personality cult had no place in Korea. Kim continues to receive personal credit in his regime's propaganda for North Korean progress. North Korea on 10 March followed the example of the Chinese Communists in sending agricultural experts to Albania under the terms of a technical cooperation agreement signed in January. The USSR and the Eastern European satellites have withdrawn almost all of their technicians from Albania during the past year.

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[REDACTED]

Chile: The conservative Alessandri government has permitted the Communist party of the USSR to be represented for the first time at a Latin American Communist party congress. Soviet and Rumanian delegates joined Bulgarian observers at the inaugural ceremonies in Santiago of the Chilean Communist party's 12th congress, which is scheduled to continue through

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18 March. The Soviets have generally used opportunities to attend congresses of free world Communist parties to consult on regional Communist tactics, and to consult with local subversive elements.

25X1 The Chilean Communist party, in coalition with other leftist parties, almost defeated Alessandri in the presidential election of 1958. Their present tactics are to achieve power through legislative means rather than by revolutionary violence. [REDACTED]

25X1 Situation Report--Greece: Relations between the government and the non-Communist opposition have become more embittered than at any time in recent years as a result of the opposition's continued allegations of electoral corruption. The Communists, attempting to recover from the smashing defeat suffered by their front party in the elections, appear in a position to profit from the growing antagonisms between the major parties. Another noteworthy aspect of the present situation is the increase in criticism by the opposition of the monarchy itself, especially for financial extravagance. The Queen is reported especially disturbed that Prime Minister Karamanlis has not made a strong defense against such criticism. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
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viii

25X1 [REDACTED]

African Nationalist Pressure On Portuguese Guinea

Portuguese Guinea has an area of 14,000 square miles-- less than half that of Portugal--and a population numbering approximately 550,000. Except for a few thousand whites and mulattos, the inhabitants are African tribesmen who are among the most backward in West Africa. Two of the most important tribal groups are the predominantly Moslem Fulani and Mandingos who inhabit the interior of the territory and have traditionally maintained close contacts with fellow tribesmen dwelling in Senegal and the Republic of Guinea.

In addition to the nationalist pressures emanating from Conakry, which hopes ultimately to annex Portuguese Guinea, Senegal has for some time been providing propaganda and at least some financial assistance to other, more moderate Portuguese Guinean emigré elements. The most important of these are organized in the Dakar-based Liberation Movement of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (MLGC). A "United Liberation Front" which was proclaimed by MLGC and PAIGC leaders at a conference in Dakar last July apparently never got off the ground and has since been superseded by an alignment between the MLGC and Holden Roberto's non-Communist Angolan People's Union (UPA).

Although both the MLGC and the PAIGC claim to have the greater support within Portuguese Guinea, a Senegalese official characterized the MLGC last fall as "substantially weaker" than its rival. In January, [redacted] the MLGC did not appear to be in a position to engage in any significant action since it lacked arms and other necessary materiel and was not well enough organized either within or outside Portuguese Guinea. This situation in part reflects the much more cautious support being given Portuguese Guinean nationalists by Senegal, which is under French pressure to minimize provocation of the Portuguese. Paris is reportedly concerned that it might become involved, because of [redacted]

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its defense agreements with Senegal, should a major crisis develop between Lisbon and Dakar as a result of the activities of the Portuguese Guinean nationalists operating from Senegal. Since last July such elements have provoked several well-publicized border incidents.]

Portuguese authorities have recently been manifesting increasing apprehension over the possibility of early disturbances in Portuguese Guinea. Despite their heavy commitment in Angola, they have been steadily increasing the strength of their forces in the smaller territory. These now are estimated to number approximately 3,300 men. [redacted]

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Chile's 12th Communist Party Congress

Among the issues confronting the congress which opened on 13 March is the Peiping-Moscow dispute. The Chilean party, unlike many of its Latin American counterparts, has failed to issue a formal statement supporting Khrushchev and his condemnation of Albanian leadership. Chile's Communist leader, Luis Corvalan, and his lieutenants appear to support the Soviet position, but there reportedly is doubt among many of the Chilean party's 17,000 to 20,000 members regarding Khrushchev's treatment of Stalin, China, and Albania.

Chile broke diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1947 and has not re-established them. The Alessandri government has been tolerant toward the Chilean Communists, however, and the presence of a Soviet party delegation suggests a belief by Moscow that with proper guidance the Chilean Communists may be of considerable assistance in furthering Soviet interests in Chile.

A major consideration during the five-day congress will probably concern tactics to strengthen the party's popular appeal in view of the 1964 presidential elections. The party, legalized in 1958 after ten years of being outlawed, received 11.8 percent of the vote in the 1961 congressional elections. As a result, it holds 16 of the 147 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 4 of the 45 Senate seats.

During the past two years the party has failed to increase its influence in the labor movement. Ways to correct this weakness will also probably be a major consideration of the congress.

Emphasizing his belief in ultimate victory, Corvalan declared in opening the congress that "the Chilean Communists are in favor of the country's deciding its internal problems without civil war." He warned, however, that if the free expression of popular will is prevented, the working class will have to defend with violence its right to govern. He urged "the nationalization of US firms and the expropriation of internal monopolies." [REDACTED]

Situation Report: Greece

The elections resulted in a vote of confidence for the right-of-center party of Premier Karamanlis, which won slightly over 50 percent of the popular vote and 176 of the 300 seats in parliament. Equally significant was the defeat of the Communist-dominated United Democratic Left (EDA). It dropped from nearly 25 percent of the popular vote in the 1958 elections to less than 15 percent in 1961, with the result that its representation in parliament dropped from 79 to 24 deputies. A coalition of nationalist opposition parties--the Center Union and Progressive--elected 100 deputies, re-establishing a non-Communist alternative to Karamanlis after three years in which EDA had been the major opposition party.

Since October the Center Union, with 76 deputies, has maintained a constant attack, charging that the elections were conducted in a fraudulent manner, and has refused to accept the legitimacy of the present government. Parliament has been forced to delay discussion of crucial domestic and foreign problems, in order to debate this issue. Following the rejection on 2 March of opposition motions to censure members of the caretaker government under which the elections were held, the Center Union announced plans for public demonstrations throughout Greece. The next one is scheduled in Crete on 18 March. George Papandreou, veteran Liberal politician and leader of the Center Union, is waging the campaign in the hope of forcing the King to name a caretaker government and hold new elections.

The leadership of EDA appears to be badly split over the issue of responsibility for the party's poor showing in the elections. The confusion will probably continue until specific guide



lines for future policies are received from the proscribed Communist party of Greece, whose headquarters are located in Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, EDA is collaborating with the Center Union in denunciation of the elections, thereby gaining a degree of respectability which it has long sought. Recent reports of dissatisfaction within the Center Union at Papandreou's largely negative policies could be the forerunner of fragmentation of his party with resultant benefits to EDA.

Recent attacks on the crown by both EDA and the Center Union have reopened old wounds in Greek political life. Publication of recently available correspondence between the late King Constantine, father of King Paul, and the Kaiser during World War I has revived charges of disloyalty against the monarchy. Other attacks against the palace involve the size of the dowry for Princess Sophia's forthcoming marriage, the renovation of a new palace for the crown prince, and other financial issues. The attacks on the royal family have been denounced by the government as political blackmail designed to force the King to call new elections.

25X1 [redacted] Both King Paul and Queen Frederika are described as "furious" with the opposition. While palace irritation with Karamanlis has also been reported over his alleged failure to take a strong stand in defense of the royal family, it is most unlikely that the King would accede to opposition pressure for new elections. [redacted] Karamanlis has a sizable working majority in parliament, and his present government is generally regarded as the most competent of the four he has formed. It is unlikely that a significant number of his deputies would desert him, despite some personal antagonisms, unless it became apparent that he had lost the support of one or more of the major "factors" in Greek politics, the palace, the army, or the Americans. [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]

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