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19 December 1961 25X1

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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19 December 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN


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
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DAILY BRIEF

25X1	*Goa Situation: With the reported fall of the Goan capital of Panjim early this morning, the Indian army's thrust had cut Goa in two and broken the back of Portugal's outmanned and outgunned resistance. At 0300 EST, New Delhi began claiming total victory after 36 hours.	25X1 25X1
	The Council met in an urgent session late on the 18th, in response to a Portuguese appeal. Following the failure of a resolution submitted by Ceylon, Liberia, and the UAR calling upon Portugal to "cooperate with India in liquidation of the colonial position" in the subcontinent, the USSR vetoed a Western-sponsored resolution calling upon India to agree to a cease-fire and the withdrawal of its troops.	
25X1	Portugal's press and radio are reflecting the regime viewpoint that the reported loss of Goa is partly the responsibility of Lisbon's NATO partners, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, who failed to take a sufficiently vigorous position against Indian aggression. As a result, Lisbon appears to be reassessing its alliance system. A broadcast on the 18th, for example, included the statement that "we shall see how the Americans who used our bases in the Azores will excuse themselves." On	
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	that there would	n Minister Nogueira told Secr be a "possibility of a fundame ign policy" should Goa be los	ental change	25X1
· 25X1	fairly predictable the action while vical. Sukarno, wanalogous, has lead the Egyptians and	reaction to the Indian move e lines. The Communists have Western reaction has been un whose position regarding Western strong support to India's a detail the Afghans. A number of o	ve supported iformly crit- t Irian is action, as have other neutrals	
25X1		an enthusiastic about India's : time strongly critical of Po (Map)		25X1
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*Congo: Tshombé, who arrived in Northern Rhodesia on 18 December, is expected to reach Kitona base near Leopold-ville on 19 December for talks with Adoula. Prospects for an early accommodation, however, are poor. UN officials in Leopoldville regard Adoula's initial terms—which include a demand for Tshombé's resignation as provincial premier—as "stiffer than expected." Tshombé, on his part, continues to profess confidence concerning the fighting in Elisabethville, and may not meet with Adoula unless the UN carries out its commitment to permit a suspension of hostilities during the negotiations.

UN forces in Elisabethville, although in control of most 25X1 of the city, continue to meet with pockets of Katangan resistance. Tshombe's residence and the Union Miniere smelterboth on the western side of the city-reportedly are in Katangan hands. /Tshombe's forces appear disorganized, however, and probably number no more than 1,600 in the city proper. Ethiopian troops have engaged in thievery, wanton destruction, and at-25X1 tacks on civilians during the UN operation. Such depredations, together with instances of looting by anti-Tshombé Baluba tribesmen from the nearby refugee camp, appear to have heightened apprehension among Europeans still in Elisabethville. 25**X**1 Adoula is confronted with serious dissension from within his government, 25X1 and may face a cabinet crisis regardless of the outcome of his talks with Tshombé. Interior Minister Gbenye--who until recently served as a rallying point for leftist elements loyal to Adoula-appears to have broken with Adoula in a dis-25X1 pute over control of internal security. 25X1 19 Dec 61 DAILY BRIEF iii 25X1 25X1

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25X1				
25X1	bassador Galbrai Kashmir dispute ent cease-fire lin limited areas non settlement. Ambiterest in encoura now will be less tions. Such nego elections in Febr is using developm aganda against In	dia: President Ayub, on being to the that Nehru may be willing to by making minor adjustments he, replied that Pakistani control held by India could provide the assador Roundtree believes, in aging negotiations on Kashmir, inclined to press the dispute in the press that in Governments in Goa as an excuse to state in the Kashmir dispute, where to negotiate.	o settle the on the pres- rol over certain he basis for a liview of US in- that Pakistan he the United Na- after Indian hent, however, tep up its prop-	25X1
25X1	election on 17 De Democratic party	ne conservative victory in the line cember completes the Okinaway's (OLDP) control of the majoryu Islands and increases the line	t Liberal- r elective of-	
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using this new system, so that farmers would have to rely on their own crops whether harvests were successful or not. While reportedly pleased that the authorities were acknowledging the need for stronger incentives, the peasants were still apprehensive over the as yet undetermined level of taxes, which they feel could mean starvation rations if there were another poor crop.

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*Indonesia: Sukarno, in a speech before a mass rally in Jogjakarta on 19 December, issued a call to the Indonesian people to "be prepared for a general mobilization" for an assertion of Indonesia's sovereignty over West New Guinea. The speech, delivered in demagogic style, as expected sets no specific date for the "liberation" of West New Guinea but represents a significant further step in Sukarno's conditioning of the Indonesian public -- and a warning to the world at large--of his intent to achieve control of the Dutch territory by a military adventure if necessary. Sukarno's self-styled "people's command" also included instructions to "hoist the (Indonesian) flag" in the disputed territory and to "frustrate the organization of the Papua puppet state by the Dutch colonialists"--the latter a reference to recent Dutch efforts to provide the rudiments of self-rule for the indigenous peoples of West New Guinea.

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There is ample evidence of Indonesia's efforts to prepare for aggressive action in the event that its political efforts to gain control of West New Guinea--without which, it asserts, its independence is not complete--are unavailing. The latest indication is an announcement by the Indonesian Air Minister, apparently issued concurrently with Sukarno's speech, of a new Air Force command for the districts of the Molucca Islands and West Irian, and an order to close all airspace over this area in the shortest possible time. Despite protests of unpreparedness on the part of some of Indonesia's military chiefs, there is general agreement

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	against the territ	observers that if Sukarno or ory he would be obeyed So in effect an ultimatum: th	ukarno's latest	
	intends to take ag factory political s tary action agains	gressive action if it is not settlement by the Dutch. C st Portuguese possessions i	given a satis- urrent mili- in Indiaa	25X1
		dorsed by Indonesiawill p uragement to Sukarno for a		- `
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