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3 February 1962




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
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


9. Italy: Fanfani's resignation is first formal step toward formation of center-left coalition government. *(Page vi)*

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DAILY BRIEF

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[Redacted]

*Argentina: The Foreign Ministry's announcement that Ambassador Julio Amoedo has been recalled from Havana is President Frondizi's first step toward appeasing military demands for a complete break in relations with Cuba. The crisis precipitated by Argentina's abstention at Punta del Este may result in Frondizi's ouster if he does not satisfy the military's demands. These also include public clarification of foreign policy and Foreign Minister Carcano's resignation, which reportedly has been tendered but not yet formally accepted. The US Embassy in Buenos Aires believes Frondizi recognizes the strength and unity of military pressure and will comply. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Frondizi tentatively agreed during a meeting with the armed forces secretaries on 1 February to break relations with Cuba, but insisted on consulting Ambassador Amoedo before making a final decision.]

The embassy reports that Frondizi is again arguing that he and President Kennedy were in complete accord and that his OAS stand was completely understood by the US Government; he also reportedly stated that Argentina was responsible for Uruguay's vote with the US. Former Provisional President Aramburu, who has just returned from Punta del Este, has issued a strong statement condemning Argentina's stand. This has strengthened the military's resolve, probably because of General Aramburu's role as an arbiter between Frondizi and the armed forces in past military crises. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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DAILY BRIEF

ii


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[Redacted]

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[redacted] Cuba: "There are indications that the mass rally to be held in Havana on 4 February may feature a demand for US withdrawal from the naval base at Guantanamo Bay. Preparations for the rally are reaching a peak of intensity as propaganda media engage in a concerted campaign to stimulate popular fervor and the network of Communist-controlled "mass organizations" mobilize their members. Preliminary demonstrations on 1 February featured slogans of "Down with Caimanera"-- the Cuban name for the base--and demands for US withdrawal. No military attacks on the base are considered likely. [redacted]

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
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DAILY BRIEF

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

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Italy: Premier Fanfani's resignation on 2 February is the first formal step toward the formation of a center-left coalition government depending on external parliamentary support by the Nenni Socialists. Despite the strong support for such a move expressed by the party's national congress in late January, the Christian Democratic party's right wing will seek to block it by making proposals of programs which would be unacceptable to the Socialists. Although the Socialists will probably agree not to vote against the government on foreign policy questions, they will make substantial demands for domestic reforms and will probably expect to have a vote in the allocation of portfolios in any cabinet they would support. The Nenni Socialist minority left wing can be expected to try to impose for Socialist support a program which would not be acceptable to the Christian Democrats.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Cuba May Demand US Withdrawal From Naval Base
At Guantanamo Bay

The "General Assembly of the Cuban People," a Castro euphemism for the mass rally scheduled for 4 February, is to "vote by unanimous acclamation" on the Second Declaration of Havana--Cuba's "answer" to the meeting of American foreign ministers in Punta del Este. In the First Declaration of Havana, in September 1960, Castro responded to an OAS warning against accepting support from the Sino-Soviet bloc by defiantly announcing Cuba's decision to initiate diplomatic relations with Communist China and the intention to continue relying on bloc military aid. In his speech on that occasion, Castro warned that if "aggression" against Cuba continued, a new "peoples' assembly" would be convened to demand US withdrawal from the base.

Castro and other high Cuban officials have always maintained that Cuba will not employ military force against the base, but that "at the proper time" Cuba will present before unspecified "international bodies" a demand for US withdrawal. This line was most recently repeated by President Dorticos at Punta del Este. The UN General Assembly is scheduled to begin debate on 5 February on a Cuban complaint of US "aggressive intentions."

The 4 February rally in Havana may also be the occasion for Castro to announce the formal organization of the United Party of the Socialist Revolution--planned to become the sole political party in Cuba.

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